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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis investigates the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry. This industry 
has experienced a sharp growth in the last decades supported by public policies and a 
protected and fast-growing public market. In addition, this development is apparently 
characterized by continuous processes of technology acquisition, rather than indigenous 
R&D, as the main source of its technological knowledge, and by other specificities in 
the vaccine context. 
 
The research draws on studies of the dynamics of technological capability building in 
catching-up industries of latecomer contexts, especially during the transition period 
when they are approaching the innovation frontier. It also draws on those studies 
focusing on new directions/paths as an alternative strategy adopted to overcome barriers 
and disadvantages to develop. It has been argued that the specificities of the Brazilian 
context and, of the vaccine sector, may be determining a particular pattern of 
technological accumulation to this industry, and that interpreting its pattern of 
development may be useful to understand how and if this industry has overcome its 
constraints to develop. A framework based on linear approaches of catching-up, and that 
integrates the innovation transition approach was built as a benchmark model for the 
search for similarities and differences in the pattern of development of this industry. 
 
The findings show similarities and new directions in the process of technological 
accumulation of the industry, suggesting that, more recently, it has actually developed 
through a distinct pattern. They also show the strong role of the government and its 
public market as one of the drivers of this new path. Distinct roles of the technology 
acquisition strategy and a high level of technological capabilities currently developed 
are also revealed. Finally, they show that the technology acquisition strategy has 
effectively contributed to the development of this industry and that the constraints to the 
completion of the transition phase is linked less to technical and scientific issues and 
more to managerial and policy ones. 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... IV 
SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... V 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... X 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... XI 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................... XII 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Motivations and Aims ............................................................................................ 1 
1.2 The Empirical Context ........................................................................................... 3 
1.3 The Theoretical Context ......................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Research Strategy, Design and Methods ................................................................ 9 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis ..................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 2 – INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY, CAPABILITIES AND INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT – LITERATURE AND LINKS ....................................................... 11 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 Innovation and Development ............................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Antecedents – an overview ............................................................................ 12 
2.2.2 Key Features of Innovation ........................................................................... 13 
2.2.3 National Systems of Innovation ..................................................................... 16 
2.2.4 Measuring and Assessing Innovation............................................................ 18 
2.3 Linking Innovation and Development of Technological Capabilities ................. 19 
2.3.1 Knowledge, Learning and Development of Technological Capabilities ...... 19 
2.3.2 Technological Capabilities – Basic Concepts, Definitions and Levels ........ 20 
2.3.3 Capabilities at Technological Frontier Level: the Strategic Management 
Literature ............................................................................................................... 21 
2.3.4 Building up Technological Capabilities in Latecomer Catching-up Firms: 
common approaches and key characteristics ........................................................ 24 
2.3.5 Assessing Technological Capabilities ........................................................... 36 
2.4 Older Concepts, New Applications – Gerschenkron and the Backwardness 
Approach .................................................................................................................... 38 
2.5 Summary .............................................................................................................. 41 
vii 
CHAPTER 3 – MOTIVATIONS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, PROPOSITIONS AND 
FRAMEWORKS ........................................................................................................... 44 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 44 
3.2 Introductory Notes on the Rationale of Building the Frameworks ...................... 44 
3.3 Research Problem and Research Questions ......................................................... 46 
3.3.1 Motivations, Research Problem, Arguments and Objectives ........................ 46 
3.3.2 Research Questions and Propositions .......................................................... 49 
3.4 The Conceptual Framework ................................................................................. 50 
3.4.1 Building a Conceptual Framework as a Benchmark Model ......................... 50 
3.4.2 Pattern of Technological Capabilities Development in Catching-up 
Industries ................................................................................................................ 54 
3.4.3 Transition within Innovative Capabilities Development............................... 58 
3.4.4 New Directions/Paths ................................................................................... 64 
3.5 The Analytical Framework and the Elements of the Model ................................ 64 
3.5.1 The Analytical Framework ............................................................................ 64 
3.5.2 The Specific Aspects of the Elements of the Model ....................................... 66 
3.6 Summary .............................................................................................................. 75 
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 77 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 77 
4.2 Research Strategy and Design and the Boundaries of the Research .................... 77 
4.2.1 Research Strategy and Design ...................................................................... 77 
4.2.2 The Boundaries of the Study ......................................................................... 80 
4.3 Operationalizing Data and Data Collection ......................................................... 82 
4.3.1 Operationalizing Data .................................................................................. 82 
4.3.2 Operationalizing Data Collection ................................................................. 85 
4.4 Analyzing and Interpreting Data .......................................................................... 88 
4.5 Summary .............................................................................................................. 90 
CHAPTER 5 – VACCINE AND INNOVATION ON VACCINE ................................ 91 
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 91 
5.2 Facts and History.................................................................................................. 91 
5.2.1 Vaccine – Key Facts and Paradoxes ............................................................. 91 
5.2.2 History at a Glance ....................................................................................... 96 
5.2.3 Vaccines and Vaccination in Brazil – the beginning of the history .............. 98 
5.3 Innovation on Vaccines ...................................................................................... 100 
viii 
5.3.1 Cycles and Breakthroughs .......................................................................... 100 
5.3.2 The Actors ................................................................................................... 107 
5.3.3 Developing Vaccines – Complexities, Steps and Capabilities .................... 109 
5.4 Manufacturing Vaccines .................................................................................... 115 
5.5 The Future of Innovation on Vaccines ............................................................... 118 
5.6 Summary ............................................................................................................ 119 
CHAPTER 6 – VACCINE INDUSTRY, MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
BRAZIL AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT........................................... 121 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 121 
6.2 The Vaccine Industry ......................................................................................... 121 
6.2.1 The “Big Pharma” ...................................................................................... 121 
6.2.2 The Biotechs ................................................................................................ 125 
6.2.3 Local Manufacturers: private, public and emerging .................................. 129 
6.2.4 The Brazilian Vaccine Industry (BVI) ......................................................... 135 
6.3 Markets and Economics of Vaccine ................................................................... 144 
6.4 The Role of Government and Institutions .......................................................... 151 
6.4.1 – Government, Policies and Institutions – the international context .......... 152 
6.4.2 – Government, Policies and Institutions – the Brazilian context ................ 156 
6.5 Summary ............................................................................................................ 161 
CHAPTER 7 – TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN THE BRAZILIAN 
VACCINE INDUSTRY ............................................................................................... 163 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 163 
7.2 Technology Acquisition ..................................................................................... 164 
7.2.1 Determinants, Dynamics and Extent of the Processes of Technology 
Acquisition ........................................................................................................... 164 
7.2.2 The Characteristics of the Process of Technology Acquisition in BVI ....... 167 
7.2.3 Trends to the Technology Acquisition Strategy .......................................... 172 
7.3 Development of Innovative Capabilities ............................................................ 173 
7.3.1 Internal Innovative Capabilities: Own R&D, Clinical Trials, Design and 
Engineering .......................................................................................................... 174 
7.3.2 Other Sources of Knowledge – Internal and External Linkages ................. 184 
7.3.3 Other Sources of Knowledge – Learning by Training ................................ 186 
7.4 Organizational Capabilities ................................................................................ 189 
7.5 Technological Capabilities and the Unfinished Transition in the BVI .............. 192 
ix 
7.5.1 The Boundaries of the Transition Phase ..................................................... 193 
7.5.2 The Characteristics of the Transition Phase – Unfinished Transition? ..... 195 
7.5.3 The Constraints to the Completion of the Transition Phase in the BVI ...... 198 
7.6 Assessing the Technological Capabilities – a Survey ........................................ 201 
7.7 Summary ............................................................................................................ 206 
CHAPTER 8 – ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ....................................................... 208 
8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 208 
8.2 Literature and Development of Technological Capabilities in the BVI ............ 209 
8.2.1 The Pattern of Technological Capabilities Development in the BVI – 
Differences and Similarities ................................................................................. 209 
8.2.2 Technology Acquisition, Local Capabilities and the Gap to the Technological 
Frontier ................................................................................................................ 214 
8.2.3 Overall Findings of Research Question 1 ................................................... 219 
8.3 Development of Innovative Capabilities within the Transition Phase ............... 221 
8.3.1 Technological Capabilities in Transition ................................................... 222 
8.3.2 The Hindrances of the Unfinished Transition ............................................. 225 
8.3.3 Unfinished Transition and Foreign Technology Acquisition Strategy ....... 228 
8.3.4 Overall Findings of Research Question 2 ................................................... 229 
CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .......................................... 232 
9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 232 
9.2 Main Findings .................................................................................................... 233 
9.2.1 Technological Accumulation in the BVI – Similarities, Differences, New 
Directions and Specificities of the Context .......................................................... 233 
9.2.2 The Roles of Foreign Technology Acquisition ............................................ 236 
9.2.3 The Unfinished Technological Transition – Key Issues .............................. 239 
9.3 Implications ........................................................................................................ 242 
9.4 Contributions and Limitations ............................................................................ 244 
9.5 Further Research ................................................................................................ 245 
9.6 Final Remarks .................................................................................................... 245 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 246 
ANNEX A .................................................................................................................... 265 
ANNEX B ..................................................................................................................... 267 
 
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Key Characteristics: the elements for the analysis of Technological 
Accumulation ................................................................................................................. 57 
Table 3.2: Technological Capabilities Levels – different terminologies adopted and 
transition boundaries ...................................................................................................... 60 
Table 3.3: Firms in Technological Capabilities Transition Process – Boundaries, 
Characteristics and Constraints ...................................................................................... 62 
Table 4.1: Topics and Types of Data about Sources of Knowledge .............................. 83 
Table 4.2: Topics and Types of Data about Other Influencing Elements ...................... 84 
Table 4.3: The Nine Dimensions for Assessing Technological Capabilities ................. 85 
Table 4.4: Number of Interviews by Subject ................................................................. 87 
Table 5.1: Non-exhaustive list of human infectious diseases preventable by vaccine .. 93 
Table 5.2: Some estimations of the cost-effectiveness of vaccination........................... 94 
Table 5.3: History of vaccine and vaccination in Brazil – key facts 1808 – 1969......... 99 
Table 5.4: Main Technological Strategies for Developing Vaccines and Vaccines 
Developed Over Time .................................................................................................. 104 
Table 5.5: Models of Vaccine Development – Actors and Vaccines .......................... 108 
Table 5.6: Vaccine R&D Projects – Status and Market Entrance Probabilities .......... 110 
Table 5.7: Amount of QC Tests Performed During MMR Vaccine Manufacturing ... 118 
Table 6.1: Illustrative Facts and Figures of the “Big Pharma” .................................... 125 
Table 6.2: Selected Biotech Firms in the Vaccine Business ........................................ 128 
Table 6.3: LA Vaccine Manufacturers in the early 1990s and in 2000s ...................... 130 
Table 6.4: Common Characteristics of Viable, Potentially Viable and Low Viability 
Vaccine Manufacturers ................................................................................................ 132 
Table 6.5: Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network – DCVMN ......... 135 
Table 6.6: The Brazilian Vaccine Manufacturers ........................................................ 143 
Table 6.7: Vaccines by Product Segment .................................................................... 145 
Table 6.8: Advanced Vaccines Acquired by PNI / Supplied by BVI – starting dates . 148 
Table 6.9: Participation of Emerging Manufacturers in UN Vaccine Purchases ......... 154 
Table 6.10: PASNI – Investments in the Public Manufacturers 1985-1998 ................ 159 
Table 7.1: Vaccines Introduced by the BVI post-PNI and Sources of Knowledge ..... 165 
Table 7.2: R&D Personnel x Employee Total in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz ................ 180 
Table 7.3: R&D Intensity and Investment Growth in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz......... 182 
xi 
Table 7.4: Training Investment in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz ...................................... 188 
Table 7.5: Technological Capabilities Transition in the Brazilian Vaccine Industry – 
Boundaries, Characteristics and Constraints ................................................................ 200 
Table 7.6: Survey on Technological Capabilities Level – the Detailed Results .......... 203 
Table 9.1: Context of Development of the BVI: Dimensions, Determinants and 
Specificities .................................................................................................................. 235 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1: Logical Sequence and Feedbacks of the Research Construction ................ 45 
Figure 3.2: The Simple Framework ............................................................................... 53 
Figure 3.3: The Analytical Framework .......................................................................... 66 
Figure 5.1: Developing a Vaccine: Key Steps and Aspects ......................................... 114 
Figure 5.2: Main Production Steps of the Triple Viral Vaccine – MMR .................... 117 
Figure 6.1: Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances in the Vaccine Industry .................. 123 
Figure 6.2: Global Vaccine Market – Figures and Growth .......................................... 144 
Figure 6.3: Manufacturer’s Market Share .................................................................... 145 
Figure 6.4: International Market Segmentation ........................................................... 145 
Figure 6.5: Typical Vaccine Life Cycle ....................................................................... 146 
Figure 6.6: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – National x Imported purchases 
(US$ million) ............................................................................................................... 149 
Figure 6.7: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – National x Imported purchases (%) .. 150 
Figure 6.8: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – Doses Purchased ............................... 151 
Figure 7.1: Technology Acquisition Processes X Products Introduced ....................... 166 
Figure 7.2: Technology Acquisition Processes as % of Products Introduced ............. 167 
Figure 7.3: Selected Projects of the R&D Pipeline of the BVI Firms ......................... 179 
Figure 7.4: Capability Level in the BVI – the Overall Results .................................... 201 
Figure 7.5: Profile of the Technological Capability of the BVI .................................. 202 
Figure 9.1: Characteristics of Technological Accumulation in the BVI ...................... 242 
 
 
xii 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abifina Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Química Fina (Brazilian 
Association of the Fine Chemicals Industries) 
ANVISA Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (National Health 
Surveillance Agency) 
BCG Bacille Calmette-Guérin (Tuberculosis vaccine’s strain) 
BCG Boston Consulting Group 
Bio-Manguinhos Instituto de Tecnologia em Imunobiológicos (Institute of 
Technology on Immunobiologicals) 
BVI Brazilian Vaccine Industry 
CDTS Centro de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico em Saúde (Centre of 
Technological Development in Health) 
CGIES/CGPNI Coordenação Geral de Insumos Estratégicos em Saúde/ 
Coordenação Geral do Programa Nacional de Imunizações 
CMO Contract Manufacturing Organization 
COPPE/UFRJ Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa de 
Engenharia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 
CRO Contract Research Organization 
CVI Children’s Vaccine Initiative 
DCL Developing Countries Literature 
DCVMN Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network 
Dt Adult Double (Diphtheria and Tetanus) vaccine 
DT Infant Double (Diphtheria and Tetanus) vaccine 
DTPa Diphtheria, Tetanus and acellular Pertussis (whooping cough) 
DTPw Diphtheria, Tetanus and whole cell Pertussis (also DTP) 
DTPw+Hib Tetravalent vaccine (Diphtheria, Tetanus and whole cell Pertussis 
+ Haemophilus influenzae type b) 
EPI Expanded Programme on Immunization (of WHO) 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
FIOCRUZ Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation) 
FUNED Fundação Ezequiel Dias 
GAVI GAVI Alliance  
GLP Good Laboratory Practices 
GMP Good Manufacturing Practices 
GSK GlaxoSmithKline 
HAV Hepatitis A Vaccine 
HBV Hepatitis B vaccine (also HB) 
Hib Haemophilus influenzae type b 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IAVI International AIDS Vaccine Initiative 
IBMP Instituto de Biologia Molecular do Paraná 
IH In-house 
INCQS/Fiocruz Instituto Nacional de Controle de Qualidade em Saúde (National 
Institute of Quality Control in Health) 
INOVACINA Programa Nacional de Competitividade em Vacinas (National 
Programme of Competitiveness in Vaccines) 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
xiii 
IPV Inactivated Polio Vaccine 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
LA Latin America 
MCCV Meningococcus C Conjugate Vaccine 
MMR Measles, Mumps and Rubella 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MOH Ministry of Health 
MVI Malaria Vaccine Initiative 
N/A Not available 
NIAID National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (of NIH) 
NIC Newly Industrializing Countries 
NIH National Institutes of Health (USA) 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
OPV Oral polio vaccine 
PAHO Pan American Health Organization 
PASNI Programa de Auto-suficiência Nacional em Imunobiológicos 
(Programme of National Self-sufficiency on Immunobiologicals) 
PATH Program for Appropriate Technology in Health 
PCV Pneumococcus Conjugate Vaccine 
PMT Proteína Monomérica Tetânica (Tetanus Monomeric Protein) 
PNI Programa Nacional de Imunizações (National Immunization 
Programme) 
R&D Research and Development 
ST&I Science, Technology and Innovation 
SAGE Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (of WHO) 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
SML Strategic Management Literature 
TA Technological Accumulation 
TECPAR Instituto de Tecnologia do Paraná (Institute of Technology of 
Paraná) 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
TT Technology Transfer 
UN United Nations 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
WHO World Health Organization 
WRAIR Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
WTO World Trade Organization 
WWII World War II 
 
1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
Development is all about overcoming barriers to catch-up: at the level of the 
nation, the firm and individuals. Industrial development is at the heart of any 
national catch-up process, and firms are at the heart of industrial development 
(Forbes and Wield, 2002:xiii). 
 
1.1 Motivations and Aims 
This thesis analyzes the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI), an 
industry that has experienced a sharp growth in the last decades. Preliminary data 
identified some circumstances in both the Brazilian vaccine context and the world 
vaccine sector that seem to have strongly influenced this development.  
 
On the former, attention is drawn at the national level to a successful immunization 
programme that coordinates a large and increasing public market, a government policy 
created to achieve national self-sufficiency on immunobiologicals, and strong 
government protection for local manufacturers, that has remained steady across the 
discontinuous industrial policy regimes that have marked the country in the last three 
decades. At the industry/firm level the two most noticeable issues are the continuous 
processes of technology acquisition as the main strategy to develop capabilities rapidly 
and fulfil the public market needs, and public firms dealing with advanced technologies 
but a level of innovative capabilities developed to date that is not clearly visible.  
 
On the latter, among the most evident factors are the highly specific, sometimes unique, 
characteristics of the vaccine sector, such as the social impact of and pressures on 
immunization, strong government regulation, the high technological complexity and 
costs of the processes of manufacturing and developing vaccines and, in particular, the 
quick and significant advances in the knowledge frontier, well protected by intellectual 
property rights (IPR). The vaccine sector has been, indeed, an international business 
dominated by few oligopolistic firms in the last decades. 
 
The literature on innovation and technological accumulation has inspired this research. 
More specifically, it draws on studies focusing on the dynamics and diversity of 
technological capabilities building in catching-up industries/firms of latecomer contexts, 
2 
on the characteristics and constraints faced by firms during the innovation transition 
stage, and on new directions/paths as the strategy to develop. Drawing on them this 
thesis assumes that a common/linear pattern of development of catching-up 
firms/industries in latecomer contexts may be represented by the level of importance of 
two complimentary sources of knowledge – acquisition of foreign technology and local 
innovative capabilities – along their technological accumulation path, and that this 
pattern may be influenced by internal and external elements of the context of these 
firms/industries. It is then being argued that the specificities of the Brazilian context and 
of the vaccine sector may be determining a particular pattern of technological 
accumulation within the BVI, and that interpreting its pattern of development may be 
useful in understanding how and if this industry has overcome its disadvantages to 
develop. 
 
A scarcity of studies about the vaccine industry, especially in latecomer contexts, and 
the specific conditions of the context of the BVI seem, together, to constitute an 
opportunity to extend knowledge about the process of technological accumulation in 
catching-up firms/industries, particularly during the phase when the firms are 
approaching the innovation frontier. This thesis seeks to understand, in a broad sense, 
two main issues on this subject:  
 
1) how have technological capabilities evolved over time within this industry; and  
2) how far has the BVI gone to date in the transition phase, how and why.  
 
In a more specific sense, it investigates:  
a) whether or not the BVI has developed through a particular pattern of 
technological accumulation; the characteristics of the process and 
importance of the specific circumstances of its context;  
b) the extent to which the strategy of technology acquisition has been 
effective as a source of technological knowledge to the development of 
local capabilities;  
c) the current level of innovative capabilities developed and the main 
characteristics of the process during the transition phase;  
d) possible factors constraining the catch-up process; and,  
3 
e) the existence of relationships between the pattern of development and the 
unfinished technological transition. 
 
In addition to the motivations, aims and objectives described above, this chapter is 
organized in order to provide an overview of the specificities of the vaccine sector and 
of the Brazilian vaccine industry, as raised by the preliminary data (Section 1.2), and of 
the main bodies of knowledge underpinning the conceptual issues of the thesis (Section 
1.3). Section 1.4 briefly describes the methodology employed in order that the 
objectives proposed are achieved, while Section 1.5 describes how the thesis is 
organized. 
 
1.2 The Empirical Context 
Vaccines long have been acknowledged as one of the public health interventions – 
together with clean water – that has achieved the greatest impact on the improvement in 
global health (WHO, 2002a; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). In addition, immunization is 
one of the most cost-effective public health interventions (WHO, 2002a; Plotkin and 
Plotkin, 2004; Blume, 2005; Orenstein et al., 2007).
1
 These two remarks highlight the 
social, political and economic importance of vaccines. However, existing vaccines are 
still out of reach of most people in poorer countries, and even in poorer regions of 
wealthier nations, with millions of children dying every year from infectious diseases 
preventable by vaccines (WHO, 2002b). Moreover, although vaccines for neglected 
diseases of developing and poorer countries are critically needed, they have not been 
developed due to economic reasons. 
 
The industry providing vaccines to the world market is full of specificities. It is 
dominated by only a few oligopolistic firms belonging to some of the largest 
pharmaceutical companies. These companies own the organizational capabilities and 
can afford the high investments required to deal with this dynamic business, and with 
the long and complex process of developing vaccines.
2,3
 Altogether the five leading 
                                                 
1
 In this research the terms immunization and vaccination are used interchangeably and with similar 
meaning, even though some authors argue that the former is more inclusive because it results in the 
development of adequate immunity (see Stern and Markel, 2005). 
2
 Innovation on vaccines and the complex aspects involved in the processes of developing and 
manufacturing vaccines are stressed throughout Chapter 5. 
3
 The terms “organizational capabilities” and “managerial capabilities” are used interchangeably and with 
similar meaning in this research. 
4 
vaccine manufacturers supply around 85% of the global market (Gréco, 2002). The 
main markets in terms of value are located in developed countries – USA, Canada, 
Western Europe and Japan – but the biggest demand in terms of volume is located in the 
rest of world (Boston Consulting Group, 2005).  
 
Although being only a fraction of the pharma market, the global vaccine market has 
presented an impressive growth in the last two decades, with an average growth of 10% 
in the 1990s (Mercer Management Consulting, 2002), and an estimated average growth 
of 14% in the 2000s, the latter based on WHO projections (2009a). This makes this 
market one of the fastest growing sectors of the industry (Asian Development Bank, 
2001). In terms of volume, however, the average growth was only 1% in the 1990s.
4
 
This contrast is explained by the introduction of new enhanced paediatric vaccines and 
proprietary products in the market by the “Big Pharma” (Mercer Management 
Consulting, 2002), and is suggestive of the importance of new-to-the-world product 
innovation as well as of the technological dimension to this industry.  
 
However, biotech firms and local manufacturers have also been important actors in this 
industry.
5
 The former are mainly located in developed countries and have been 
characterized by their highly skilled people, high investments in R&D and strong 
capabilities to perform the first stages of the process of vaccine development. The most 
successful biotech firms have then been acquired by, or formed alliances with, the “Big 
Pharma”. Local manufacturers have recently been re-emerging in the vaccine industry 
and have performed an important role in developing countries’ markets by providing the 
low cost/margin old technologies usually required by their public programmes that are 
no longer produced by “Big Pharma” firms.6 However, they have struggled to acquire 
the capabilities needed to govern the process of technical change and develop the 
vaccines for the neglected diseases of developing and poorer countries. These are not of 
interest to the “Big Pharma” firms due to the high investment needed and their lower 
economic returns. 
 
                                                 
4
 Further details of the global and Brazilian vaccine markets are stressed in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 (pg. 
144-151). 
5
 The term “local manufacturers” is frequently employed in the literature on vaccines, and encompasses 
the smaller manufacturers, which mainly address their country’s public and/or private markets.   
6
 Local manufacturers have also been important in some developed countries in providing the low 
cost/margin vaccines. 
5 
The focus of this study is the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI), an 
industry currently constituted of four old public manufacturers who have addressed the 
Brazilian public market almost exclusively.
7,8
 The two main firms of this industry have 
re-emerged in the last three decades after a national crisis in the supply of 
immunobiologicals. This crisis, generated by the tighter quality requirements imposed 
by the Brazilian regulatory authority in the early 1980s and the high investments needed 
to comply with these new requirements, culminated in the withdrawal of the then 
biggest Brazilian vaccine manufacturer, a private company receiving foreign capital. 
The situation left the then recently created National Immunization Programme (PNI) 
faced with an insufficient local vaccine supply from the existing smaller public 
producers, who also ran their production under precarious conditions at that time 
(Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003; Ponte, 2007).  
 
To tackle the problem the Brazilian government set the vaccine sector as an issue of 
“national security” (Benchimol, 2001:359) and put forward a new and ambitious 
programme of national self-sufficiency in immunobiologicals (PASNI), in order to end 
the high dependence on external products. As a consequence, around US$158 million 
were invested in the modernization of the public manufacturers’ facilities between 1985 
and 1998. In addition, the development of the main firms of the BVI has benefited from 
a huge, protected and fast-growing public market coordinated by the PNI, who has 
successively introduced new technological products in the immunization routine of the 
country, especially in the last decade. To serve this public market these local firms do 
not compete with each other. 
 
However, the needs involved in the technological dimension of this industry go far 
beyond the simple building of production capacity. As a result of the unidirectional 
policy of the government to this sector, innovation in the technological frontier has 
posed huge challenges for the firms of the BVI. Consequently, the acquisition of foreign 
technology has apparently been an increasingly important source of knowledge and a 
strategy to develop local capabilities, in order to supply the growing needs of the PNI 
                                                 
7
 This research approaches the business of human vaccines only. Therefore, other segments explored by 
the main firms of the BVI (e.g. serum, diagnostic reagents, biopharmaceuticals and blood products) are 
not approached here. 
8
 The smallest of the manufacturers is not public but a non-profit private organization. However it has 
benefited from the same incentives provided by the government. 
6 
for more advanced vaccines in good time, as well as to keep the benefit of market 
protection provided by the government. 
 
Within the Brazilian context, therefore, it is noticeable that the main firms of the BVI 
have developed important capabilities and, under very specific circumstances, have 
grown rapidly in the last decades. They have reversed the government’s high 
dependence on imported vaccines, and, although they have been unable to finish the 
technological transition to date, have been able to imitate and improve some existing 
non-patented technologies. Although being a fast-follower may appear a natural 
alternative strategy in a business dominated by few oligopolistic firms, reaching the 
technological frontier seems to be the main aim of the firms in a country that seeks self-
sufficiency in a sector where the new technologies continuously required by the 
National Immunization Programme are well protected by IPR, and innovation seems to 
be a result of high investments in R&D. 
 
1.3 The Theoretical Context 
Innovation has long been recognized as a central phenomenon to the development of 
firms, industries and nations. Understanding some key concepts such as uncertainty, 
diversity and interactivity and networking, as stressed in Sub-section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 
(pg. 13-16), is critical to interpreting the process of innovation. However, rather than 
innovation itself, what really matters for the development of firms and industries in the 
long run are the capabilities needed to generate innovation (Dahlman et al., 1987; Rush 
et al., 2007). To understand how innovation has been generated, therefore, an increasing 
number of scholars have used the technological capability framework in the last 30 
years or so, not only in latecomer contexts, where technological accumulation is more 
easily observable in its basic forms, but also in advanced contexts, where more 
distinctive capabilities are more commonly found.
9
 
 
If one considers the level of importance of two sources of knowledge (the acquisition of 
foreign technologies and the development of local innovative capabilities) literature on 
technological accumulation in latecomer contexts shows that the catching-up process of 
firms and industries develops through a common/linear pattern. It starts from a high 
                                                 
9
 This research uses the terms technological accumulation, technological capabilities building and 
technological capabilities development interchangeably. 
7 
dependence on the acquisition of foreign mature technologies due to the lack of 
significant local innovative capabilities and technological infrastructure (e.g. Dahlman 
and Fonseca, 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997).  
 
During this phase minimal local innovative capabilities are normally required to absorb 
and adapt the acquired technologies (Freeman and Soete, 1997). As firms need to 
innovate to be successful, over time they gradually develop more advanced innovative 
capabilities to adapt and improve existing technologies and, eventually, to generate new 
technologies (Mytelka, 1978). In doing so they become less dependent on knowledge 
from technologies imported from developed countries. As shown by Hobday (1994, 
1995) the whole process is long and painstaking. In addition, this body of literature 
stresses that internal and external factors, such as markets, government and institutions, 
culture, prior experience, national capabilities among others, heavily influence the 
development of technological capabilities inside firms. 
 
Although the broad view provided by the catching-up approach is useful in generating 
understanding of the importance and directions of these two sources of knowledge for 
technological accumulation in latecomer countries, it does not provide all the elements 
needed to interpret the relationships between them and how the process unfolds over 
time, especially in specific contexts and stages. Other elements found in more in-depth 
studies within the same body of literature should then be integrated to this approach. 
 
In this regard, some studies have stressed the role of foreign technology acquisition in 
the development of technological capabilities in catching-up firms/industries in more 
detail (e.g. Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Hobday, 1995; Radosevic, 1999). In other 
studies the interrelationships between the acquisition of foreign technologies and the 
development of innovative capabilities have been approached and a variety of different 
results have emerged. Mytelka (1978), for instance, found a strong correlation between 
the licensing of imported technologies and low engagement in in-house R&D, 
especially in state-owned firms, when analysing 90 firms in three South-American 
countries. Kim (1997) found that a passive attitude toward the learning process in some 
Korean firms could be related to the acquisition of foreign technologies through 
licensing from single sources. However, Hobday et al. (2004) have shown that both 
strategies are adopted by firms approaching the innovation frontier in Korea. 
8 
The development of innovative capabilities has been the main focus of other studies and 
has been approached from different directions. Bell (2007), for example, emphasizes 
design and engineering as a type of important innovative capability for the industry and 
infrastructure sectors, but frequently neglected in the literature. The pioneering works of 
Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and Hobday et al. (2004) are concerned with the specific 
challenges faced by firms approaching the innovation frontier. The innovation transition 
approach, first employed by the former and further stressed by the latter authors, has 
revealed important aspects and characteristics of, as well as constraints to, the transition 
process of firms of Asia and Latin America trying to catch-up and reach the 
technological frontier. Although it is an important approach to interpret the specificities 
of technological accumulation in firms/industries that have already developed advanced 
technological capabilities, the authors argue that further research is still needed to 
strengthen the knowledge about this issue in other firms/industries and contexts. 
 
The process of innovative capability building has also been approached inspired by 
Gerschenkron’s ideas (1962), emphasizing new directions/paths as an alternative 
strategy of latecomers to get around their disadvantages and catch-up with the leaders. 
The works of Forbes and Wield (2002, 2008) focus on the processes of growing value-
added through manufacturing and innovative capabilities by follower firms in order to 
move from process to product innovation and then to proprietary process and product 
innovation. They use cases in East and South Asia, Africa and regions in Latin America 
to illustrate their arguments about new strategies to develop. Hobday (2003) shows that 
the development of the Asian newly industrializing economies has been characterized 
by significant deviations from experiences of earlier industrialization, and encompasses 
a mix of strategic innovation and careful imitation He suggests that catch-up is unlikely 
to happen from imitation alone. Figueiredo (2009) investigates the aspects of a specific 
pattern of innovative capability accumulation taken by firms involved in forestry, pulp 
and paper industries in Brazil that evolved in the technological catch-up process across 
distinct policy regimes, and macro-economic disruptions faced by that country. 
 
This research draws on these bodies of knowledge to build a broader and simple 
framework in order to interpret the specific characteristics of development of the BVI, 
hopefully applicable to a wider variety of latecomer contexts. 
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1.4 Research Strategy, Design and Methods 
To achieve the objectives proposed, this research integrates the catching-up and 
innovation transition approaches, to combine the broad perspective of the former with 
the deeper focus of the latter. It builds a simple framework based on linear approaches 
of catch-up to look for differences and similarities in the pattern of development of the 
BVI. This strategy constitutes an attempt to interpret the general characteristics of 
development of the Brazilian vaccine industry over a long period of time, while 
throwing light on the micro dynamics of the critical phases of development of 
innovative capabilities. 
 
The focus on contemporary events, and the “how” and “why” type of questions, set the 
stage for an explanatory case study (Yin, 2003). Although the study analyzes events 
happening inside the firms, the focus of the research and its results are intended to 
represent the industry as a whole, constituting what the same author calls a single and 
embedded-case study – a single case-study with multiple units of analysis. Moreover, as 
technological capabilities usually develop over long periods of time, the research takes a 
retrospective account and investigates the development of the BVI during the last four 
decades. 
 
On empirical grounds multiple forms of data collection were used. In this sense, the 
Brazilian context was covered by interviews with senior actors of the firms and with 
other senior actors linked to the industry and to the policy level. Secondary sources such 
as government publications, firms’ institutional folders, annual reports, specialized 
magazines and firms’ and other institutions’ web pages were also used. This research 
also benefited from some few informal conversations and from a survey carried out in 
the main firm of the BVI to assess levels of technological capability. The international 
context was mainly covered by publications, papers and institutional web pages. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is constituted of three main parts. The first part encompasses the theoretical 
issues and is formed by Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 stresses the bodies of knowledge 
about innovation and technological capabilities that underpin the conceptual constructs 
and the analysis carried out in this study. Chapter 3 describes the research problem, 
stresses the main arguments of the research, presents the research questions and 
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propositions, and explains the conceptual and analytical frameworks developed to link 
the theory to the phenomenon being investigated. Chapter 4 is about the research 
methodology: it details the research strategy and design, and explains how data was 
defined, collected, processed and analyzed within the research. 
 
The second part relates to the empirical issues of the thesis and encompasses Chapters 5, 
6 and 7. The first two chapters address both the Brazilian and international contexts, 
while Chapter 7 is entirely dedicated to the Brazilian vaccine industry. In Chapter 5 the 
specificities and main aspects about vaccine and innovation on vaccine are presented. It 
stresses the main facts, the history, some important technological breakthroughs, the 
actors and the complexities involved in the processes of developing and manufacturing 
vaccines. Chapter 6 is about the vaccine industry, markets and institutions in Brazil and 
in the world. It provides detailed aspects and data of the dynamics of the vaccine 
business of the “Big Pharma” firms, the biotech firms and the local manufacturers. It 
also presents introductory descriptions of the Brazilian vaccine firms. Data about the 
international and Brazilian vaccine markets, and the complex role of the institutions 
giving support to the vaccine industry in the international and Brazilian context, are also 
presented in this chapter. Chapter 7 stresses the development of technological 
capabilities inside the Brazilian vaccine industry during the last four decades, with 
emphasis on the two main firms of this industry and on the processes of technology 
acquisition and the development of innovative capabilities. The characteristics of 
development of technological capabilities during the transition phase are approached in 
this chapter. Finally, the chapter presents the results of the survey carried out in the 
main firm of the BVI to strengthen the analysis of the previous findings. 
 
The third part refers to the analysis and conclusions of the research. It is constituted by 
the last two chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 8 the findings are analyzed and discussed 
by addressing the research questions and propositions. Chapter 9 summarizes the main 
findings of the research and draws some implications for policy, management and for 
the future of this industry. In addition, it points out contributions and limitations of the 
study as well as issues and questions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 – Innovation, Technology, Capabilities and 
Industry Development – Literature and Links 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature on innovation has grown at a high rate in recent decades, and its size and 
diversity reflects the importance of innovation to social and economic development. As 
noted by Fagerberg (2005), it is not possible to have a comprehensive overview of the 
entire scholarly work on innovation without years of study. On the other hand it is 
difficult to resist the temptation of going beyond the boundaries of a research topic 
when analyzing the subject. For academic methodological reasons this paradox is put 
aside. This chapter introduces the bodies of knowledge – theoretical and empirical 
constructs on the subject of innovation and technological development – that underpin 
the building up of the conceptual approaches and the analysis of the arguments in this 
research. 
 
The Chapter is organized in four main parts. Section 2.2 presents a quick overview of 
the antecedents and features of innovation as an important phenomenon to economic 
and industrial development. Section 2.3 introduces the literature on the concept of 
technological capability as one of the most successful ways of analyzing and 
understanding how innovation has been generated inside industries and firms. Section 
2.4 attempts to present an alternative and/or complementary approach to interpret the 
development of latecomer industries. Section 2.5 summarizes the ideas approached in 
the previous sections. 
 
2.2 Innovation and Development 
Understanding the key concepts of innovation is an obligatory step for anyone exploring 
the field of industry development. Firstly, this section reviews in brief the precursory 
attempts to link innovation and economic development (Sub-section 2.2.1). The main 
features of the innovation process that became the core foundation for any subsequent 
study on this field are then outlined (Sub-section 2.2.2). The approach of National 
Systems of Innovation (Sub-section 2.2.3) and indicators for measuring innovation 
(Sub-section 2.2.4) end the literature review in this section. 
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2.2.1 Antecedents – an overview 
Innovation, as an important phenomenon to the development of firms, industries and 
nations, has been historically recognized, especially in the most general sense, since the 
times of Adams, Marx and List. Neo-Classical economists of the first half of 20
th 
century, however, were mainly interested in short term economic analysis, and tended to 
treat the innovative activities as exogenous variables (Freeman and Soete, 1997).  
 
In the first decades of the 20
th
 century, Schumpeter first stressed the importance of 
innovation as central to the dynamism of firms (Pavitt, 1990). Besides placing technical 
change at the heart of capitalism development, Schumpeter’s works also pioneered 
recognition of the vital importance and relationship of the organizational, social and 
technical dimensions involved in innovation (Freeman, 1988). The impact of his 
propositions to the neo-classical theory at this time was “devastating and radical”, in the 
words of Rosenberg (1994:47). His work, however, was essentially theoretical and not 
based on statistics. Furthermore, as indicated by Freeman (1988:6), the work of 
Schumpeter concentrated its analysis on the developed world and did not pay attention 
to international trade or international diffusion of technology. Therefore, it needed to be 
complemented. 
 
During the following decades, and within an evolutionary perspective later stressed by 
Nelson and Winter (1974, 1982), attention was directed to the attempts to understand 
the relationship between technical change and economic growth. This generated two 
linear and opposite theories – the “technology push” and “demand pull” mode of 
innovation. In the former, economic growth was seen as resulting from technology 
produced by continuous investments in science. The latter was based on the idea that 
technology was produced from market signals and changes in demand. From the 1970s 
onwards, the availability of new statistical data and empirical and theoretical studies 
have provided a deeper and more diverse understanding of the process of innovation 
inside organizations, and of the complexity and relationship of science, technology and 
economic development, putting an end to the idea of linearity in the innovation process 
(Martin and Nightingale, 2000). 
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2.2.2 Key Features of Innovation 
As noted by Freeman (1991), most research on innovation were simply “anecdotal and 
biographical” before the 1970s. Nelson and Winter (1977) criticized the presumptuous 
assumption that knowledge about innovation was already strong enough to provide 
guidance to policies toward innovation at that time. Extensive and detailed research on 
innovation since then started unveiling its mysteries, strengthening knowledge and 
bringing to light some key features that constituted the core foundations of the theory on 
innovation. These key features became the starting point for most of the subsequent 
empirical and theoretical studies on the subject, influencing a great range of scholars 
who looked for new explanations and theoretical knowledge for new policy and 
management directions. To date, they remain essential. The two most important features 
or characteristics – uncertainty and diversity – are summarized below: 
 
a) uncertainty – this key feature of the innovation process has been described as 
encompassing two intertwined dimensions. The first is inherent to the process of 
research and development inside organizations, and deals with the inability to foresee 
and plan the most efficient path and outcome of the search process (Rosenberg, 
1994:93).
10
 The second is related to the important implications to the institutional 
innovation strategies posed by the uncertainties present in the external environment 
(Nelson and Winter, 1977; Tidd et al., 2001). In some works both dimensions are 
approached (e.g. Dosi, 1988).  
 
The problem of uncertainty was also raised in some empirical studies. Pavitt (1990, 
1991) highlighted the fact that the high uncertainty of innovative activities among the 
key properties of large innovative firms had been identified in previous empirical 
studies. According to these studies a very low proportion of R&D projects – about 10% 
– become a commercial success, and about 50% of R&D industrial firms find no 
profitable application. In a more elaborated approach, Freeman and Soete (1997:243) 
attributed innovation failure to three types of uncertainty – technical, market and 
general political and economic. They also linked technical uncertainty to cost and risk, 
and differentiated the degree of uncertainty by a range of categories of innovation (ibid. 
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 Rosenberg also emphasizes that knowing the content of a patent is very useful in dealing with 
uncertainty in this sense. Even though patents do not disclose details to permit imitation, the simple fact 
of knowing that something is feasible can contribute in the reduction of uncertainty during the research 
process.  
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p.244). From empirical evidence they suggested that the degree of uncertainty drives 
decision on industrial R&D since less than 5% of all R&D expenditures in most OECD 
countries is concentrated in basic research, whilst the majority of these expenditures are 
concentrated in less uncertain categories of projects such as minor technical 
improvements and quicker payback projects (ibid. p.255). 
 
b) diversity – this feature of the innovation process has been explored in several 
different contexts within the literature.
11
 Central, however, is the idea that innovation 
processes vary in many different respects, and are dependent upon external and internal 
conditions such as economic sector, field of knowledge, type of innovation, size of the 
firm, corporate strategy, prior experience, and so on (Pavitt, 2005:87), with evident 
important implications for policy and management. One seminal work characterizing 
the diverse and contingent nature of the innovation process was carried out by Pavitt 
(1984).
12
 In this work economic sectors are classified in four categories according to 
their technological trajectories – “supplier dominated”, “production intensive” (this 
subdivided into “scale intensive” and “specialized suppliers”) and “science based” – and 
regular differences and similarities among the sectors are identified, characterizing what 
he called “sectoral patterns of technical change”.13 This work also confirmed that the 
knowledge applied in innovation is largely firm specific, which strengthens its 
cumulativeness property and the importance of the knowledge built up through 
experience – the tacit knowledge. 14  In another direction, diversity inside firms, 
emphasized in literature on strategic management, has been analyzed to the 
understanding of differences in competitiveness (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Nelson, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992).
15
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 Diversity is inherent to the complexity of the process of innovation. Therefore it has been analyzed 
from many different perspectives, be they economic, organizational, managerial, social or psychological 
(see Pavitt, 2005). 
12
 This empiric work was based on the analysis of data on about 2,000 significant British innovations 
since 1945 (Pavitt, 1984:15). 
13
 Later on a new technological trajectory was identified – “information intensive” – from the emergence 
of the field of information technology – IT (see Pavitt, 1990; Tidd et al., 2001).   
14
 Cumulativeness is also an important feature of the process of innovation. The central idea behind this 
concept lies in the notion that past experience strongly conditions what firms can expect to do in the 
future. This concept is further approached in other sections of this chapter. 
15
 These works deal with internal aspects of firms such as learning, capabilities and organizational 
characteristics. Some of them are discussed in more detail in Sub-section 2.3.3.   
15 
Later on a third very important characteristic emerged from the need of firms to deal 
with the growing complexity and shorter life-cycles of the technologies. The speed of 
development then became a crucial factor for the competitiveness of firms, as noted by 
Rothwell (1994). The interactions and search for external knowledge then became an 
increasing part of the strategies of firms. Some aspects of this feature of the innovation 
process are discussed below.  
  
c) interactivity and networking – There is a common belief in the more recent literature 
that innovation does not take place in isolation, but rather firms depend upon a large 
range of interactions and relationships with their environment to innovate (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Freeman, 1995; Fagerberg, 2005). Two features seem to underpin the 
importance of interactivity: 1) the increasingly specialized and interdisciplinary nature 
of the innovation process, as pointed out by Rosenberg (1994:148) and Pavitt (2005:88), 
especially in a sector such as pharmaceuticals; and,
16
 2) the learning as an interacting 
and central element for the innovation process, as described by Lundvall (1992a:1) and 
Johnson (1992:23). These features result in internal and external interactions and have 
been explored in several works. Pavitt (1991) stresses the sources of learning and its 
interactions inside large innovative firms. The partly tacit nature of knowledge and the 
collective nature of the learning activity require frequent personal interaction for 
effective learning, according to some of his findings. Also, strong linkages between 
R&D laboratories, and other technical functions, and the marketing function are of 
central importance in the dimensions of learning inside firms (ibid. p.47). Increasing 
external linkages such as acquisitions, alliances, licensing, for obtaining new 
technologies are one of the major features of contemporary business, according to 
Granstrand et al (1997:87). In the project SAPPHO, the existence or lack of external 
linkages and networks were emphasized among the most important characteristics of the 
success and failure of innovations.
17
 Two of these conclusions are quoted below. 
 
(1) User needs and networks. Successful innovators were characterised by 
determined attempts to develop an understanding of the special needs and 
circumstances of potential future users of the new process or product. Failures 
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 Rosenberg points out the remarkable advances in fields such as biochemistry, molecular and cell 
biology, immunology, etc, to emphasize a newly emerging pattern of innovation and recognize that 
success in pharmaceuticals requires close cooperation among a growing number of specialists. 
17
 Project SAPPHO analyzed several pairs of successful and unsuccessful innovations competing in the 
same markets to identify the differences between them (Rothwell et al., 1974). 
16 
were characterised by neglect or ignorance of these needs. … (3) Linkage with 
external sources of scientific and technical information and advice. Successful 
innovators, although typically having their own in-house R&D, also made 
considerable use of other sources of technology. Failures were characterised by 
the lack of communication with external technology networks, whether national 
or international (Freeman, 1991:500). 
 
Lundvall (1988) analyzes the interactions in the process of innovation from two 
dimensions. Within a microeconomics framework he approaches the specific aspects 
involved in the interactions between users and producers. In this work the focus of his 
analysis is on the process of learning since successful innovation must be based upon 
knowledge about the needs of potential users (ibid. p.350). In the second part of his 
paper Lundvall outlines some of the implications of his approach to the national and 
international contexts in an attempt to develop introductory ideas on a model of national 
systems of innovation. Interaction in this broader sense has been the object of intense 
attention by scholars, as well as, more recently, generating a vast range of concepts and 
frameworks. Given its repercussion the National Systems of Innovation framework is 
discussed in the next Sub-section. 
 
One very relevant empirical work on networks was written by Galambos and Sewell 
(1995). They describe in historical perspective the rich and diverse networks of 
innovation that contributed to the development of Merck Sharp & Dohme, one of the 
four current global leading vaccine firms. One of the most prominent merits of this 
work is revealing the special features of the networks in this sector.
18
  
 
2.2.3 National Systems of Innovation 
The first attempt to link the interactions among institutions within the borders of a 
nation and their influence on economic growth is attributed to List in 1841 (Lundvall, 
1992a; Freeman, 1995).
19
 It was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that this 
approach was first extensively used in order to investigate the relationship among 
national elements contributing to economic growth and innovative performance within 
the context of countries, and to stress similarities and differences across countries (e.g. 
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 One important finding highlighted by Galambos and Sewell was the tendency of long cycle networking 
originated by the specificities of the process of vaccine development. 
19
 The work of Freeman (1987) was the first to explicitly employ the concept of “National Systems of 
Innovation” (Lundvall, 1992a:16; Edquist, 2005:183). Freeman (1995:5), however, attributes to Lundvall 
the first use of this terminology. 
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Freeman, 1987; Dosi et al., 1988; Lundvall, 1992b; Nelson, 1993). Notwithstanding, the 
use of this terminology does not mean that the interactions that permeate the process of 
innovation are restricted to, or take place only in, a national dimension. There was 
already a common awareness in these works, that systems of innovation transcend 
national geographical borders or clusters into regions, sectors, industries or other 
economic and social spaces. However, this diversity was not explored in these works, 
except in Freeman (1987).
20
 Another common view and point of departure of these 
studies was related to the systemic nature of innovation – R&D as not only part of the 
innovation process but rather of a system where several elements interact and influence 
the process (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). On the other hand, these works adopted 
different perspectives and distinguished different elements or determinants that 
influence the innovation process, generating, therefore, different concepts and a lack of 
a generally accepted definition for this approach (Edquist, 2005:183).
21
  
 
Rapidly increasing bodies of research on this topic have attempted to conceptualize and 
understand in depth the characteristics of the systems of innovation since then. 
Nevertheless, it has not been a simple task. Edquist defines systems of innovation as all 
important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional and other factors that 
influence the development, diffusion and use of innovations (2005:182), and indicates a 
problem in his own definition: if there are some potential factors missing in this 
definition, because they are still not known, there is a danger of excluding what might 
prove to be an important determinant from the analysis (ibid. p.183). Hence the 
implications of applying a system perspective to the study of innovation, as Fagerberg 
(2005) observes.  
 
One common feature of systems is that their components have strong complementarities 
and the lack of one critical component may affect the entire system (ibid. p.13). 
Complementarity is also found across systems of different levels, e.g. continental, 
national or sub-national (Freeman, 2002), and the question to be asked will determine 
the most appropriate context to be focused, as noted by Edquist (2005). In fact, analysis 
of sub-systems has been proved quite useful, either because technologies differ across 
                                                 
20
 In this work Freeman analyzes the organization and interactions between sub-systems of innovation in 
Japan. 
21
 Fragmentation of empirical works on innovation preventing the building up of specific theoretical 
approaches had been previously noticed by Nelson and Winter (1977).  
18 
sectors (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005) or because innovation is a learning process and 
therefore tends to be highly influenced by local and specific contexts (Fagerberg, 
2005).
22,23
 One relevant example is the work of Albuquerque and Cassiolato (2000), 
which focuses on the specificities of the innovation system of the health sector in Brazil. 
Besides the interactions between the components of this highly specific system, they 
analyze interactions of the health sector system with other national systems. 
 
2.2.4 Measuring and Assessing Innovation 
Quantitative methods have also been extensively used as a foundation for the analysis of 
innovation, both in the national and industrial contexts. Initiatives of measuring 
scientific and technological activities were a result of the increasing interest in 
understanding the role of technological change in economic growth, and, some decades 
ago, this ability made economists increasingly more confident in dealing with 
technological issues in economics (Rosenberg, 1974). Despite eventual criticism on 
their limitations, quantitative techniques of measurement have been largely used to 
assess innovation since then.  
 
The most common indicators used in science, technology and innovation analysis are 
R&D data, patent data and bibliometric data (Smith, 2005), although they are 
complemented by several other families of statistics (OECD, 2005). However, R&D has 
been by far the most used indicator of innovative activities (Smith, 2005).
24
 The rapid 
and wide propagation of studies using measurement techniques in the assessment of 
innovation activities, led to the development of standards or guidelines as a reference 
for surveys attempting to examine the characteristics of the innovation process (e.g. 
Arundel et al., 1998; OECD, 2002, 2005).
25
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 Malerba (2005:386) argues that sectoral systems coexist in three different dimensions – local, national 
or global.  
23
 Arundel et al. (1998) point out that the specificities and complexity of some sectors make the 
boundaries of systems of innovation unclear and problematic to define. They show the example of the 
pharmaceutical sector: this sector is supposedly highly globalized, with firm strategies depending little on 
where they are located, at the same time they are closely tied to national infrastructure, such as regulatory 
systems and public research. 
24
 R&D intensity – the ratio of R&D expenditures to some measure of output – is the most used R&D 
indicator. Patents are considered more as an invention indicator whilst bibliometrics are considered more 
related to scientific activities (Smith, 2005). 
25
 The Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) was first edited in 1963. Now in its 6
th
 edition, it is a standard for 
R&D surveys; the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) is a general guideline for surveys in innovation. In its first 
edition in 1992 the focus was on technological innovation in manufacturing but it has been updated and 
expanded since then. Now, in its 3
rd
 edition, it encompasses service sectors as well as other types and 
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Innovation is very complex and, however sophisticated the indicators are, there are 
many innovative activities that are not directly measurable. Arundel et al. (1998:8) 
illustrate this assertion with two examples: the first is related to tacit knowledge and its 
relation to the ability to innovate; the second concerns why firms adopt particular 
strategies.
26
 The growing concern of the importance of knowledge and learning to the 
innovative process has generated a tradition since the early 1980s of assessing the 
process of building up technological capabilities inside firms, especially in developing 
countries, to strengthen the understanding about innovation. This is the object of the 
next section. 
 
2.3 Linking Innovation and Development of Technological Capabilities 
In this section the review of the literature seeks to present the concepts of technological 
capability accumulation as one of the most diffused frameworks to analyzing and 
understanding the process of innovation inside firms and industries (Sub-section 2.3.1). 
It presents the basic concepts (Sub-section 2.3.2) and some approaches of the strategic 
management literature (Sub-section 2.3.3). Emphasis is put on the approaches applied in 
the analysis of latecomer firms, and on the key characteristics of the process of building 
up technological capabilities (Sub-section 2.3.4). Some models for assessing 
technological capabilities are also discussed in this section (Sub-section 2.3.5). 
 
2.3.1 Knowledge, Learning and Development of Technological Capabilities 
As discussed in Sub-section 2.2.1, innovation has long been recognized as vital for the 
development of firms, industries and nations. In the last thirty years or so, an increasing 
number of scholars have studied the process of technological capability accumulation as 
a way of understanding how innovation has been generated (e.g. Bell et al., 1984; 
Fransman and King, 1984; Katz, 1987; Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1992, 1993, 1995; 
Hobday, 1995; Ernst et al., 1998a; Dutrénit, 2000, 2007; Figueiredo, 2001, amongst 
others). Rather than innovation itself, what matters for firms and industries in the long 
run is the capability to generate innovation (Dahlman et al., 1987; Rush et al., 2007), 
and the accumulation of the capabilities needed to generate continuous technical change 
                                                                                                                                               
areas of innovation such as organizational, marketing, incremental innovations and innovation linkages, 
so it accompanies the changing and newly understanding of the innovation process. The IDEA 3 report 
(Arundel et al., 1998) focuses on survey questions aiming to provide more suitable indicators to the 
innovative process. 
26
 According to the authors these types of limitation point out to the need of focused case studies and 
semi-structured interviews as complementary to innovation indicators. 
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is, therefore, essential for competitiveness (Bell and Pavitt, 1995). The complexity and 
nature of technology, however, as stressed by Pavitt (1987), means that the development 
of technological capabilities at the level of the firm is essentially based on learning 
processes. In general, although differences across industrial sectors should be 
considered, even for the borrowers of technology, the accumulation of technological 
capabilities is not always automatic but requires substantial and, quite frequently, 
explicit effort in undertaking different types of learning activities.
27
 In the sense 
employed by Bell (1984:188), learning refers to the “acquisition of increased 
technological capacity – e.g. technical skills and knowledge – by individuals and 
organizations”. Fransman (1984) points out the high specificity of the process of 
knowledge accumulation so that one cannot expect the same forms of knowledge to 
emerge from two identical industrial plants. Hence the emphasis on the learning 
mechanisms to understand how the process of technological accumulation takes place 
inside firms and thus generates innovation. The importance of learning at the 
management dimension to technological accumulation is barely approached in these two 
latter works. 
 
2.3.2 Technological Capabilities – Basic Concepts, Definitions and Levels 
Literature on technological capability is also broad and diverse and frequently 
disconnected. It is a difficult task to capture all the dimensions approached in the 
literature on technological capabilities in a single definition. Bell (2007) has identified 
two levels of technological capabilities analysis within the literature: the macro or 
country level, and the micro or enterprise level. More recently micro analysis has also 
addressed the capabilities interacting beyond the boundaries of the firms (ibid. p.98). 
Within the micro level some approaches suggest different elements or categories of 
technological capability – e.g. production, investment and innovation, as in Dahlman et 
al (1987) and Kim (1997), or production, investment, minor change, strategic marketing, 
linkage and major change, as in Ernst et al (1998b). Others distinguish the types of 
technological capability in a matrix that categorizes the capabilities by functions and 
degrees of complexity (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Figueiredo, 2001). The use of 
stages as a reference is also a common approach in the analysis of the sequences by 
                                                 
27
 The idea of explicit effort for learning is used here in the way stressed by Bell (1984) to refer to the 
other mechanisms not based on experience or “doing-based” learning. In this latter form technological 
capabilities are acquired as a by-product of the production activities. 
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which technological capabilities develop in latecomer firms, and this model has been 
represented by several different forms, as in Kim (1980, 1997), Dahlman and Fonseca 
(1987) and Hobday (1995), to cite only a few works. 
 
For the reasons above mentioned we can find several different definitions for the 
technological capabilities approach. In addition, in the literature the term capability is 
also interchanged with the terms mastery, competence and capacity. The broader and 
more common sense captured from most of these works is that capability means the 
ability to do things, and technological capability refers to the stock of different skills, 
knowledge and organizational resources that enables a firm or industry to absorb, adapt 
and generate new technologies as well as to change the technology it uses.
28,29
  
 
Technological accumulation can mean, therefore, the process of building up 
technological capabilities or, according to Bell and Pavitt (1993, 1995), the process of 
learning inside firms. The problem with this broader definition is that one should 
consider technological capabilities encompassing the different dimensions that involve 
the activities inside firms, be they operating, innovative or organizational. Hence the 
usual need to delimitate the scope of each work. The building up of technological 
capabilities in the micro or enterprise level will be addressed in more detail in Sub-
section 2.3.4 within the most recent perspective, that is, encompassing its interactions 
with the boundaries of the firm. 
 
2.3.3 Capabilities at Technological Frontier Level: the Strategic Management 
Literature 
Recent reviews of the literature on technological capability (e.g. Dutrénit, 2000, 2004; 
Figueiredo, 2001) have highlighted the two main streams that have characterized the 
studies on this subject in the last decades: the strategic management literature (SML), 
which draws attention to the existing capabilities of technological frontier companies, 
and the developing countries literature (DCL), which focuses on the processes of 
building-up technological capabilities in latecomer companies.
30
 Both bodies of 
                                                 
28
 The term absorb employed here includes the acquisition, assimilation and use of a given technology. 
29
 The definition was condensed from the micro or enterprise level of literature and it does not fit the 
macro or national level. 
30
 This distinction implies that firms in more technologically advanced countries have already developed 
the capabilities needed to innovate, whilst latecomer firms enter into a business acquiring technology 
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literature have, therefore, distinguishing objectives. Whilst the former is interested in 
the kinds of distinctive capabilities that have enabled technological frontier firms to deal 
successfully with the fast changing environment and achieve and/or sustain their 
technological competitive advantage, the latter focuses on the range of capabilities – 
frequently from the most basic ones – still being developed in latecomer firms that are 
normally struggling to become innovative and to catch-up. 
 
These distinctive capabilities have been stressed within the SML through several 
approaches. The “Core Competences” (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), the “Dynamic 
Capabilities” (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) and the “Core Capabilities” 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992) are among the most influential ones. However, as pointed out 
by Dodgson (1993) and Dutrénit (2000), these approaches share some similar ideas such 
as the uniqueness of the firm’s core competencies, due to the tacit characteristic of the 
learning process inside firms, as well as the importance of the organizational dimension 
along with the technological dimension in the building up of these competencies. 
 
Although sharing similar ideas, these works put emphasis on different aspects of the 
organizational dimension to describe the characteristics of these distinctive capabilities. 
For Prahalad and Hamel (1990) the need for developing core competencies is a 
management issue rather than a lack of technological capabilities.
31
 It is a collective 
learning and the harmonization of the diversity in production skills, of multiple streams 
of technology and of the understanding of key personnel about customer needs and 
technological possibilities.  
 
The approach developed by Leonard-Barton (1992) explores the paradox of dealing 
with core capabilities. On the one side core capabilities may enhance the development 
of new products and processes. On the other they may hamper these innovation 
processes – what she then denotes as core rigidities. Moreover, she describes four 
dimensions to the sets of knowledge that constitute the core capabilities, with emphasis 
on the fourth – values and norms – as frequently neglected by managerial literature but 
                                                                                                                                               
from other firms in developed countries and need to develop their capabilities from basic stages 
(Figueiredo, 2001). 
31
 The authors’ argument is based on comparisons between some Japanese corporations and their 
American and European market competitors that were outperformed by the former.  
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crucial to managing both the innovation processes and the core capabilities.
32
 For the 
author, the same dimensions that may be appropriate for the development of core 
capabilities in some contexts may result in core rigidities or inappropriate sets of 
knowledge in others. 
 
In the Dynamics Capabilities approach the strategic dimensions of the firm (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994:541-548) are represented by:  
 
1) its ability to coordinate and integrate activities, to learn and to reconfigure and 
transform its asset structure (managerial and organizational processes);  
2) its business – technological, complementary, financial and locational – assets 
(present position); and,  
3) its prior history and technological opportunities available (paths). 
  
One major problem of these approaches, as indicated by Teece and Pisano (1994:538) 
and highlighted by Dutrénit (2000:27) and Figueiredo (2001:19), relates to the scarcity 
of works focusing on the first development of these core capabilities. Another visible 
problem is that these works focus almost exclusively on the largest companies, and pay 
little or no attention to small and medium sized enterprises. This brings about some 
limitations to the use of these approaches in the analysis of latecomer firms. 
 
Other approaches within the same stream of literature, however, introduce some 
concepts which seem to be more easily adaptable to the context of latecomer firms. 
Pavitt (1991) links the building up of firm-specific competencies to the firm’s size and 
its accumulated competence.
33
 In addition, he links the improvement of these 
competencies to the continuous, collective and diverse processes of learning 
experienced by the firms. The organizational forms, and the methods of allocating 
resources required to create the firm-specific competencies, complete what Pavitt 
identifies as the four central characteristics of large innovating firms.  
 
                                                 
32
 According to the author the three first dimensions of knowledge are embodied in employee knowledge 
and skills, and embedded in technical and managerial systems. 
33
 The accumulated competencies are represented in this work by the technological trajectories of the 
firms – e.g. science-based, scale intensive, information intensive and specialized suppliers. 
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The “Absorptive Capacity” concept of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) departs from the 
assumption that the innovation process is critically dependent upon outside sources of 
knowledge, and that prior related knowledge is essential to the assimilation and use of 
new knowledge
34
. In their own words they argue: 
 
Outside sources of knowledge are often critical to the innovation process. … 
The ability to exploit external knowledge is thus a critical component of 
innovative capabilities. We argue that the ability to evaluate and utilize outside 
knowledge is largely a function of prior related knowledge. … Thus, prior 
related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively 
constitute what we call a firm’s “absorptive capacity” (ibid. p.128). 
 
The authors also emphasize that R&D has two functions inside the firm: to generate 
innovation and facilitate learning
35
. Prior related knowledge and learning, therefore, 
underpins the development of absorptive capacity and have important implications on 
the innovative performance of the firms
36
. Notwithstanding the importance of technical 
knowledge, the awareness of the useful sources of complementary expertise inside and 
outside the firm is also critical in enhancing organizational absorptive capacity. This 
awareness, in turn, is strengthened with a broad and active network of internal and 
external relationships developed by the firm (ibid. p.133-134). 
 
2.3.4 Building up Technological Capabilities in Latecomer Catching-up Firms: 
common approaches and key characteristics 
The emergence of latecomer economies in the international economic scenario in the 
post war era, especially in Asia and Latin America, has led to the development of 
several approaches to address issues on how these countries have technologically grown, 
and how some of their industries have caught-up or are in the process of catching-up. 
One common idea in these approaches takes into account the fact that the development 
of technological capabilities inside industries and firms of latecomer countries usually 
begins from the experience on simple production activities and takes a progressive 
move – frequently over long periods of time – towards more complex technological 
                                                 
34
 An R&D unit is considered by the authors to be the formal innovative unit. Therefore, even other units 
inside the firm, such as manufacturing or marketing, are considered as outside sources of knowledge and 
information. 
35
 This idea is stressed in more detail in a previous work of the authors (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
36
 The prior related knowledge is typified by the authors. It must be both close and fairly diverse to the 
new knowledge to permit its assimilation and exploitation. 
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activities (Hobday, 2003). This happens because these industries draw frequently on the 
acquisition of imported technologies that already exist, reversing the usual sequence – 
innovation/investment/production – of developing new capabilities in developed 
countries (Dahlman et al., 1987). The importance of production capabilities and of this 
reversed sequence is then emphasized by these authors: 
 
Experience in production is generally needed to know what makes sense in 
expansions and new plants. Experience in production and investment is 
generally needed to know what is wanted and what is possible in the way of new 
products and processes. Acquiring this experience is not automatic, however. 
Nor it is rapid and effortless. It takes conscious effort over a long period of time 
(ibid. p.764). 
 
Research exploring this reversed sequence is not rare. The sequences are usually 
represented in stages and this way of interpreting the technological development of 
industries and firms in latecomer countries has proved an useful tool (Hobday, 2003). 
The stages model has then been applied to a range of different sectors. One important 
work stressing this idea was developed by Kim (1980) who later further developed his 
idea in another work (Kim, 1997). In his works Kim identified three main sequential 
stages in the process of technological development within the electronics industry in 
Korea: Implementation, Assimilation and Improvement.
37
 During the first stage a 
complete lack of local capabilities to establish production operations was observed and 
the firms opted to acquire “packaged” technologies overseas. 38 , 39  Afterwards, other 
production units benefited from capabilities developed previously and were established 
from local technological transfers. This evolution, along with increasing market 
competition and the mobility of experienced technical personnel, allowed firms to move 
to the second stage.
40
 The technical emphasis during this assimilation stage was 
basically concentrated upon engineering and development. Greater emphasis in local 
research, development and engineering was a characteristic of the third stage when 
                                                 
37
 In his second work Kim used the term “Acquisition” instead of “Implementation”. The idea behind this 
first stage of his model, however, remained the same. 
38
 By “packaged” technology the author means complete technical assistance from the seller of the 
technology, including specifications and know-how for the product and assembly processes, technical 
personnel and components parts (Kim, 1980:258-259). 
39
 Kim highlights the fact that government protection and import substitution policies were key to open 
market opportunities and therefore for the initial establishment of the electronics industry in Korea, in a 
similar pattern to other developing countries (Kim, 1980:257-258).  
40
 The importance of the movement of people is also stressed by other authors, such as Dahlman and 
Fonseca (1987), Bell and Pavitt (1993) among others.  
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firms gradually began improvements in foreign technologies and gained access to 
export markets.
41
  
 
The stage model was also successfully used by Hobday (1995) to interpret the 
development of the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of East Asia and its 
economic and technological significance to Japan.
42
 In this broader research the author 
identified five technological stages during the learning process of the industries and 
firms. Although in greater number, the stages encompass the usual sequence of 
developing technological capabilities from the basic to the most advanced level. In his 
research, however, the author links the technological stages to a range of marketing 
stages, suggesting a tendency of latecomer firms in improving both capabilities 
simultaneously in order to develop (ibid. p.40).
43
 Formal and informal mechanisms of 
technology acquisition by the firms are also presented and linked to the stages of 
learning and improving both capabilities.
44
 Moreover, the research revealed that some 
later entrants did not necessarily pass through all the technological stages to develop or 
exactly follow the usual sequence, as in some cases they had already begun carrying out 
more complex activities.
45
  
 
Other later entrants may benefit from an improved infrastructure to advance more 
quickly through the stages. However, the common pattern observed is related to a long 
and hard cumulative process of technological learning rather than leapfrogging (ibid. 
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 For more about the importance of design and engineering as innovative capabilities see footnote 56. 
42
 The NIEs in this study comprehend the four dragons of East Asia: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. 
43
 In his research Hobday used a five stage marketing model developed by Wortzel and Wortzel who 
analyzed the export market strategies of three of the four NIEs plus Thailand and Philippines. For 
reference and more detail see Hobday (1995:39).   
44
 The most important mechanism used by the firms in East Asia was the OEM/ODM system. The 
Original Equipment Manufacture strategy is frequently linked to the earlier stages of development since it 
implies complete technical dependence on the seller. The Own-Design and Manufacture implicates the 
need of intermediate level of technological capabilities already developed by the buyer. When the firm 
reaches the highest stage of technological and marketing development (and catches-up) it is able to carry 
out its Own-Brand Manufacture (OBM). The technological and marketing stages are then also 
represented by the author as a sequence from OEM to ODM to OBM (for this issue see also Hobday 
(2003:298)). Other formal mechanisms of foreign technology acquisition involve foreign direct 
investment (FDI), joint ventures, licensing, sub-contracting, overseas acquisitions and strategic 
partnerships. Among the informal mechanisms, overseas training, hiring and returnees were listed. For 
details about how each of these mechanisms fits the stages of development of the firms see Hobday 
(1995:35-39). 
45
 This finding is in line with Lall’s work described in the following paragraph, and is also noted by Bell 
and Pavitt (1995). 
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p.200).
46
 In another dimension, the Hobday’s work also explores the diversity of policy 
models in the region to induce and sustain the development of the electronics industry, 
and shows the different results achieved by this industry in each country. 
 
The framework developed by Lall (1992) contemplates a matrix where the main 
technological capabilities at the firm level are categorized by function and by degree of 
complexity or difficulty. According to the author, the investment and production 
functions detailed in his approach are merely illustrative as they can vary from industry 
to industry. Nor do the three levels of complexity – simple/routine (experience based), 
adaptive/duplicative (search based), and innovative/risky (research based) – necessarily 
indicate a sequence of learning. Notwithstanding, the author suggests that firms must be 
able to identify the basic core of functions needed to ensure the success of the enterprise, 
and that the capabilities must grow over time as more complex activities are undertaken. 
In addition, the author also points out the importance of the elements of the external 
environment in stimulating the development of capabilities within firms. One advantage 
of this approach is its flexibility in adapting to the analysis of different industries. In 
fact, this approach was later adapted by other scholars and applied in different contexts 
and case studies.
47
 
 
In another case study the stage model is not explicitly applied but it is clearly linked to 
the technological development of a firm. The research carried out by Dahlman and 
Fonseca (1987) shows that USIMINAS, a Brazilian steel company, developed its 
technological capability using the acquisition of foreign technology as the starting point 
of a continuous and progressive learning process, which led it to a stage of creating new 
techniques, processes and products and to its technological independence. The authors 
conclude the study stating: 
 
The evolution of USIMINAS shows that rather than seeking to resist foreign 
technology, as is currently advocated by many, this firm has sought to pull itself 
up by it. USIMINAS started by being completely dependent on foreign 
technology and using that as a base from which to selectively absorb more 
advanced technology through which it has progressively developed its potential. 
From a technological dependent firm it has evolved to the point where it is 
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 The author had reached the same conclusion in a previous work. See Hobday (1994:853). 
47
 E.g. Bell and Pavitt (1993, 1995) and Figueiredo (2001, 2007). 
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developing technology of its own and selling technical assistance both nationally 
and internationally (ibid. p.172). 
 
Therefore, studies focusing on stages since the development of the most basic 
capabilities are related to the capture of the entire dimension of the dynamic process of 
building up technological capabilities inside latecomer firms. The importance of this 
dynamic perspective has been acknowledged in later studies (Figueiredo, 2001, 2007; 
Bell, 2006). Bell (2006) argues, however, that even empirical studies focusing on 
sequential learning stages, with few exceptions, have been unable to provide useful 
information on how long it takes firms to move through these stages, and how and why 
these periods vary under specific circumstances. He then suggests the need for changes 
in the way research is currently organised and funded to enable more longitudinal 
studies. Figueiredo (2007) is keen to identify some common features of firm’s 
capabilities building rates from some few empirical studies based on similar 
frameworks. His analysis, however, reveals variations in the capability development 
rates among firms, and suggests that there is still no substantial evidence to treat these 
findings as conclusive.
48
 
 
Other works focus on certain specificities of the process of technological accumulation 
with a diversity of results. The process of acquiring foreign technology and its 
relationship to the development of local capabilities is one of them. The work of 
Dahlman and Fonseca (1987), cited above, emphasizes the importance of this channel of 
knowledge acquisition for the development of the steel industry in Brazil, and suggests 
that this strategy is seen with reluctance by many. Mytelka (1978), for example, 
explores the means by which this process occurs with an emphasis on licensing, and 
analyzes the relationships between licensing and technology dependence in 90 firms of 
the metalworking and chemical industries in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Among the 
results she points out that licensing did not promote what she calls technological self-
reliance, i.e. to foster local R&D, but, in fact, causes a kind of technological dependence 
syndrome, especially in state-controlled firms (ibid. p.456).  
 
In the Korean context of several industries, Kim (1997) identified that the acquisition of 
foreign technologies could lead to a passive attitude in terms of learning when licensed 
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 Yet the author’s findings show no significant variation in the rate of capability development in the 
lower levels (level 1 – basic, and level 2 – renewed).  
29 
from single sources. In the same context, Hobday et al. (2004) showed that acquisition 
of foreign technology and development of local innovative capabilities are 
complementary strategies of firms approaching the innovation frontier. 
 
Historically the process of technological capability accumulation has changed, as noted 
by Bell and Pavitt (1995). Increasing specialization and professionalization have 
become the accumulation of technological capabilities required to generate change that 
is progressively more distant from the production activities, as opposed to the early 
stages of industrialization when these capabilities were generated along with the 
expansion of production capacity and output (ibid. p.77).
49
 For this reason the 
framework proposed in the approach of Bell and Pavitt (1992, 1993, 1995) to analyse 
technological accumulation, makes a distinction between production capacity and 
technological capability.
50
  
 
This distinction is also emphasized by Fransman (1984) with some few differences.
51
 
The latter adds that the ability of firms to make the qualitative jump from the 
capabilities involved in the “know-how” to those involved in the “know-why” is a 
necessary condition to long-run progress.
52
 The purpose of the distinction in the 
approach of Bell and Pavitt is to concentrate the analysis of technological accumulation 
in the capabilities needed to generate and manage technical change. 
 
In fact, some studies concentrate the focus on innovative capabilities due to some 
specific purpose. In an original fashion Dutrénit (2000, 2004, 2007) identified a missing 
issue between the SML and DCL, and proposed a framework to analyze the “transition 
process”, a phase where firms are in the process of developing the kind of strategic 
innovative capabilities needed to catch-up. The author argues that, due to its peculiarity, 
both bodies of literature neglect this transition process, which she named the process of 
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 One important implication of this change, also noted by the authors, is that capabilities accumulated 
only from cumulative operational experience – the learning-by-doing – will not keep firms that import 
technology competitive.  
50
 According to the authors this distinction is important because the resources to generate and manage 
technical change differ substantially from those needed to produce industrial goods (Bell and Pavitt, 
1995:78). 
51
 Fransman refers to the paper of Lall (1984) as also making the same distinction. 
52
 The “know-how” capabilities are described by Fransman as those involved in four kinds of activities: 
search and selection of technologies; mastering of technology; adaptation of technology; and, further 
development of technology. The “know-why” capabilities are recognized as usually the most complex 
and costly, and are represented by R&D and basic research activities.  
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building up “embryonic strategic capabilities”. According to Dutrénit, SML 
concentrates the analysis on the strategic innovative capabilities already built by firms 
with a complex knowledge base. The focus of research is then on organizational aspects 
rather than on technological ones. On the other hand, DCL has primarily focused on the 
technological aspects of firms still building intermediate innovative capabilities of a 
simple knowledge base.  
 
To build up embryonic strategic capabilities, latecomer firms need to develop deeper 
and broader stocks of knowledge in both technological and organizational dimensions 
(Dutrénit, 2004:231). By applying her framework on case studies, and investigating the 
process of building up technological capabilities in three large Mexican firms, Dutrénit 
has identified four factors influencing the transition process: a) the unevenness in the 
knowledge bases;
53
 b) the profile of R&D activities and the technology strategy options 
of latecomer firms; c) the impact of the context on the stability of the technology 
strategy and the knowledge creation process; and, d) national science, technology and 
innovation capabilities. According to the author, it is important to highlight the fact that 
these factors lie in the micro, meso and macro levels, and that the first three factors 
should be managed by the firms whilst the fourth is beyond their decision power 
(Dutrénit, 2007:145). Dutrénit has the merit of being the first to explore this dimension 
of the process of technological accumulation. However, as she also stated, further 
research should be conducted to strengthen the knowledge about this issue. 
 
In a similar direction Hobday et al. (2004) analyzed a sample of 25 leading Korean 
firms approaching the world frontier, from different industrial sectors and different sizes, 
and focused on their transition phase to leadership. The study sought to identify the key 
aspects and challenges involved during the transition process, and the strategies 
followed by the firms to deal with the higher R&D costs, uncertainties and threats of 
competing as leaders on the international scenario – the innovation dilemma.  
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 By unevenness in the knowledge base the author means an imbalance in the levels of knowledge both 
between technological fields and between organizational units. 
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To determine whether or not the firms had reached the transition phase, a framework for 
assessing the firm-level innovation capability was applied.
54
 The findings of this study 
revealed interesting technological and non-technological aspects of this transition 
phase.
55
 Among them the study showed that technological strategies vary according to 
the size of the firms. Large firms, even when already competing in the innovation 
frontier, pursue different strategies according to the stage of development of each of 
their products. Therefore, they may adopt a mix of leadership, followership and 
latecomer technological strategy at the same time. In addition, the in-house R&D route 
is not the only option, and technological partnerships are also among the strategies used 
to develop the capabilities needed to go through this transition stage. On the other hand, 
small and medium size firms generally deliberately pursue a niche strategy that does not 
involve reaching leadership positions.  
 
On the non-technological side the study points out that the transition phase implies the 
need to develop stronger marketing capabilities, a new strategic mindset and new 
organizational structures. In a similar way to Dutrénit’s conclusion, the authors point 
out the need for further and deeper research. If the mix of industries and firm’s size 
analyzed provided important contrasting aspects of the transition phase on the one hand, 
it prevented the exploration of some key points in more depth on the other.  
 
Other aspects of innovative capabilities are emphasized in some studies. With the 
objective of providing an overview of possible activities to be officially supported in 
order to strengthen the development of productive capacities and technological learning 
in Least Development Countries, Bell (2007) proposes a simple framework that 
distinguishes two types of capability: a) operating capabilities – those capabilities 
involved in the use and operation of given forms of technology; and, b) innovative 
capabilities – those capabilities to create new knowledge and to transform it into new 
specifications and production systems. For the purpose of the paper, and due to the 
characteristics of the least developed countries, the author directs focus to the second 
capability. More specifically, he subdivides innovative capabilities into two types: b1) 
                                                 
54
 The framework for assessing technological capability developed by Bessant et al. (2001) measures the 
degree of awareness of firms on the need to change and on what and how to change. This framework is 
discussed in Sub-section 2.3.5. 
55
 The authors have pointed out that the results are indicative rather than conclusive due to the small size 
of the sample. 
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R&D capabilities – those for creating new knowledge; and, b2) design and engineering 
capabilities – those for transforming knowledge. The purpose of this distinction is to 
throw light on the importance and features of design and engineering, the kind of 
innovative capability that plays a central role in innovation but is frequently neglected. 
This issue is also highlighted in other previous works (e.g. Dahlman et al., 1987; Lall, 
1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995).
56
 Therefore, by stressing the importance of design and 
engineering capabilities, Bell places it at an intermediate level between the operating 
and R&D capabilities. Rather than emphasize its importance as a link between the two 
types of capability, however, he recognizes this type of capability as a basis for the 
development of R&D capabilities. The simple framework proposed by the author does 
not contemplate any kind of stage or movement through degrees of complexity nor 
functional distinctions for the analysis of the development of capabilities.
57
 At the end, 
what Bell implies with this emphasis is that innovative capability is more than simply 
R&D capability and more attention should be directed to it. The general industrial and 
infrastructure context approached in that paper favours the emphasis on design and 
engineering capabilities argument. Yet, in other specific contexts, such as case studies 
on industries in the pharmaceutical sector, where the knowledge base is basically 
originated from biomedical, biological and chemical sciences, design and engineering 
may have a different importance or a different role from that approached by the author. 
 
One singular model for analyzing the development of catching-up firms was developed 
and stressed by Forbes and Wield (2002, 2008). The authors argue that firms develop 
indigenous technological capability and catch-up by innovating and continuously 
growing value-added. A learning hierarchy of process to product innovation is then 
identified in firms of some newly industrializing countries (NIC). It consists of a 
progressive move throughout several stages represented by learning to produce, learning 
to produce efficiently, learning to improve production, learning to improve products and 
learning to develop new products. The model consists of mapping the moving up of the 
firms within a process-product/non-proprietary-proprietary grid.
58
 To move to the 
                                                 
56
 Bell argues that part of the underemphasis of the importance of design and engineering as generating 
innovation comes from the narrow concepts and boundaries for the research and development activities 
adopted by the OECD Frascati Manual. A thorough discussion about this problem is carried out by the 
author in Annex 2 of his paper. 
57
 They are introduced when needed by the qualitative analysis throughout the paper. 
58
 The process-product-proprietary grid is presented in Forbes and Wield (2002:87 - Figure 5.1; 2008:74 - 
Figure 1). 
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proprietary quadrants the firms need to develop distinctive capabilities in either or both 
process and product innovation. The position of the firms is defined by the sum total of 
their assets and capabilities. The trajectory within the quadrants is dependent upon their 
strategies, choices, culture and policy environment. 
 
As outlined above, the development of technological capabilities in latecomer catching-
up industries/firms has been approached in different ways, and new areas have been 
identified and explored within the contemporaneous literature on this issue. One 
common belief in most of the studies is that the development of technological 
capabilities is significantly constrained by the conditions present in the technological, 
organizational, local and national contexts of the firms, and the findings of each firm, 
industry, sector or country may vary considerably. 
 
This raises some concerns. First, it suggests attention when trying to draw lessons from 
the experience of other countries (Hobday, 2003), and opens space for further research. 
Second, the use of the above approaches and frameworks should be carefully considered. 
As shown they are frequently adapted to the specific circumstances of the studies, even 
in studies within the same technological sector. For instance, as indicated by Malerba 
and Orsenigo (2002), the factors and dynamics of the evolution of both computer and 
pharmaceutical industries are radically different, even though they belong to the so-
called science-based sector. In this particular sense, no specific work analyzing the 
technological capabilities development of the pharmaceutical/vaccine industry in a 
latecomer context was identified during the literature review. This makes the use of a 
ready-made framework for such a context more difficult.  
 
However difficult it is to find a ready-made approach suitable for every specific purpose, 
it is helpful to identify some common characteristics/elements of the process of 
technological capabilities development in these studies, either in DCL or in SML, or in 
both. Within the literature these characteristics/elements are frequently acknowledged as 
decisive and closely linked to the incentives and/or constraints of the process. Careful 
attention should be given to these when approaching the development of technological 
capabilities whatever the approach used. Some of them were then selected from the 
literature and are being named here as key characteristics/elements. They are presented 
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below arranged in two groups: the sources of technological knowledge, and the other 
influencing elements. 
 
In the first group – sources of technological knowledge – five key 
characteristics/elements were identified:  
 The first is discussed in most of the literature and refers to the acquisition of 
foreign technology, the common way latecomer firms usually start their 
business and complement the development of their local capabilities, as 
highlighted by several authors (e.g. Dahlman et al., 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; 
Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; Forbes and Wield, 2002).
59,60
  
 The second relates to the role of R&D as the main source of new knowledge, 
especially in science-based sectors. However it is not the only one, suggesting 
the need to investigate other forms of knowledge creation inside firms (e.g. 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995; Forbes and 
Wield, 2004; Hobday et al., 2004; Bell, 2007).  
 A firm’s ability to identify and establish internal and external technological 
linkages as increasingly important new sources of knowledge, and a significant 
part of the process of technological accumulation, is the third key characteristic 
raised by many authors (e.g. Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Lundvall, 1988; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Freeman, 1991; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Hobday, 
1995; Hobday et al., 2004; Kim, 1997; Ernst et al., 1998b).
61
  
 The fourth key characteristic concerns the importance of the existence of prior 
knowledge, or accumulated competence, as a prerequisite to enhance the 
capability to assimilate and exploit outside sources of knowledge and to develop 
new knowledge, as stated in several works (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 
1990; Pavitt, 1991; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997).
62
  
                                                 
59
 The citations for each key characteristic are not exhaustive. They mostly reflect the works where the 
issue is more clearly and emphatically addressed. 
60
 As noted by some authors, although critical for latecomer countries, the acquisition of imported 
technology is also a strategy adopted by firms in developed countries (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 
1995; Hobday et al., 2004). 
61
 The increasing complexity and specialization of the technological knowledge impels firms to search for 
different types of collaboration to develop the technological capabilities they need to innovate. This also 
includes interactions with users. 
62
 The importance of prior knowledge is determined by the complexity of technology and the specific, 
cumulative and partly tacit nature of the technological learning (Pavitt, 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1993).  
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 Technological accumulation is a learning process and the main elements of this 
process are regarded to be inside business firms. As technological learning is 
only partly tacit and technology has become increasingly more complex, the 
fifth key characteristic implies that firms should be aware of the need for 
initiatives and explicit investments in learning to develop technological 
capabilities, especially innovative ones (Bell, 1984; Bell et al., 1984; Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993; Hobday et al., 2004). 
 
In the second group – other influencing elements – three further characteristics/elements 
were identified. One is the role of the markets – domestic and export – in promoting 
competition and inducing innovation, as stressed by Lall (1992), Hobday (1995), Ernst 
et al. (1998b), Mytelka et al. (1998), Kim (1998) and Forbes and Wield (2002, 2008), 
among others. The second key characteristic of this group is found in both bodies of 
literature and refers to the significance of the organizational dimension of 
technological capabilities, but frequently neglected especially in DCL (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Dutrénit, 2000; Figueiredo, 2001; Tidd et al., 2001; 
Hobday et al., 2004). The last key characteristic selected is the importance of 
government and institutions in promoting national basic conditions such as general 
education, incentives, regulation, market creation, protection and stimulation and so on, 
as they directly affect the development of capabilities. This point is widely emphasized 
in several studies (e.g. Lall, 1984, 1992; Bell et al., 1984; Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; 
Dahlman et al., 1987; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997, 1998; Mytelka et al., 1998; Figueiredo, 
2001). 
 
Identifying the above characteristics may constitute a starting point for the development 
of an alternative approach that is more suitable for a specific context. However, some 
implications of doing this should be considered. Although emphasized in a great range 
of works these characteristics/elements cannot be considered exhaustive as there is 
always a risk of excluding potential important elements for a specific situation. 
Moreover, notwithstanding each of them can be considered of great importance in 
isolation, it is clear that their importance increases and really matters as they are seen as 
integrated parts of a system. In a broader perspective, as the business corporations are 
regarded to operate, these elements have strong complementarities and interactions, as 
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noted by Fargerberg (2005) and Bell (2007), and stressed in Sub-sections 2.2.3 and 
2.3.2 respectively. 
 
2.3.5 Assessing Technological Capabilities 
The approaches and frameworks described in the two previous sub-sections can be 
viewed as useful and classical ways of analyzing the development of technological 
capabilities. However, literature has presented recent attempts to develop models to 
directly measure and assess technological capabilities in both national and firm levels. 
Ultimately these models seek to appraise the performance of countries and firms as a 
basis for qualitative analysis on how these capabilities develop, and on how they are 
influenced by internal and external elements. The spread of these new models reflects 
today’s existing relative consensus shared by some disciplines such as economics, 
social sciences and management on the nature of technology (Archibugi and Coco, 
2005).
63
 
 
At the national level the models have been applied to contrast differences among 
countries and, not surprisingly, countries have been increasingly ranked according to 
their performance in science and technology activities (ibid. p.176).
64
 At this level 
quantitative indicators are mostly used, including the two most common indicators used 
for measuring innovation: R&D intensity and patents. As an illustrative example, two 
influential works are mentioned here. Lall (1992) applies his framework to measure 
national technological capabilities of eight countries through a set of data in two main 
categories: education, and science and technology.
65
 Patel and Pavitt (1984) do not 
present any specific framework, but use an elaborated set of indicators based on patent 
data across many different sectors of OECD countries as a basis to conclude that 
technological development is uneven even among developed countries; this is different 
from what was supposed at that time.
66
 Although the importance of measuring national 
technological capabilities for policy and management is argued by many, Archibugi and 
Coco (2005) note that they should be interpreted with caution as they can obscure some 
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 The authors refer to national technological capabilities but this notion can be perfectly applied to the 
firm context. 
64
 On occasion, similarities are also identified and highlighted, as the work of Lall (1992) shows. 
65
 This work concentrates on latecomer countries. The sample contemplates South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, India, Brazil and Mexico. 
66
 Indicators based on R&D and on qualification of the workforce are also used in this study. 
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aspects of the economic and social development, such as, for example, health and well 
being. 
 
At the firm level, models for the assessment of technological capabilities are less 
diffused. They are used for management purposes as well as by policy-makers and 
researchers and data should be gathered directly from the firms. One common 
characteristic in some models is the use of benchmarks and its importance is stressed by 
Tidd et al. (2001:375). One of the first methodologies for assessing technological 
capabilities was developed by Panda and Ramanathan (1997). The model is intended to 
provide information for strategic planning decisions. The authors identify three main 
categories of technological capabilities to be addressed – strategic, tactical and 
supplementary – each of them with some sub-categories. The framework still 
contemplates a range of steering capabilities, which are not technological. The 
methodology is flexible and the technological activities to be assessed are defined after 
the identification of the value added stages performed by the firm. The application of 
the model will determine the technological capabilities gap between the firm assessed 
and a benchmarking firm. The model was then applied by the authors in a case study 
comparing the capabilities of two companies in the electric sector.
67
 Even though the 
methodology is complex and long it seems to be easily adaptable to other sectors. The 
problem with this model is the huge amount of data to be gathered from the firms and 
therefore some analysis may be precluded.
68
 
 
One more simple framework was developed by Bessant et al. (2001). The “Audit Tool” 
is based on a model where firms are categorized into four types – A, B, C and D – 
representing progressive stages of technological competency and maturity.
69
 Two 
dimensions determine the location of the firms within this framework, where the 
awareness of the need to change and the awareness of what and how to change are 
assessed. Underpinned by SML and DCL, nine components of technological 
capabilities are then identified and generate a series of questions that enables the 
                                                 
67
 The companies assessed were the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand and the Electricité de 
France. The latter was used as the benchmark firm. 
68
 Problems with data gathering were reported by the authors for these case studies (see pg. 386 and 
tables).  
69
 The four types are: Unaware/Passive (Type A), Reactive (Type B), Strategic (Type C) and Creative 
(Type D). For a graphic representation of this classification see Bessant et al. (2001:2). 
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assessment of the technological capabilities of the firm (Rush et al., 2007).
70
 The 
average score in each of the components can be compared to the total possible score that 
represents the best practice. The authors also developed three different tools to enable 
the assessment process.
71
  
 
Although the purpose of this model is broader it seems very useful as a support tool for 
studies focusing on transition stages. One good example can be found in Hobday et al. 
(2004). In this work the authors used the above tool to identify firms approaching the 
technological frontier in Korea in order to analyze the transition phase to leadership. 
The sample of firms was mainly composed of those who fell into Type C – Strategic 
category.
72
 The use of this model in isolation for policy purposes, however, remains 
unclear. 
 
2.4 Older Concepts, New Applications – Gerschenkron and the Backwardness 
Approach 
In this section an alternative approach is presented and reviewed in an attempt to open 
space for different perspectives on the analysis of the technological development of 
industry/firms in the context of latecomer countries. 
 
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron is the author of a singular theory about 
economic and industrial development in the early 1960s, concerned with the 
development of Europe during the industrial revolution. His ideas have matured 
remarkably and have influenced many scholars in recent years (Fishlow, 2003). 
Gerschenkron’s theory departs from his half-disagreement with the Marxian 
generalization about the history of industrialized countries as a determinant to the future 
of more backward ones.
 73
 In Gerschenkron’s own words: 
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 The nine components of technological capabilities identified are: awareness; search; building core 
competence; technology strategy; assessing and selecting; acquiring technology; implementing; learning, 
and; linking to external sources. They are stressed in Rush et al. (2007:227-228). 
71
 A “simple survey tool” was designed for a quicker assessment and may be conducted by mail or e-mail. 
An “interview tool” is a more detailed assessment and requires access to key personnel of the firms. A 
“case study” is a very detailed assessment and requires multiple interviews with managers across the 
organization. For details see Bessant et al. (2001:9). 
72
 For methodological reasons the authors also included in the sample some firms that fell in Types B and 
D. 
73
 Marx’s generalization referred to by Gerschenkron came from Marx’s famous work “Das Kapital”. 
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For the half-truth it contains is likely to conceal the existence of the other half – 
that is to say, in several very important respects the development of a backward 
country may, by the very virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ 
fundamentally from that of an advanced country (Gerschenkron, 1962:7). 
 
Although accepting that historical events change the course of subsequent events, and 
that industrial development cannot be understood if considered in isolation, the 
emphasis of his work is therefore in the deviations from earlier industrialization. The 
differences to which Gerschenkron refer are related to both the speed of development 
and the productive and organizational structures of industries. They were developed in 
the more backward countries by state intervention, application of institutional 
instruments, ideology and other local and external circumstances, to remove existing 
obstacles and substitute “missing prerequisites” of earlier industrialization.74 Therefore, 
his model assumes the idea that the patterns of development of backward countries 
embedded imitation in combination with indigenous elements. This is closely connected 
to his other important argument, which rejects the generalization of Rostow, to whom 
there is a necessary existence of preconditions or prerequisites for industrial growth.
75
 
The concept of “Substitution for Missing Prerequisites” suggests, on the contrary, that 
the development of more backward countries presented significant innovative initiatives, 
relying on the “substitution” rather than on the “dependence” of prerequisites. This idea 
is clearly explicit in his statement below: 
 
… the very concept of substitution is premised upon creative innovating activity, 
that is to say, upon something that is inherently unpredictable with the help of 
our normal apparatus of research (ibid. p.359-360). 
 
What is interesting to notice is that, whilst contemporaneous literature on innovation 
and technological accumulation puts more emphasis on the key characteristics for the 
success of developed countries that have enabled the technological development of 
latecomer economies and industries, Gerschenkron’s approach makes evident the 
differences or deviations. According to Hobday (2008), in a broader sense 
Gerschenkron’s model rejects the “follow the leader” dominant thinking in the last 
                                                 
74
 The idea of “substitution for missing prerequisites” can be represented for the government and banks, 
in the lack of capital from entrepreneurs to invest in the industry, or the import of skilled people, to 
substitute illiteracy or low standards of education, among others. 
75
 The work of Rostow may be found in Rostow, W.W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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decades since the “Washington Consensus”, and suggests the search for new innovative 
paths as a strategy more backward countries should adopt in order to develop. 
 
On the other hand, one should argue that his model is not proper for microanalyses on 
technological development in the 21
st
 Century. In fact Gerschenkron focuses on national 
contexts and events that took place in a remarkably different era, especially in contrast 
to the current particular characteristics of economic and technological development. 
Furthermore, most of his arguments were built on statistical evidence. Some authors 
argue that the application of his approach requires a quantitative emphasis (e.g. Fishlow, 
2003).  
 
Despite these apparent hindrances, some of Gerschenkron’s arguments are rich and 
seem to be very present in the current development context of economies and industries. 
As an example, recent works have approached the development of firms and industries 
drawing on the theory of Gerschenkron. They emphasize new directions/paths as 
alternative strategies adopted by some firms/industries to get around their disadvantages 
as latecomers, overcome barriers and take advantage of opportunities to develop and 
catch-up. In line with Gerschenkron’s ideas, these works go beyond the common linear 
approach of the catching-up approach, and assume that these firm/industries embody at 
least some innovative characteristics in their directions/paths in order to deal with 
unfavourable circumstances of their environment and develop. 
 
One successful attempt to interpret the electronic industrialization in East and South 
East Asian by using the Gerschenkron approach was carried out by Hobday (2003). In 
this work the author observed that the development of the Asian newly industrializing 
economies has been characterized by significant deviations from experiences of earlier 
industrialization, and encompasses a mix of strategic innovation and careful imitation.
76
 
These findings suggest a pattern where the stages of latecomers’ industries development 
are distinctive due to their own characteristics and governed by the substitution for 
missing prerequisites. As a consequence Hobday suggests that catch-up is unlikely to 
happen from imitation alone, and that there is no ready-made model of development to 
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 For strategic innovation the author refers to a broader concept of innovation including the introduction 
and implementation of new ideas, new institutions, new governmental policies and experimental business 
strategies (ibid. p.311 - note1). 
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be automatically transferred to other developing countries (ibid. p.310). Figueiredo 
analyzed the nature of catching-up of 13 firms from the forestry, pulp and paper 
industries in Brazil, and found a kind of path-creating capability accumulation that these 
firms followed across discontinuities in the policy regimes to catch-up and even 
overtake world leaders. 
 
Other works are equally relevant in approaching the development of firms/industries 
under this Gerschenkronian perspective, among them Perez and Soete (1988), Lee and 
Lim (2001), Forbes and Wield (2002, 2008) and Mathews (2006). These works show 
that the notion of substitution for missing prerequisites may be adapted for different 
contexts and constitutes a useful alternative and a complementary device to help the 
interpretation of the development of technological capabilities in latecomer industries. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the bodies of literature on innovation and technological 
capabilities that can underpin the construction of the frameworks for the analysis of the 
arguments and assumptions raised in this research. 
 
Within the literature on innovation section this review has presented some of the key 
features of the process of innovation that became the starting point for any research in 
this field. National Systems of Innovation, one of the most extensively used frameworks 
to investigate the process of innovation in the last two decades, was also presented and 
discussed. As shown, this framework puts the emphasis on the analysis of the 
determinants of the innovation process. Finally this section has briefly discussed the use 
of quantitative indicators as an alternative method to analyze innovation across 
countries and industries. 
 
Given its extent and importance within the literature on innovation, the technological 
capability framework was presented and discussed in a separate section. It has also been 
largely and successfully used in the last three decades as a way of understanding how 
innovation has been generated, especially in latecomer contexts. The review in this 
section has shown at least two main streams in the literature on this approach – SML 
and DCL – and that there are a great variety of types, levels, definitions and frameworks 
developed and adapted for the analysis of different contexts.  
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The focus of this review was directed at the literature on micro-analysis. However it 
also highlighted the importance of the interaction of capabilities with other elements in 
the meso and macro levels. As discussed, the emphasis of this approach is on the 
learning processes and on the dynamics of building up the capabilities needed to 
develop. It was emphasized that the accumulation of technological capabilities in 
industries of latecomer catching-up countries follows a well-known pattern, usually 
beginning from simple production capabilities and progressively moving to more 
complex ones. At least eight common key characteristics linked to the process of 
development of technological capabilities were also identified and selected within the 
literature. Furthermore, the literature has also shown that the transition phase to the 
development of advanced/competitive innovative capabilities is a critical one inside 
firms. This is a recent and still not fully explored area. The section has also presented 
and discussed more recent attempts to develop and use models for assessing 
technological capabilities. 
 
The subsequent section presented and discussed Gerschenkron’s theory and the notion 
of substitution for missing prerequisites as an alternative approach that might be 
adapted and used as a complementary device for the analysis of technological 
capabilities development in latecomer industries. Empirical works carried out under the 
Gerschenkronian perspective suggests that patterns of technological development are 
distinctive and shaped by the specific characteristics of each industry/country and the 
specificities of their environment. As shown, no ready-made model of development can 
be automatically transferred from the experience of more developed countries, and 
missing prerequisites should eventually be substituted as a conditional path for the 
development of today’s developing countries. 
 
All in all, some final remarks can be drawn from the literature reviewed. The process of 
innovation is quite complex and its analysis requires the domain of some key concepts 
and the awareness of its key features. On the one hand, literature has provided a great 
number of useful frameworks, approaches and indicators for analyzing, interpreting and 
assessing this important phenomenon of the development of firms, industries and 
nations. On the other, it has shown that these approaches and indicators should be 
applied with caution in order not to lead to misleading interpretations and conclusions, 
given the great diversity in the technological, industrial, social and economic contexts 
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of the firms. Therefore, although a rich variety and diversity of works have been carried 
out on this issue, there are specific contexts, such as the vaccine sector, and other areas, 
such as the innovation transition approach, still not fully explored and therefore 
potential subjects for new research. These gaps are some of the aspects underpinning the 
development of the conceptual and analytical frameworks in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 – Motivations, Research Questions, Propositions 
and Frameworks 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter has multiple theoretical purposes. It presents the research problem, 
arguments and objectives of this research, and it also sets forth the research questions 
and propositions. It describes the building of the conceptual and analytical frameworks 
that link the theory to the phenomenon to be researched in order to identify its elements 
and relationships. These frameworks also orient and support the choices about research 
design and operational strategies for the investigation of the problem, and the search for 
the answers to the research questions. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, literature on innovation and technological capabilities, and 
preliminary data of the vaccine industry, underpinned both the identification of the 
research problem and the formulation of the research questions. It is argued that specific 
characteristics both inside and outside of the context of the Brazilian vaccine industry 
(BVI) may be determining a particular pattern of technological accumulation within this 
industry, and that interpreting this pattern of development may be useful in 
understanding how and if the BVI has overcome its disadvantages to develop. 
  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly describes some methodological 
aspects of the process of building the frameworks, for academic clarification only. In 
Section 3.3 the research problem and objectives, and the research questions and 
propositions are restated and explained. Section 3.4 introduces the broad concept of the 
research, the conceptual framework, describes the two conceptual issues embedded in 
the model, and sets out an explanation of its elements and relationships. Section 3.5 
introduces the analytical framework and describes the analytical aspects of the elements 
of the model. Section 3.6 summarizes the whole chapter. 
 
3.2 Introductory Notes on the Rationale of Building the Frameworks 
Similar to other research in social sciences, the first ideas devised in this research 
benefited from a trade-off between literature on innovation and technological 
capabilities and preliminary data previously gathered about the vaccine industry. From 
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this trade-off specific assumptions about the development of this industry in Brazil 
arose, and, in turn, made possible a clearer identification of some research problems 
amongst the wide variety of those possible. The main arguments and objectives were 
then set up and the research questions and propositions posed. This construction, 
however, was not as linear as it appears since feedback during the process of the 
research gradually helped to improve its stages and tighten the conceptual and analytical 
structures. The simple sequence and feedback embedding the present research 
construction is represented in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 3.1: Logical Sequence and Feedbacks of the Research Construction 
 
Literature on research methods recognizes different forms of organizing these events. 
Huberman and Miles (2002), for example, support straighter and tighter initial designs 
arguing that key constructs emerging from the case may take a long time. Moreover 
they suggest that formulating research questions is a direct step from the conceptual 
framework and the beginning of its operationalization – a deductive model.  
 
Other authors support more iterative models (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Alford, 1998; Van 
de Ven, 2007).
77
 In the Engaged Scholarship Research Model of Van de Ven (2007), 
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 Huberman and Miles also admit the use of less tight designs and the formulation of research questions 
preceding the development of conceptual frameworks depending on certain circumstances of the research, 
although they emphasize their preference for the opposite (ibid. p.17 and 23). 
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although a sequence of four research activities is suggested, they can be performed in 
any sequence. According to the author, this is “because they are highly interdependent 
and are seldom completed in one pass” (ibid. p.11).78 Furthermore, in the model of Van 
de Ven the research questions often represent the end of the process of formulating the 
research problem, and the development of the conceptual model requires close 
familiarity to the problem domain. The rationale and sequence employed in the present 
research is closer to the latter, as we shall see in the next sections. 
 
3.3 Research Problem and Research Questions  
In this section the research problem, arguments and objectives of the research are 
restated (Sub-section 3.3.1), and the research questions and propositions are presented 
and explained (Sub-section 3.3.2). 
 
3.3.1 Motivations, Research Problem, Arguments and Objectives 
The previous chapter showed that the technological capability framework has been one 
used most by scholars to understand the process of innovation and development of firms, 
industries and nations, both in developed and in latecomer contexts. In the review of 
this body of knowledge it was emphasized that the development of technological 
capabilities in catching-up industries of latecomer countries follows a well-known 
pattern, usually beginning from simple operating capabilities and progressively moving 
to more complex innovative ones. Within a great diversity of concepts and empirical 
findings, some common key characteristics linked to the process of development of 
technological capabilities were identified. The previous chapter also highlighted recent 
works addressing the innovation transition issue, which showed that the transition phase 
to the development of advanced/competitive innovative capabilities is a critical one 
inside firms approaching the innovation frontier, but this is still a not fully explored area. 
Other works, inspired in an alternative approach that analyzes the technological 
development of latecomer economies from a different perspective of the linear catch-up 
approach, were also identified within the literature.  
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 The engaged scholarship diamond model of Van de Ven encompasses four activities: problem 
formulation, theory building, research design and problem solving. The engaged scholarship method 
proposed by the author is based on the participation of key stakeholders in the research process in order to 
produce more penetrating and insightful knowledge.  
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On the other hand, some special circumstances of the context of development of the 
BVI and of the vaccine sector, a sector barely approached in the literature, were brought 
to light by preliminary data. These special circumstances were identified as strongly 
influencing the sharp growth of this industry in the last decades. They were found at 
both the national and industry/firm level. They were also found in the general context of 
the vaccine sector, including the international context. 
 
At the national level three initiatives of the Ministry of Health (MOH) draw attention. 
The first refers to the National Immunization Programme (PNI), created in 1973. This 
internationally acknowledged programme coordinates a large and rapidly increasing 
public market that has continuously introduced recently developed technologies in the 
immunization routine. The second relates to another programme created by the 
government: The Programme of National Self-sufficiency on Immunobiologicals 
(PASNI). This was created in 1985 after a national supply crisis, in order to support the 
modernization of the facilities of local public firms, allow import substitution and cope 
with vaccine shortages in the international scenario.
79
 The third relates to the market 
protection granted by the government to these public firms to complement the support 
of the PASNI. This policy has remained steady across both the discontinuities in the 
industrial policy regimes in Brazil since then and the macro-instability of the country in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
At the industry/firm level attention is drawn to persistent and successfully implemented 
processes of foreign technology acquisition as the main strategy of this industry to 
quickly develop capabilities and address the public market needs. Attention is also 
drawn to the existence of public firms that have developed important technological 
capabilities, but do not present a clearly visible level of innovative capabilities 
developed to date. 
 
In the general context of the vaccine sector it draws attention to its specificities: the high 
impact of vaccines on society and how susceptible this sector is to social pressures, the 
strong regulation, the high complexity of manufacturing and developing vaccines and, 
most dramatically, the significant advances in the knowledge frontier that are well 
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 In the case of serum the objective of PASNI was to cope with the non-existence of products 
manufactured abroad for the specific venoms of the Brazilian species. 
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protected by intellectual property rights (IPR) and dominated in the last decades by few 
oligopolistic firms. 
 
The above issues seem to give ground to a singular opportunity to extend knowledge 
about the process of technological accumulation in catching-up firms/industries, 
particularly during the transition phase to the development of advanced/competitive 
capabilities. In addition, they motivate the following assumptions: 
 
1) although embedded in the so called science-based sector, with a century-old 
tradition in vaccines and with the more recent development of significant 
technological capabilities, the recent impressive growth of the BVI relies, and 
has relied, predominantly on foreign technology acquisition rather than on 
indigenous R&D as a strategy to develop and catch-up;
80
  
2) the BVI has been forced to adopt and maintain this strategy to fulfil the growing 
needs of the Brazilian public market. This is due to the complexities of the 
vaccine industry and the extent of major breakthroughs in the knowledge 
frontier currently dominated by few oligopolistic firms. In turn, the BVI might 
be neglecting the development of innovative capabilities; and, 
3) this might be determining an endless technological transition phase in which the 
BVI has developed some important technological capabilities but has been 
unable, so far, to catch-up and reach the technological frontier. 
 
Some points, therefore, remain unclear: a) whether or not the BVI has developed 
through a particular pattern of technological accumulation, the characteristics of the 
process and the importance of the specific circumstances of its context; b) the extent to 
which foreign technology acquisition has been effective as a source of technological 
knowledge to the development of local capabilities; c) the level of innovative 
capabilities developed so far and the main characteristics of the process during the 
transition phase; d) possible hindrances to the development of advanced/competitive 
innovative capabilities that could enable this industry to catch-up and compete globally 
at the leading edge; and, e) the existence of relationships between the pattern of 
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 The impressive growth of BVI stands for an increase in sales of more than 5 fold from 1996 to 2006. 
Moreover, it took place at the same time that almost all of the vaccine producers in Latin American 
countries have simply vanished (details and figures about these issues are presented in Chapter 6). 
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development/strategy of technology acquisition and the unfinished technological 
transition. 
 
This research draws on the literature reviewed, on the above assumptions, and on the 
unclear issues. It argues that the specificities of the context of the Brazilian vaccine 
industry (BVI) may be determining a particular pattern of technological accumulation 
within this industry, and that interpreting this pattern of development may be useful in 
understanding how and if the BVI has overcome its disadvantages to develop. 
 
The aim of this research is, therefore, to investigate these unclear circumstances of the 
development of the Brazilian vaccine industry in order to understand how technological 
capabilities have evolved over time within this industry, and how far the BVI has gone 
to date in the transition phase, how and why.  
 
3.3.2 Research Questions and Propositions 
Van de Ven (2007) states that the research questions are often the solution to the 
research problem in research, just to show the interactions between both. Research 
questions also help to focus on specific aspects of interest (Alford, 1998; Huberman and 
Miles, 2002). Yin (2003) goes further by emphasizing the importance of stating some 
propositions in order to direct attention to the relevant points that need to be examined 
and challenged within each research question. To investigate the research problem 
identified and address points raised that are unclear, the following research questions 
and propositions are being posed: 
 
RQ1 How have technological capabilities in the Brazilian vaccine industry evolved over 
time? 
P1 Technological capabilities have been developed in the BVI in a distinct 
pattern of that represented by the traditional catch-up mode identified in the 
literature on technological accumulation in latecomer firm/industries, influenced 
by specific circumstances of the context of this industry; 
P2 The strategy of continuous foreign technology acquisition adopted by the 
BVI has not contributed effectively to the development of local capabilities that 
could help to narrow the gap to the technological frontier. 
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RQ2 How far has the Brazilian vaccine industry gone to date in the transition phase, how 
and why? 
P3 The BVI has been unable to develop significant innovative capabilities so far 
within the transition phase; 
P4 The speed of change in the scientific/technological frontier is the most 
important factor hindering the transition to competitive innovative capabilities; 
P5 The unfinished transition is a by-product of the strategy of continuous foreign 
technology acquisition adopted by the BVI. 
 
3.4 The Conceptual Framework 
In this section the conceptual framework is presented and explained. The three 
conceptual issues underpinning the building of the conceptual framework are introduced 
in Sub-section 3.4.1. Sub-section 3.4.2 addresses the first of these concepts – 
technological capabilities development in catching-up industries, whilst the second 
concept – transition within innovative capabilities development, is addressed in Sub-
section 3.4.3. The third conceptual issue – new directions/paths as an alternative 
strategy to develop – is addressed in Sub-section 3.4.4. 
 
3.4.1 Building a Conceptual Framework as a Benchmark Model 
The first two conceptual issues addressed in this research are technological capabilities 
development in catching-up industries of latecomer countries, and transition within 
innovative capabilities development. This research integrates these two conceptual 
dimensions looking to benefit from their complementarities. It then builds a simple 
framework to be used as a benchmark model, in order to unveil the main characteristics 
of the pattern of development of the BVI and address the third conceptual issue: new 
directions/paths as an alternative strategy of latecomers to develop. 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the common/linear pattern of developing technological 
capabilities in catching-up industries of latecomer countries is the reverse sequence – 
e.g. from production to investment to innovation; this is because existing technologies 
are acquired as the main source of initial technological knowledge, usually from 
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developed countries (Dahlman et al., 1987).
81
 At this time, minimal innovative 
capabilities are required for the successful absorption of the foreign technology (Pavitt, 
1987; Freeman and Soete, 1997). As time passes these industries gradually develop new 
capabilities for adapting existing and introducing new technologies, inverting the 
importance of the sources of knowledge. Intermediate and advanced levels of 
technological capabilities development are mainly based on increasing internal 
innovative capabilities and on exploiting other new sources of technological knowledge, 
internal and external, and are increasingly influenced by other internal and external 
elements, as noted by several authors (e.g. Lall, 1992; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; Bell 
and Pavitt, 1993, 1995; Ernst et al., 1998a). 
 
As also shown in Chapter 2, recent literature has approached the transition phase from 
intermediate and advanced levels to competitive levels of innovative capabilities, and 
has highlighted it as a critical phase in the catching-up process of firms and industries, 
though not fully explored so far (Dutrénit, 2000, 2007; Hobday et al., 2004). Although 
not explicit in this body of literature, this could suggest that the level of importance of 
the sources of knowledge for the development of technological capabilities of catching-
up firms/industries changes more dramatically during this transition phase. Initial 
findings from these few existing studies has started to unveil some challenges, 
specificities and factors influencing the completion of this transition process in some 
industries, but there is still a large number of issues to be understood on this subject. 
 
In Sub-section 3.3.1 it was suggested that the Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI) has 
possibly been developing through a distinct pattern of technological accumulation. This 
possible different pattern is supposedly the result of persistent high levels of technology 
acquisition and slow increasing levels of innovative capabilities. Both seem to be 
greatly conditioned by specificities of the context of this industry and especially 
constrained by major breakthroughs in the development of new vaccines in the 
knowledge frontier. In turn the transition phase to a competitive level of innovative 
capabilities seems to be endless as the technological frontier moves quicker than the 
ability of the BVI to build up this type of technological capability and catch-up. 
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 The nomenclature of the stages of this reverse sequence varies across the wide literature on this subject 
but the logic remains the same.  
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The simple framework draws on these two conceptual issues. It is expected to 
contribute to the understanding of the general and specific circumstances that have 
characterized, enabled and hindered the development of the BVI, and work as a 
benchmark tool in the search for similarities and differences that can characterize new 
directions/paths in the process of its development. It is represented in Figure 3.2 and is 
explained in more detail in Sub-sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Complementarily, some key 
terms used in this research are defined as follows: 
 
“Technological capability” is being employed in this thesis in a broad sense, as 
employed by Kim (1997:4) and others, as the ability to make effective use of 
technological knowledge. This is in line with the most common and broad sense 
captured from the vast range of literature on this subject, and encompasses, at the micro 
level, the efforts, technical or managerial, of a firm/industry to absorb (acquire, 
assimilate and use), adapt and change existing technologies as well as generate new 
technologies. 
 
“Technology acquisition” is used here with a specific sense, and refers to the acquisition 
of foreign “packaged” technologies – the vaccines. The term “packaged” has been 
employed by some authors (e.g. Mytelka, 1978; Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Kim, 
1997) with the meaning of technology acquired with full specifications of the 
production process, frequently accompanied by training, technical assistance and 
components and parts. 
 
“Innovative capabilities” refers to the ability to generate innovation inside the formal 
internal innovating units (e.g. R&D, Design and Engineering), as well as to the 
absorptive capacity in the way employed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), with the 
exception of the acquisition of technology in the sense defined above. 
 
The term “catch-up” is normally employed in this research with a general meaning, i.e. 
encompassing technological catch-up and market/economic catch-up, as employed in 
most works. The main concern of this research, however, is with technological catch-up, 
in the sense employed by Figueiredo (2009).  
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Source: Own elaboration, based on literature reviewed and on the assumptions raised in this research. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Simple Framework 
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3.4.2 Pattern of Technological Capabilities Development in Catching-up Industries  
The building of the conceptual framework draws on both developing country literature 
(DCL) and strategic management literature (SML). These two main streams in the 
literature on innovation and technological capabilities were reviewed in the previous 
chapter. Based on these streams, this research suggests that the common pattern of 
technological capabilities development in catching-up firms/industries of latecomer 
economies may be shaped and expressed by the level of importance of two sources of 
technological knowledge (acquisition of foreign technology and innovative capabilities) 
over time, and by the influence of other firms’ internal and external elements, as 
represented in the upper part of Figure 3.2. This needs further elaboration as follows. 
 
This research takes into consideration the fact that the development of technological 
capabilities is a process of learning inside firms, following the common view amongst 
many scholars (e.g. Bell, 1984; Bell et al., 1984; Lundvall, 1988; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 
1995; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997; Mytelka et al., 1998; Figueiredo, 2001). By definition 
learning is the action of acquiring knowledge of a subject or matter (OED, 1973:1191). 
The process of learning is linked to different sources of knowledge, either internal or 
external, and enhances the stock of knowledge and technological capabilities of firms, 
as noted by Malerba (1992:84). Technological learning inside firms may also change 
the path along which technological capabilities proceed over time (Figueiredo, 2001). 
Thus technological knowledge, and its sources, can be considered as some of the most 
important elements of firms’ technological capabilities development. This is one of the 
premises of this conceptual framework. 
 
The other dimension considered in the model is related to the catching-up strategy of 
latecomer firms. Located in places where local capabilities and technological 
infrastructure are not well developed, latecomer firms start their business through the 
acquisition of foreign mature technologies (Hobday, 1994; Kim, 1997).
82 , 83
 
Nevertheless, technology is specific and complex, and the successful absorption of these 
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 As noted by many authors (e.g. Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Dahlman et al., 1987; Hobday, 1994, 
1995; Kim, 1997; Hobday et al., 2004) at this stage latecomer firms acquire mature technologies from 
developed countries. A mutual interest is observed in this process, as can be inferred by the life-cycle 
model of Abernathy and Utterback (see Utterback, 1994). In this model, products at this specific phase 
compete on the basis of cost rather than on product and process innovation. The technology is then 
transferred to catching-up countries in order to lower its costs and extend its life-cycle (Kim, 1997:86). 
83
 Although this notion was applied by the authors to the Asian context, it applies perfectly to the Latin 
American context as well. 
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technologies implies an activity that is rarely costless for its adaptation to local 
conditions (Pavitt, 1987). This implies the need for the existence of in-house minimal 
innovative capabilities, as noted by Freeman and Soete (1997). Moreover, in the long 
run firms need to innovate to be successful (Nelson, 1991; Tidd et al., 2001), and they 
“cannot mature unless they accumulate the capabilities for technical change” (Bell et al., 
1984:121). 
 
Consequently, firms gradually develop more advanced innovative capabilities to adapt 
and improve existing technologies and to generate new technologies (Mytelka, 1978) 
over time. This is a long, incremental and painstaking process even for subsidiaries of 
TNC, according to some studies (Hobday, 1994, 1995).
84
 It is also gradual because 
firms cannot develop all capabilities at the same time (Dahlman et al., 1987). With the 
development of more advanced capabilities the mode of technology transfer then 
changes, as firms may acquire technology without a transaction cost – e.g. through 
reverse engineering (Kim, 1997:103). At this stage, the development of more advanced 
innovative capabilities increasingly involve what Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define as 
“absorptive capacity”. This refers to the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge, 
often critical to the innovative process. At the end, firms will only achieve technological 
catch-up if they acquire the set of capabilities to improve and create technology 
(Freeman and Soete, 1997). The development of technological capabilities is also 
heavily influenced and shaped by other internal and external factors, as shown by 
several works (e.g. Nelson, 1991; Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Kim, 1997; Ernst et 
al., 1998b), and therefore this aspect is also being considered as relevant in the model. 
 
To sum up, the “pattern of technological capabilities development in latecomer 
catching-up industries”, as represented in the upper part of Figure 3.2, means a 
commonly observed pattern in which the development of technological capabilities in 
its basic or initial level of complexity depends heavily on the acquisition of technology 
(packaged technology), and little on in-house R&D and other sources of knowledge. 
More complex levels of technological capabilities are, in turn, characterized by the 
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 The works of the author reject the “leapfrogging argument” of technological accumulation in latecomer 
countries. According to the author this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that it was tested and proved 
not true in Singapore, a country that supposedly accumulated the most appropriate national conditions for 
leapfrogging to take place: small population, high educational rates, modern technological infrastructure, 
etc. 
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increasing development of in-house R&D and other innovative capabilities, and on 
more intensive knowledge from other internal and external sources. At the same time, 
the need for knowledge from packaged technology externally acquired gradually 
decreases up to the point that the level of importance of the sources of knowledge 
becomes inverted.  
 
During the transition phase firms develop the kind of capabilities needed to catch-up 
and to try to compete with the market leaders.
85
 High levels of innovative capabilities 
and knowledge from other sources, new kinds of capabilities, and lower levels of 
technology acquisition (packaged technology) characterize the highest level – the 
competitive stage. Moreover, as innovation does not take place in isolation, other 
elements present in the internal and external environment of the firms/industries, as well 
as some specificities of each industrial sector, influence this pattern with different 
intensities and implications across the whole process of technological accumulation; 
they are very integrated and interrelated. 
 
The lower part of Figure 3.2 suggests a supposed distinct pattern of technological 
capabilities development in the BVI; this is based on persistent high levels of 
technology acquisition (packaged technology) and a lower rate of development of in-
house R&D and of exploiting other sources of knowledge.
86
 It is also suggested that 
major breakthroughs (radical and incremental innovation) in the knowledge frontier and 
the scientific, technological, social and economic specificities of the vaccine sector have 
been critical elements influencing the pattern of technological accumulation in this 
industry. A longer and unfinished technological transition stage may be related to this 
distinct pattern. Both parts of the figure embed the constituent elements of this model to 
serve as a benchmark tool in the search for differences and similarities in the path of 
development of the BVI. 
 
The sources of technological knowledge, and the other firm’s internal and external 
influencing elements, stand for the key characteristics of technological accumulation 
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 The characteristics of the transition stage are detailed in the next Sub-section. 
86
 The existence of initial innovative capabilities, however, seems to be especially important in the 
vaccine industry. 
57 
previously selected from the literature.
87
 Some of them were expanded, other were 
included as they may be of interest for the analysis of the pharmaceutical sector. The 
analysis of the pattern of technological accumulation will be concentrated on them. 
Table 3.1 lists these key characteristics. The analytical aspects of each are defined in 
Sub-section 3.5.2.  
 
Table 3.1: Key Characteristics: the elements for the analysis of Technological 
Accumulation 
Sources of Knowledge 
 
Other Influencing Elements 
. Technology Acquisition 
. Internal Sources of Knowledge 
   . In-house R&D 
   . Design and Engineering 
   . Clinical Trials 
. Other Sources – Internal and External 
Linkages  
   . Operating Capabilities 
   . Inter-firm Collaboration/Alliances 
   . Consultancy/Hiring Skilled Specialists 
   . Universities/Research Institutes 
   . Prior Knowledge 
. Learning by training – Initiatives and 
investments 
 . Organizational Capabilities 
 
. Markets 
 
. Government Policies, Institutions 
and Regulation 
 
. Innovation in the knowledge frontier 
 
. Scientific, technological, social and 
economic specificities 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on literature review and prior expertise 
 
It is important to highlight some additional considerations about this conceptual 
framework. Firstly, the common pattern suggested in the model does not ignore the fact 
that the rate of technological capabilities development may vary considerably across 
firms, industries, sectors and nations, and that the sequences of development are not as 
linear as they appear, as well advised by some authors (Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Hobday, 
1995; Mytelka et al., 1998; Bessant et al., 2001). In effect, the “common pattern” part of 
the model seeks to capture the general sense of the catching-up strategy of a great range 
of latecomer firms, as supported by many empirical works especially in Asia and Latin 
America. It thus serves as a benchmark model to be contrasted with non-linear 
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 See Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.3.4 (pg. 34-35). 
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approaches of catching-up only, as described in Sub-section 3.4.4, and not as a 
description of actual reality.  
 
Secondly, even though the importance of the learning process is highlighted, the model 
does not intend to support the analysis of the dynamics of the learning process inside 
firms, as carried out in some works (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Figueiredo, 2001).  
 
Thirdly, the model focuses on the segment of vaccines inside the Brazilian vaccine 
industry. Other segments explored complimentarily by the firms of this industry, such 
as biopharmaceuticals, serum, blood products and diagnostic reagents, are out of the 
scope of the model. And finally, even though there are some references to “stages”, and 
the development of technological capabilities is categorized in levels of complexity, this 
research is not proposing to analyze technological capabilities development in a strict 
perspective of stages or sequences.
88
 
 
3.4.3 Transition within Innovative Capabilities Development 
Differently from the “pattern of technological capabilities” area, the transition phase is 
still a grey area, as deliberately represented in a rough way in both parts of Figure 3.2. 
This also needs further elaboration. Generically, transition means “the passage from an 
earlier to a later stage of development or formation” (OED, 1973:2347), and therefore it 
can be inferred that it occurs along all the process of technological capabilities 
development. Notwithstanding, this research draws on the idea initially approached by 
Dutrénit (2000), and further stressed later by Hobday et al. (2004) and Dutrénit (2007), 
to define the boundaries and scope of analysis of this transition issue within the BVI. 
The essence of the transition process approached by both Dutrénit and Hobday et al. is 
similar, but as they approach the issue in a different way there are some slight 
differences in the boundaries, characteristics and constraints in both approaches. Rather 
than divergent, however, these differences are considered here as complementary and as 
a useful parameter for the analysis of the transition phase of BVI. 
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 The idea of rigid stages or sequences in technological accumulation may be misleading due to the 
diversity found in different firms and industries, as noted by Bell and Pavitt (1995:88). 
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The characteristics of the transition process raised by Dutrénit came about mainly from 
the empirical findings of two works.
89
 According to her: 
 
Those firms (that are undertaking a transition process) have accumulated the 
minimum essential knowledge base, have developed R&D activities and have 
acquired advanced innovative TC in certain technical functions. They have 
different challenges and types of problems from those observed in firms that are 
still in the process of building-up basic and intermediate innovative TC. 
(Dutrénit, 2007:130 - sentence between parentheses added) 
 
The embryonic strategic capabilities, as she named this phase, seems to be located 
somewhere between the upper intermediate capabilities level (when firms have built the 
minimum essential knowledge), and the lower strategic level (when firms have already 
built some of the capabilities which will distinguish them competitively). This 
minimum essential knowledge base is described as the one built by the firm to survive 
in the market, a long process that lasted from the early 1900s to 1970 in her first case 
study. It examined a kind of routine production capability, and basic to intermediate 
innovative technological capability (Dutrénit, 2000:107). The development of 
embryonic strategic capabilities – the transition process – explained the undertaking of 
more complex activities based on the increasing importance of internal and external new 
sources of knowledge, particularly R&D, and on some knowledge management 
capabilities. However, by the time of the case study conducted by the author, the 
transition process had already lasted around 25 years and had not been completed by the 
firm. 
 
In a different fashion Hobday et al. (2004) used a predefined set of capabilities’ 
characteristics to select firms within a technological capability level they elected as of 
interest for the purpose of analyzing transition. They applied an audit tool in a sample of 
25 Korean firms looking for those that had achieved the Type C – “strategic” – 
capability level defined in this audit tool.
90
 The empirical findings confirmed that 19 
firms were at the strategic level described in the audit tool, and that they were not yet 
contributing to move the world technology frontier. It also confirmed that these 19 firms 
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 Dutrénit (2000) is a case study of the Glass Container Division of the Mexican Vitro Group. Later on 
the concept of transition was applied in case studies of two large Mexican firms and a subsidiary of 
multinational company located in Mexico (Dutrénit, 2007).  
90
 The audit tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001) was stressed to some extent in Sub-section 2.3.5 (pg. 
37-38) of the previous chapter.  
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were not uniformly distributed within the strategic category but rather they had different 
levels of strategic capabilities.
91
  
 
In Hobday et al.’s study, therefore, it is implicit that firms that succeed in overcoming 
the weaknesses of their capabilities within this level are approaching the innovation 
frontier, and are supposedly in a transition stage to reach the Type D – “creative” level, 
the highest level in the scale of the audit tool. Firms categorized as creative are those 
able to move the international technological frontier forward. Furthermore, firms failing 
to overcome their weaknesses tend to lose capabilities and become Type B – “reactive”. 
The different terminologies across the stages of technological capabilities adopted in the 
works of Dutrénit, Hobday et al. and in this research, and the correspondence amongst 
them, are represented in Table 3.2. The description of the boundaries, characteristics 
and constraints to the transition process approached in the works of these authors are 
summarized in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2: Technological Capabilities Levels – different terminologies adopted and 
transition boundaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
       Source: Own elaboration 
 
Based on the contribution of Dutrénit and Hobday et al. discussed above and on the 
preliminary data gathered, this research is precariously assuming that the BVI is 
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currently in a transition process within the development of innovative capabilities. The 
real constraints and drivers to the development of this industry’s advanced innovative 
capabilities are unknown, as are the boundaries and level of the transition phase. These 
are the issues raised by research question 2, propositions 3 and 4. This idea is explained 
in more detail within the Analytical Framework in the next Section. 
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Table 3.3: Firms in Technological Capabilities Transition Process – Boundaries, Characteristics and Constraints  
Dutrénit  Hobday et al. 
Boundaries   
. from the lower advanced innovative capabilities, when minimum 
essential knowledge base was already built, to the building of some 
strategic capabilities (which distinguish the firm competitively); 
 . firms that have overcome the reactive approach to technology 
strategy and are building strategic capabilities to reach the creative 
capability level, and that are able to compete in/contribute to the 
world technological frontier; 
Characteristics (not exhaustive)   
. minimum essential knowledge base already built (capabilities to 
achieve more efficient levels of production, improve the quality, 
upgrade equipments); 
. accumulation of routine production capabilities; 
. intermediate innovative technological capabilities in some 
technical functions and advanced in others; 
. increasing importance of internal sources of knowledge (especially 
R&D – applied research, product and process development and 
minor improvement activities); 
. integration of knowledge located in different organizational units; 
. learning from competitors and external sources of knowledge; 
. acquisition of technology (engineering and know-how to 
manufacture equipment); 
. development of innovative capabilities to adapt and keep in 
operation the technology acquired abroad; 
. capability to develop linkages with suppliers; 
 
 . well-developed awareness of the need for technological change; 
. highly capable in implementing new projects and taking a strategic 
approach to the process of continuous innovation; 
. clear idea of priorities and of resources needed; 
. strong internal capabilities in both technical and managerial areas; 
. can implement changes with skill and speed; 
. consciously develop a strategic framework in terms of search, 
acquisition, implementation and improvement of technology; 
. overall strong in-house capabilities, including R&D; 
. strategic thinking about technology in the medium and long term; 
. tends to lack the capabilities to re-define or create new market 
opportunities through new types of technology; 
. tends to compete within the boundaries of an existing industry, 
despite having exploited technology efficiently; 
. sometimes limited in knowing where and how to acquire new 
technologies beyond the boundaries of their traditional business; 
. face difficulties to challenging existing business models; 
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Table 3.3 (cont.): Firms in Technological Capabilities Transition Process – Boundaries, Characteristics and Constraints 
Dutrénit  Hobday et al. 
Characteristics (cont.)   
. strengthening of capabilities in knowledge management (sharing of 
internal knowledge and use of external sources of knowledge), 
process engineering, and investment project management; 
 . in their own fields they may be at the international technology 
frontier; 
. more extensive partnerships with foreign firms; 
. may benefit from new networks of technology providers and from 
links with universities; 
. tends to follow a mixed corporate strategy towards technology; 
. small and medium size firms tend to seek niche markets and not to 
seek international leadership positions; 
Constraints to complete transition   
. difficulties in the knowledge management processes, especially: 
   . conversion of individual into organizational learning; 
   . coordination of the leaning strategies; 
   . knowledge integration and knowledge creation; 
. unevenness of the knowledge bases – embryonic strategic 
capabilities in some areas and lack of knowledge in others; 
. embryonic strategic capabilities that did not become strategic 
capabilities: 
   . investment project management; 
   . job changes; 
   . electronic control systems and glass composition; 
   . coupling equipment technology; 
. imbalance between science and technology capabilities in the 
national context. 
 . external shocks (economic crisis) can arrest the pace of change as 
firms move for shorter-term R&D; 
. government policies and competitors’ strategies, especially in 
changing circumstances; 
. own history, cultures and strategies and lack of a strategic mindset; 
. dependence of foreign capital goods technology and suppliers; 
. international brand recognition; 
. stronger market capabilities; 
. control of foreign distribution channels; 
. need for a strategic mindset, quite different from that of a firm in 
catch-up mode; 
. need for more organizational flexibility (e.g. flatter organizational 
structures and fast moving project-based organizational structures);  
Source: Own elaboration based on Dutrénit (2000, 2007), Bessant et al. (2001); Hobday et al. (2004) and Rush et al. (2007). 
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3.4.4 New Directions/Paths 
A third conceptual issue is considered in this research. It refers to the concept first 
stressed by Gerschenkron (1962), which suggests that the development of more 
backward countries present differences from the development of advanced countries, 
and encompasses innovative initiatives to overcome their disadvantages and barriers to 
develop. More recent works (e.g. Forbes and Wield, 2002, 2008; Hobday, 2003; 
Figueiredo, 2009), as discussed in Section 2.4 of the previous chapter (pg. 40-41), have 
used this concept of new directions/paths inspired in the work of Gerschenkron to 
interpret the development of firms/industries in developing countries. 
 
This research uses this concept to interpret the pattern of technological accumulation of 
the BVI. It uses the simple framework developed (Figure 3.2), based on linear patterns 
of catch-up in latecomer firm/industries, as a benchmark model to look for possible 
differences and similarities in the pattern of the BVI. It attempts to identify a particular 
pattern of development and new directions undertaken by this industry in order to 
develop its technological capabilities and reach the technological frontier. 
 
3.5 The Analytical Framework and the Elements of the Model  
This research is proposing the use of a benchmark model integrating two conceptual 
issues – technological capabilities development in catching-up industries of latecomer 
countries, and transition within innovative capabilities development – to interpret the 
development of the BVI and look for differences and similarities in its pattern of 
development. This model is represented in Figure 3.2 and further stressed in Sub-
sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 above. The objectives of this Section are to present the 
analytical framework (Sub-section 3.5.1), and to describe the specific aspects of the 
elements of this model (Sub-section 3.5.2) in order to support the choice of the research 
design, the data to be gathered and the analysis to be carried out.
92
 
 
3.5.1 The Analytical Framework 
This research argues that the technological development of the BVI can be adequately 
interpreted by the analysis of two conceptual approaches – technological capabilities in 
latecomer catching-up industries, and transition within innovative capabilities 
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 The choice of the research design and the data to be gathered is within the objectives of the next 
chapter. The analyses and discussion are carried out in Chapter 8. 
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development, integrated in a benchmark model that supports the search for new 
directions/paths. Drawing on DCL and SML on technological accumulation, a set of 
key characteristics/elements was identified as shaping the common pattern of 
technological capabilities development in latecomer catching-up industries. These key 
characteristics/elements were then categorized in two interrelated groups – sources of 
technological knowledge and other influencing elements. Based on preliminary data 
gathered about the international vaccine industry and about the BVI, further elements 
were added to the conceptual model. In this respect it is assumed that some specificities 
of the context of the BVI and the persistent strategy of foreign technology acquisition 
adopted by the firms are possibly giving rise to some differences between the 
common/linear pattern and the pattern of technological development of the BVI, and 
that the strategy of foreign technology acquisition is not contributing to shorten the gap 
to the technological frontier (Research Question 1 Propositions 1 and 2).  
 
The literature was also the source for the development of the second conceptual issue. 
On this issue it is assumed that the BVI has possibly not developed the innovative 
capabilities needed to complete the transition phase to date, and that this might mostly 
be linked to the dynamics in the technology frontier (Research Question 2 Propositions 
3 and 4). Also, it is being assumed that the hindrances to the unfinished transition may 
be related to the persistent strategy of foreign technology acquisition (Research 
Question 2 Proposition 5). The innovation transition approach is expected to illuminate 
the micro dynamics of this industry during the transition phase and provide a deeper 
understanding of its process of technological accumulation. 
 
The analytical framework representing the whole idea described above and supporting 
the analysis of the empirical information about technological development of the BVI is 
represented in Figure 3.3. 
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   Source: own elaboration. 
 
Figure 3.3: The Analytical Framework 
 
 
3.5.2 The Specific Aspects of the Elements of the Model 
The elements for the analysis of the technological development of BVI were set up in 
the conceptual framework, Sub-sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.4 and are listed in Table 3.1 (pg. 
54-64 and 57 respectively). In this Sub-section the specific aspects of these elements are 
described. They are arranged in four groups: a) sources of technological knowledge; b) 
other influencing elements; c) transition issues; and, d) new directions/paths. 
 
a) Sources of Knowledge 
 Technology Acquisition 
It has been common knowledge that the acquisition of external technology has been 
essential for the development of technological capabilities of catching-up firms in 
Catch-up Approach
in Latecomer
Firms/Industries
Innovation Transition
Approach
Sources of
Technological
Knowledge
Transition
Stage’s
Characteristics
Other Influencing
Elements/Specificities 
of the Vaccine Sector
Empirical IssuesConceptual Issues Conceptual Issues
. Similarities and differences between the pattern of technological accumulation of the BVI 
and the benchmark pattern based on linear approaches of catching-up;
. The extent of the importance of the technology acquisition strategy;
. Current level of technological capabilities development of the BVI;
. Boundaries, characteristics and constraints of the transition process;
. Possible relationships between the pattern of technological accumulation of the BVI and its 
unfinished the transition process.
New Directions/Paths
Approach
New Directions/Paths
Approach
Similarities
and
Differences
Research Outputs
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latecomer/developing countries. In the broad sense employed by the authors, the 
acquisition of technology takes place through a variety of formal and informal, domestic 
and foreign mechanisms, and it is a strategy adopted by firms complementary to the 
development of in-house technological capabilities, as shown by Bell and Pavitt (1995), 
and Hobday et al. (2004).
93
 Some works, however, have indicated opposite findings. 
Mytelka (1978), for example, has found a correlation between licensing of foreign 
technologies and low engagement in in-house R&D in some industries of three Andean 
countries of South America. Her findings are more noticeable in state-owned firms.  
 
Kim (1997) has suggested that a passive attitude towards the learning process in Korean 
firms is linked to the acquisition of foreign package technologies through licensing from 
single sources. For the purpose of this research, and in accordance with the conceptual 
framework proposed, the term here has a narrower sense and refers to the acquisition of 
foreign “packaged” technologies, as defined in Sub-section 3.4.1 (pg. 52). It represents 
a very high stage of a firm’s technological dependence. This is the type of technology 
acquisition that tends to decrease in importance as firms develop more advanced 
technological capabilities. The most common mechanisms of technology transfer in this 
sense are foreign direct investment (FDI), licensing, joint ventures, turnkey plants and 
technological agreements.
94
 Other mechanisms of technology acquisition, represented 
here by internal and external linkages, will be investigated within the “other sources of 
knowledge” item since they, conversely, and along with R&D capabilities, tend to have 
their importance increased as firms develop more complex technological capabilities, 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Therefore, this research proposes to investigate the mechanisms used by the BVI to 
acquire these “packaged” foreign technologies and, more specifically, the importance of 
these mechanisms along the process of this industry’s technological development. The 
first objective is to find out whether or not the level of importance of this source of 
technological knowledge performs like the curve in the upper part of the proposed 
model and, additionally, whether this strategy has been successful to the development of 
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 For a description of several technology acquisition channels see Hobday (1995:35-39), Bell and Pavitt 
(1995:94-96), Dahlman et al. (1987:768), Freeman (1991:502) and Tidd et al. (2001:252). 
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 Technology transfer mechanisms related to the manufacture of equipment such as OEM (original 
equipment manufacture) and ODM (original design and manufacture) were not included since they are 
not related with the case of vaccines. 
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the industry. The second is to try to identify relationships with other sources of 
knowledge, with the other elements of the model and with the transition phase. 
 
 Internal Sources of Knowledge – In-house R&D 
Recognized as the main source of technological knowledge in science-based sectors 
since the seminal work of Pavitt (1984), R&D is traditionally highly intensive in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002). In this context, R&D 
capabilities are assumed as essential to competitiveness. However, in latecomer contexts 
the development of R&D capabilities usually starts much less intensively in the very 
beginning of the businesses embedded in basic, frequently informal problem-solving 
activities, especially to help the assimilation of foreign acquired technologies and to 
adapt them to local conditions, as implicit in the work of Dahlman and Fonseca (1987). 
Although ignored by some authors, these kinds of informal R&D activities, even those 
performed in non-R&D units, is admitted by the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002).  
 
The importance of R&D capabilities tends to strengthen as firms accumulate 
technological knowledge, consciously engage in more complex innovative activities, 
and increasingly generate process and product innovation. This requires an increasing 
allocation of resources in high skilled people, training, R&D facilities and technological 
management. On the other hand, investments in R&D may be negatively affected by 
deteriorating economic conditions in the external environment, as noted by some 
authors (Hobday et al., 2004).  
 
Besides the capabilities for developing new processes and products, Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989, 1990) suggest another role for R&D – the development of capabilities 
to exploit outside sources of knowledge – a learning process. This is connected with the 
strengthening of internal and external linkages. Analyzing the above aspects is being 
proposed as they may indicate the strengthening of R&D capabilities and, consequently, 
the gradual increase of its importance to the firm. On the other hand, constraints to the 
development of these capabilities may signal difficulties in the transition technological 
process. 
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 Internal Sources of Knowledge – Design and Engineering, and Clinical Trials 
Some authors have emphasized the importance of Design and Engineering capabilities 
to the innovative process (e.g. Dahlman et al., 1987; Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; 
Bell, 2007). According to these authors, they are initially developed for project 
management and for the building and upgrading of industrial facilities, and further 
developed for scale-up activities, equipment design and project specification amongst 
others. More than a link between operating and R&D capabilities, they are a necessary 
basis for building R&D capabilities in some cases, especially in infrastructure sectors 
and scale-intensive industries, as indicated by Bell (Bell, 2007:63).  
 
This research argues, however, that these capabilities seem to have a different 
dimension in the vaccine industry and should be investigated in the sense that very 
specialized engineering is required during some few steps of the R&D process and for 
the compliance with the tight regulatory requirements of the WHO (World Health 
Organization), GMP (good manufacturing practices) and GLP (good laboratory 
practices). Therefore, the importance of the development of these capabilities seems to 
be linked to some phases of R&D and to the regulatory issues, and may constitute a 
very specific type of capability in this industry. 
 
Clinical Trials are defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002:45), and are usually 
considered as R&D capabilities. This research is proposing to treat them apart from 
R&D for the following reasons:  
 
1) clinical trials (phases I, II and III) are the last step in the process of developing a 
vaccine before registration and licensing. In fact, the candidate vaccine is 
completely developed and produced before clinical trials. Thus the existence of 
these capabilities within the firm, or of a product within these phases, suggests 
the development of significant innovative capabilities;  
2) clinical trials are currently by far the most expensive phase of the development 
of a vaccine (Milstien and Candries, 2002), and require capabilities somewhat 
different from those required for the earlier phases of the vaccine development 
process (Bomtempo and Baetas, 2005);  
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3) the complexity and specificity of this phase has led most of the “Big Pharma” to 
outsource this R&D phase (Milstien and Candries, 2002:75).
95
 It seems, 
therefore, a good qualitative indicator for the development of innovative 
capabilities in this industry. 
 
 Other Sources of Knowledge – Internal and External Linkages 
This group encompasses some other formal and informal channels of acquisition of 
technological knowledge through internal and external links. As noted by Bell and 
Pavitt (1993:168), one must not assume that firms develop their technological 
capabilities as isolated actors. The complex structure of networks developed by a 
vaccine enterprise was an essential component of its success, as shown by Galambos 
and Sewell (1995), and it was gradually strengthened over time.  
 
Freeman (1991:500) refers to the “multiple sources of information” and to the 
“pluralistic patterns of collaboration” as a rule rather than an exception in the networks 
explored by the firms (especially the informal ones) to complement the competencies of 
their R&D units. The author has also shown that firms enter into collaboration 
agreements for strategic reasons – e.g. technological complementarity and lead-time 
reduction – rather than because of lack of financial resources (ibid. p.507). Moreover, 
the accessibility of knowledge is directly related to its appropriability, as noted by some 
authors (e.g. Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Malerba, 2005).  
 
The modern vaccine industry is recognized as of high appropriability of knowledge – 
e.g. by patents and by the tacit nature of the knowledge – and therefore of low 
accessibility, which reinforces the importance of linkages to the access of knowledge. 
The ability of establishing links and acquiring knowledge at these levels is referred to 
by Ernst et al. (1998b:21) as “linkage capabilities”. Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) 
call it “absorptive capacity”, a critical component of the innovation process and a 
function of prior knowledge. The existence of substantial flows of technological 
knowledge from other internal and external sources is a characteristic of the transition 
process inside firms and of higher levels of technological capabilities, as shown in the 
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works of Dutrénit (2000, 2007), Hobday et al. (2004) and Rush et al. (2007), and listed 
in Table 3.3 on pg. 62-63. 
 
 Other Sources of Knowledge – Learning by Training 
As stressed before, technological accumulation is a learning process. Learning inside 
firms takes place in a variety of ways (Hobday, 1994; Malerba, 1992; Bell, 1984; Pavitt, 
1991), and some of these processes are already the object of analysis in previous 
sections – e.g. learning by doing/using (technology acquisition, operating capabilities), 
learning by interacting/collaborating (internal and external linkages), learning by 
searching (R&D and other innovative capabilities), etc. The object of analysis now is 
the explicit initiatives in training. When active, explicit and directed to activities other 
than operating routines, training is essential to technological change (Bell et al., 
1984:121). The initiatives of training undertaken by firms are often more effective than 
formal education, as some works show (e.g. Bell, 1984; Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; 
Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995). Therefore, the importance the BVI has been given to this 
learning mechanism may be also indicative of the reasons for either success or failure in 
the process of development of more complex technological capabilities. 
 
Along with R&D and other internal innovative capabilities, these other sources of 
knowledge are represented by the ascending curve of the upper part of Figure 3.2. It is 
important, however, not only to detect a growing existence of these channels, both 
formal and informal, but also to determine how effective they have been for the process 
of innovation in the industry. 
 
b) Other Influencing Elements 
In this group, as well as in the sources of knowledge group, a mix of some internal and 
external elements was selected to be investigated, as they are supposed to contribute to 
the understanding of the two conceptual issues of the model.  
 
 Organizational capabilities 
The importance of the organizational dimension for the development of technological 
capabilities has been the object of analysis within the SML, as stressed in Sub-section 
2.3.3 of the previous chapter (pg. 21-24). Within this body of literature the main 
concern is with the type of capabilities needed to deal with the fast changing 
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environment and to achieve and/or sustain technological competitive advantage. Thus it 
refers to the capabilities of firms operating around the technological frontier. Bringing 
this to the perspective of this research, it is, according to Dutrénit (2000, 2007), the type 
of capabilities latecomer firms in transition should develop to catch-up. Hobday et al. 
(2004) also emphasize that the organizational aspects involved in the transition process 
of Korean firms are as critical as the technological ones.  
 
This is certainly a subject for a whole thesis. In this research, however, for obvious 
reasons, more limited attention will be given to this issue. This research is concerned 
with this subject in two dimensions: the awareness of the need of this type of capability 
to the development of the firms, and the effective existence of initiatives aimed at the 
strengthening of the managerial capabilities inside firms. The objective is simply to try 
to understand the extent to which this issue has been affecting the current context of 
development of the BVI, and the amount of attention the firms have been giving to this 
matter. 
 
 Markets 
It is common notion amongst scholars that the market, through competitive pressures, is 
a basic stimulus that affects the development of technological capabilities. This is the 
main point about this subject to be approached in this research. The huge Brazilian 
public market for vaccine, along with government policies against internal competition 
and protection against outside players, has been an open field for the growth of the BVI. 
However, the extent to which this has been successful or harmful in promoting the long-
term development of technological capabilities within the BVI is a matter to be 
investigated.
 96
  
 
Lall (1992:169), however, calls attention to the potential long delays competition may 
cause to the development of technological capabilities in infant industries due to the 
costs of learning during the existence of certain market failures.
97
 On the other hand, the 
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 Although export-oriented strategies have been suggested in several empirical studies as the main driver 
for the development of firms in East Asia, Mytelka et al. (1998:335) show that domestic markets were 
also important agents for the development of technological capabilities in the region. 
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 The problem of “costs of learning” noted by Lall could be complemented with the “partial 
appropriability of the returns”, as raised by Bell and Pavitt (1993:202). 
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lack of competitive pressures and rivalry served as non-incentives for the development 
of firms in centrally planned economies, according to Bell and Pavitt (1993:173).  
 
The strategies and policies of the Brazilian government seem to be benefiting the BVI 
in another way – by easing the technology transfers agreements from the “Big Pharma”, 
even of those still non-mature technologies. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the 
international markets, both public and private, and the main players in the world 
scenario are aspects not to be ignored in the analysis proposed in this research. 
 
 Government Policies, Institutions and Regulation 
It has been widely agreed that national idiosyncrasies highly influence the system of 
innovation of the firms, and that the state has an important role in mediating the 
elements of this system (Lundvall, 1992b; Nelson, 1993). Freeman (1995) has pointed 
out that national policies remain decisive for the catching-up strategies in developing 
countries. In this sense, in fact, the role of government is huge. Even though there is no 
room in this research to investigate this, to some extent some important specific points 
should be addressed. Besides the policies to protect and stimulate the Brazilian vaccine 
market, as mentioned in the previous item, greater emphasis should be directed to other 
aspects of the government initiatives directly encouraging or affecting the vaccine 
industry. These include the health and vaccination policies, S&T policies, R&D projects 
funding, and the effects of these policies on the interactions between BVI and other 
domestic and foreign actors. The regulatory aspects have also highly influenced the 
pharmaceutical industry. The trend toward increasing regulation threatens vaccine 
development due to increasing costs and uncertain returns (Milstien and Candries, 
2002:77). On the other hand complying with international standards is indicative of 
well-developed capabilities in many areas of the firms. 
 
 Innovation in the Knowledge Frontier 
In the last decades there have been major breakthroughs in the development of new 
vaccines (WHO, 2002b) and the number of firms in this business has declined 
(Galambos, 1999). Although vaccine R&D is seen as increasingly risky, costly and 
lengthy (WHO, 2002b), new technologies in the 21
st
 century will guarantee a passage 
from the golden age to the platinum age of vaccinology (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). In 
addition, the new technologies come protected by patents, which impede the 
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development in particular domains (Plotkin, 2005c:632).
98
 For new entrants it becomes 
increasingly difficult to catch-up. In turn, it makes them rely more often on technology 
transfers and licensing (Milstien et al., 2007). In fact, as noted by Gadelha and Azevedo 
(2003), the BVI has been unable to keep up with international developments. Innovation 
and development of vaccines in the knowledge frontier is certainly one of the most 
complex issues influencing the development of the BVI, therefore requiring special 
attention to the purpose of this research. 
 
 The Specificities of the Vaccine Sector 
The vaccine sector seems highly influenced by special characteristics that have been 
raising growing concerns in the international community and have a different appeal in 
the world economic scenario. The social relevance of the adoption of vaccination, 
especially in developing and in the poorest countries, along with the high technological 
complexity of vaccine development and the constraints faced by governments due to the 
effects of an oligopsonistic market, are possible reasons that have shaped a unique 
industrial sector. This suggests a different perspective to assess the role of markets, 
governments and institutions in the development of this sector and of the BVI in 
particular. 
 
c) Transition Issues 
The main aspects of the transition issues approached in this research were stressed in 
Sub-section 3.4.3 of this chapter, and Sub-section 2.3.4 of the previous chapter (pg. 58 
and 29 respectively). This research argues that the characteristics of the transition phase 
of the BVI are closely linked to, and influenced by, the specific pattern of technological 
capabilities development of this industry. Therefore, to interpret this transition phase 
this research will draw on the analysis of the “sources of knowledge” and “other 
influencing elements” groups proposed above in the light of the specific characteristics 
of transition, as raised in the works of Dutrénit and Hobday et al and summarized in 
Table 3.3 (pg. 62-63). The current level of technological capabilities development, and 
the supposed constraints and/or innovative initiatives to the development of 
strategic/competitive capabilities in the BVI, are expected to emerge from this way of 
looking at these events and data. Moreover, an alternative way of assessing the current 
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level of technological capabilities of the BVI, as well as of identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses in the process of development of this type of capability, is a tool to be used 
complementarily to the above analysis in order to strengthen the findings of this 
research. 
 
d) New directions/paths 
Looking for new directions/paths means to investigate whether the development of the 
BVI presents innovative initiatives that can be considered as being distinguishing from 
the common pattern of development identified in linear approaches of catching-up, in an 
attempt to overcome its disadvantages and barriers. This will be carried out through 
looking for similarities and differences throughout the analysis of the elements 
described in items a) to c) above and their relationships. The existence of new 
directions/paths in the development of the BVI may strengthen the arguments around 
latecomer development inspired in the ideas of Gerschenkron. It may also disclose new 
characteristics of latecomer development based on this type of strategy. 
  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter describes the motivations of this research and the rationale for the 
identification of the research problem and for setting the objectives of this research. It 
also presents the research questions and propositions to be investigated. The conceptual 
and analytical ideas that nurture the development of this research and the analysis to be 
carried out are then developed and explained. 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that the specificities of the context of the Brazilian 
vaccine industry (BVI) may be determining a particular pattern of technological 
accumulation within this industry, and that interpreting this pattern of development may 
be useful in understanding how and if the BVI has overcome its disadvantages to 
develop.  
 
Rather than choosing a single approach amongst the ones stressed in the previous 
chapter for interpreting the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry, this research 
is proposing to perform this task in a different and simple way. In this sense it is 
proposed to integrate two different approaches regarding both the linear catching-up 
model of industries/firms of latecomer economies and the transition issues involved in 
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the development of advanced/competitive capabilities. The first reason behind this idea 
is the attempt to benefit from the broader concepts embedded in the former, along with 
the more specific ones represented by the latter, in order to interpret the development of 
the BVI in its entire length, with a focus on its supposedly current transition phase. 
 
The second reason is to provide a benchmark model in the search for similarities and 
differences in the pattern of development of this industry. This is in order to investigate 
the existence of new directions/paths in its strategy of development, in line with 
contemporaneous works that draw on the theory of “backwardness and substitute for 
missing prerequisites” of Gerschenkron. 
 
This chapter also presents the framework that supports the analysis of the above-
mentioned contexts and describes the analytical aspects of the elements of this 
framework in order to address the research questions and propositions. The next chapter 
defines the research design and the strategies to the operationalization of the analysis 
and to answer these research questions. 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the overall strategy for answering the research questions and 
achieving the research objectives. It relates to the operationalization of the frameworks 
and concepts developed in the previous chapter. It explains the research design chosen 
and the operationalization of data gathering. It is also about the analysis of the data 
gathered.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains the rationale for defining the 
research strategy and design (Sub-section 4.2.1) and the aspects that contributed to the 
definition of the boundaries of this research (Sub-section 4.2.2). Section 4.3 relates to 
the operationalization of data and data collection. The topics covered and data selected 
are presented in Sub-section 4.3.1, and the methods of data gathering are introduced and 
explained in Sub-section 4.3.2. Section 4.4 shows how the evidence has been analyzed. 
Section 4.5 summarizes the content of the whole chapter. 
 
4.2 Research Strategy and Design and the Boundaries of the Research 
This section introduces the research strategy and design and states why they were 
chosen (Sub-section 4.2.1). It also explains how the boundaries of the study were 
defined (Sub-section 4.2.2).  
 
4.2.1 Research Strategy and Design 
The general aim of this research is to investigate the circumstances which have been 
both enabling and hindering the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI). In 
the previous chapter the conceptual and analytical frameworks were developed and 
explained to fit the specificities of this research. This research argues that the BVI might 
be developing its technological capabilities in a way that is distinct from the 
common/linear pattern suggested in the literature for most of the catching-up industries 
of latecomer countries. Additionally, it is also argued that the characteristics of the 
specific pattern of development of this industry may be setting back the transition to the 
development of more complex innovative capabilities. The framework proposes to 
integrate these two conceptual issues (the pattern of technological capabilities 
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development in catching-up countries, and the transition within innovative capabilities 
development) as a benchmark model in order to interpret the development of the BVI 
and address the third conceptual issue – the existence of new directions/paths as an 
alternative strategy to develop. 
 
In order to interpret how the BVI has developed its pattern of technological capabilities 
over time (Research Question 1), an investigation of some specific elements of its 
environment has been suggested, i.e., its sources of technological knowledge and other 
internal and external influencing elements. To interpret how far this industry has gone 
to date, how and why (Research Question 2), analyzing the specific issues of its 
transition phase in the light of the findings of the works of Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and 
Hobday et al. (2004) has also been suggested. The integration of both conceptual issues 
means that interpreting the first will help to understand the second, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the use of the innovation transition approach intends to throw light on the 
micro dynamics of a critical phase, that is, when the firms have been developing more 
advanced technological capabilities. In addition, this model, based on linear approaches 
of catching-up, is intended to serve as a benchmark to the search for similarities and 
differences in the pattern of development of the BVI. The expected results are a better 
understanding of the whole process and the disclosure of the specific characteristics of 
the process of technological accumulation of the BVI. 
 
The focus on contemporary events of the context of the BVI and the “how” and “why” 
types of question posed, as shown above, clearly set the stage for an explanatory case 
study strategy, in line with the definitions proposed by Yin (1981, 2003) for this type of 
study. More careful explanation is needed, however, to justify the choice for a single-
case rather than a multiple-case study design. An initial reason relates to the theory 
underlying the study and the type of questions and propositions posed. They are of an 
holistic nature and address a more general phenomenon of the industry, as shown in the 
previous paragraph.  
 
A second reason comes from the analysis of the preliminary data gathered about the 
structure of the BVI. Even though the Brazilian vaccine market may be considered 
expressive when compared to the world market, the BVI comprises only four 
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manufacturers.
99
 These manufacturers are public, address the public market only and 
supply different products to the National Immunization Programme (PNI).
100,101,102
 Two 
of these manufacturers have supplied over 97% of the PNI local purchases and the great 
majority of the products purchased. Also, these two manufacturers were the only firms 
to introduce new products in the last two decades, most of them based on the acquisition 
of foreign technology.  
 
From the above facts one can consider these two biggest manufacturers as highly 
representative of the industry and, consequently, the focus of this research was 
concentrated on them.
103
 If the two reasons are put together and described from a 
different viewpoint, the findings of each of unit of analysis were expected to contribute 
to the general purpose of the research and would not be used for comparisons between 
them. These constitute what Yin (2003:40-46) considers as some of the rationales for 
designing a single and embedded case study – a single case-study with multiple units of 
analysis. This design was then adopted for the purposes of this research. 
 
Still relating to the research design, another important perspective was considered here. 
This research essentially focuses on the dynamics of building up technological 
capabilities over time. Investigating the pattern of technological capabilities 
development means trying to understand how a sequence of events has unfolded over a 
period of time. Similarly, investigating transition within innovative capabilities 
development means a temporal examination of events being changed. The order of the 
sequence of events is thus relevant to interpreting the phenomena. These characteristics 
basically require an event-driven explanation and characterize the need for a process 
approach in order to adequately address the research questions (Van De Ven and Poole, 
1995; Van de Ven, 2007). This was also taken into consideration here. 
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 The figures about the world and the Brazilian vaccine markets as well as the details about the 
manufacturers are presented in Chapter 6. 
100
 The smallest of the manufacturers – the Ataulfo de Paiva Foundation - is not public but a non-profit 
private organization (see Sub-section 6.2.4 on pg. 140). 
101
 One of the two biggest manufacturers – the Institute of Technology on Immunobiologicals (Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz) – also supplies some vaccines for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).  
102
 Supplying different products for the PNI means that the manufacturers have not, so far, competed with 
each other. 
103
 However, some data from the other two manufacturers were also occasionally considered. 
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Additionally, this research has taken a retrospective account because technological 
capabilities usually develop over a long period of time, sometimes over decades, as 
noted by some authors (Dahlman et al., 1987; Hobday, 1995), making it useless to 
observe the events in real time over a short period. This seems especially true in the 
field of vaccine, which is characterized by long cycles of technological development as 
stated by Galambos and Sewell (1995). According to Van de Ven (2007:208), knowing 
the outcomes of a process in advance may be helpful for interpreting events that have 
already unfolded.  
 
This research is also qualitative as it relies mainly on wordy rather than on numerical 
evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, some quantitative 
data were also collected, since they proved useful in helping qualitative analysis in 
certain situations. Furthermore, multiple forms of data collection, such as interviews, a 
survey and secondary sources (e.g. government publications, firm’s institutional folders, 
annual reports, academic theses and dissertations, specialized magazines and firms’ and 
other institutions’ web pages) were used.104 This research also benefited from a small 
number of informal conversations that were useful, especially to check the need for 
further data. According to some authors (Hakim, 1987:63; Yin, 2003:97), the use of 
multiple sources of data strengthens the outcomes of a case study and makes this type of 
research design very powerful.  
 
4.2.2 The Boundaries of the Study 
The boundaries of the research were defined in two steps: before and after the fieldwork. 
Before the fieldwork some preliminary data about the history and contemporaneous 
facts on vaccination in Brazil were determinative. Firstly, a threshold was defined: the 
establishment of the National Immunization Programme (PNI). Created in 1973 by the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) the PNI was the driver for the transformation of the 
Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI) and of immunization in Brazil.
105
 Therefore, the period 
of analysis of this research starts in the mid-1970s, when the public market started 
growing faster, public demands received poor answers from the manufacturers and, 
consequently, public investments in new industrial facilities took place, technology 
transfer processes became a continuous technological strategy, and the vaccines began 
                                                 
104
 More details about data collection and sources of data are presented in Sub-section 4.3.2. 
105
 The PNI and the success of the immunization initiatives in Brazil are described in detail in Chapter 6. 
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to be produced by the BVI under tighter quality control standards. Notwithstanding, 
some interesting and useful historical facts about this industry have also been used to 
illustrate and give sense to the arguments.  
 
Secondly, the four national producers and the public market were defined as comprising 
the scope of the study. The private market is dispersed and supplied only by the biggest 
international pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”) and little information is 
available (Temporão, 2002). Moreover, there is no technological activity involved since 
the “Big Pharma” do not produce vaccines locally but import all the vaccines they sell 
in Brazil. 
 
During the fieldwork it became clear that the two smaller national producers would be 
of minor interest for the purposes of this study.
106
 Even though their few products have 
been important to PNI so far, they constitute very old technologies and both producers 
have been carrying out only basic R&D activities within this field. Therefore, only 
limited data were collected from them. On the other hand the two other producers – the 
Instituto de Tecnologia em Imunobiológicos (Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz) and the 
Instituto Butantan – were confirmed as meeting the characteristics proposed in this 
research. Moreover, figures proved these manufacturers are highly representative of the 
BVI, as stated in the previous sub-section and presented in Chapter 6.
107
 Focus was 
therefore directed on them. 
 
An additional point should be restated here. The firms comprising the BVI also explore 
other segments of Immunobiologicals (e.g. serum, biopharmaceuticals and diagnostic 
reagents).
108
 For the purpose of this research, however, only the vaccine segment is 
being discussed. As stated in the previous chapter (Sub-section 3.4.2 on pg. 58) the 
conceptual model developed does not encompass the general strategy of diversification 
of the firms but the strategies to the vaccine segment only. 
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 They are the Fundação Ataulfo de Paiva and the Instituto de Tecnologia do Paraná (TECPAR). See 
details about both manufacturers in Sub-section 6.2.4 on pg. 140 and 141, and some comparative data of 
the four manufacturers in Table 6.6 on pg. 143. 
107
 Details about both manufacturers in the same sub-section (pg. 137-140) and Table referred to in the 
previous footnote. 
108
 Vaccine is the main segment of three of the four firms. See Sub-section 6.2.4 (pg. 135-143) of Chapter 
6 for more details about this issue. 
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4.3 Operationalizing Data and Data Collection 
In Chapter 3 the frameworks were developed, their elements were set up and some 
analytical aspects of these elements were defined. This section is about the data to be 
gathered (Sub-section 4.3.1) and the methods of data collection (Sub-section 4.3.2), in 
line with the research design chosen. 
 
4.3.1 Operationalizing Data 
The main concern of this stage was to select the type of data to be gathered which could 
provide an evolving picture of the evidence as well as being meaningful for qualitative 
analysis. A second concern was about the amount of data to be collected in order not to 
overload the analysis. It is acknowledged that some new portions of data tend to emerge 
during the fieldwork as a dynamic in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).
109
 A third concern was about the accuracy of the data and triangulation, a matter 
that is discussed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
 
In the previous chapter the selected elements for the analysis of the technological 
capabilities development of the BVI were arranged in four groups: a) the sources of 
knowledge; b) other influencing elements; c) transition issues; and, d) new 
directions/paths. Some analytical aspects of these elements were then defined in order to 
orient the better choice for data.
110
 The elements of group d) above are embedded in the 
analysis of the elements of the other groups. 
 
The topics of information chosen were therefore arranged within the first three groups 
and specified by each element. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the topics and types of data 
selected to constitute the evidence of both (i) the sources of technological knowledge 
and (ii) the other internal and external influencing elements, respectively. They were 
primarily intended to address the analysis of the pattern of technological capabilities 
development concept, but they have also helped the analysis of the other conceptual 
issue – transition within innovative capabilities development. For specifically 
addressing this latter issue other strategies were also adopted and they are explained in 
item (iii). 
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 In this research the importance of the aspects of the transition phase within the development of more 
complex innovative capabilities became more evident during the fieldwork, and led to a higher emphasis 
on this issue in order to strengthen the understanding of the development of the BVI. 
110
 See Sub-section 3.5.2 on pg. 66-75. 
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(i) Sources of Knowledge 
 
Table 4.1: Topics and Types of Data about Sources of Knowledge 
Elements Topics Covered / Types of Data Selected 
Technology Acquisition 
. sources of technology of each product launched in 
the market (foreign technology or in-house 
development); 
. mechanisms of technology transfer used; 
. gap between the launching of each technology in 
the international market and its launch in the 
Brazilian market; 
. aspects of the strategy of technology acquisition; 
R&D (including clinical 
trials) 
. domain of capabilities required to develop a 
vaccine; 
. investments in R&D; 
. personnel employed; 
. sources of knowledge exploited; 
. existence of process and product innovation; 
. existence of candidate products in clinical trials; 
. existence of clinical trials activities and capabilities 
developed; 
. strategies for innovation; 
Design and Engineering . main activities and capabilities developed 
Internal and External 
Linkages 
. existence and importance of links between 
Operating and Innovative areas; 
. existence of capabilities flowing from Operating 
(acquired technology) to Innovative areas; 
. existence and results of links and alliances between 
firms within the BVI; 
. existence and results of links and alliances between 
the BVI and external firms, research institutions 
(including universities) and other institutions; 
. existence and importance of links with suppliers; 
. use of consultancy and/or skilled specialists in 
technological activities; 
. importance of prior knowledge; 
. strategies for collaborating. 
Learning by Training 
. awareness of the importance of learning; 
. mechanisms of formal technological training; 
. training embedded in technology transfer processes; 
. on-the-job training; 
. investments in training; 
Source: own elaboration. 
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(ii) Other Internal and External Influencing Elements 
 
Table 4.2: Topics and Types of Data about Other Influencing Elements 
Elements Topics Covered / Types of Data Selected 
Organizational Capabilities 
. project management experience; 
. existence of awareness to the development of 
managerial capabilities; 
. existence of initiatives to strengthen the managerial 
capabilities; 
Markets 
. main figures; 
. dynamics of the Brazilian public market; 
. international and Brazilian markets as an 
opportunity and as a threat; 
. actors of the markets; 
Government Policies, 
Institutions and Regulations 
. existence and adequacy of policies stimulating this 
industry, especially innovation; 
. impact of regulation on the development of 
innovative capabilities; 
. existence and importance of institutions in the 
national and international contexts to the 
development of this industry; 
Innovation in the Knowledge 
Frontier 
. breakthroughs within vaccine development and 
alternative strategies adopted by the BVI; 
Social and Technological 
Specificities 
. evidences which could possibly characterize the 
vaccine as a singular sector. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
(iii) Transition Issues 
As stated earlier, some of the evidence for the analysis of the transition within the 
innovative capabilities development concept is embedded in the topics listed in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2. However, to address the issues raised by Research Question 2 and its 
propositions in more detail, drawing on the approach on innovation transition reviewed 
in the literature, this research made use of other types of data. The objective was to 
select the type of data that could help the identification of the level of complexity of the 
innovative capabilities developed by the BVI to date, and of the boundaries, 
characteristics and constraints of the transition phase of this industry. Thus the data 
selected mirrored the results of other experiences approached in the works on 
innovation transition as described in Table 3.3 on pg. 62-63. 
 
As a complementary tool for the analysis of the transition phase this research made use 
of a survey. The Simple Survey Tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001) is one of the 
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three audit tools designed by the authors for assessing technological capabilities of 
firms. This tool provides a quick assessment of the level of technological capability and 
points out strengths and weaknesses across the nine dimensions listed in Table 4.3. Its 
adoption proved successful and useful in some previous works related to innovation 
transition (e.g. Hobday et al., 2004; Rush et al., 2007) and, therefore, it was considered 
adequate for the purposes of this research. One further advantage of this survey was to 
cover several points of the interview questions by a larger distributed population. 
Conversely, the result of the interviews helped to explore the issues of the survey in 
more detail and at greater depth. 
 
Table 4.3: The Nine Dimensions for Assessing Technological Capabilities 
1 – Awareness 
2 – Searching 
3 – Building core technological competences 
4 – Technology strategy 
5 – Assessing and selecting technology 
6 – Technology acquisition 
7 – Implementing and absorbing technology 
8 – Learning 
9 – Exploiting external linkages and incentives 
Source: Bessant et al. (2001). 
 
4.3.2 Operationalizing Data Collection 
Data to cover the topics listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and those about transition issues, 
were collected through a variety of ways and in two rounds. Most of data were collected 
in the first and main round. A second round was undertaken mainly to address missing 
points and to clarify possible inconsistencies. However, the survey, two new interviews, 
and an extension of one previous interview were also carried out during this second 
round of fieldwork. 
 
Given the high specificity of the topics to be addressed, a large body of data was 
gathered through semi-structured interviews. This type of interview has proved to be 
appropriate as it allows a combination of guided questions with a certain freedom in 
questioning and answering. In addition, it provides a closer interaction with the 
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interviewees. As long answers were expected, and since there was no objection by the 
interviewees, the interviews were all audio recorded. This allowed more attention to be 
paid to the answers during the interviews, a quicker managing of the interviews 
conducted, a later review and pre-analysis of data gathered in order to search for 
missing points during these interviews, and easier access to the data gathered during the 
data analysis phase. 
 
A short protocol adapted from Yin (2003:67-77) was used as a guide to the interviews 
and as a source of general information about the research to the interviewees. The 
research protocol was constituted of two parts. The first part comprised the specific 
information to help with the interviews, such as the agenda of the process (e.g. 
prearranged interviews, date, place, interviews planned to be arranged on the site, 
contacts), general information about the research (e.g. research questions, propositions, 
topics of interest), background information about the firm of each interviewee and the 
interview questions. The second part comprised the general information to make the 
interviewees aware of the objectives of the research, as well as the terms for requesting 
permission to audio record the interview and for stating the strict use of data gathered 
during the interviews for the purpose of the research only. 
 
The interviews were primarily designed to cover four different themes: Policies, 
Strategies/Management, Operating Capabilities and Innovative Capabilities. A set of 20 
interviews was conducted initially. They lasted 90 minutes each on average. Some of 
the interviews covered more than one subject since the interviewee showed 
familiarization and a willingness to contribute to other themes. Two interviewees 
spontaneously approached issues about markets. A further two interviews were 
conducted later on other specific themes (Clinical Trials, and Engineering and Design) 
to complement information gathered through documentation and other sources and to 
address specific issues of the research. One previous interview was complemented 
during this second set of interviews. Due to the small number of firms and consequently 
the small number of interviews, emphasis was given to selecting senior actors as 
interviewees inside and outside the firms. Table 4.4 presents the number of interviews 
by each of the subjects approached. The list of interviewees with their current and 
previous positions is presented in Annex A. 
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Besides the interviews and a few informal meetings this research benefited from a wide 
and rich variety of sources of data. Some recent studies about this industry proved 
highly useful and eclectic, providing both historical and contemporaneous facts besides 
discussing proposals for the development of the BVI (e.g. Benchimol and Teixeira, 
1993; Benchimol, 2001; Brasil, 2003; Buss et al., 2005; Azevedo and Gadelha, 2007). 
Papers, government documents (e.g. Laws, Ministerial Acts), theses, dissertations, 
institutional folders, annual reports and the Internet are also amongst the vast range of 
sources of data used. Technical information, information about investments, personnel 
and the main projects undertaken within the R&D area of the two biggest firms was 
requested and provided by the firms in most cases. Some figures about this industry 
were also provided by the Coordination of the PNI/Ministry of Health. 
 
Table 4.4: Number of Interviews by Subject 
Subject No. of 
Interviews
1
 
Policies 6 
Strategies/Management 7 
Operating Capabilities 4 
Innovative Capabilities 9 
Clinical Trials 3 
Engineering and Design 1 
Market 2 
1
 Some interviewees approached more than one subject.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
With regard to the survey, this was conducted in the biggest firm of the BVI across all 
of its working areas. The firm was chosen not only because of its relevance within the 
context of the industry but also due to logistical reasons and the higher probability of 
obtaining a good response rate. In this sense there were 123 valid responses 
representing 10.6% of the total number of employees of the firm, and 22.9% of the 
employees in positions requiring graduation as the minimum background, to whom the 
survey was directed.
111
 The questions formulated for the audit tool by the authors were 
kept for the survey, but some variables about the population were introduced (e.g. area 
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 There were 140 responses in total of which 17 were not considered due to high blank responses (16 
questionnaires) and due to lack of coherence (1 questionnaire). The percentage was calculated over the 
number of employees in August 2009, as provided by the Human Resources Department of the firm.  
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of work – R&D/Production/Engineering/Quality/Management; years in the firm – less 
than 10/between 10 and 20/over 20; type of post – manager/non-manager; and highest 
qualification – graduation/specialization/MSc/PhD). 112  The results of the survey are 
presented in Chapter 7 on pg. 201-206. The questionnaire and the analytical tables are 
reproduced in Annex B. 
 
Finally, the choice of the sources of data embedded the concern with triangulation. This 
research has tried to avoid bias and strengthen the reliability and validity of data using 
many different methods. As shown before, the use of multiple sources of evidence was 
one method used. In this case, this strategy was adopted not only for gathering a wider 
variety of data but also for looking for convergences and discrepancies in the evidences 
gathered. Yin (2003:98-100) emphasizes that data triangulation of multiple sources 
happens only when there is a convergence in the facts addressed. Van de Ven 
(2007:284-285) distinguishes between reliability and validity in triangulating data. He 
notes that convergence of data addresses only the reliability of data. Validity, instead, is 
obtained from different perspectives of the phenomenon approached.  
 
The selection of senior actors as interviewees was another strategy. Most of the 
interviewees are managers in high positions inside the firms and have been working in 
the BVI for many years. Furthermore, many of them started working in the BVI around 
the beginning of the main period covered by this research (1970s).
113
 However, in 
addition to the other sources of data, this research made use of some quantitative figures 
to help to corroborate some of the data gathered through interviews and to avoid what 
Miles and Huberman (1994:41) call “elite bias”.114 Moreover, the survey provided data 
from a broader and varied population, as stated before, allowing the analysis of some 
points approached in the interviews from other perspectives. 
 
4.4 Analyzing and Interpreting Data 
The analysis of the data was carried out in three main steps. The first one started almost 
simultaneously with the data collection during the fieldwork, drawing on some methods 
described by Miles and Huberman (1994:50-53) for organizing early analysis. Although 
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 The authors emphasize that diversity in the population surveyed brings a more representative view 
from inside the firm and can be very informative (Bessant et al., 2001:10). 
113
 The profile of the interviewees is presented in Annex A. 
114
 For “elite bias” the authors mean “talking only to high-status respondents”.  
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it had been only a primary analysis this proved an arduous task as the main concern was 
not to delay the data collection including the period planned for the interviews. On the 
other hand the exact objective to raise feedback from the material already collected in 
order to detect possible inconsistencies, address missing points before the end of the 
fieldwork, and improve the approach for the subsequent interviews, if needed, by 
adding possible contradictory ideas. As a matter of fact the pre-analysis of some data 
provided by the firms before starting the set of interviews, was key in determining the 
need for more emphasis on the transition issues and led to the strengthening of the 
interview questions in the same direction. In addition, it led to the search for more data 
that could more accurately address the transition context of the development of the 
firms. 
 
The second step in the process of data analysis was the longest and most laborious one. 
It consisted of organizing all the data according to the elements and topics selected, and 
defined for the characterization of the level of importance of the sources of knowledge 
and of the influence of other internal and external elements, as described in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2. Data were also organized in order to represent the chronology of the events 
since this process approach is fundamental for interpreting development and change in 
organizations across time, as noted by Van De Ven and Poole (1995).  
 
This generated large draft tables, or what Miles and Hubeman (1994:90) describe as 
“display”. In this specific case the drafts were arranged in a format inspired in the 
“time-ordered matrix” format described by these authors as appropriate to track 
sequences, processes and flows (ibid. p.119-120), and they contributed to the building 
of the empirical chapters (Chapters 5 to 7). During this phase some doubts and missing 
points were raised. They were clarified during the second round of data collection. The 
survey was also carried out during this second round of fieldwork. These new data were 
also analyzed during this second step of data analysis. 
 
The last step of the data analysis referred to the linking of the conceptual issues 
approached in the literature review, and organized within the frameworks developed 
with the empirical evidence gathered in order to address the research questions and their 
propositions. This will be described in Chapter 8. In this sense the integration of the 
catch-up approach with the innovation transition approach was put forward, as proposed, 
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allowing the interpretation of the data in three dimensions, and serving as a benchmark 
model to the search for new directions/paths. The first dimension has a broader view 
based on the former approach, the second has a more detailed view, focusing on a 
specific stage of technological capabilities development, as provided by the innovation 
transition approach, and the third dimension refers to the search for innovative 
initiatives across the first two dimensions.  
 
The explanations offered were all built taking into account the order of the events and 
were always illustrated by empirical evidence. For analyzing one specific proposition 
(Proposition 2) the results of the survey and some of the dimensions (along with their 
underlying themes), approached in the audit tool referred to in item iii of Sub-section 
4.3.1, were adapted and successfully used. The claims for the conclusion are presented 
in the last chapter (Chapter 9). 
 
4.5 Summary 
The present chapter has presented the strategies adopted to deal with the conceptual and 
empirical issues of this research that made possible the achievement of the research 
objectives. In this sense it has described the methods for choosing the research design, 
for defining and collecting data as well as the ones for analyzing them. The next chapter 
starts a set of three empirical chapters where the evidence collected and organized is 
presented. 
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Chapter 5 – Vaccine and Innovation on Vaccine 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three dedicated to the description of the empirical issues of 
this research. This first chapter shows how and why vaccine and vaccination have 
achieved a place of distinction in the worldwide public health scenario and why there is 
much still to be done in this field.
115
 Special attention is given to the dynamics of 
innovation on vaccines. It also shows the complexity of dealing with vaccines and the 
capabilities required to develop and manufacture vaccines. 
 
The chapter is organized into five sections. Section 5.2 presents the facts that 
characterize the importance of vaccines today and some paradoxical aspects of their 
existence. It also outlines the history of vaccine worldwide and in Brazil in particular. 
Section 5.3 describes the main breakthroughs that characterize the innovation on 
vaccines. Section 5.4 describes the steps of developing and manufacturing vaccines and 
the capabilities involved in these complex processes. Section 5.5 briefly outlines some 
tendencies in vaccine innovation. Section 5.6 summarizes the concept of the whole 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Facts and History 
This section describes some facts that have made vaccines one of the most important 
tools for public health as well as some hindrances for its development, manufacture and 
administration (Sub-section 5.2.1). The history of vaccine and vaccination in the world 
and in Brazil since its inception is also briefly approached in this section (Sub-sections 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3). 
 
5.2.1 Vaccine – Key Facts and Paradoxes 
Vaccine is acknowledged by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the 
public health interventions – together with clean water – that has achieved the greatest 
impact in world health (WHO, 2002a; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). Immunization is also 
frequently cited as one of the most cost-effective public health interventions (e.g. WHO, 
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 This research uses the terms “immunization” and “vaccination” interchangeably and with similar 
meaning, as already mentioned in the footnote 1 (pg. 3).  
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2002a; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004; Blume, 2005; Orenstein et al., 2007). These two 
statements explain the importance that vaccines and vaccination have achieved in the 
world today. 
 
Vaccines are the keystone of the fight against pathogenic microbes. It is 
vital to develop new vaccines continuously, as well as to improve existing 
vaccines. (Kieny and Girard, 2005:5706). 
 
Indeed, empirical data can better illustrate the importance of the vaccine. Nowadays, 
over 26 serious infectious diseases are preventable by vaccine (a non-exhaustive list of 
human infectious diseases preventable by vaccine is shown in Table 5.1). Millions of 
lives are saved every year across the world, 3 million of them children (Andre, 2003), 
and the risk of disabilities caused by infectious diseases has shown a  significant 
reduction by immunization programmes (WHO, 2002b). The most important 
achievement in the field of vaccinology was against smallpox, declared eradicated from 
the globe by the WHO in 1979 (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004; Blume, 2005). The 
worldwide eradication of poliomyelitis is expected soon (WHO, 2006), and the 
incidence of measles and maternal and neonatal tetanus has been dramatically reduced 
in the poorest countries (WHO, 2002b). Moreover, the use of existing vaccines is 
considered the solution for increasing microbial resistance caused by the use of 
antibiotics and antivirals (Vandersmissen, 2002:S105). Table 5.2 shows an estimation of 
the cost-effectiveness of vaccination. 
 
Notwithstanding, vaccines cross the boundary that divides two paradoxical worlds. On 
the dark side social interests have been frequently dazzled by economic, scientific, 
political, technical and managerial reasons. The wider benefits of existing vaccines have 
not reached millions of children, especially in poorer countries or poorer regions of 
wealthier countries. Estimations from the WHO (2002b:vii) indicate that one-quarter of 
world’s children are still unprotected against preventable infectious diseases, and 2 
million die every year from those diseases. Other studies estimate that 25% of global 
mortality, especially amongst children younger than five years, is still due to infectious 
diseases. This contributes to the great disparity in average life spans between rich and 
poor countries (Kieny et al., 2004:1931). 
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The high price of some vaccines is one of the alleged reasons. The persistence of 
mortality and morbidity caused by some diseases where vaccines are widely available at 
low cost, such as measles and tuberculosis, however, indicates other reasons of 
programmatic and scientific nature respectively, as noted by Vandersmissen 
(2001:1611-1612). Vaccine shortages have frequently happened even in developed 
countries, as described by Hinman et al. (2006), and they have resulted not only from 
the lack of resources to purchase vaccines but also from interruptions in supply due to 
technical problems, higher-than-expected demands or manufacturer’s withdrawals from 
the business for economic reasons. 
 
Table 5.1: Non-exhaustive list of human infectious diseases preventable by vaccine 
. Anthrax  . Poliomyelitis (Types I, II, III)  
. Cholera  . Rabies 
. Diphtheria  . Rotavirus 
. H. Papillomavirus (several Types)   . Rubella 
. Haemophilus influenzae b  . Plague 
. Hepatitis (A, B)  . S. Pneumoniae (several Serotypes) 
. Herpes Zoster  . Smallpox 
. Influenza (several Types)  . Tetanus 
. Japanese Encephalitis  . Tuberculosis 
. Lyme  . Typhoid Fever 
. Measles  . Varicella 
. Mumps  . Whooping Cough 
. N. Meningitidis (several Serogroups)  . Yellow Fever 
Own elaboration. Source: NIH/NIAID (2007:Appendix B) 
 
Recent events have once more raised these concerns and exposed some of the paradoxes 
of this phenomenon. In July 2009, when officially reported cases of the pandemic 
Influenza A (the new H1N1 virus or swine flu) quickly reached almost 100,000 cases 
across the world, with more than 400 deaths in just a few months, the WHO considered 
the spread of the pandemic virus unstoppable by means of intervention other than 
vaccine, and its Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on immunization 
recommended the vaccination of the population for all countries (WHO, 2009b). The 
specific vaccine for this type of virus was still not available, however, and it was 
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estimated that it would not be available for three or four months.
116
 SAGE’s 
recommendations also took into consideration the fact that production capacity of the 
vaccine by the manufacturers would be insufficient for world demand, particularly in 
the first months, and then priorities for distribution should be defined by individual 
governments. Moreover, SAGE advised that each country’s strategy should reflect their 
availability of resources to buy and ability to access the vaccine. Implicit was the 
prediction that many more people would inevitably die from this preventable disease, 
and the poorer countries would have more difficulty in obtaining the vaccines. 
 
Table 5.2: Some estimations of the cost-effectiveness of vaccination 
Rubella Each US$1 spent in vaccination saves nearly US$8 in costs 
associated with the treatment of the disease in the US;  
Poliomyelitis US$1.5 billion/year in costs with vaccines, treatments and 
rehabilitation would be saved when the disease is eradicated, 
according to WHO estimations; 
MMR US$21 is saved for every dollar spent with this vaccine in the 
US, according to the US Institute of Medicine; 
Smallpox Its eradication has saved US$1.3 billion/year in treatment and 
prevention costs; 
Pneumococcus The introduction of the vaccine has been associated with a 39% 
reduction in hospital admissions due to pneumonia from any 
cause. 
Source: NIH/NIAID (2003), Bloom et al. (2005) and WHO (2009a). 
 
Furthermore, even though vaccines and vaccination have achieved this high level of 
importance and acknowledgement over more than 200 years, some anti-vaccine 
movements have taken place in many parts of the world. These were frequently based 
on unscientific reasons or even scientifically disproved (WHO, 2002b; Offit, 
2005).
117,118
 This has caused important impacts on public health, such as the resurgence 
of  some diseases and distrust in vaccines (Andre, 2003), to drug companies, with rising 
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 An effective vaccine against influenza has been available since the 1940s but, as there are hundreds of 
different viruses causing influenza, production depends on the identification and isolation of the influenza 
virus strain each season. The process is similar for this new swine flu virus. 
117
 The existence of anti-vaccine movements is not recent. Since the times of Jenner in the 18
th
 century 
(see sub-section 5.2.2 for more details about Edward Jenner and his discovery), when some people were 
afraid of becoming cow-like hybrids if they were inoculated with the bovine material for the 
immunization against smallpox (Andre, 2003), there have been reports about these movements. In Brazil, 
a movement known as “The Rebellion of the Vaccine” took place in 1904 against a government law 
obliging the population to be vaccinated against smallpox (Benchimol, 2001). More recently, there have 
been several unproven associations between vaccines and heath conditions. Andre (2003:595) lists some 
of these associations in countries such as Scotland, Japan, Canada, France UK and US. 
118
 Adverse events post-vaccination have occurred, however, and are largely described in the literature. 
See, for example, Andre (2003), Plotkin and Plotkin (2004) and Hinman et al. (2006). 
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liability risks and possibility of litigation (Vandersmissen, 2002), and of R&D costs due 
to tighter regulatory issues (Wilson et al., 2007).
119,120
 
 
… no medical product is 100 percent (sic) safe or effective. Vaccines have been 
proven, over decades, to be one of the safest and most powerful disease 
prevention tools available (FDA, web page, accessed in 9/2009).
121
 
 
In fact, and paradoxically, the main and biggest manufacturers and developers of 
vaccines nowadays are a few multinational pharmaceutical companies. These 
companies mainly make their revenue and profit from the drug market, which is 
estimated to be more than 50 times larger than the vaccine market, and considered much 
more profitable and much less risky (Gréco, 2001; Vandersmissen, 2002; Plotkin, 2005c; 
Hinman et al., 2006). The forces which have caused manufacturer’s withdrawals from 
the vaccine market are still present (Vandersmissen, 2002).
122
 Moreover, even though 
60% of the demand for vaccines in volume terms is in poor countries (Blume, 2005), the 
new vaccines are often developed to address diseases of the developed world and are, in 
many cases, not suitable for the same disease in developing countries (WHO, 2002b; 
Mahoney et al., 2007).
123
 
 
From the scientific point of view, however, there is a prolific way and great expectation 
for the near future in terms of new vaccines and vaccination, as noted by many authors 
(e.g. Galambos, 1999; Andre, 2003; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004; Plotkin, 2005b). Besides, 
as several important infectious diseases are still not preventable by vaccines (e.g. 
malaria, HIV, hepatitis C, Dengue, SARS, leishmaniasis and avian influenza), and new 
ones have emerged through mechanisms such as mutation, transformation and 
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 A typical example of impact on the firms is the case of the Lyme vaccine. This recombinant vaccine, 
the first against the disease, was linked to some adverse effects and, although never proven, this fact 
negatively impacted on the sales and led the manufacturer (GSK) to withdraw the vaccine in 2002, a few 
years after its licensing (Plotkin, 2005c; Wilson et al., 2007). 
120
 Most authors do not associate the tightening of regulatory requirements to the existence of anti-vaccine 
movements, but to the evolution of good clinical and manufacturing practices (e.g. Andre, 2003), or to the 
need to ensure the potential safety of the vaccines (e.g. Milstien and Candries, 2002). Plotkin (2005a), 
however, mentions the societal aversion to risk as causing the regulators to apply the “principle of 
precaution” on the tightening of the regulatory requirements. 
121
 http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/VaccineSafety/ucm133806.htm  
122
 The industry and the economics of vaccine are better developed in Chapter 6. 
123
 According to the report of the WHO, different types and often more dangerous forms of organisms 
prevalent in developing countries, especially amongst children suffering from malnutrition, may cause the 
same disease found in developed countries. This is one of the constraints to the adoption of some new 
vaccines in poorer countries (WHO, 2002b:xi). Mahoney et al. (2007:4004) give the example of the 7-
valent Pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, which serotypes covered are the ones prevalent in developed 
countries and its effectiveness in developing countries is still not proved. 
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interspecies transfers, much needs to be done and new technologies will evolve from 
old ones, according to Plotkin (2005a). 
 
By helping to reduce the burden of disease, new, improved and more accessible 
vaccines will contribute to international efforts to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals and to global efforts to reduce poverty, and should lead to a 
safer and more equitable world (Kieny and Girard, 2005:5706). 
 
5.2.2 History at a Glance 
Curious procedures, such as the blowing of powdered pox crusts into people’s nostrils 
in ancient China or the intake of snake venom by Indian Buddhists in the 7
th
 century, are 
described in the literature as some of the earliest attempts at immunization (Hilleman, 
2000; Gréco, 2001; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). However, documented initiatives of 
systematic “variolation”, the introduction of dried material from smallpox pustules into 
healthy individuals, date from the 17
th
 century (Bazin, 2003; Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). 
The technique of variolation spread to many parts of the world during the 18
th
 century, 
when smallpox became the most terrible disease, but it could lead to several fatal 
reactions and further contagions from newly variolated people; this meant that people 
were hesitant to use this method (Bazin, 2003; Plotkin, 2005b). 
 
The word vaccine was coined by the English doctor Edward Jenner in 1798, following 
the completion of his successful experiments on preventing smallpox (BBC, web page, 
accessed in 11/2007).
124
 Indeed, this was the first scientific attempt to control an 
infectious disease (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). Besides being a result of scientific work, 
the “vaccine” developed by Jenner was innovative as it used another known infectious 
disease, cowpox, as the principle to immunize against smallpox.
125
 The great advantage 
of Jenner’s discovery over the variolation technique was that cowpox was a less 
aggressive illness in humans. The sciences of vaccinology and immunology were born 
then (Hilleman, 2000). 
 
After Jenner the road to the development of new vaccines was not an easy one. The 
achievements were thanks to advances in science and revolutions in vaccinology, as 
approached by Plotkin (2005a). Almost 90 years later, the development of the second 
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 Available online at www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/jenner_edward.shtml . 
125
 The work of Jenner – “Variolae Vaccinae” – was published in 1798 by the Royal Society (see web 
page cited in the previous footnote). 
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human vaccine was then made possible. The French scientist Louis Pasteur developed 
the rabies vaccine in 1885 following his successful experiments in modifying the 
virulence of microorganisms.
126
 Shortly after, still in the 19
th
 century, new vaccines 
were developed for typhoid, plague and cholera thanks to another new technique of 
dealing with microorganisms – the inactivation.127 
 
During the last century the world saw great advances in the development of new 
vaccines, major discoveries have become vaccines, and vaccination has become the 
greatest ally in reducing mortality and controlling several infectious diseases. In the 
1920s and 1930s new vaccines against seven different infectious diseases were 
introduced. Table 5.3 presents the chronology of vaccine introduction in the world by 
each of the main technological approaches discussed in the next section. However it was 
after World War II, when most of the currently used vaccines were introduced, that the 
golden age of vaccine development was reached (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). During the 
war, and in the first decades after the war, the United States became the driver for 
breakthroughs in vaccinology and for the development of new vaccines since the most 
advanced European countries were recovering from the devastation of the war 
(Galambos, 1999). According to Hilleman (2002:25) the “modern era vaccines” were 
starting. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the vaccine business – development, production and marketing 
– was carried out mainly by the public sector and small enterprises. From the 1970s 
onwards, again pushed by breakthroughs in science (and with the development of new 
and more technologically sophisticated vaccines, the tightening of manufacturing 
practices and the increasing costs of R&D, manufacturing and marketing), the actors 
have changed. Large pharmaceutical enterprises now dominate the scene (Blume and 
Zanders, 2006) whilst several smaller manufacturers have left the market (Hinman et al., 
2006). 
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 Just before the development of the rabies vaccine, Pasteur developed other vaccines against diseases 
such as chicken cholera and anthrax. However they were developed for animals and were not to be 
administered to humans. These vaccines are acknowledged by some authors as the first vaccines using the 
same agent that caused the disease, and different from Jenner’s vaccine (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004).  
127
 The isolation of bacteria and viruses, the “germ theory”, and the concepts of antibodies and cellular 
immunity are described in the literature as important advances in science that made the development of 
vaccines possible after the rabies vaccine of Pasteur in the late 18
th
 century (Bazin, 2003; Plotkin and 
Plotkin, 2004). The discoveries of Jenner and Pasteur were, in fact, considered totally empirical as they 
didn’t know how the vaccines actually generated protection (Bazin, 2003; Orsenigo et al., 2006). 
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More than 200 years after they were first developed, the history of vaccine is still under 
construction. The list of diseases for which there is still no vaccine is far bigger than the 
one with diseases currently covered by licensed vaccines (Plotkin, 2005c:631). On the 
other hand, the number of general strategies and specific technical approaches for 
making new vaccines has expanded quickly and become limitless, as noted by 
Galambos (1999:S9). 
 
5.2.3 Vaccines and Vaccination in Brazil – the beginning of the history 
The history of vaccine and vaccination in Brazil is long and interesting. It began in the 
early 1800s, just after the arrival of the Portuguese Royal Family to settle in Rio de 
Janeiro.
128
 Amongst the initiatives which started the social, political and economic 
transformation of Brazilian society was the creation of the “Junta Vacínica da Corte” in 
1811, a state maintained Institution responsible for disseminating the use of the 
“Jennerian” vaccine against smallpox (Fernandes, 1999).129 
 
Many years later, in the late 1890s, an unknown infectious disease arrived in Brazil 
through Santos harbour and quickly spread among the population. Bubonic plague was 
identified by two young physicians, Oswaldo Cruz and Vital Brazil, and the shortage of 
serum, only produced at that time by the French Pasteur Institute, led to the creation of 
two new institutions – the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) in 1900 and the Butantan 
Institute in 1901 (Benchimol and Teixeira, 1993).
130
 The young physicians were named 
to organize and direct the new institutions.
131
 
 
Shortly after their inauguration both institutes were able to produce immunobiologicals 
for several diseases such as Bubonic Plague, Smallpox, Rabies, Diphtheria and Cholera, 
as well as carrying out important research in the health area that achieved international 
acknowledgement. It is clear from the literature that both institutes were, at that time, 
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 The Portuguese Royal Family arrived in Brazil in 1908 with 15,000 members of Portuguese society 
escaping from Napoléon’s invasion of Portugal. 
129
 The Junta Vacinica da Corte was created with similar orientation to European Institutions such as the 
English Vaccine Institute and the Chambon of Paris (Fernandes, 1999:31). 
130
 Oswaldo Cruz, 27 years old, had recently arrived from France where he attended the Microbiology 
Course in Pasteur Institute. Vital Brazil worked for the Bacteriological Institute of São Paulo and attended 
a specialization in laboratory work in Paris. 
131
 The Butantan Institute was created by the Government of São Paulo State. The creation of the 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation was an initiative of the Government of Rio de Janeiro City. Shortly after, it 
passed to the Federal Government sphere. 
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closely connected with the scientific communities of Europe, the United States and 
Cuba. It is also clear that they followed different paths. While Fiocruz opted for 
diversifying its activities, carrying out research in parasitological diseases, production 
of biologicals and teaching, the Butantan Institute specialized in ophiology – research 
and production of anti-ophidian serums (Benchimol and Teixeira, 1993). In the first 
decades of the 20
th
 century Brazil was close to the frontier in terms of development and 
production of biologicals. 
 
Table 5.3: History of vaccine and vaccination in Brazil – key facts 1808 – 1969 
Year Fact 
1808 The Royal Portuguese Family arrives in Brazil escaping from Napoléon.  
1811 The Junta Vacínica da Corte is created by D. João VI to disseminate the 
vaccination against Smallpox in the country. 
1846 The Instituto Vacínico do Império is created, restructuring the activities of 
Junta Vacínica da Corte and to introduce the new vaccine against Smallpox 
developed in Europe in the early 1840s. 
1894 The Instituto Vacínico Municipal is created and definitely introduced the 
new vaccine. 
1900 The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) is founded (named Instituto 
Serumtherápico Federal), primarily to produce the serum to fight against 
Bubonic Plague. 
1900 The Ataulfo de Paiva Foundation (FAP) is created (named Liga Brasileira 
contra a Tuberculose) to fight against Tuberculosis. 
1901 The Butantan Institute is inaugurated in São Paulo (named Instituto 
Serumtherápico de São Paulo) with the same objective as the creation of 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation. 
1920 The Instituto Vacínico Municipal is incorporated with the Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation. 
1930 Ataulfo de Paiva Foundation starts the production of the oral BCG vaccine. 
1937 Yellow Fever vaccine – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation starts its production in 
collaboration with, and with technology developed and transferred by, the 
Rockefeller Foundation (USA). 
1942 The Institute of Technology of Parana – Tecpar is created. 
1960 Fiocruz starts the production of the new smallpox vaccine developed in-
house.
132
 
1966 The Smallpox Eradication Campaign begins in Brazil. 
Sources: Benchimol and Teixeira (1993); Fernandes (1999); Ministério da Saúde (2003) and FAP (web 
page, accessed in 05/2008 ). 
 
During the following decades, especially between the end of World War II and the early 
1970s, innovation in vaccines in advanced countries experienced a new and astonishing 
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 Fiocruz was acknowledged by World Health Organization (WHO) as an international supplier of 
smallpox vaccine to the world campaign of eradication of the disease started in 1967. It also exported this 
new smallpox vaccine for some Latin American countries during this campaign (Benchimol, 2001).  
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era with several discoveries and the development of new and safer vaccines (Galambos, 
1999). During this period, the conditions of the Brazilian manufacturers deteriorated 
and they lagged far behind the international technological context (Homma et al., 2003). 
The lost competitiveness of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry as a whole was due to 
the lack of investment in R&D (interview 19). 
 
The second phase of this history starts in the early 1970s with the re-emergence of the 
Brazilian vaccine industry and of some manufacturers. This period is the main focus of 
this research and it is approached in detail in the next two chapters. 
 
5.3 Innovation on Vaccines 
In this section the advances in vaccinology and the technological breakthroughs that 
gave sustainability to innovation on vaccines are detailed in Sub-section 5.3.1. In Sub-
section 5.3.2 the actors of the innovation on vaccines are briefly introduced. The last 
sub-section is dedicated to the demonstration of some specificities and complexities of 
and capabilities needed in the process of developing vaccines (Sub-section 5.3.3). 
 
5.3.1 Cycles and Breakthroughs 
Historians have described the advances in vaccinology and the development of vaccines 
in many different ways. The “waves” or “revolutions” of Plotkin (2005a, b), the “steps 
in immunization” by Bazin (2003), the “eras” of Galambos (1999) or the 
“breakthroughs” of Hilleman (2000) have made the history in this field both clear to 
understand and interesting to read, as briefly reviewed in Sub-section 5.2.2. 
 
According to Galambos and Sewell (1995), the process of innovation in the vaccine 
industry has been characterized by a long cycles pattern. Since Pasteur’s time the 
authors identified four cycles that exerted major influences in the subsequent 
development of vaccines. The first, in the late 18
th
 century and beginning of 19
th
 century, 
was the original bacteriology cycle that influenced the development of most of the new 
vaccines until the 1930s. The second long cycle, the virology, exerted strong influence 
in the development of viral vaccines from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. The third, 
the new bacteriology of polysaccharide capsules, has influenced the innovation of new 
bacterial vaccines from the early 1970s, and the fourth, based on advances in 
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recombinant DNA technology and molecular genetic, has been the main source of 
innovation since the mid-1980s. 
 
Indeed, science and technology have evolved pari passu in the field of vaccinology. 
Along with other advances in science, new approaches in dealing with microorganisms 
were of fundamental importance to the development of new and improved vaccines, and 
they are in close proximity with the long cycles described by Galambos and Sewell. The 
most important scientific and technological breakthroughs are briefly described below. 
They are not necessarily in chronological order as some of them came about 
contemporaneously. Table 5.4 outlines the main strategies used to develop most of the 
vaccines over time. 
 
a. Attenuation 
Regarded as the first major advance in vaccinology since Jenner’s vaccine, the 
attenuation of live microorganisms, developed by the French scientist Louis Pasteur, 
was a serendipitous discovery (Plotkin, 2005a).
133
 The process of attenuation consists of 
the artificial modification of the virulence of a microorganism in order to induce the 
protection against the disease caused by the microorganism as well (Bazin, 2003). 
Attenuation of live microorganisms has been the concept for the development of several 
human vaccines since then.
134,135
 First was the rabies vaccine, developed by Pasteur in 
1885. Tuberculosis and Yellow Fever, in the early 20
th
 century, and Varicella and 
Rotavirus, in recent times, are examples of other vaccines made of attenuated live 
microorganisms. Therefore, the importance of attenuation persists to the present time, 
since the use of live microorganisms to make vaccines has advantages for preventing 
some specific diseases. They may elicit broader immune responses, may require fewer 
doses and produce generally longer lasting protection (Ellis, 1999:1597). 
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 Pasteur left a chicken cholera culture exposed to air on the bench by chance during his summer holiday 
in 1879. When he returned he decided to inoculate it into chickens but it did not cause the disease. Further 
experiments with fresh cultures proved the same; chickens had received protection against the disease 
(Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004; Plotkin, 2005b).   
134
 This research will focus on human vaccines only. 
135
 The process of attenuation has been improved over time as new technologies have been introduced to 
the process. See items c and d about virus cell culture and tissue culture. 
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b. Inactivation 
A new and equally important process of dealing with microorganisms was announced in 
1886, only six years after the publication of Pasteur’s discovery of attenuation. The 
Americans, Daniel Elmer Salmon and Theobald Smith, of the US Department of 
Agriculture, had developed the process of inactivating microorganisms.
136
 In their 
successful experiment they killed salmonella bacteria by heat and injected them into 
pigeons which were then protected against the same disease (Bazin, 2003). As well as 
the process of attenuation, the process of inactivation made possible the development of 
many vaccines, and the concept of non-living vaccines was further developed later 
on.
137
 The first human killed vaccines developed were for Typhoid, Cholera and Plague, 
just few years after the development of the process (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). More 
recently important vaccines such as inactivated polio vaccine and hepatitis A vaccine 
were developed using the technology of inactivation (Plotkin, 2005b). 
 
c. Cell Culture 
The next major advance took place only in the early 1930s and is represented by the 
development of the process of virus cell culture. The process consists of growing 
viruses in embryonated hens’ eggs. Until that time the only way of cultivating viruses 
was in live animals such as ferrets, mice and rabbits; this was considered an obstacle to 
the development of new virus vaccines (Bazin, 2003). Furthermore, the process 
developed by the American Ernest Goodpasture, of the Vanderbilt University, proved to 
be cheaper and safer (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004), and a new means of attenuating 
viruses (Plotkin, 2005b).  New vaccines, such as a safe and effective yellow fever 
vaccine and the influenza vaccine, were developed by using this process shortly after. 
This was the transition time to the new era of vaccine (Hilleman, 2002). 
 
d. Tissue Culture 
The tissue culture of cells may be considered the next important advance in terms of 
process. Tissue culture is a process of cell culture in vitro with the use of a growth 
medium, instead of in hen’s eggs as in the traditional method. It was developed by 
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 There were some disputes over the rights for this discovery. Pasteur argued that results of experiments 
on inactivation were first obtained in his Institute since his disciples Roux and Chamberland had 
published similar results shortly after the Americans but his claim was proven to be untrue (Bazin 2003). 
137
 Other technologies of nonliving vaccines were approached in the following decades. See item e about 
toxoids and sub-unit vaccines. 
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scientists at Harvard University just after World War II and opened the way for the 
development of a safe poliomyelitis vaccine (Blume, 2005).
138
 From this discovery the 
culture of many viruses was also achieved and many other vaccines were developed 
including Measles, Rubella, Mumps and Varicella (Plotkin, 2005b). However, several 
other cells would still not grow in vitro hindering the development of many vaccines 
(Bazin, 2003). In addition to allowing the development of new vaccines, the tissue 
culture method has several advantages over the traditional cell culture method. It’s 
cheaper, much more efficient and safer as the vaccine is free from egg protein, which 
may cause some adverse effects in people with sensitivity to egg products. Important 
vaccines, however, such as yellow fever and influenza, are still produced by the 
traditional method since, to date, it has not been possible to improve their production 
method because of technological reasons. 
 
e. Toxoids and Sub-unit Technologies 
The early 20
th
 century was also the stage for further developments on the technology of 
inactivated vaccines. In the 1920s a new process of inactivating bacterial toxins by the 
use of chemicals (formalin) made the development of diphtheria and tetanus toxoids 
possible (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). The process was developed by the British 
immunologist Alexander Glenny, of Wellcome Physiological Research Laboratories, 
even though this discovery is also claimed by the German Gaston Ramon who worked 
at the Pasteur Institute (ODNB, web page, accessed in 11/2007).
139
 Later on, as whole 
cell vaccines were considered dangerous and technology advanced, it became possible 
to separate and use sub-units of organisms in the development of several vaccines 
(Plotkin, 2005b; Bazin, 2003). Examples of sub-unit technologies developed are the 
extracts of infected tissues, capsular polysaccharides, purified or recombinant proteins 
and, more recently, protein-conjugated capsular polysaccharides (Plotkin, 2005b). The 
sub-unit vaccines have some important advantages as they are unable to replicate in the 
host and therefore cannot revert into pathogenicity. Furthermore they are generally less 
reactogenic, non-transmissible and usually more feasible technically (Ellis, 1999:1597). 
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 The work “Cultivation of the lansing strain of poliomyelitis virus in cultures of various human 
embryonic tissues” was published in 1949 by Enders et al in the journal Science. 
139
 Available on line at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33424 . 
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Table 5.4: Main Technological Strategies for Developing Vaccines and Vaccines Developed Over Time
1
 
Attenuation (Live) 
Inactivation (Killed) 
Genetic Engineering Combination
2
 
Whole Organisms 
Sub-units – Extracts, Toxoids, 
Protein or Polysaccharide 
18
th
 Century 
Smallpox (1798) 3     
19
th
 Century 
Rabies (1885) Typhoid (1896)    
 Cholera (1896)    
 Plague (1897)    
  1920s and 1930s   
Tuberculosis/BCG (1927) Pertussis (1926) Diphtheria (1923)  DT (1926) 
Yellow Fever (1935) Influenza (1936) Tetanus (1927)   
 Rickettsia/Typhus (1938)    
After World War II 
OPV (1958) IPV (1955) Japanese encephalitis (1944) Hepatitis B (1986) DTPw (1957) 
Measles (1963) Rabies/cell culture (1976) Meningococcal (1972) Lyme (1998) – withdrawn DT+IPV (1961) 
Mumps (1967) Hepatitis A (1991) Pneumococcal (1976) Human Papillomavirus (2006) DTPw+IPV (1966) 
Rubella (1969)  Hepatitis B (1981)  MMR (1971) 
Adenovirus (1971)  Acellular Pertussis (1981)  DTPw+IPV+Hib (1988) 
Varicella (1984)  Hib (1985)  DTPa (1994) 
Typhoid (1989)  Hib conjugate (1987)  DTPw+HBV (1996) 
Rotavirus (1998) – withdrawn  Typhoid Vi (1994)  Hib+HBV (1996) 
new Rotavirus (2006)  MCCV (2000)  DTPa+Hib (1997) 
Zoster (2006)  PCV (2000)  DTPa+IPV+Hib (1997) 
  Anthrax (2002)  DTPa+HBV+IPV (2000) 
    DTPa+HBV+IPV+Hib (2000) 
    HAV+HBV (2001) 
1. Not exhaustive. 2. The strategy of combination may bring together components developed by other different strategies (e.g. DTPa – whole organisms and sub-unit). In 
this column only combination of vaccines for different diseases were considered. 3. Between parentheses the approximate year of introduction of each vaccine in the market. 
For some of the most recent vaccines the dates are based on the approval by FDA. Legend: OPV – Oral Polio Vaccine; IPV – Inactivated Polio vaccine; Hib – Haemophilus 
influenzae b; MCCV – Meningococcal C Conjugate Vaccine; PCV – Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine; DTPw – Diphtheria, Tetanus and whole cell Pertussis; MMR – 
Measles, Mumps and Rubella; DTPa – Diphtheria, Tetanus and Acellular Pertussis; HAV – Hepatitis A Vaccine; HBV – Hepatitis B Vaccine. 
Source: Adapted from Plotkin and Plotkin (2004). Other sources: Jordan (2002); Hilleman (2002); Andre (2003); Plotkin (2005b); Wilson et al. (2007) and FDA (web page, 
accessed in 09/2009). 
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f. Combination 
Little has been said by the authors about the process of the combination of vaccines 
during the 20
th
 century. Combination is a process by which immunogens for different 
diseases are combined into a single product. Vaccines made of different types of virus, 
or different Serotypes/Serogroups of bacteria of the same disease, are also considered 
combined vaccines.
140
 The process was first developed in 1926, when the French 
scientist from the Pasteur Institute, Gaston Ramon, and his colleague Christian Zoeller 
combined the Diphtheria and Tetanus toxoids (DT) (Pasteur, web page, accessed in 
11/2007).
141
 The DTP (Diphtheria, Tetanus and Pertussis), DT+IPV (DT combined with 
Inactivated Polio vaccine), DTP+IPV, MR (Mumps and Rubella), MMR (Mumps, 
Measles and Rubella) and Meningococcus AC are examples of other combined vaccines 
commonly in use before the 1980s (Andre, 2003; Hilleman, 2002). However, combined 
vaccines have been more emphasized as recent discoveries (Plotkin, 2002) or a 
candidate for the next revolution in vaccinology (Plotkin, 2005a) since the development 
and licensing of more complex combinations has been achieved since the late 1980s. In 
fact, the importance of combined vaccines has increased recently as they reduce the 
costs of public campaigns, diminish the suffering of children and ease the vaccination 
coverage. 
 
g. Genetic Engineering 
It seems to be common sense amongst many authors that the advent of molecular 
biology and genetic engineering in the 1950s provided a dramatic influence on vaccine 
development (Bazin, 2003; Galambos, 1999; Plotkin, 2005b, a; Milstien, 2005). 
However, even though there have been many achievements in this field, and many 
vaccine candidates are already in Phase III trials, only a few human vaccines against 
widespread disease and developed by using this technology are currently in use. The 
first one is the recombinant Hepatitis B vaccine, which was licensed in 1986. Besides 
being the first recombinant vaccine developed, recombinant Hepatitis B vaccine is also 
acknowledged as the first human vaccine against cancer (Hilleman, 2000). In 1999 a 
recombinant Lyme vaccine was licensed by the FDA but it was withdrawn from the 
market three years later due to low acceptance (Plotkin and Plotkin, 2004). Quite 
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 DTP is an example of a combined vaccine using immunogens for three different diseases (Diphtheria, 
Tetanus and Pertussis). The Oral Polio Vaccine and the Inactivated Polio Vaccine are combined vaccines 
using three different types of virus of the same disease. 
141
 Available on line at http://www.pasteur.fr/infosci/archives/f-bio.html . 
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recently the technology for producing a Human Papillomavirus vaccine (HPV) by 
genetic engineering was developed by scientists at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
in the USA and licensed to two pharmaceutical companies. The vaccines were then 
developed and licensed by the FDA in 2006 and 2008. Amongst the advantages are that 
genetic vaccines elicit cellular immune responses and have a standardized method of 
production (Ellis, 1999:1597). In addition, the use of genetic engineering technology 
provides opportunities for the construction of inactivated antigens and for rational 
attenuation of organisms through direct mutation. 
 
h. Adjuvants and Delivery Systems 
Innovation on vaccines is also approached here in a broader perspective. In parallel to 
the development of the technologies to deal with microorganisms described above, are 
other important technologies that have been developed to enhance the power of vaccines. 
Adjuvants are molecules developed to enhance, accelerate, modify or prolong the 
immune response to the vaccine antigens (Vogel and Alving, 2002:39). They are a 
necessary component of many vaccines (Liu, 2002). Non-live vaccines and highly 
purified or recombinant antigens, for example, need adjuvants to enhance their 
immunogenicity (Ellis, 1999; Vogel and Alving, 2002). The first type of adjuvant, the 
Gel-type, was first described in the 1920s, and remains the most common in use so far.  
 
New delivery systems have been developed to both enhance immunity and the comfort 
of the patient. The most common way of administering vaccines are the subcutaneous or 
intramuscular injections. Oral vaccines, however, have existed since the 1950s. The first 
one was the Oral Polio Vaccine developed by Sabin. Rotavirus is a more recent example 
of oral vaccine. Another mucosal means of administering vaccine today is the intranasal. 
An intranasal vaccine against influenza A and B has been registered in the US since 
2003 (FDA, web page, accessed in 9/2009).
142
 In addition to not requiring the use of 
needles and syringes, reduced adverse effects, immunization directly at the site where 
many infections start and the possibility of administration by non-healthcare 
professionals are amongst some of the advantages of these types of delivery system (Liu, 
2002).  
 
                                                 
142
 http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/ucm094047.htm . 
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5.3.2 The Actors 
Innovation on vaccines must also be approached from another important perspective: 
the actors of the process. When we approach the innovation on vaccines in its full extent 
it becomes clear that it is full of specificities, even within the pharmaceutical industry 
whose subsectors are considerably different (Nightingale and Mahdi, 2006). Vaccine 
R&D has often been characterized by the involvement of quite complex network of 
relationships and collaboration amongst multiple actors (Galambos and Sewell, 1995; 
Galambos and Sturchio, 1996; Galambos, 1999; Wilson et al., 2007). Two distinct 
periods are being highlighted here: the periods before and after WWII. Within the 
period from Pasteur until WWII there is a lack of comprehensive data specifically 
focusing on this issue (Wilson et al., 2007). However, it is possible to point out a 
predominance of research and public institutions and non-profit organizations as the 
main actors of the process even though a limited participation of small private 
companies is also identified.
143,144 
 
Yet the most recent period, post-WWII, was driven by the massive investments of the 
US government in vaccine research and development, and by a new network of public, 
private and non-profit organizations supporting vaccine development and distribution. 
Amongst the latter were organizations such as the United Nations, the World Health 
Organization and the World Bank Group (Galambos, 1999:S8). From this time on it is 
possible to devise a new division of labour in the process of vaccine R&D (Mazzucato 
and Dosi, 2006). For the majority of vaccines developed since then, basic research has 
been carried out by universities and public or non-profit research institutions, often 
financed by public funds. On the other hand, technological development, clinical trials, 
licensing and manufacturing have been conducted by industry, as noted by Wilson et al. 
(2007).  
 
Four models of vaccine development are then identified by these authors to characterize 
the role of each actor in this period: 
                                                 
143
 This idea draws upon the events approached and in the literature cited in the previous sections of this 
chapter. Galambos and Sewell (1995) and Galambos and Sturchio (1996) are exceptions of works 
approaching this issue from an historical perspective. 
144
 The few companies dedicated to the business of biologicals were small at that time (Galambos and 
Sturchio, 1996). The large and integrated pharmaceutical companies of the first half of the 20
th
 century 
were dedicated to the development and manufacturing of drugs (Galambos and Sturchio, 1996; 
Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006). 
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a. predominantly private sector development;  
b. public (or non-profit) sector vaccine design, with a handover to the private sector 
for trials and manufacturing;  
c. predominantly public sector development; and  
d. coordination by a non-profit entity (ibid. p.1).  
 
Table 5.5 lists some vaccines developed after WWII by each of the development model 
described by the authors. 
 
Table 5.5: Models of Vaccine Development – Actors and Vaccines  
Vaccine Development Model 
Vaccine Developed 
a. Predominantly Private Sector development 
Cholera, inactivated (1952) 
Mumps, live (1967) 
Hepatitis B, plasma-derived (1981) 
Hepatitis B, recombinant (1986) 
Typhoid Vi polysaccharide (1992) 
Pneumococcal conjugate, 7-valent (2000) 
b. Public Sector vaccine design, with handover to the private sector for trials and manufacturing 
Measles, live (1963) 
Rubella (1967) 
Pneumococcal polysaccharide (1977) 
Typhoid, live oral (1981) 
Hib polysaccharide (1985) 
Hib conjugate (1988) 
DTaP (1991) 
Hepatitis A (1991) 
Cholera, live oral (1994) 
Varicella (1995) 
Lyme disease (1998) 
Rotavirus (1998) 
Influenza, live attenuated intranasal (2003) 
HPV (2006) 
Rotavirus, live oral pentavalent (2006) 
Zoster (2006) 
c. Predominantly Public Sector development 
Influenza (1945) 
Mumps, inactivated (1948) 
Adenovirus (1957) 
Polio, oral trivalent (1963) 
Anthrax (1970) 
Meningococcus polysaccharide (1974-5) 
Adenovirus, live oral (1980) 
Meningococcus (types B and C) (1989) 
Japanese encephalitis B, killed (1992) 
d. Coordination by a Non-profit Entity 
Inactivated polio (1955) 
Source: Adapted from Wilson et al. (2007:20). 
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Other actors have been of growing importance in this process. The boom of 
biotechnology firms (Biotechs) since the 1980s is a phenomenon that has directly 
affected the network of innovation. Apart from drugs against cancer, vaccine 
development and manufacturing has been the main business of these firms (Milstien, 
2005).
145
 Along with universities and public research institutions, biotechs concentrate 
their capabilities mainly on upstream research, (Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006), as they 
lack the essential capabilities to compete with the “Big Pharma”, even though some 
clinical and financial successes have taken place (Nightingale and Mahdi, 2006). Within 
this new network of innovation the diffusion of technological knowledge from the 
Biotechs to the “Big Pharma” has often been through alliances (Rothaermel, 2001; 
Nightingale and Mahdi, 2006).
146
 
 
Indirect actors have also exerted important influence in the process of vaccine 
innovation today. The national regulatory authorities have provided increasingly tighter 
regulations and guidance both to the pre-marketing and post-marketing phases (Baylor 
and McVittie, 2002).
147
 Government agencies, such as the NIH in the US, have 
provided significant financial resources for vaccine R&D. Non-governmental 
organizations, such as UNICEF, GAVI Alliance and IAVI, have also provided 
important support and funds for the development and distribution of vaccines.
148
 
 
5.3.3 Developing Vaccines – Complexities, Steps and Capabilities 
Whatever the technology used, the process of development of a vaccine is very complex 
and long. The average time for the development of a product is estimated to be between 
10 and 15 years but it can take longer (Homma et al., 2003). A vaccine against HIV, for 
example, has been pursued unsuccessfully for more than 20 years.
149
 As time has passed, 
technical requirements to license a human vaccine have become stricter, and new pre-
clinical and clinical trials have been required in order to make the products safer. The 
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 The boom of Biotech firms has its origins in the US Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which allowed 
universities and small enterprises to patent discoveries and license them to the large pharmaceutical firms 
even when the research had been financed by the public funds of NIH (Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006).  
146
 The case of Biotechs is also approached in Chapter 6, Sub-section 6.2.2 (pg. 125-128). 
147
 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA, European Medicines Agency (EMEA) in Europe 
and Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA) in Brazil are examples of national regulatory 
authorities. 
148
 These and other actors are also approached in the section about Government and Institutions in the 
next chapter on pg. 151-161. 
149
 The Jordan Report 2000 (NIH/NIAID, 2000:85) reports HIV vaccine studies funded by NIAID since 
1987 involving a great range of actors.  
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investments required became huge and returns uncertain, which makes the business too 
risky (Hinman et al., 2006). Estimations suggest that the cost of vaccine development 
ranges between US$300-800 million (Plotkin, 2005c),
150
 and few manufacturers have 
managed to accomplish all the stages of a vaccine’s development (Orenstein et al., 
2007). In fact, most projects fail. Table 5.6 below outlines the status of vaccine R&D in 
2006 and the probabilities of launching in each of the R&D phases. 
 
Table 5.6: Vaccine R&D Projects – Status and Market Entrance Probabilities 
Basic 
Research 
Pre-clinical 
Clinical 
Trials I 
Clinical 
Trials II 
Clinical 
Trials III 
Registration 
Status of Vaccine R&D in 2006 – 448 Vaccine Projects / 115 Target Agents(1) 
84 180 68 63 53 - 
Market Entrance Probability
(2)
 - % 
- 22 39 54 68 96 
Own elaboration 
(1) Source: NIH/NIAID (2007:Appendix A). Data refers to publicly available information only. HIV 
projects not included. 
(2) Source: Struck (1996). 
 
The complexities of vaccine development may be illustrated in other ways. Compared 
with drugs, there is no bioequivalence procedure for vaccines, which means that there 
are no “generic” vaccines and therefore any new or improved vaccine should go through 
at least limited clinical trials (Milstien et al., 2007). Moreover, as briefly approached in 
footnote 123 of Sub-section 5.2.1 (pg. 95), the same disease may be caused by different 
microorganisms due to specific population characteristics (WHO, 2002b:xi), which 
makes the development of potential globalized vaccines technologically challenging 
(Milstien and Candries, 2002). 
 
According to Homma et al (2003), the typical process of development of a vaccine 
comprises seven main steps. However, these authors emphasize that this process is far 
from being linear since the need to return to previous steps is not uncommon. 
Additionally, as pointed out by Bomtempo & Baetas (2005), the frontiers of these steps 
are flexible since some activities are superposed. The basic steps are summarized as 
                                                 
150
 The cost of the development of the live attenuated influenza vaccine may have exceeded US$ 1 billion 
(Orenstein et al., 2007).  
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follows, based on Homma et al. (2003) and Bomtempo & Baetas (2005), and 
represented in Figure 5.1. 
 
Step 1 – Discovery/Invention: in this first step basic research is performed in very well 
equipped laboratories and by very skilled and multidisciplinary researchers and 
technicians to set up a scientific understanding of the etiology of the disease, the 
interactions between human being and pathogen, and the immune response of the 
human being. Researches on new adjuvants and molecules are also performed within 
this step. Infectology, biochemistry, epidemiology, immunology and microbiology are 
amongst the main capabilities required. Molecular biology, genetic engineering and 
studies on the genome are increasingly used technologies in this phase. 
 
Step 2 – Pre-development studies: this step includes studies on the identification and 
analyses of the antigen(s), on the modification of its virulence and on the determination 
of its stability and immunogenicity. In addition, material is specified and several studies 
are repeatedly performed in the same conditions and parameters in order to standardize 
the methodology of production, to obtain the biological and physic-chemical 
characterization, to test the reproducibility, to establish the parameters of scaling-up and, 
in short, to show its technical feasibility to become a product. Similar capabilities are 
required in this step. 
 
Step 3 – Candidate Vaccine and Pre-Clinical Trials: in this step a candidate vaccine is 
designed, developed and produced for the pre-clinical studies. This includes adjuvants 
selection, vaccine presentation (e.g. liquid or freeze-dried, intramuscular or oral) and 
formulation parameters. The pre-clinical trials consist of evaluating the inocuity, 
reactogenicity, toxicity and immunogenicity of the potential vaccine to determine the 
level of risk of inoculating it in humans. The tests are performed in selected in vivo 
animals especially grown for use in research, and in laboratories that comply with Good 
Laboratory Practices (GLP). Veterinarians are amongst the professionals performing 
these activities. 
 
Step 4 – Vaccine for Clinical Trials: since an acceptable level of risk in administering 
the potential vaccine in humans is demonstrated in the pre-clinical trials phase, 
experimental lots of the vaccine are produced to be tested in clinical trials. The lots are 
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produced in pilot plants that simulate the same conditions of production facilities.
 151
 
The scale-up process encompasses an industrial dimension and Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP) are required. The commercial feasibility is determined in this phase. 
New capabilities are incorporated for the development of these activities, amongst them 
engineering (chemistry, biochemistry, production, economic), marketing and regulation. 
In this phase the seed lot is prepared to assure the reproducibility of subsequent lots. All 
the parameters defined in this phase cannot be modified after the clinical trials 
otherwise new trials will be required. 
 
Step 5 – Clinical Trials: these trials are very complex and sensitive since they are 
carried out on human beings. With the introduction of new regulatory and safety 
standards, clinical trials have become the major expense in the process of development 
(Milstien and Candries, 2002) and may take several years to be carried out. They are 
divided into three distinct phases:  
 Phase I: the safety of the vaccine is tested in a small number of adults and 
healthy volunteers;  
 Phase II: the immunogenicity of the product is tested in an amplified population. 
In this phase the real product is compared to a placebo and the adverse effects 
studies are extended; 
 Phase III: the efficacy of the vaccine is the main purpose of the tests in this 
phase, which are carried out on a larger population preferably from endemic 
areas. The immunogenicity and adverse effects studies are complemented in this 
phase.  
 
When performing clinical trials for an improved vaccine, the old one should be used as 
a reference during the tests: Good Clinical Practices (GCP) should be observed during 
these trials (Milstien, 2005). The capabilities required for performing clinical trials are 
somewhat different, as shown by Bomtempo & Baetas (2005), and include ethical 
procedures. Moreover, they are restricted to a limited number of research centres (WHO, 
2002b). There is a trend, therefore, to outsource the clinical trials to specialized 
organizations also called Contract Research Organizations (CROs) (Milstien and 
Candries, 2002).  
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 The vaccine for Clinical Trials Phase III is produced in the production facilities (interview 11). 
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Step 6 – Registration – Detailed documentation about the development, production and 
quality control methodology, and pre-clinical and clinical trials results, must be 
submitted to the regulatory authority in order to obtain the license to market the product. 
Once licensed the product cannot be modified in any of its characteristics otherwise new 
studies must be carried out and the results re-submitted to the regulatory authority. For 
this step, deep knowledge about the regulation is required. 
 
Step 7 – Post-Marketing Trials: also called Clinical Trials Phase IV, this step is 
performed after the commercialization of the licensed vaccines and consists of testing a 
large population of vaccinated people to monitor the results of the vaccination with 
regard to both any adverse effects – rare or delayed adverse reactions not detected in 
smaller trials – and to the global impact over the disease. The tetravalent rhesus-based 
recombinant rotavirus vaccine, for example, was withdrawn from the market after some 
adverse risks were identified in the post-licensure tests (Hinman et al., 2006; Milstien 
and Candries, 2002). 
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Own elaboration. Source: Homma et al. (2003), Leal (2004), Moreira (2005) and Plotkin (2005c) 
 
Figure 5.1: Developing a Vaccine: Key Steps and Aspects 
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5.4 Manufacturing Vaccines 
The previous section has shown the complexity of the innovation process on vaccine. 
Manufacturing vaccines is also very complex on technological grounds.
152
 Vaccines are 
biological substances and their manufacture is considerably different and more 
complicated than drugs manufacture, which involves chemical systems rather than 
biologic systems (Gréco, 2001; Hinman et al., 2006). Moreover, vaccines are 
administered to healthy people, often children, which requires higher standards of safety 
than those for substances which are administered to sick patients (Offit, 2005; Milstien 
et al., 2007). As they are biologically variable, the characterization and reproducibility 
of the product is very difficult, and their safety and efficacy must be consistently shown 
(Gréco, 2001; WHO, 2002b). This requires strict conditions for the manufacture of each 
batch and the whole process must comply with Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP); 
it is tightly controlled by regulation authorities (Milstien et al., 2007).
153
 
 
Each step of the production process must be documented and validated. 
(Milstien and Candries, 2002:74). 
 
Every single step in the manufacture of vaccines is extremely challenging. 
(Sheridan, 2005:1359). 
 
Additionally, the technological knowledge required to manufacture a vaccine is 
eminently tacit, not easily communicated by codified documents (patents or routines) 
and, therefore, costly and time consuming to acquire (Milstien et al., 2007).
154
 
 
The manufacture of a vaccine can take up to 22 months and the quality control tests are 
responsible for approximately 70% of the vaccine’s total manufacturing time (Sanofi 
Pasteur, web page, accessed in 7/2009).
155
 Vaccines may be classified as viral or 
bacterial, depending on their etiological agent (Barbosa, 2009). Two main independent 
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 In this chapter vaccine manufacture is shown under the technological perspective only. Other aspects 
related to this issue are presented in Chapter 6, about the industry of vaccine.  
153
 Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), as proclaimed by the World Health Organization (WHO) is 
much broader than simple manufacture procedures. It implies the implementation of a whole quality 
system that encompasses organizational structure, procedures, processes and resources, managed and 
supervised by an internal quality assurance area. The manufacturer of pharmaceuticals should be licensed 
by the local regulatory authority, and assumes total responsibility for the quality of the product (WHO, 
2003).  
154
 The main way vaccine manufacturing knowledge has been acquired by the Brazilian vaccine industry 
during technology transfer processes is outlined in Section 7.2.2 on pg. 167-172. 
155
 http://www.sanofipasteur.com/sanofi-pasteur2/front/index.jsp?siteCode=SP_CORP&codeRubrique=25 
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stages can be identified in the process of manufacturing a vaccine: the vaccinal (viral or 
bacterial) concentrate production and the final processing. The first stage is considered 
more technologically complex, while the second predominantly involves the domain of 
capabilities to deal with large industrial equipment in a controlled environment 
(Temporão, 2002). 
 
At the end of the first stage the concentrate produced may be stored for long periods, 
often frozen at very low temperatures to retain its physical characteristics. The facilities 
for the vaccinal concentrate production are built specifically to fit to the technological 
characteristics and design of the vaccine (e.g. viral, bacterial, attenuated, inactivated 
etc.). Yet the facilities for final processing are generally multi-purpose and usually 
encompass technological processes for different types of vaccine presentation (e.g. vials, 
ampoules, syringes, liquid, freeze-dried, etc.). The main production steps of the triple 
viral vaccine (Mumps, Measles and Rubella) are represented in Figure 5.2 for 
illustration. 
 
At the end of the final processing steps the vaccine batch must be kept stored in cold 
chambers until the release of the final QC tests. As noted by a “Big Pharma” 
manufacturer, the cold chain must be assured through all stages, including the 
distribution.
156
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 See previous footnote for the reference. 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
Own elaboration. Source: Data kindly provided by the Department of Viral Vaccines of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz. 
 
Figure 5.2: Main Production Steps of the Triple Viral Vaccine – MMR 
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(1) Measles and Mumps viral concentrate production  are similar processes but performed independently. (2) The 
seed lot is prepared during the development of the vaccine. (3) working seed lot is produced from time to time and 
use to last several years. (QC) Quality Control tests performed at the end of the steps except for chicken eggs, which 
are performed before.
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the production dossier
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Quality control tests are also technologically complex and of fundamental importance to 
the manufacturing process. They are performed from the beginning and across all the 
manufacturing processes of the batch. Several different tests are performed at the same 
time for most of the production steps. QC tests are also performed on materials that are 
used in direct contact with the vaccine – e.g. reagents, vials, stoppers, etc. – and on 
some indirect materials – e.g. cardboards and labels for packaging (interview 11).157 QC 
results are stated in the production dossier, which must be kept for tracking if needed. 
Table 5.7 lists the amount of QC tests performed during the production process of the 
MMR vaccine, not including tests in stabilizers, reagents and other raw materials. 
 
Table 5.7: Amount of QC Tests Performed During MMR Vaccine Manufacturing 
Production Step
1
 
Vaccine Component / Amount of Tests 
Measles Mumps Rubella 
Chicken eggs 2 2 - 
Cell cultured/expanded 7 7 7 
Virus harvested 5 - 5 
Virus pooled 13 13 11 
Virus purified/clarified 4 4 4 
Vaccine formulated 3 
Final product 15 
Q.C. Tests total amount 102 
1
 Refers to the production steps described in Figure 5.2. 
Own elaboration. Source: Data kindly provided by the Department of Quality Control of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
 
5.5 The Future of Innovation on Vaccines 
Advances in many fields are pointed out as the drivers for the development of new 
vaccines. Recent and future remarkable discoveries on immunology, genomics and 
proteomics, and a broader and more intensive use of molecular biology and genetic 
engineering, will allow the development of safer and less reactogenic vaccines, new 
combinations, new adjuvants, new delivery systems, the enlargement of target groups 
and vaccines for non-infectious diseases (Hilleman, 2000; Plotkin, 2005a). Furthermore, 
partnerships will be the strategy used by successful manufacturers to gain access to new 
technologies and markets (Milstien, 2005). 
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 According to the interviewee, direct materials outside of the correct specifications may cause changes 
in the physical characteristics of the product. Yet the case of indirect materials, products outside of the 
correct specification may cause damage in the machines of the production line.  
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On the other hand, R&D on vaccines will face challenging pressures. Growing 
regulatory requirements, cyclical pressures on governments and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and tighter sales margins, are increasing the costs as well as 
reducing the number of manufacturers able to invest in new vaccines (Galambos, 1999; 
Andre, 2003). Moreover, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), although important to 
protect and encourage innovations, have not only prevented investigations but also 
collaboration in particular domains (Plotkin, 2005c). In some developing countries, 
which emerging manufacturers have tried to move from incremental to radical 
innovations, IPR has led the manufacturers to technology transfers and licensing 
agreements to have access to new technologies (Milstien et al., 2007). 
 
All in all, it is expected that during this new era the number of vaccines will double 
(WHO, 2005). However, the future of innovation on vaccines resides, according to 
Galambos (1999), on strengthening and not weakening, the three-sided networks – 
government/non-government organizations, research institutions and private companies 
– that have been responsible for the sequence of breakthrough innovations during the 
20
th
 century. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has inaugurated the description of the empirical issues of this research. 
More specifically, it seeks to bring to light evidence about the specificities of the field 
of vaccine in order to allow the building of a link between them and the development of 
technological capabilities in the BVI, in light of the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 3. The issues were described in social, historical, scientific and technological 
perspectives with evident economic implications across all of them.  
 
Under the social perspective the importance achieved worldwide amongst governments 
and health authorities by the use of vaccines and consequent reduction of infectious 
diseases is emphasized. In addition, it is shown that the increasing access to vaccines 
has been advocated more recently to be linked to the reduction of poverty and inequity 
across the world. Yet the contrast between the international and Brazilian historical 
perspective, shows that Brazil has a long tradition in dealing with vaccines and that it 
was close to the technological frontier in this field in the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
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The section about innovation on vaccines describes the long cycle pattern of the process, 
and the scientific and technological breakthroughs that made the development of several 
vaccines since late the 1800s possible. The almost exclusive role of academia and public 
institutions in the innovation process of vaccines up to the mid-20
th
 century is also 
highlighted. On the other hand it was shown that the subsequent period presents a new 
division of labour in the process of vaccine R&D, with basic research being carried out 
predominantly by academia, strongly supported by public funds, and downstream 
development by the “Big Pharma”. In this regard, the huge costs of R&D due to tighter 
requirements to license a human vaccine have favoured the hegemony of the “Big 
Pharma” in this field. The last sub-section of this section and the following section show 
how the processes of developing and manufacturing vaccines are complex, requiring 
very specialized technological capabilities that are costly and time consuming to 
developed, and constituting an important entry barrier in this sector. 
 
Finally, some expectations about the future of innovation on vaccines raised by experts 
in this field are presented. As suggested, they encompass a scenario of increasing 
technological complexity, requiring the domain of new scientific and technological 
capabilities and new strategies to compete in more competitive markets. 
 
The next chapter continues to examine the empirical issues by addressing the dynamics 
and organization of the vaccine industry, the markets and their drivers and the role of 
government and institutions in the support of the development of this sector.  
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Chapter 6 – Vaccine Industry, Markets and Institutions in 
Brazil and in the International Context 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter approached the characteristics and complexities of vaccines and of the 
innovation on vaccines under historical, social and, in particular, scientific and 
technological perspectives. The focus in this chapter is on the dynamics and economics 
of the vaccine industry, with the emphasis on its organization, markets and institutions. 
These have driven important implications on the development of technological 
capabilities in the field of vaccines. 
 
The organization, dynamics and trends of the vaccine industry are approached in 
Section 6.2. The markets and economics, with an emphasis on the structure of the 
Brazilian market, are the issues in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the other actors and 
the current role of the intricate network of institutions that has been one of the pillars of 
sustenance to the development of the vaccine industry over time. However, although 
this gives details of the proposed organization of the chapter, some issues overlap across 
the sections. Section 6.5 summarizes the whole chapter. 
 
6.2 The Vaccine Industry  
In this section the organization and dynamics of the vaccine industry are depicted. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the industry was divided into three main groups: the aspects 
of the “Big Pharma” – the global players – are presented in Sub-section 6.2.1. The next 
sub-section describes the characteristics of the most recent phenomenon of the vaccine 
industry – biotech firms. Sub-section 6.2.3 approaches the smaller, but of growing 
importance, firms – private, public and emerging local players. This group includes the 
Brazilian vaccine industry.  
 
6.2.1 The “Big Pharma” 
The “Big Pharma” firms are represented here by the few large and global 
pharmaceutical companies that have participated and dominated the vaccine business 
during the last decades: Sanofi-Aventis (Sanofi-Pasteur), GlaxoSmithKline 
(GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals), Merck & Co. (Merck Sharp & Dohme), and Wyeth 
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(Wyeth Pharmaceuticals).
158
 Novartis (Novartis Vaccines) has recently been attempting 
to join this group following their acquisition of Chiron in 2006. Altogether the sales of 
the four leading companies in 2000 represented almost 80% of the global market of 
vaccines, and around 85% when Chiron is included (Gréco, 2002). Recent estimations 
show that this picture remains unchanged.
159
 
 
This oligopolistic core of the few large pharmaceutical companies in the vaccine 
business has its origins in the post-war era. Massive government investments in basic 
biomedical research, especially in the US (Galambos and Sturchio, 1996), 
breakthroughs in virology and vaccinology (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; Galambos, 
1999), development of new vaccines – e.g. inactivated polio and influenza – (Offit, 
2005), opened new markets and awoke the interest of the larger pharmaceuticals to 
vaccines in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1970s to the mid-1980s the number of 
private manufacturers decreased sharply due to the lower profit margins generated by 
the tightening of the manufacturing standards, liability concerns, high investments 
needed for R&D (Galambos, 1999; Hinman et al., 2006), and the need to 
internationalize the business (Gréco, 2001). Mergers and acquisitions then became more 
frequent and, according to Offit (2005:623), the number of manufacturers in the vaccine 
business declined from 26 in 1967 to 17 in 1980 and to only 5 in 2004.
160
 In this process, 
even public producers dedicated only to national needs and some major pharmaceutical 
companies dropped out, as noted by Gréco (2001). An illustrative picture of the 
dynamics of acquisitions, mergers and alliances of the vaccine industry pushed by the 
current “Big Pharma” is presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
One reason for the current success of the few large pharmaceutical companies who 
decided to pursue the business of vaccines is certainly the organizational capabilities 
developed by their parent companies in the drug business. As indicated by Mazzucato 
and Dosi (2006), the capabilities to manage the process of R&D, including large-scale 
clinical trials, applying and getting registration of products from regulatory authorities, 
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 Between parentheses are the vaccine divisions of the “Big Pharma”. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals includes 
the drugs and biopharmaceuticals businesses. Wyeth is in the process of merging with Pfizer. 
159
 Based on the firms’ Annual Reports, freely available at their web pages (GSK, web page; Merck, web 
page; Novartis, web page; Sanofi Aventis, web page; Wyeth, web page). 
160
 According to Mowery and Mitchell (1996:195) between 1966 and 1977 one-half of commercial 
vaccine producers quit the business in the USA , a trend that continued in the 1980s and led to price rises 
paid both by public and private purchasers. 
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and marketing and distribution developed by the large and vertically integrated 
pharmaceutical companies since the 1930s, has been one of the main entry barriers in 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
This figure presents only some selected events of the dynamics of the vaccine industry. By obvious 
reasons it would be impossible to represent it in its full extent. 
Own elaboration. Source: Galambos and Sewell (1995), Mowery and Mitchell (1996), Sheridan (2005), 
Hinman et al. (2006) and the web pages of the five “Big Pharma” companies. 
 
Figure 6.1: Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances in the Vaccine Industry
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Besides these distinct technological and organizational capabilities, the “Big Pharma” 
firms have other specific characteristics that differentiate them from other groups acting 
in the vaccine business. Firstly, as private companies and major global players they are 
profit oriented, which means that the objective of their shareholders are fundamentally 
economic (Vandersmissen, 2001). Although scientific progress may restrict their 
decisions, the costs, risks and return on future sales drive the investment decisions of 
the vaccine manufacturers (Batson, 2005), and have been one of the causes of the 
decrease in the number of pharmaceutical companies in the vaccine business (Offit, 
2005; Coleman et al., 2005).
161
  
 
Secondly, they invest significantly in R&D as a percentage of sales and, according to 
the Mercer Consultants’ report (Mercer Management Consulting, 2002), since the 1990s 
these investments are estimated to be at the same level of R&D investments of the 
broader pharmaceutical business. Moreover, according to the same report, the 
development pipeline of the “Big Pharma” is constituted of increasingly complex 
vaccines, especially the genetically engineered recombinants, the conjugate and the 
combined vaccines (ibid. p.14). On this matter it is important to highlight that the “Big 
Pharma” companies do not usually carry out basic research. Conversely, they benefit 
from a wide network of alliances with universities and research institutions (Galambos 
and Sewell, 1995; Wilson et al., 2007).  
 
Thirdly, as noted by Mowery and Mitchell (1996), they also access technologies and 
markets through the dynamic strategies of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances (see Figure 6.1).
162
 Indeed, the “Big Pharma” can spend up to a 
quarter of their R&D budgets with their network of alliances (Nightingale and Mahdi, 
2006). Fourthly, high revenues from vaccines allow them to afford the characteristic 
permanent high investments needed for R&D and manufacturing infrastructures. Table 
6.1 presents some facts and figures of these large pharmaceutical firms.  
 
According to the Mercer report (Mercer Management Consulting, 2002:13-14), some 
significant differences in terms of strategy, even within the “Big Pharma” group, can 
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 This point is approached in more details in Section 6.3. 
162
 “Big Pharma” companies also go through mergers and acquisitions to increase the manufacturing 
capacity, as shown by Sheridan (2005). 
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also be identified. These differences or trends are region specific and refer to the two 
big vaccine markets: the US and Europe. The US-based multinational producers – 
Merck and Wyeth – mostly focus on higher profit margin proprietary products through a 
narrower range of products for high-income customers, and their scale of production is 
low. On the other hand, the strategy of the European-based multinational producers – 
Aventis, GSK and Chiron – encompasses a broader range of products for a wider range 
of buyers and their scale of production is high.
163
 
 
Table 6.1: Illustrative Facts and Figures of the “Big Pharma” 
Facts 
& 
Figures 
“Big Pharma” 
Sanofi-
Aventis 
GSK Merck Wyeth 
R&D 
investments
1
 
(% of total sales) 
16.1 14.9 20.5 14.9 
Vaccine R&D 
expenditures 
(US$ million)
2
 
653 491 722 323 
Vaccine revenues 
(as % of total 
revenues)
3
 
13 10 17 12 
Blockbusters 
. Influenza 
. Paediatric 
combinations 
. Hepatitis 
. Paediatric 
Combinations 
. Papillomavirus 
. Viral 
combinations, 
. Rotavirus 
. Pneumococcal 
conjugate 
R&D personnel 19,089
1
 
1600 
scientists
4
 
N/A N/A 
Headquarter 
Europe 
(France) 
Europe 
(UK)
5
 
North America 
(USA) 
North America 
(USA) 
1
 Average from 2006 to 2008 for the whole company business. 
2
 Estimative based on the percentage of vaccine revenues to total revenues and global R&D 
expenditures in 2008. The values in pounds Sterling and Euro were converted into US dollars using the 
average rates of exchange provided by the Federal Reserve. 
3
 In 2008. 
4
 Only for the vaccine business.  
5
 The headquarter of GSK Biologicals is in Belgium. 
Own elaboration. Source: The Annual Reports of the four companies. 
 
6.2.2 The Biotechs 
The biotechnological firms are being approached as a distinct group due to their highly 
specific characteristics and trajectory, and to their importance in the context of vaccine 
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 Originally, Chiron is a US-based biotech, which expanded its business to Europe before being 
acquired by Novartis. See Figure 6.1 for illustration. 
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development and manufacturing in the last decades. According to Milstien (2005),this 
has not previously been fully taken into account.
164
 
 
The rise of the first biotech firms took place in the 1970s filling a gap in the market 
caused by the recently posed challenge to the large enterprises by the new technological 
regime – the biotechnology transition (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). At that time, 
most of the early biotech firms were founded by academic scientists involved in 
University entrepreneurial activities, as also noted by these authors.
165
 The boom of the 
biotech firms, however, took place after the US Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980. Under this Act, universities and small enterprises financed by public funds – e.g. 
funds from NIH – were allowed to patent their discoveries and license them to the large 
pharmaceutical companies (Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006; Milstien and Kaddar, 2006). 
The rapid growth in the number of biotech firms, however, was circumscribed 
essentially to the US and eventually to the UK (Garavaglia et al., 2006). In fact, over 
90% of the existing biotech firms involved with pharmaceuticals in the 1990s were 
concentrated in the US, many of which dealt with vaccine development (Mowery and 
Mitchell, 1996).
166
 Milstien (2005) adds that vaccines have been the second target of 
biotech firms’ R&D pipeline, just behind cancer drugs. 
 
Nowadays several biotech firms are effectively participating in the vaccine market with 
their own products and/or services, exploring, in particular, some niche opportunities 
opened by the vacuum left by the “Big Pharma” (Sheridan, 2005). Milstien (2005) 
points out, for example, that US stockpiles of vaccines against bioterrorism diseases 
have been one of the main targets of biotech firms. Some biotech firms, however, have 
                                                 
164
 It may seem confusing to set up a distinct group of biotech firms when approaching the vaccine 
industry. If we draw on the definition employed by Hodgson (2006:635), biotech firms encompass those 
with a commercial application of biological organisms, biological systems or biological processes, in 
activities such as R&D, manufacturing or services. In a broad sense all the vaccine firms fall into this 
group. However, the objective of the proposed distinction is to focus on the dynamics of those more 
recent firms that have, as their main characteristic, the employment of molecular genetics and 
recombinant DNA technology – the new biotechnological paradigm – instead of “traditional” 
biotechnology, as a foundation to carry out their business. This research, therefore, approaches biotech 
firms in the same sense as Galambos and Sturchio (1998). 
165
 According to the authors, with the emergence of the new biotechnology, scientists who were normally 
providers of technical expertise to private ventures started carrying out a dual role – inventors and 
entrepreneurs, frequently holding University positions (ibid. p.257). 
166
 As data presented by Mowery and Mitchell may be considered relatively old for a dynamic sector such 
as biotech, this picture has probably changed. A study by Lawrence (2006) about the biotech sector in 
general, shows that in 2005 Europe concentrated more biotech firms than the United States although the 
latter still dominated the healthcare category.  
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expanded their business to other niches and, in some cases, have been acquired by large 
pharmaceuticals, or even by other biotech firms. Table 6.2 presents a list of selected 
biotech firms, their alliances, situation and the main products or services marketed. 
 
In fact, the dynamism of biotech firms has been one of the drivers for their quick 
technological and commercial success. Besides the very close connection with 
universities and research institutes and their high skilled staff, biotech firms are 
characterized by the highest R&D intensity within the science-based sector, as they 
invest up to 50% or more of their total revenues in R&D (Global Forum for Health 
Research, 2001; Milstien, 2005).
167
 For some authors (e.g. Sheridan, 2005) biotech 
firms may be challenging the hegemony of the “Big Pharma” companies. Nightingale 
and Mahdi (2006) point out, however, that biotech firms, with few exceptions, lack the 
essential capabilities – financial, marketing and technical – to compete with the “Big 
Pharma” in the global market and they therefore need to form alliances to survive.168 
 
Even though alliances have been one of the biotech firms most important strategies, in 
the vaccine business they are not the only one. According to Sheridan, as their R&D 
pipeline matures biotech firms face tough decisions on manufacturing and frequently go 
through one of two options: either to outsource the manufacturing of their products to 
existing manufacturers, or to develop the in-house manufacturing capabilities needed.
169
 
An alternative path chosen by some biotech firms to raise their working capital has been 
the initial public stock offerings (IPOs) (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998) or other 
financial transactions such as private investments in public equities and debt financing 
(Lahteenmaki and Lawrence, 2006). 
 
In the fields of vaccine development and manufacturing, some biotech firms can be 
found outside the US/Europe-axis. India, China, Cuba, Australia and Thailand host 
some of them (see list in Table 6.2). In fact, a more recent analysis of the biotech sector 
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 The report of the Global Forum for Health Research (2001:14) lists two biotech firms investing over 
50% of their revenue in R&D: ALZA (67%) and Genentech (55%). 
168
 This trend is confirmed in a recent WHO report. Biotech firms are expected to play an increasing role 
in vaccine R&D, but they have limited ability to penetrate some downstream functions such as Phase 3 
Trials, industrialization and commercialization. Some large biotech firms that manage to reach the market 
are usually taken over by the “Big Pharma”; a recent example is Genentech, which was taken over by 
Roche in 2009 (WHO, 2009a:22). See Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2 for other examples.  
169
 According to the author, the partnership for outsourcing is through contract manufacturing 
organization (CMO) to retain product exclusivity. 
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has shown that the Asia-Pacific region has shown a rapid increase in the number of 
biotech firms (Lawrence, 2006). In Brazil the situation is different. A recent study 
carried out by a specialized institution has mapped 71 biotech firms, 12 of which are in 
the field of human health (Fundação Biominas, 2007). This study, however, has not 
identified any biotech firm dealing with vaccine development or manufacturing.
170
 
 
Table 6.2: Selected Biotech Firms in the Vaccine Business 
Biotech Firm Major Products/ Services Alliances Remarks 
US/Europe-based biotech firms 
Acambis (UK) Typhoid, Smallpox Baxter, Aventis-
Pasteur, Berna Biotech 
Acquired by 
Sanofi-Pasteur 
Bavarian Nordic 
(Denmark) 
Smallpox GSK, Powderject, IDM 
Pharma 
- 
Berna Biotech 
(Switzerland) 
Influenza, Typhoid
1
, Hepatitis A and 
B 
Corixa, Orphan Europe, 
Chiron, Solvay 
Acquired by 
Crucell 
BioPort (USA) Anthrax
1, 
Rabies
1
 - - 
Chiron (USA) Rabies
1
, Meningitis C conjugate, 
Influenza, DTaP 
- Acquired by 
Novartis 
Crucell (The 
Netherlands) 
Vaccine development 
Commercialization of vaccines of 
acquired firms. 
Chiron, MedImmune, 
Merck, Sanofi-Pasteur 
Acquired 
Berna Biotech 
ID Biomedical 
(Canada) 
Influenza
1 
Vaccine development 
- Acquired by 
GSK 
MedImmune 
(USA) 
Influenza (FluMist)
1
 ViroNovative, Wyeth, 
GSK 
- 
Powderject (UK) Influenza, Yellow fever, BCG, 
Cholera, IPV 
CSL, Acambis, GSK Acquired by 
Chiron 
VaxGen (USA) Development of biodefense vaccines, 
outsource of manufacturing facilities  
Kekutsuken, Celltrion 
Incheon 
- 
Other countries-based biotech firms 
Bharat Biotech 
(India) 
Hepatitis B, TyPhoid Wyeth - 
CSL (Australia) DT, Influenza, Plague Merck, Chiron - 
Heber Biotec 
(Cuba) 
Hepatitis B, Hib, DTP-Hepatitis B, 
DTP-Hepatitis B-Hib 
Panacea Biotec - 
Panacea Biotec 
(India) 
DTP-Hepatitis B-Hib Heber Biotec, Chiron - 
Sinovac (China) Hepatitis A+B, Hepatitis A, 
Influenza 
- - 
1
 Vaccines licensed by FDA. 
Source: Milstien (2005), Sheridan (2005), Milstien et al. (2007), The Jordan Report (NIH/NIAID, 2007). 
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 Other studies, however, indicate a Brazilian incubated biotechnology firm, FK Biotecnologia, as 
developing anti-cancer vaccines. See Ferrer et al. (2004) and Rezaie et al. (2008). 
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6.2.3 Local Manufacturers: private, public and emerging 
In this sub-section attention is drawn towards those vaccine manufacturers who, with a 
few exceptions, have primarily dedicated their business to fulfil requirements in their 
local markets. These manufacturers were the main source of vaccines until the 1970s 
and 1980s (Gréco, 2001; Milstien and Candries, 2002). Until that time the vaccines 
commonly used by immunization programmes were decades old, as were the production 
methods employed, and which were widely available (Milstien et al., 2007).
171
 
According to Milstien et al. (2007), these factors made it easier to establish several 
public producers in developing countries. 
 
From this time on the “Big Pharma” began to dominate R&D and the commercialization 
of vaccines, and the number of smaller and local manufacturers started to decrease.
172
 
The situation was more pronounced amongst the public manufacturers, which used to be 
the arm of governments in developing countries for the supply of the low cost vaccines, 
but it was also recurrent in the USA and Europe. In the USA the two major public 
manufacturers are the most relevant examples: the Massachusetts Public Health 
Biologics Laboratories is currently producing limited quantities of a few old vaccines, 
and the Michigan Department of Public Health is no longer producing any vaccine 
(Hinman et al., 2006). According to Mowery and Mitchell (1996), in the 1990s in 
Europe public manufacturers were fighting to survive. In Latin America the situation 
was even more dramatic since only Brazil and Cuba continued regular local production 
of vaccines in the late 1990s (Homma et al., 2003).
173
 Table 6.3 lists the active 
manufacturers in Latin America (LA) in the early 1990s and the first part of this century, 
after most of them stopped regular production. The causes for the decline of local 
manufacturers have already been approached in Sub-section 6.2.1 as they were exactly 
the opposite of the ones contributing to the rise of the “Big Pharma”.174 
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 When the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) was created by the WHO in 1974, the 
vaccines commonly in use were Smallpox, BCG, DTP, Polio and Measles (WHO, 2002a). See Table 5.4 
in the previous chapter (pg. 104) for more details about the technology and dates of introduction of these 
vaccines. 
172
 The declining of private manufacturers has already been approached in Sub-section 6.2.1. See also 
Footnote 160 in this chapter. 
173
 According to the authors, Mexico was trying to sell its only public producer (Birmex) to an MNC.  
174
 The decline of local manufacturers took place in different times depending on the region of their 
markets. In the USA and Europe it started in the 1970s, as noted by Galambos (1999) and Hinman et al. 
(2006). In developing countries, whose immunization programmes delayed the introduction of new 
available vaccines, it started in the mid-1980s or later, as is the case of the Latin American vaccine 
manufacturers, as pointed out by Homma et al. (2003). 
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One consequence of the decline of local producers was the shortage of basic vaccines 
for national immunization programmes, and stockpiles in both developed and 
developing countries. As they became low margin products, the “Big Pharma” firms 
naturally drove their production to the new, more complex and more profitable vaccines 
(Batson, 2005; Hinman et al., 2006), and the remaining local producers were unable to 
cope with the demand.
175
 
 
Table 6.3: LA Vaccine Manufacturers in the early 1990s and in 2000s 
Country Manufacturer
1
 
Argentina Instituto Malbrán 
Laboratorio Central de Salud Pública de La Plata 
Brazil Fundação Ataulfo de Paiva 
Instituto Butantan 
Instituto de Tecnologia em Imunobiológicos (Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz) 
Instituto de Tecnologia do Paraná 
Instituto Vital Brazil 
Chile Instituto de Salud Pública 
Colombia Instituto nacional de Salud 
Cuba Instituto Finlay 
Ecuador Instituto de Higiene y Medicina Tropical Leopoldo Izquieta Pérez 
Mexico Gerencia General de Biológicos y Reactivos (currently Birmex) 
Uruguay Instituto de Higiene Dr Arnaldo Berta 
Venezuela Instituto Nacional de Higiene Rafael Rangel 
1
 Manufacturers with current regular production are in bold italic. 
Source: Adapted from Homma et al. (1995). Other sources: Homma et al. (2003) and DCVMN 
(web page, accessed in 10/2009). 
 
Notwithstanding the above picture, smaller manufacturers have been re-emerging in the 
past few years and some of them are now even supplying the international vaccine 
market (Mercer Management Consulting, 2002; Milstien et al., 2007). Besides the 
concerns with vaccine shortages, growing worldwide concern with the inequity between 
rich and poor countries regarding access to basic and new vaccines (WHO, 2002b), as 
well as with the “regionalization” of circulating pathogens (WHO, 2002b; Blume, 2005), 
has raised the awareness of governments and non-government organizations to the 
importance of the role of emerging manufacturers.
176,177,178
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 Vaccine shortages have taken place for many other reasons, but this issue is out of the scope of this 
research, even though it was briefly approached in Sub-section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5 (pg. 93). See Coleman 
et al. (2005), Hinman et al. (2006) and Orenstein et al. (2007) for detailed analyses on this issue. 
176
 From this point on the “smaller” and local manufacturers, either public or private, will be termed as 
“emerging” interchangeably, as they have been approached in recent literature. This may sound strange as 
many of them are, in fact, old established institutions that managed to survive and are re-emerging after 
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The rise and growth of emerging manufacturers has been captured in some studies (e.g. 
Milstien et al., 1997; Mercer Management Consulting, 2002; Boston Consulting Group, 
2005), and this phenomenon seems to overlap with the decline of many larger 
manufacturers. These studies’ findings are highly representative of the real 
characteristics of emerging manufacturers and indicate several factors contributing to or 
hindering the development of their capabilities.
179
 
  
The study of Milstien et al. (1997) was carried out in 31 manufacturers from 13 
countries.
180
 Seven critical elements for viability were assessed. These elements were 
proposed based on the characteristics of successful producers. Based on the scores 
achieved the manufacturers fell into three categories: viable, potentially viable and low 
viability (or probability of becoming viable). Only five manufacturers were considered 
viable whilst fifteen fell into the second group and eleven into the low viability group. 
Amongst the main findings, three of them draw the attention: a) the fundamental 
importance of government commitment to the viability of the manufacturers; b) the size 
of the national population as important but not critical for the success of local 
manufacturers; and
181
 c) the rationalization of facilities within countries as a means of 
increasing the viability of production.
182
 Moreover, the authors add that the current 
technological standard of vaccine and vaccine production requires a new and expensive 
quality system where quality assurance capabilities are of higher importance. The 
current acceptance of product quality is not based on quality control tests alone, but also 
                                                                                                                                               
experiencing a period of decay or hibernation. In this research, therefore, “emerging” simply refers to the 
current growing importance of these smaller manufacturers in the international scenario. 
177
 The regionalization of circulating pathogens means that the same disease may be caused by different 
forms of organisms due to specific regional characteristics. See Sub-section 5.2.1 of the previous chapter 
(pg. 95 and footnote 123) for more information about this issue. 
178
 Milstien et al. (1997) point out that a study in the mid-1990s revealed that 50% of the doses of 
vaccines acquired by national immunization programmes all over the world had been locally produced. 
179
 These studies were commissioned to guide governments, non-governmental organizations and donors 
in the strategies and/or investments needed to strengthen the development of new and the supply of 
current vaccines for national immunization programmes in the poorest and developing countries. 
180
 The authors point out that there are vaccine manufacturers in more than 55 countries but many of their 
facilities do not meet the quality standards for a reliable vaccine manufacture. The manufacturers assessed 
were established in Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, South Africa, Senegal and Thailand.  
181
 According to the authors this finding is confirmed by the existence of some successful small private 
producers in industrialized countries where the national population is not large. Viability seems to be 
more related to total GNP and some government support in this case. 
182
 Rationalization was a hypotheses raised by the authors when analyzing the critical elements of three 
manufacturers in the same country who had ranked as potentially viable or below. The idea consisted in 
the combination of capabilities and strengths of those manufacturers that might result in a new viable 
scored producer (Milstien et al., 1997:1362). 
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by a quality assurance system. This is across all the production steps through 
documentation, environment control, validation of equipment and operational 
procedures, and ensures product safety and production consistency.  
 
One critical point raised was the access to new technologies. As most are now protected 
by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), national producers need to enter into agreements 
with the “Big Pharma” to access them or wait until the patents expire. Before entering 
into these agreements, however, manufacturers need economically viable facilities with 
assured quality. Table 6.4 summarizes some of the characteristics of the manufacturers 
assessed. 
 
To stay current, national producers must upgrade technology and increase 
budgets and investments, but those which serve relatively small markets will 
find they are unable to compete with large scale producers who can take 
advantage of economics of scale (Milstien et al., 1997:1359-1360). 
 
Table 6.4: Common Characteristics of Viable, Potentially Viable and Low 
Viability Vaccine Manufacturers 
Main Characteristics 
Manufacturers Categories 
Viable Potentially Viable Low Viability 
Support from 
government 
Strong 
Low commitment to 
long-term viability (e.g. 
week NRA
1
). 
No commitment. 
 
Technical and 
Managerial Skills 
Strong 
Ability to produce 
traditional vaccines; 
No commitment/ability 
to cope with change; 
Need to improve 
management and legal 
structures. 
Weak (even for old 
products). 
Quality System 
Proven track records 
with the current 
vaccines; 
Track record (quantity 
element) for some 
traditional vaccines; 
Quality assurance 
system often not in 
place. 
Lack of independent 
NRA
1
. 
Facilities 
Make changes to be 
able to meet new 
demands. 
Investments in some 
extent to facilities 
upgrade. 
Decaying facilities; 
Lack of adequate 
maintenance. 
Other 
Likely to need alliances 
and joint-ventures to be 
successful in the long 
term. 
Viability does not 
depend on investments 
in buildings and 
equipments alone. 
Investments in facilities 
alone unlikely to 
change the situation. 
1
 National Regulatory Authority  
Own elaboration. Source: Milstien et al. (1997:1361-1362). 
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The Mercer report (2002) focuses mainly on the economics of markets, and vaccine 
development and production, which are issues to be approached in more detail in the 
next section. However, some aspects presented in the report about the dynamics and 
characteristics of emerging manufacturers deserve to be mentioned here. First, and 
consistent with other studies, the report states that these manufacturers have been 
expanding capacity significantly, improving production scale and widening the range of 
products offered. They have benefited from their cost advantage and different objectives 
from the large multinationals to increasingly supply basic vaccines for international 
public sector procurement on a profitable basis. Second, and in an opposite way, as they 
often lack the innovative capabilities of the large multinationals, their key challenge is 
to access and/or develop the new technologies increasingly procured by international 
agencies and low and middle-income countries. 
 
The Boston Consulting Group’s report (2005) analyzes 18 emerging manufacturers 
(public and private) and 6 multinational corporations (MNCs) in order to assess the 
characteristics of potential suppliers to the GAVI priority needs, to identify the 
constraints faced by these manufacturers in the production and development of these 
priority vaccines, and to point out possible actions to GAVI partners to ensure security 
and quality of supply.
183,184
 The emerging manufacturers assessed in this study are 
located in Brazil (2), China (5), Cuba (2), India (5), Indonesia (1), Korea (2) and 
Mexico (1). Some of the findings of this study show the contrast between both groups 
of manufacturers. For instance, emerging manufacturers are focused in the vaccine 
business whilst the MNCs are focused in other products.
185
 Moreover, even though the 
emerging manufacturers assessed have been responsible for half the volume of vaccines 
produced, this volume represented only 8% of the total sales of vaccines of both groups. 
This finding reinforces the fact that the portfolios of emerging manufacturers are 
constituted of older products.
186
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 The six MNCs assessed in the study of BCG include the five “Big Pharma” addressed by this research 
in Sub-section 6.2.1 plus the Berna Biotech, which was addressed in Sub-section 6.2.2.  
184
 GAVI Alliance is a public-private partnership. Its role and importance are stressed in Sub-section 6.4.1. 
185
 In 2004, an average of 66% of the total revenue of emerging manufacturers assessed came from 
vaccine sales whilst it represented only 6% for MNCs in the same year. However, higher figures were 
raised by this research for MNCs in 2008, as shown in Table 6.1, which can probably indicate a shift in 
MNCs’ strategy. 
186
 According to the report, however, emerging manufacturers are starting to invest in the development of 
more technically challenging vaccines (e.g. rotavirus), but not in the most scientifically challenging ones 
(e.g. HIV). Furthermore, emerging manufacturers can be more successful in innovation focusing the local 
markets needs (e.g. heat stable vaccines). 
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Other findings of this study are very indicative of the growing position of emerging 
suppliers. Within this group the study identified a few manufacturers that are export-
focused rather than dedicated to the local market.
187
 However, most of them address 
their entire production only to local markets, or only a small percentage of their 
production to export markets. Amongst those assessed some were identified as having 
technical and production capabilities to supply high quality vaccines. However, they 
were considered rather unrealistic in terms of timelines of product development, which 
denotes a certain weakness in innovative capability and project management. IPR 
capabilities have not been a barrier, but they are of growing importance to the firms’ 
innovative capabilities. Amongst the main needs of the emerging manufacturers are 
assistance with regulatory issues, WHO pre-qualification, and mechanisms to access 
new technologies. 
 
The need for mechanisms to strengthen the capabilities for production and development, 
and to ease the access to new technologies, is a point already being addressed by the 
main emerging manufacturers. In 2001 most of them formed an alliance and the 
Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), an international 
non-profit and public health driven organization, was created. After some years in 
existence, the DCVMN has been considered by some as the main representative of 
emerging manufacturers in the international scenario (Jadhav et al., 2008). Some of the 
members have WHO pre-qualification, which means that they comply with WHO 
required standards for producing vaccines and are able to sell their products to 
international organizations (e.g. UNICEF, GAVI, PAHO). According to Milstien (2005), 
obtaining WHO pre-qualification is indicative of their viability. Other members are still 
pursuing this status. The two main Brazilian vaccine manufacturers are members of 
DCVMN but with a different status. The list of members is shown in Table 6.5. Other 
aspects of DCVMN are stressed in Sub-section 6.4.1. 
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 The few export-oriented manufacturers are located in India, Korea and Indonesia, and the UNICEF 
and middle-income countries are the main markets to them. 
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Table 6.5: Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network – DCVMN 
Vaccine Manufacturer/member Country Category
1
 
Bio Farma Indonesia FM 
Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz Brazil FM 
Bionet-Asia Co., Ltd Thailand FM 
Finlay Instituto Cuba FM 
LG Life Sciences Korea FM 
Panacea Biotec India FM 
Serum Institute of India India FM 
Bharat Biotech India PFM 
Biological E Ltd India PFM 
Birmex Mexico PFM 
Indian Immunobiologicals Ltd India PFM 
Instituto Butantan Brazil PFM 
JGAD China PFM 
The Biovac Institute South Africa PFM 
Zydus India PFM 
CNBG China AM 
INNOVAX China AM 
IVAC Vietnam AM 
Queen Saovabha Memorial Institute Thailand AM 
Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute Iran AM 
TIANYUAN Bio-Pharma China AM 
VABIOTECH Vietnam AM 
VACSERA Egypt AM 
1
 FM – Full Member (manufacturers with WHO pre-qualification and with a fully functional 
National Regulatory Authority – NRA); PFM – Prospective Full Member (manufacturers of 
countries with fully functional NRA and working towards attaining status of WHO pre-
qualification); AM – Associate Member (manufacturers committed to become viable but from 
countries with no fully functional NRA). 
Source: DCVMN (web page, accessed in 10/2009). 
 
6.2.4 The Brazilian Vaccine Industry (BVI) 
Brazil has a century-old tradition in the vaccine industry.
188
 In this sub-section some 
introductory aspects and a general overview of the current manufacturers of the 
Brazilian vaccine industry during the second phase of its history is presented.
189
 The 
                                                 
188
 The primordia of the Brazilian vaccine industry and the first phase of its history were approached in 
Sub-section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5 (pg. 98-100). 
189
 The second phase of the history of BVI starts in the early 1970s after the creation of the National 
Immunization Programme (PNI). The reason for establishing this threshold is stressed in Sub-section 
6.4.2.  
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development of technological capabilities of the two main manufacturers of this 
industry is depicted in the next chapter. 
 
Of the four current manufacturers, three are public and one is a private non-profit 
organization. They have been the only local manufacturers to supply the public market 
with human vaccines since the early 1980s.
190
 In 1981 the then biggest Brazilian 
vaccine manufacturer, Sintex do Brasil, a private company receiving foreign capital, 
stopped the production of vaccines and sera due to the tighter requirements imposed by 
the local regulatory authorities and the high investments needed to comply with the new 
requirements. This left the Brazilian government faced with an insufficient vaccine 
supply by the existing smaller public producers, which also ran their production under 
precarious conditions at that time (Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003; Ponte, 2007). 
 
Successes and failures have marked the trajectory of these manufacturers since then. 
Huge investments from the Brazilian government through the Programme of National 
Self-Sufficiency in Immunobiologicals (PASNI) from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, 
and a growing and assured public market coordinated by the National Immunization 
Programme (PNI) of the Ministry of Health, have attempted to create the foundations 
for the development of Brazilian manufacturers.
 191
 Much was achieved, but weaknesses 
amongst the articulation of governmental policies have limited the intended success 
(Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003; Gadelha, 2005). Moreover, some studies consider the 
high dependence of central government vaccine purchases is considered of high risk for 
the manufacturers (e.g. Castanhar et al., 2005). The same authors point out, however, 
that the size and rapid growth of this public market and possibilities of internal and 
international cooperation open a window of opportunity to these manufacturers. 
Consequently, the development of these four manufacturers has not been balanced and 
remarkable differences can be noticed between the two bigger manufacturers and the 
two smaller ones. Table 6.6 presents some data about these current manufacturers. 
Other general information and characteristics are described below: 
                                                 
190
 A fifth small public manufacturer, Instituto Vital Brazil, provided small quantities of tetanus toxoid to 
the public market for some years, but it ceased production in the 1990s, as indicated in Table 6.3. 
Recently, the Ministry of Health announced that the “Big Pharma”, Novartis, started building a vaccine 
production industrial plant in the city of Recife, in the north-eastern region of Brazil, with completion 
forecast for 2010 (interview 10). 
191
 The aspects of the Brazilian public market are approached in more detail in Section 6.3. Both PNI and 
PASNI are also approached in Section 6.4. 
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Instituto de Tecnologia em Imunobiológicos (Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz): the biggest 
Brazilian vaccine manufacturer by sales, Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz is an Institute of the 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), a century-old institution linked to the Ministry of 
Health, and the most prominent biomedical and biological research institution in Latin 
America (Moreira, 2005).
192
 The creation of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz by Fiocruz in 
1976 was motivated by the desire to centralize and organize the production and 
development of immunobiologicals then carried out since the beginning of the 20
th
 
century by different research laboratories across the institution, according to the same 
author (ibid. p.15). Besides human vaccines the institute manufactures diagnostic 
reagents and biopharmaceuticals. Its current mission is “to contribute to the 
improvement of Brazilian public health standards, through technological research 
focused on product development and production of immunobiologicals, in order to 
respond to the demands originated by the national and worldwide epidemiological 
situation” (Bio-Manguinhos, web page, accessed in 11/2009), which states its public 
and local main purposes.  
 
Being part of a huge research institution with an internationally acknowledged scientific 
community seems, however, has not yet made a great difference to Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz in terms of innovation on vaccines. This is because the source of 
technology for the great majority of its current products is foreign, obtained through 
technology transfer agreements. Notwithstanding, several successful incremental 
innovations and recent product innovations have been achieved and are the result of 
increasing investments in in-house R&D activities, as noted by Milstien et al. (2007), 
and of a growing network of partnerships (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b).
193
 On the other 
hand, the technology transfer agreements have been a successful strategy of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz to quickly acquire technological capabilities and fulfil some of the 
needs of the PNI, as shown by Moreira (2005) and Barbosa (2009). 
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 The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) is a complex and large institution with 15 technical institutes 
carrying out activities such as basic research, education, hospitals with clinical research, technological 
development and production of immunobiologicals (Bio-Manguinhos), and of medicines and drugs, 
quality control, animal breeding and scientific and historical information. Its headquarters are in Rio de 
Janeiro in an 800,000-square metre campus. It is also present in other sites in Rio de Janeiro and in 
another six Brazilian states. Moreover, it employs over 7,500 employees (Fiocruz, web page, accessed in 
11/2009). 
193
 This network includes partnerships with several other institutes of Fiocruz. 
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The manufacturer is currently supplying eight products to PNI – Yellow Fever, 
Meningococcal A+C and C, OPV, Hib, DTP+Hib, MMR and Rotavirus vaccines. The 
production lines for the two first vaccines are WHO pre-qualified, and the institute have 
exported the surplus of production of both vaccines to United Nations (UN) 
Agencies.
194
 Recently a new technology transfer agreement was announced for the 
production of a 10-valent Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine to be supplied to PNI from 
2010 (Bio-Manguinhos, web page, accessed in 11/2009).
195
 Currently, several products 
are in the R&D pipeline (Milstien et al., 2007; Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b), some in the 
late stages of development (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b).
196
 The manufacturer fully 
complies with the GMP requirements being annually inspected by the national authority. 
 
The legal status of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, submitted to the tight rules of the public 
administration in Brazil, has been long recognized by some as inadequate for the 
management of an enterprise of its size, complexity and rapid growth (Castanhar et al., 
2005). As a consequence, the institute has resorted to continuous processes of labour 
outsourcing and to the support of a non-profit foundation linked to Fiocruz to carry out 
vaccine exportation and some activities such as procurement (partially) and training, 
amongst others (interview 10). 
 
The manufacturer largely benefited from the resources provided by PASNI to 
modernize the facilities and build a new large industrial plant in the 1990s, as shown in 
Table 6.10 in Sub-section 6.4.2. Significant investments in infrastructure, however, 
have also been made on a continuous basis. To perform its activities Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz relied on an approximately 35,000 square metre facility built in 
2007 (Bio-Manguinhos, 2008), and new facilities are under construction to strengthen 
the quality of the current products and accommodate the production and development of 
new vaccines (interview 21).
197
 
 
Instituto Butantan (Butantan): internationally acknowledged by its scientific and 
technological activities and production of serums in the ophidian area (Mello, 2000), 
                                                 
194
 Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz is currently the world biggest producer of yellow fever vaccine. 
195
 Available at http://www.fiocruz.br/bio/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=964&sid=227, in 
Portuguese only. 
196
 See Figure 7.3 on pg. 179 for a list of selected R&D projects of both Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz and 
Instituto Butantan. 
197
 The total area includes facilities for activities other than vaccines. 
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Butantan is currently the second largest supplier of vaccines for the local public market. 
Together with Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz it supplied 67% of the total needs of PNI and 
98% of the human vaccines locally purchased by PNI in 2006 (see Table 6.6). Figures 
released by institutional materials of Butantan (e.g. Instituto Butantan, 2007; Fundação 
Butantan, 2007) place the institution as the biggest vaccine manufacturer in number of 
doses produced and supplied. This public institution is linked to the São Paulo state’s 
Secretary of Health and is headquartered on a large campus in the city of São Paulo 
(Instituto Butantan, 2000). In addition to vaccines and serums, Instituto Butantan also 
manufactures biopharmaceuticals and blood products.  
 
Currently Butantan is supplying the PNI with six products, all different from the ones 
supplied by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz.
198
 They are, in order of introduction in the 
production line, the BCG, DTP, DT, dT, Hepatitis B, Influenza and Human Rabies. 
Butantan’s development strategy has mixed in-house development with technology 
transfers. The first four products were developed in-house from old and widely 
available technologies. The recombinant Hepatitis B was the first and the only vaccine 
of the newer generation to be completely developed in-house in Brazil. Although 
Influenza and Rabies were introduced through technology transfer agreements, Rabies 
was substituted by a further improved in-house developed vaccine. This manufacturer 
also fully complies with GMP requirements (interview 6). 
 
Butantan’s R&D pipeline also has several vaccines being developed, most with a wide 
range of collaborations and partnerships (Fundação Butantan, 2007). Investment in 
R&D has significantly increased in recent years, mainly thanks to research grants from 
São Paulo state’s S&T support agency (Milstien et al., 2007).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, PASNI also contemplated giving the manufacturer resources to 
modernize and build new facilities for vaccine production (Temporão and Gadelha, 
2007). It was the only manufacturer to direct part of these resources to build R&D 
facilities – the Biotechnology Centre – (see Table 6.10 in Sub-section 6.4.2), which, in 
turn, made the development of the recombinant Hepatitis B vaccine possible (Gadelha 
and Azevedo, 2003; Temporão and Gadelha, 2007). Butantan’s potential technological 
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 The tetravalent (DTP+Hib) vaccine produced by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz is a partnership with 
Butantan, which supplies the bulk of DTP to the former. 
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capability is recognized as one of its strengths amongst the Brazilian manufacturers 
(Temporão, 2002).  
  
In order to grant more administrative flexibility, a non-profit foundation – Fundação 
Butantan – was created in 1989 to support Butantan’s financial, procurement and 
personnel management (Instituto Butantan, 2000), but it participated effectively in the 
Institute’s strategic decisions.199 
 
Fundação Ataulfo de Paiva (FAP): this traditional private and non-profit organization, 
acknowledged by the Brazilian government as being a public utility, is at the other side 
of the BVI. Although it is the main supplier of the BCG vaccine to PNI, it is a small 
manufacturer of a sole product of old technology, which imposes clear financial and 
technological restrictions to its management (Castanhar et al., 2005). Therefore, its 
participation in the Brazilian vaccine public market is tiny (see Table 6.6). Butantan, a 
significantly stronger institution on scientific, technological and financial grounds, 
which implies a real threat for the continuity of its business, also produces the BCG 
vaccine. 
 
Despite having the managerial flexibility characteristic of private firms, in contrast to 
the other three manufacturers, FAP’s financial fragility is an important limitation to the 
development of its activities and its ability to invest in R&D, quality, and the 
modernization of its production facilities (Castanhar et al., 2005).
200
 In this regards, 
although they have received financial resources from PASNI for the building of a new 
industrial plant (which could increase its production capacity and enhance the quality of 
its production process that is still not fully compliant with GMP), the new facilities are 
still not operative and require further investment for their completion (Limonta, 
2005).
201
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 The Four-Year Plan 2007-2010 of the Institute was elaborated by the chairman of the Fundação 
Butantan, a former general director of the Institute, influential researcher and charismatic character 
amongst its workers, as revealed by the general director of the Institute in a interview to a magazine 
published by Butantan (Instituto Butantan, 2007:26). 
200
 According to the authors, due to its private nature FAP cannot count on financial aid from government 
like the other manufacturers and need to resort on bank loans, which become its situation still more 
dramatic (ibid. p.256). 
201
 See table 6.10 in Sub-section 6.4.2. 
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Instituto de Tecnologia do Paraná (Tecpar): Tecpar is a public institution linked to the 
Paraná state government. Even though it is a vaccine manufacturer its main business is 
in the field of technical and technological services provided for other firms installed in 
the Paraná state. Tecpar is a medium sized firm, but a small vaccine manufacturer and 
does not dominate any recent technology. Curiously it is not currently supplying any 
human vaccine, but only a canine rabies vaccine to PNI. In the past Tecpar supplied PNI 
with three human vaccines: DTP, dT and human rabies, the two first introduced through 
an unfinished technology transfer agreement with a “Big Pharma”; production of these 
had to be stopped due to quality problems raised by PNI over the product (interview 8). 
The human rabies vaccine was supplied from 1986 to 2002 and, according to the same 
interviewee, production of this was also interrupted due to complaints over the side 
effects of its old technology. 
 
Tecpar’s weakness in the vaccine field is attributed to its low tradition and technological 
commitment to vaccine R&D (Temporão, 2002). One of the interviewees pointed out 
the reasons for Tecpar’s poor performance in the field of vaccines today in more detail. 
Firstly, the institute hasn’t structured any formal area for vaccine R&D and there are 
few researchers allocated to these activities. Secondly, the lack of capability in 
molecular biology has been the main hindrance to the development of new vaccines 
(interview 8). In 2001, however, the IBMP – a molecular biology institute – was created 
on the campus of Tecpar through a partnership between Tecpar and Fiocruz, but there 
have been no successes in the vaccine field so far. Through other cooperation initiatives, 
however, Tecpar has been developing a new human rabies vaccine and it is expected to 
be launched soon, according to the interviewee. Moreover, with a partnership with Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz, Tecpar established the Tetanus Monomeric Protein (PMT) 
production process, a component used by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz in the conjugation 
process of its Hib vaccine, and has been supplying this product regularly to that 
manufacturer. 
 
Tecpar’s managerial capabilities were pointed out by some authors as one of its 
strengths when compared to the other vaccine manufacturers (Temporão, 2002; 
Castanhar et al., 2005), but this has not translated into success in the vaccine business. 
Tecpar also benefited from PASNI resources to modernize and build new facilities, as 
142 
shown in Table 6.10, but the new facilities for the DTP vaccine were not completed and 
were adapted for the production of PMT (interview 8). 
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Table 6.6: The Brazilian Vaccine Manufacturers 
Manufacturer
1
 
Start 
Date 
Legal Status, 
Owner 
Size of Manufacturer 
Main Product 
Line 
Other Product 
Lines 
Number of 
Vaccines 
Marketed 
2008 
Human Vaccine Market 
2006 
Employment 
US$ Sales
5
 
(in million)
 
 
Markets 
Explored 
Market 
Share
9
 
Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz
2
 
(Rio de Janeiro) 
1900 
Public, 
Brazilian 
Federal 
Government 
1102
3
 316.8
3
 Vaccines 
Biopharmaceuticals; 
Diagnostic Reagents 
8 
Local public 
and 
Export 
(Unicef, 
PAHO) 
38.9% 
(56.9%) 
Instituto Butantan 
(São Paulo) 
1901 
Public, São 
Paulo State 
Government 
1020
4
 158.1
6
 Vaccines 
Hyperimmune Sera; 
Vaccine bulk, Blood 
products 
6 Local Public 
28.1% 
(41.1%) 
Fundação Ataulfo de 
Paiva 
(Rio de Janeiro) 
1900 
Non-profit 
Organization 
of Public 
Utility 
155
4
 4.0
7
 Vaccines - 1 Local Public 
1.4% 
(2.0%) 
Instituto de Tecnologia 
do Paraná 
(Curitiba) 
1942 
Public, Paraná 
State 
Government 
566
3
 16.5
8
 
Technical and 
Technological 
Services 
Vaccines; Tetanic 
Monomeric Protein; 
Antigens 
1 Local Public 0% 
10
 
1
 The city where the manufacturer is established is given in parentheses.  
2
 Bio-Manguinhos was inaugurated in 1976 as a separate Institute within the Fiocruz structure.  
3
 In 2008.  
4
 In 2004.  
5
 Encompasses all businesses of the firms. Values converted into $US using the average annual exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Brazil.  
6
 In 2009.  
7
 In 2006.  
8
 Sales of canine rabies vaccine only in 2008.  
9
 Local market share excluding imported vaccines are given in parentheses.  
10
 Currently not marketing human vaccines. 
Sources: Limonta (2005); CGIES/CGPNI (2007) and data collected during the field work.  
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6.3 Markets and Economics of Vaccine 
Vaccine markets and economics have been analyzed in several studies and papers in 
recent years. This section seeks to present selectively the main aspects of the 
international and Brazilian vaccine markets revealed in these studies, and/or raised in 
data gathered during fieldwork, in order to bring to light some possible elements that 
might be influencing or affecting the development of BVI. Further economics of 
vaccine development and production are also approached amid the data. 
 
The global vaccine market is, in fact, “a series of markets”, in the words of Milstien and 
Candries (2002), or highly segmented, according to the report of Asian Development 
Bank (2001). This segmentation has two dimensions, as stated in this report: an 
international dimension, with the market segmented between industrialized and 
developing countries, and a national dimension, constituted by the public and private 
sectors. In a global perspective the vaccine market has presented an impressive average 
growth of 10% in the 1990s, having reached US$ 6bn in 2000 (Mercer Management 
Consulting, 2002).
202
 This trend was expected to continue or accelerate in the early part 
of this century, according to some authors (e.g. Gréco, 2002; Mercer Management 
Consulting, 2002; Milstien and Candries, 2002). In fact, recent estimates point to a 
global vaccine market of over US$ 17bn in mid-2008 (WHO, 2009a), representing an 
average growth of 14%. According to the same report, this makes it one of the fastest 
growing sectors of industry. Figure 6.2 illustrates the global market growth.
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Own elaboration. Source: Mercer Management Consulting (2002) and WHO (2009a). 
 
Figure 6.2: Global Vaccine Market – Figures and Growth 
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 According to the report, growth was calculated in nominal terms, i.e. with no inflation adjustment. 
203
 In fact, an examination of the four “Big Pharma” firms’ sales published in their annual reports, shows 
that only their vaccine sales, all together, exceeded US$ 16 billion in 2008. 
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In terms of volume, however, the average growth was only 1% in the first period, the 
difference explained by the increase in the average price of the vaccines supplied due to 
the introduction of some enhanced pediatric vaccines, and especially of proprietary 
products in the market (Mercer Management Consulting, 2002).
204
 Table 6.7 shows the 
product segmentation of vaccines and the impact of “blockbusters” in the market. 
 
Table 6.7: Vaccines by Product Segment 
Basic 
Pediatrics 
Enhanced 
Pediatrics 
Proprietary Pediatrics Adult/Travel 
. OPV 
. DTP 
. BCG 
. TT 
. Measles 
. IPV 
. DTaP 
. Hepatitis B 
. Hib 
. MMR 
. Pneumococcal conjugate
1
 
. Meningococcal conjugate
1
 
. Varicella
1
 
. Rotavirus
2
 
. HPV
2
 
. Hepatitis A 
. Yellow Fever 
. Typhoid 
. Influenza 
Vaccines in italics are those currently produced by the manufacturers of BVI. The Pneumococcal 
conjugate is planned to be introduced in 2010. 
1
 These vaccines represented approx. 30% of the market value and 1% of the market volume in 2000. 
2
 Recent proprietary products not in the market in 2000 - see Table 5.4 in the previous chapter (pg. 104). 
Source: adapted from Mercer Management Consulting (2002). 
 
As stated before (Sub-section 6.2.1) the “Big Pharma” firms are the main suppliers of 
this market and their revenues represent over 80% of this global market.
205
 The main 
markets, in terms of value, are located in the private sector of developed countries, 
where the products in their early lifecycle are launched (Vandersmissen, 2001). Figures 
6.3 and 6.4 illustrate these statements. 
 
Market Shares in 2000
Wyeth, 16.6%
Chiron, 5.6%
Others, 15.2%
Merck Sharp & 
Dohme, 20.6%
Sanofi-
Pasteur, 
20.4%
GSK 
Biologicals, 
21.6%
2004 (US$ 8.4 billion approx.)
USA and 
Canada, 46%
Japan, 7%
Rest of World, 
17%
Europe 
(Northern and 
Western) 25%
UNICEF/GAVI, 
5%
 
Source: Adapted from Gréco (2002) Source: Adapted from Boston Consulting Group 
(2005) 
Figure 6.3: Manufacturer’s Market 
Share 
Figure 6.4: International Market 
Segmentation 
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 This growth excludes the worldwide effort to eradicate poliomyelitis. 
205
 In a comparison between the six biggest MNCs (see Footnote 183 in this chapter) and the 18 main 
emerging manufacturers, the BCG’s report (2005) found that the sales of the former represented approx. 
92% of the total sales of vaccines of both groups in 2004, but only 42% of the doses supplied. 
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As also stated before (Sub-sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4), smaller and emerging 
manufacturers, including one Brazilian manufacturer, have been increasing their 
participation in the international market. However, mainly high volumes of basic and 
existing vaccines to address public markets of middle and low-income countries have 
characterized their participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Vandersmissen (2001), Milstien and Candries (2002) and Mercer Management 
Consulting (2002). 
 
Figure 6.5: Typical Vaccine Life Cycle 
 
The lifecycle of a vaccine in the market follows a similar pattern to other products in the 
pharmaceutical sector, but it has some specific characteristics due to the action of 
governments and public agencies. Vandersmissen (2001) describes the typical stages of 
this market development. According to him, in its early stage the product is marketed at 
a high price only in private markets of high-income countries. Due to the high R&D and 
capital investments required to develop a vaccine, the existence of this segment is of 
fundamental importance to the innovator to receive acceptable returns.
206
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 See Sub-section 5.3.3 of the previous chapter (pg. 109-110) about investments to develop a vaccine. 
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In the second stage the vaccine begins to be introduced to public markets of 
industrialized countries and the power of government purchases forces prices down. In 
the USA the pressures of public purchases have been indicated as an impediment to 
vaccine development as they dramatically reduce the manufacturers’ profits (Hinman et 
al., 2006). Tiered prices are found in this stage, and some new manufacturers enter in 
the market, frequently through either their own R&D efforts or licensing from the 
owner of the technology (Milstien and Candries, 2002). 
 
In the last stage the vaccine is introduced and almost exclusively marketed in public 
markets of middle and low-income countries, and large purchases of governments and 
public agencies force prices to the lowest level. At this stage the intellectual property 
protecting the product is expiring and several new manufacturers are in the market 
(Milstien and Candries, 2002). The typical life cycle of a vaccine and its specific 
characteristics are represented in Figure 6.5. 
 
For each of the three stages of market development described by Vandersmissen, it is 
possible to identify the vaccines currently in the market, according to the product 
segments found in the Mercer’s report and shown in Table 6.7. At one extreme are the 
“blockbusters” or proprietary products, new technologies sold exclusively in private 
markets of high-income countries. At the other extreme are the basic vaccines, old 
technologies manufactured almost exclusively by emerging/local manufacturers and 
commercialized in middle and low-income countries. In the middle, the relatively 
mature vaccines, which are manufactured and marketed in both high and middle-income 
countries but are more likely to be purchased by the former. According to Mercer’s 
report, adult/travel vaccines are purchased exclusively by high-income countries. 
However, Influenza and Yellow Fever vaccines have been largely used in middle-
income countries and/or endemic regions. 
 
In Brazil, a country ranked by the World Bank as an upper-middle income country, the 
vaccine market seems to follow a different pattern fuelled by a large population, a 
decreasing but still important birth rate, and a strong and active federal government 
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presence through its National Immunization Programme (PNI) and other government 
policies.
207,208
 
 
Little information is available about the Brazilian private market. Temporão (2002) 
estimated this market to be around US$ 96 million in 2000 and pointed out that it grows 
within the gaps left by PNI.
209
 According to this author, vaccines sold in this market are 
mainly the proprietary and the enhanced pediatrics (Table 6.7), all of them produced by 
foreign manufacturers and marketed by private clinics and in doctor’s offices. 
 
Table 6.8: Advanced Vaccines Acquired by PNI / Supplied by BVI – starting dates 
Vaccine 
Starting date 
Elapsed Time 
(years) 
PNI Routine or 
Specific 
Immunization
1
 
Supply by BVI 
(manufacturer) 
Hepatitis B recombinant 1992 1998 (Butantan) 6 
Triple Viral (MMR) 1993 2004 (Bio-Manguinhos) 11 
Rubella 1997 - - 
Hib 1999 1999 (Bio-Manguinhos) 0 
Influenza 1999 2000 (Butantan) 1 
Pneumococcal 1999 - - 
DTaP
2
 1999 - - 
Hepatitis A
2
 1999 - - 
Double Viral (MR) 2000 - - 
Varicella 2001 - - 
Meningococcal Conjugate
2
 2001 - - 
Pentavalent (DTP+Hib+HBV) 2002 registering (Bio-
Manguinhos/Butantan) 
? 
Pneumococcal conjugate 2002 announced for 2010 
(Bio-Manguinhos) 
8 
Tetravalent (DTP+Hib) 2002 2002 (Bio-Manguinhos) 0 
Rabies (vero cell)
 2
 2002 2002 (Butantan) 0 
IPV
2
 2003 - - 
Rotavirus
2
 2006 2007 (Bio-Manguinhos) 1 
1
 Some vaccines were introduced by PNI for immunization routine, others for use only in small groups or 
special communities (e.g. Varicella vaccine has been acquired for immunization of Indian communities). 
Most of the new generation vaccines were introduced gradually. 
Own elaboration. Source: Brasil (2003); vaccines with 
2
 were included from data provided by 
CGIES/CGPNI (2007). 
 
On the other hand figures for the Brazilian public market are even more impressive than 
that for the global market. From 1996 to 2006 the public market has grown from 
                                                 
207
 The Brazilian population, the fifth largest in the world, was around 190 million in 2008 according to 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2008). The average birth rate in the 1990s was 
around 2.23%, which represents around 4 million births every year (IBGE, web page, accessed in 11/2009 
- data available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/ibgeteen/pesquisas/fecundidade.html#anc3). 
208
 The Brazilian institutions and policies are approached in more detail in the next section. 
209
 The private market was estimated by the author to be R$ 176 million. It was converted from the 
Brazilian currency into $US using the average annual exchange rate published by the Central Bank of 
Brazil (available at www.bcb.gov.br). 
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US$ 85.2 million to US$ 294.3 million in nominal terms, with an annual growth rate of 
13.2%. This growth was basically due to the introduction of more advanced vaccines in 
the immunization programme by PNI (Temporão and Gadelha, 2007), the coordinator 
and sole purchaser in this market. The starting dates of regular acquisitions of more 
advanced vaccines by PNI, as well as of the supply by BVI, are shown in Table 6.8. The 
purchases from the Brazilian manufacturers were responsible for most of this growth in 
this period since their annual growth rate was 19.1%, from US$ 35.1 million to 
US$ 201.3 million. Imports remained fairly steady in the same period (US$ 51.3 
million/year in average), with some variations in the years where PNI introduced new 
generation vaccines in the immunization programme. In 2006, for example, when the 
recently launched oral rotavirus vaccine was introduced by PNI, the purchase of this 
vaccine represented 78% of total imports, reaching the highest peak of the analyzed 
period.
210
 Figure 6.6 illustrates the evolution of local and the imported purchases. 
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Own elaboration. Source: 1996-2004 (Temporão and Gadelha, 2007). 2005 and 2006 (CGIES/CGPNI, 
2007).  
 
Figure 6.6: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – National x Imported purchases 
(US$ million) 
 
Another aspect to be highlighted in the evolution shown in Figure 6.6, is the shift in the 
profile of government purchases in late 1999 and early 2000 when local purchases of 
vaccines overtook imported vaccines. It was at that time that Brazilian manufacturers 
started supplying more technologically advanced, and consequently more expensive, 
                                                 
210
 In 2007, however, one Brazilian manufacturer started supplying the PNI with this vaccine ending the 
need for importing it (see Table 6.8). This quick response is explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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vaccines – e.g. Hib, Hepatitis B and Influenza (Limonta, 2005; Temporão and Gadelha, 
2007), after expanding their portfolio in qualitative terms. Figure 6.7 shows the 
percentage of participation of each segment in the evolution of government purchases. 
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Own elaboration. Source: Idem Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.7: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – National x Imported purchases (%) 
 
The analysis of the number of doses acquired by the Brazilian government in the same 
period, as shown in Figure 6.8, also reveals the development of the BVI. While the 
extremes of this period can show a null growth of the total doses acquired (traced line) 
it is explained by the introduction and growing supply of combined vaccines by the 
local manufacturers – e.g. DTP+Hib and MMR vaccines – in the early 2000s.211 The 
middle of the graphic, however, once more shows a shift in the profile of doses acquired 
from local and imported segments in the 1990s (dotted and continuous line). In this 
regard, the impressive growth noted in the supply by local manufacturers to 1999 is 
attributed to the modernization and expansion of their installed capacity provided by the 
PASNI investments (Temporão and Gadelha, 2007). 
 
In summary, the above data about the Brazilian vaccine market show some of its 
specific characteristics. Firstly, the Brazilian government has introduced in its 
immunization programme some proprietary and enhanced vaccines that are commonly 
purchased only by high-income countries. Currently, the Brazilian vaccination coverage 
                                                 
211
 The number of doses of a vaccine decreases as multiple antigens are combined into a single product. 
One example is the MMR vaccine, which production steps are represented in Figure 5.2 on pg. 117. Each 
single dose of this vaccine protects against three different pathogens – measles, mumps and rubella – 
avoiding, therefore, the need for three separate doses (see also item f of Sub-section 5.3.1 on pg. 105). 
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encompasses about 90% of all antigens (Milstien, 2005). Secondly, due to this policy, 
the Brazilian government has created a huge and attractive, but protected, public market. 
Thirdly, this huge and protected market has been the platform for the growth of the BVI 
in the last 13 years or so, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Some Brazilian 
manufacturers have been able to introduce more advanced vaccines to this market, 
drastically reducing government dependence on imported vaccines. The influence and 
importance of government institutions and policies in the growth and sedimentation of 
this market are issues for the next section. The strategies of the main Brazilian 
manufacturers to develop their technological capabilities and introduce the new 
vaccines needed by the PNI are approached in the next chapter. 
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Own elaboration. Source: Idem Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.8: Brazilian Vaccine Public Market – Doses Purchased 
 
6.4 The Role of Government and Institutions 
Different from most sectors and industries, the importance and influence of government 
and institutions to the development of the vaccine industry, in both private and public 
sectors and in either international or national contexts, have been remarkable. The 
important achievements and concerns about vaccination and vaccine development and 
manufacture, as stressed in Chapter 5, have triggered a constant deployment of an array 
of initiatives that may be considered as unique. 
 
Post WWII was the stage for the appearance of most of these institutions and initiatives. 
As there is no room in this research for a complete appreciation of this issue, some of 
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the most influential ones are approached below in Sub-sections 6.4.1 (international 
context) and 6.4.2 (Brazilian context).  
 
6.4.1 – Government, Policies and Institutions – the international context 
World Health Organization (WHO): created in 1948 with the objectives of 
disseminating high levels of health worldwide and of coordinating the fight against 
infectious diseases, the WHO selected the fight against Smallpox as one of its first 
targets (Temporão et al., 2005). Less than twenty years later the WHO launched the 
huge campaign which culminated with the worldwide eradication of the disease in 1977 
(Benchimol, 2001).
212
 Seventy four vaccine manufacturers were acknowledged by the 
WHO throughout the world to produce the 200 million doses/year of the vaccine needed 
for this task, including Fiocruz in Brazil, as noted by this author. 
 
The launching of the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) in 1974 was another 
remarkable WHO initiative. Aiming to increase the vaccination rates amongst children 
of the poorest nations and developing countries (Stern and Markel, 2005), the 
Programme recommended the inclusion of two new diseases – Poliomyelitis and 
Measles – to the existing list of diseases commonly fought by immunization at that time 
(WHO, 2002a).
213
 The WHO also provided training and technical assistance, and the 
principle of national immunization programmes was implemented across the world 
(WHO, 2002a; Temporão et al., 2005). Later on two new vaccines were added to the 
EPI – Hepatitis B and Yellow Fever – the latter only in endemic areas, and the MMR 
vaccine substituted the measles vaccine in several, mostly industrialized countries 
(WHO, 2002a). 
 
Concerns about the quality and safety of pharmaceutical products, including the 
vaccines increasingly produced and marketed across the world at that time, motivated 
the development of the regulatory apparatus by the WHO. The WHO Certification 
Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International Commerce, 
and the Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) were first recommended in 1969 (WHO, 
                                                 
212
 According to the author, the date of the last known case of smallpox was 1977. The WHO declared 
smallpox eradicated from the globe in 1979 - see Sub-section 5.2.1 in the previous chapter (pg. 92). 
213
 Smallpox, BCG and Diphtheria, Tetanus and Pertussis were the vaccines commonly in use by most 
countries at that time. Poliomyelitis and Measles were diseases with a high incidence rate and with good 
and affordable vaccines available (WHO, 2002a). 
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2003). Since then they have been periodically revised and extended. One relevant aspect 
to be highlighted is that the products encompassed by the legislation, and their 
manufacturers, should be licensed and inspected by competent national regulatory 
authorities. In the last decades the sophistication and complexity of regulatory 
legislation has been discussed by many authors (e.g. Milstien and Candries, 2002; 
Plotkin, 2005c; Offit, 2005) as the main pressure for the increasing costs of vaccine 
R&D, clinical trials and production, and, consequently, for the delay in the development 
of new vaccines or the disappearance of many manufacturers. 
 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO): established over 100 years ago, the PAHO 
became the arm of WHO in the Americas in 1949, and it has been largely linked to the 
successful implementation of the national immunization programmes in the region (de 
Quadros, 2004). One very important initiative of the PAHO was the implementation of 
the Revolving Fund in 1979 to provide access to vaccines to the poorest countries in the 
Americas and Caribbean. Through the Revolving Fund, which was initially supported 
by their own resources and donations from UNICEF, the US government and some 
European countries, the PAHO was able to purchase large quantities of better quality 
vaccines at lower prices for its countries’ members (Benchimol, 2001). Another 
advantage for its countries’ members was the possibility of refunding the Fund only at 
the time of the arrival of the product and using their own currencies (Temporão, 2002). 
Currently, every country in the Americas and Caribbean can buy its vaccines through 
the Revolving Fund, which enhance its purchasing power.  
 
Brazil has not only used the Revolving Fund for some of its imported vaccines, in 
addition, one of the Brazilian manufacturers has participated in tenders to export some 
of its vaccines (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b). Another important aspect is that the PNI have 
used the prices achieved by the Revolving Fund as a reference price for establishing the 
prices to be paid for some of the Brazilian manufacturer’s products, putting pressure on 
the manufacturer’s efficiency. 
 
UNICEF: the United Nations Children’s Fund has been the operational arm of the 
WHO’s policies on immunization to the less favoured countries of other regions. The 
incomes of UNICEF come from a large range of voluntary donors, especially 
governments, but also private sector and non-government organizations (UNICEF, 
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2009b). Its huge purchases of vaccines since early 1980s have pushed down prices to 
the lowest levels in the international market (Temporão, 2002). After being at a steady 
rate in the 1990s, from early 2000, UNICEF vaccine procurement has grown from about 
US$ 100 million/year to US$ 493 million in 2006, partially due to the financing from 
GAVI Fund (IAVI, 2008). In 2008 vaccines and biologicals procured accounted for 
US$ 633 million, almost 50% of the total UNICEF procurement, and 2.6 billion doses 
of vaccines were delivered to 80 countries (UNICEF, 2009a).
214
 More than half of the 
world’s children benefit from UNICEF vaccine procurement annually (WHO, 2009a). 
 
One point to be highlighted is the growing participation of emerging suppliers in the 
UNICEF procurement since the mid-1990s, as shown in Table 6.9. Bio-Manguinhos, 
the main Brazilian vaccine manufacturer, is currently a UNICEF supplier having 
supplied US$ 4.4 million in vaccines in 2008 (UNICEF, 2009a). 
 
Table 6.9: Participation of Emerging Manufacturers in UN Vaccine Purchases
1
 
Year 
Number of 
vaccines 
Number of 
suppliers … 
… of which Emerging 
Manufacturers 
%  
1986 4 7 0 
1996 5 14 50 
2001 6 12 58 
2008 N/A 16 50 
1
 1986-2001 – refers to UN Agencies procurement. BCG not included. 2008 – refers to UNICEF 
procurement only. In 2003 there were 23 pre-qualified vaccines in the list of UNICEF (IAVI, 2008). 
Source: 1986-2001, Milstien (2005); 2008, UNICEF (2009a). 
 
GAVI Alliance: by the end of the 1990s, when concerns about low expenditures on 
immunization in developing and low-income countries increased, the GAVI Alliance 
(formerly called the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) was formed to 
revitalize an international coalition in support of immunization initiatives for children in 
the poorest countries (Muraskin, 2004). The GAVI Alliance is a global health public-
private partnership launched in 2000 with a start-up grant of US$ 750 million from Bill 
and Melinda Gates. It relies on other donors such as governments, multilateral 
organizations (e.g. WHO, UNICEF, World Bank), the vaccine industry, civil society 
                                                 
214
 In 2006 UNICEF procurement accounted for around 40% of the global volume of vaccine, but only 
5% in terms of value (IAVI, 2008). 
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organizations and independent individuals, to strengthen the immunization programmes 
of countries with a Gross National Income per capita below US$ 1,000 in 2003 (GAVI 
Alliance, web page, accessed in 11/2009). US$ 3.8 billion had been received from 
public and private sector donors as at the end of 2008, of which US$ 2.7 billion had 
been disbursed to eligible countries (WHO, 2009a). 
 
New innovative sources of funding for immunization programmes have been created 
recently: the International Finance Facility for Immunization, which sells bonds in 
international markets and provides cash to be used by the GAVI Alliance (WHO, 
2009a), and the Advanced Market Commitment, a pull mechanism to subsidize future 
purchases and stimulate the development and manufacture of vaccines for developing 
countries (Batson et al., 2006). 
 
DCVMN: originally created to strengthen the supply of quality vaccines to the local 
markets of its members, the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network 
expanded its goals, as the manufacturers developed new capabilities and introduced new 
vaccines in their portfolio, trying to reach the global market (Jadhav et al., 2008). 
Currently seven of its members are WHO pre-qualified (see Table 6.5 in Sub-section 
6.2.3) and supply vaccines to the two major UN procurement agencies (UNICEF and 
PAHO). Access to new technologies, one of the strategic priorities of the DCVMN, has 
also been achieved by some members.  
 
Recently the Netherlands Vaccine Institute (NVI) transferred its own technology of a 
Hib conjugate vaccine to three DCVMN members, in a move that was seen by GAVI as 
an opportunity to break the monopoly of Hib containing vaccines in the international 
market (Jadhav et al., 2008). As an acknowledgement of the growing importance of its 
members in the international scene, the DCVMN now has a seat on the board of GAVI, 
joining the representatives from multinational industries on this board (Milstien et al., 
2008). 
 
In fact, the list of institutions and governments in the international context that have 
decisively influenced and participated in the vaccine endeavour worldwide is endless, 
and many of them have played an important role in the development of the BVI as well. 
Many other important institutions and organizations could be emphasized perfectly here, 
156 
such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal agency leading in vaccine 
research and development in the US, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
(WRAIR), the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Sabin Vaccine Institute, to cite only 
some acknowledged by Jordan (2002). To quote other authors, the list would include the 
Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI), the forerunner of GAVI, according to Milstien et al. 
(2008), the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), the Malaria Vaccine Initiative 
(MVI), and the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), amongst many 
others. This research now turns to the Brazilian context in order to provide evidence for 
connections between national policies and institutions, and the strategies and 
achievements of the BVI. 
 
6.4.2 – Government, Policies and Institutions – the Brazilian context 
Brazil is a country with a good and broad scientific foundation, largely acknowledged 
by the international scientific community and backed by several universities and 
research institutes (Homma et al., 2003). Its S&T system and policies have been 
traditionally governed by the Ministry of S&T and the Ministry of Education through 
their agencies, namely the National Council of Scientific and Technological 
Development (CNPq), the Financing Agency for Studies and Projects (FINEP), and the 
Coordinating Body for Upgrading of Higher Level Personnel (CAPES) (Serruya et al., 
2008). More significant strides towards denser initiatives to support innovation and 
overcome the barriers against technological and scientific development, however, 
became apparent only in the early 2000s with the launching of 14 Sectoral Funds in 
S&T, the 1
st
 National Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation in 2001, 
(Brasil, 2002), and with the enacting of the Innovation Law in 2004. 
 
More recently, the Secretariat of Science, Technology and Innovation in Health was 
created within the structure of the Ministry of Health to strengthen the development of 
scientific knowledge and technological innovation concerning the Brazilian health 
system (Serruya et al., 2008). Traditionally, low investments in health R&D and the 
need for higher coordination of the investments made in this area, have recently driven 
the changes in S&T policies of the Ministry of Health (Brasil, 2006b).
215
 The lack of 
                                                 
215
 In the 1990s, Latin American countries on average spent only 0.5% of GNP on health R&D. In Brazil 
these investments were 0.76% on average. In 1998 Brazil spent nearly US$ 715 million on health R&D, 
half the total investment of all Latin American countries in the same area. By 2001 Brazil invested around 
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articulation amongst policies in ST&I in Brazil have delayed the development of the 
BVI, and have recently been the object of criticism by some authors (e.g. Gadelha and 
Azevedo, 2003; Gadelha, 2005; Temporão and Gadelha, 2007). This is one of the issues 
addressed below along with the description of the main institutions that have supported 
the development of the BVI in the last decades. 
 
One further point that deserves to be mentioned relates to the country’s general 
industrial policy context in the last decades. As shown by Figueiredo (2009), this policy 
has been marked by discontinuities. The import substitution policy of the 1970s and 
1980s gave place to the open economy and global competition of the 1990s and 2000s, 
with little intervention of the government. The author also emphasizes that the new 
government from 2003 sought to re-establish the role of the government in supporting 
economic development (ibid. p.34), reflecting what was described in the two previous 
paragraphs. 
 
PNI: The Brazilian National Immunization Programme was created in 1973 aiming to 
keep Smallpox eradicated and Measles, Tuberculosis, Tetanus, Diphtheria, Whooping 
Cough and Poliomyelitis under control (Benchimol, 2001).
216
 Its remarkable 
achievements in its first 30 years of existence made it respected by public health experts 
worldwide and acknowledged as a world reference programme by the WHO and the 
PAHO (Brasil, 2003).
217
 The PNI itself, and the set of institutions and initiatives 
established by the Ministry of Heath to assure its success, have dramatically influenced 
the changes and development of the BVI. For this reason the creation of the PNI was set 
up in this research as the threshold for the analysis of the technological development of 
this industry.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
2% of the public heath expenditure in health R&D, reaching the recommendation of the WHO. For these 
and other data on this issue, see Brasil (2006b). 
216
 The last case of smallpox in Brazil was in 1973 (Brasil, 2003). The objectives of the PNI preceded the 
launching of the EPI by the WHO (Benchimol, 2001). See more information about the EPI in Sub-section 
6.4.1. 
217
 Amongst its achievements are the eradication of polio in 1989 and the control and drastic reduction in 
the mortality rate by all immunopreventable diseases (Brasil, 2003). According to the same source, the 
PNI has also organized or helped immunization campaigns in Asia and the Middle –East, and provided 
training to Latin American and African countries. Its merits are enhanced when one takes into account the 
large population, the geographically diverse continental dimensions, and the huge social and economic 
contrasts found in Brazil (Temporão et al., 2005). 
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Some aspects of the PNI have already been approached in Sub-section 6.2.4 and Section 
6.3. One point to be re-stated here is the first consequence of the implementation of the 
programme together with the strengthening of the quality control authority. Higher 
demands for better quality vaccines in the late 1970s met, at the lower end of the market, 
local manufacturers with precarious facilities and producing vaccines which did not 
comply with the then new quality requirements (Temporão, 2002). The requirement for 
the high investment needed to comply with these new requirements in a less attractive 
business led to the withdrawal of the main and private manufacturer in 1981, increasing 
the supply crisis and the dependence on imported vaccines (Temporão and Gadelha, 
2007).
218 , 219
 Within this context the government put forward a new and ambitious 
programme of national self-sufficiency in immunobiologicals (PASNI), by investing in 
the modernization of the public manufacturers’ facilities, and trying to reverse the 
obsolescence of the national production of immunobiologicals. The characteristics of 
this programme are approached in the next item. 
 
During the 1980s the PNI’s great achievement was the eradication of Poliomyelitis in 
1989, but the incidence of other diseases did not decline as expected. In addition, new 
diseases were reported in some regions of the country – e.g. hepatitis B – and most of 
the vaccines purchased by the PNI were imported (Brasil, 2003). In the 1990s the 
budget for purchasing vaccines was substantially increased by the government, and the 
PNI started to introduce new generation vaccines for either routine or special 
immunization.
220
  
 
Manufacturers were just stabilizing the production of the basic vaccines in their 
modernized facilities when they faced new challenges posed by the PNI. Only in the 
late 1990s did some Brazilian manufacturers manage to start supplying the PNI with 
these new vaccines (see Table 6.8 in the previous section). Since then the PNI has kept a 
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 Low quality standards led other smaller manufacturers to interrupt vaccine production (Benchimol, 
2001). 
219
 The referred supply crisis encompassed not only vaccines but also anti-venom serums. The situation of 
the latter was still more dramatic for the government as there were no substitutes for these products in the 
international market since they were made from specific poisons from the Brazilian natural species 
(Benchimol, 2001). 
220
 In 1993 the PNI implemented the first State Reference Centres for Special Immunization (Cries) in 
five different states of the country, with the objective of providing specific vaccines for special 
individuals (e.g. immunodepressed individuals, Indian and other specific communities, risk groups and 
other patients with medical prescriptions). By 2003 there were 36 Cries implemented across all states of 
the country (Brasil, 2003).  
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policy of gradually introducing the new generation vaccines, firstly in special 
programmes (e.g. Cries – see Footnote 220) and later on in routine immunization. This 
gave public immunization in Brazil different characteristics from most developing 
countries (Brasil, 2003). 
 
PASNI: The Programme of National Self-sufficiency on Immunobiologicals was 
launched by the government in 1985. It had the basic purpose of strengthening public 
manufacturers in order to cease the shortage of immunobiologicals and, more 
ambitiously, to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of immunobiologicals 
demanded by the PNI by 1990 (Temporão and Gadelha, 2007). Indeed, the crisis 
generated by the shortage of vaccines and serums forced the government to establish the 
target of national self-sufficiency in immunobiologicals as an issue of “national 
security”, as noted by Benchimol (2001:359, emphasis added). During its lifetime, 
between 1985 and 1998, the PASNI invested around US$ 158 million in the 
modernization of public manufacturer’s facilities. Around 84% of these resources were 
allocated to the four current vaccine manufacturers, with undoubted improvements in 
terms of quality and installed capacity (Temporão, 2002). Table 6.10 provides the 
breakdown of the resources invested. 
 
Table 6.10: PASNI – Investments in the Public Manufacturers 1985-1998 
Manufacturer US$ (million)2 % Main Application 
Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
66,4 42 New industrial facilities (final processing and 
production of bacterial concentrate); 
New facilities for production of test animals; 
Butantan 34,8 22 Modernization of production facilities (DTP, 
BCG, Rabies and serums); 
Building of a biotechnology centre;  
FAP 15,8 10 New industrial facilities for BCG production and 
quality control; 
Tecpar 15,8 10 New facilities for DTP and Rabies production and 
quality control; 
Quality assurance. 
Others
1
 25,3 16 Quality Control; 
Serum production. 
1
 In this group were five serum manufacturers and the National Quality Control Laboratory 
(INCQS/Fiocruz), the only non-manufacturer to be awarded with resources from PASNI. 
2
 Values updated to July 1998 by the US inflation rate. 
Own elaboration. Source: Temporão (2002). 
 
In fact, despite the manufacturers having delayed the completion of the new facilities 
buildings, the PASNI has been acknowledged as one of the most important initiatives in 
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the development of the BVI.
221,222
 However, even though self-sufficiency was amongst 
its main objectives, it is argued that, in its narrow perspective, it paid little attention to 
the development of innovative and managerial capabilities (Temporão and Gadelha, 
2007).
223
 As a result, the introduction of the new generation vaccines for either routine 
or special immunization by the PNI from the 1990s onwards found no ready answer 
from the local manufacturers. The manufacturers’ strategies for coping with this 
challenge are emphasized in the next chapter. 
 
National Regulatory Authority: As the quality of the products was one of the main 
weaknesses of manufacturers in the early 1980s, the government also invested in the 
strengthening of the institution responsible for the quality control tests, the National 
Institute of Quality Control in Health (INCQS/Fiocruz). As noted by Temporão and 
Gadelha (2007), the strengthened INCQS/Fiocruz was of fundamental importance to 
assure the quality of the products supplied to the PNI. In 2000 the National Health 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) was created as an autonomous governmental agency, 
incorporating the responsibilities of the national regulatory authority (NRA) and 
keeping the INCQS/Fiocruz as its technical arm for performing the quality control tests 
in immunobiologicals and medicines (Miranda and Henriques, 2005). Currently 
ANVISA has incorporated all activities required by the WHO for an NRA, according to 
these authors. 
 
Other policies/institutions: More recently some scholars (e.g. Gadelha, 2003, 2005; 
Gadelha and Romero, 2007) have discussed the fragilities of local manufacturers in 
terms of technological development and indigenous innovation in a broader perspective, 
with the vaccine business being part of an integrated complex of productive actors – 
goods and services – of the health system. The Health-Industrial Complex concept seeks 
to identify the technological bottlenecks and opportunities shared by the components of 
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 Many reasons were raised for the delay in the completion of the new facilities, amongst them the 
irregular financial cash flow from the government, the high inflation rate at that time and, more important, 
the need for developing the new capabilities to comply with GMP requirements by the engineers and 
contractors (interviews 10 and 21). 
222
 Besides the improvements in the quality of the vaccines and the expansion of the installed capacity of 
production, self-sufficiency in the production of BCG and Rabies vaccines, a large installed capacity for 
the production of measles and DTP vaccines, and self-sufficiency in the production of anti-poisonous 
serums are amongst the main achievements of the investments made through PASNI. 
223
 The building of the Biotechnology Center by the Instituto Butantan was the sole example of 
investment in infrastructure for vaccine R&D with resources from PASNI. 
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this complex, in order to guide the integration of the industrial, ST&I and social policies 
and stimulate technological strategies towards competitiveness. Included as one of the 
priorities of the More Health Programme of the Ministry of Health, the Health-
Industrial Complex will receive around US$ 1.09 billion between 2008 and 2011 to 
strengthen the competitiveness of its actors and, consequently, of the health policy 
(Brasil, 2008).
224,225
 
 
The discussions around the health-industrial complex led to other initiatives. The main 
one was the Health Innovation Project, coordinated by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation. 
As a result, the sub-project vaccines became the National Programme of 
Competitiveness in Vaccines (INOVACINA), launched by an Act of the Ministry of 
Health in 2006 to implement the Brazilian Policy on Vaccine. The four areas elected by 
the programme for investment were: infrastructure and expenditures of R&D in 
vaccines; the strengthening of GMP by the manufacturers; the strengthening of the 
NRA; and a public network for pre-clinical and clinical trials (Brasil, 2006a).
226
 The 
programme has not yet been fully implemented, according to some interviewees 
(interviews 6, 10 and 17). 
 
According to one of the interviewees, despite all of these initiatives Brazil still lacks an 
institution operating similarly to the NIH/USA, in order to finance, induce and 
coordinate applied research in the health area, and make possible greater achievements 
in terms of innovation in vaccines (interview 5).  
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has described the current situation of the vaccine industry and the main 
aspects that have characterized its development in the last decades in both international 
                                                 
224
 The value was converted from Brazilian reais into $US using the 2008 average rate of exchange 
provided by the Federal Reserve. 
225
 The More Health Programme is part of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), a large 
programme launched by the current Brazilian government in 2007 to promote economic growth. As a 
productive system structuring programme, the More Health Programme will invest around US$ 3.3 
billion in several actions such as, amongst others, “the consolidation of a more competitive Brazilian 
industry (medical equipments, materials, reagents and diagnosis devices, immunobiologicals, active 
principles and drugs, vegetable extracts for therapeutic purposes); strategic areas of the field of scientific-
technologic knowledge; and the self-sufficiency in the production of blood by-products” (Serruya et al., 
2008:25), with a substantial part of the funds coming from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), 
according to these authors. 
226
 The Programme set the government vaccine priorities for 3, 5 and 10+ years, in order to guide the 
R&D pipeline of the Brazilian manufacturers (Carvalheiro et al., 2005).  
162 
and Brazilian contexts. The data provided and the aspects highlighted has shown 
considerable differences in the dynamics, organization and market strategies of the three 
main groups that represent this industry – the “Big Pharma”, the biotech firms and the 
emerging manufacturers. On the other hand, it is also shown that there are 
complementarities amongst the three groups that made their coexistence important for 
the searching of a worldwide equilibrium in terms of technology development and the 
fulfilment of market needs. Within the market context the growing importance of the 
Brazilian public market and of the local manufacturers has been emphasized. 
 
Concerning the role of government and institutions, the information gathered confirms 
that the social implications of vaccines and immunization, and the technological 
complexities of vaccine development and manufacturing as discussed in the previous 
chapter, along with the market failures approached in the present chapter, have been 
determinant to a remarkable performance of governments, UN agencies and other non-
governmental organizations in the support, harmonization and regulation of this 
industry. The role of this intricate network of institutions, rarely found in other sectors 
and industries, is especially apparent with regards to the strengthening of the BVI since 
the 1970s. In the Brazilian context the government protection to the public vaccine 
manufacturers has remained steady across discontinuities in the industrial policy regime 
in the last decades, and macro-instabilities in the economy in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, a stronger integration of the industrial, ST&I and social policies, along with 
more induction to basic research in the health area, are points still in need of 
strengthening in order to grant greater benefits to innovation in vaccines. 
 
The issues discussed in this chapter have advanced the overview of the main elements 
that have exerted important influence on the development of the vaccine industry as 
addressed in the analytical framework in Chapter 3. The next chapter completes the 
series of empirical chapters of this research by approaching the sources of technological 
knowledge and the specificities of the technological capabilities development in BVI 
since the early 1970s, with an emphasis on the transition period as a result of the 
government policies, market forces and strategies adopted. 
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Chapter 7 – Technological Capabilities in the Brazilian 
Vaccine Industry 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This is the final empirical chapter of this research. Its main objective is to approach the 
process of development of technological capabilities in the Brazilian vaccine industry 
(BVI). This will be achieved through describing the dynamics of the sources of 
knowledge exploited in the development of this industry, and the characteristics of its 
transition phase. One remaining point of the group of the other influencing elements – 
organizational capabilities – is also approached here as it is related to the internal issues 
of the firms. Moreover, this chapter presents the results of a survey carried out in the 
largest firm in the BVI to assess its current level of technological capability, and to 
show some of its strengths and weaknesses from a different perspective. 
 
As stated before (Sub-section 6.4.2 on pg. 157) the period of observation of this 
research starts in the early 1970s, the time of the creation of the Brazilian National 
Immunization Programme (PNI). The reasons for concentrating the focus on the two 
main manufacturers of the BVI were stated in Chapter 4 (Sub-section 4.2.2 on pg. 81), 
and restated using facts and figures in Chapter 6 (Sub-section 6.2.4 on pg. 135-143). 
However, some facts and figures of the two smaller manufacturers are also presented. 
 
In addition to this introduction and the summary of the whole chapter in Section 7.7, 
this chapter consists of two main parts. In the first the emphasis is on the elements of 
the development of technological capabilities within the industry. In this regard, Section 
7.2 approaches the issues on technology acquisition whilst the development of 
innovative capabilities, including the issues on internal and external linkages and 
learning by training, is approached in Section 7.3. Still in the first part, Section 7.4 
briefly presents some aspects of the organizational capabilities within the BVI.  
 
The second part is dedicated to the description of the boundaries, characteristics and 
constraints of the technological capabilities transition phase in the BVI (Section 7.5). It 
will also present the results of the survey carried out in one of the firms as a 
complementary tool to assess strengths, weaknesses and the current level of 
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technological capability, and to support the analysis of the transition phase in this 
industry (Section 7.6). 
 
7.2 Technology Acquisition 
This thesis has argued that technology acquisition (TA) has possibly been the main 
source of knowledge for the development of the BVI over the last decades, and that the 
persistence with this strategy has determined a different pattern of technological 
accumulation within this industry. This section seeks to approach the overall aspects 
involved in the process of TA in the BVI in order to clarify its determinants, dynamics 
and the extent of its application (Sub-section 7.2.1). It will also describe the 
characteristics of the process (Sub-section 7.2.2), some trends in the adoption of this 
strategy in the future (Sub-section 7.2.3) and, therefore, the implications for the 
development of the BVI. 
 
7.2.1 Determinants, Dynamics and Extent of the Processes of Technology Acquisition 
The adoption of TA strategy by the BVI was not a single decision by the firms but the 
result of a set of combined factors encompassing technological, political, marketing and 
strategic perspectives. They should be put together here for the whole comprehension of 
the context. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6 the BVI lagged far behind the technological 
frontier in this field, especially after WWII, whilst the initiatives of immunization in 
Brazil were dispersed and limited until the early 1970s. The creation of the PNI in 1973, 
and the health and social policies backing it, opened the perspective of a growing 
internal market on the one hand but ran into the fragility of the local industry on the 
other. The situation became harder after the withdrawal of the main manufacturer – a 
private company – due to tighter quality requirements imposed on this industry by the 
government in the late 1970s. Moreover, the delicate situation of the Brazilian balance 
of payments hindered the importation of vaccines to fulfil the demands generated by the 
PNI. This context urged the government to set up the vaccine sector as being of 
strategic interest and to deploy governmental measures to strengthen the public 
manufacturers (interviews 7 and 15). Since then, the quickest and cheapest way and the 
only option left to this industry to realize the expansion of the PNI in most cases, has 
been the acquisition of foreign technology (interviews 7 and 10). The magnitude of the 
adoption of the TA strategy by the BVI may be observed in Table 7.1 and is emphasized 
in more detail afterwards. 
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Table 7.1: Vaccines Introduced by the BVI post-PNI and Sources of Knowledge 
Year
1
 Vaccine
2
 Institution 
Source of Knowledge 
In-house x Tech Transfer 
(technology transferor) 
1976 
(1974/75) 
Meningococcal C, A+C Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition
6
 
by cooperation agreement 
(Mérieux Institute) 
1979 
(1963) 
Measles
3
 Butantan 
Tech Acquisition 
not concluded/interrupted  
(Merck) 
1983 
(N/A) 
Measles Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by cooperation agreement 
(Biken Institute) 
1984 
(N/A) 
Oral Polio Vaccine Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by cooperation agreement 
(Japan Poliomyelitis Institute) 
1986 Human Rabies Tecpar In-house 
1987 TT, DT, DTPw Butantan In-house 
1996 
(N/A) 
 DTPw, dT Tecpar 
Tech Acquisition
6
 
not concluded/interrupted 
(Pasteur Mérieux) 
1998 Hepatitis B recombinant Butantan In-house/consultancy 
1999 dT Butantan In-house 
1999 
(1993) 
Hib Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by licensing 
(SmithKline Biologicals) 
2000 
(1968) 
Influenza Butantan 
Tech Acquisition 
by licensing 
(Aventis Pasteur) 
2002 
(1985) 
Human Rabies (Vero cell) Butantan 
Tech Acquisition 
not concluded 
(Aventis Pasteur) 
2002 DTPw+Hib Bio-Manguinhos In-house/cooperation 
2004 
(1997) 
Triple Viral (MMR)
4
 Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by licensing 
(GSK) 
2006 Human Rabies (Vero cell) Butantan In-house 
2007 
(2006) 
Rotavirus
4
 Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by licensing 
(GSK) 
2010 
(2009) 
10-Valent Pneumococcal 
Conjugate
5
 
Bio-Manguinhos 
Tech Acquisition 
by licensing 
(GSK) 
1 Between parentheses the year of introduction of the vaccine in the international market by the 
technology transferor. 
2
 In italic are the vaccines withdrawn from the market. 
3
 Vaccine not even 
introduced in the market. 
4
 Technology transfer still in process. 
5
 Production not started by the time of the 
elaboration of this table. 
6
 The process involved 2 different products. 
Source: Own elaboration from data gathered during the fieldwork. 
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As can be seen from Table 7.1 the TA strategy was by far the one preferred in order to 
introduce new products to the Brazilian public market, especially the new technological 
generation vaccines.
227
 Of the 21 products listed, 13 (62%) were the result of successful 
or unsuccessful TA processes, and the development of at least one other– DTPw+Hib – 
was made possible thanks, in part, to the acquisition of the HiB technology.
228,229
 One of 
the firms – Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz – was alone responsible for 62% (eight TA 
processes) of all TA processes undertaken by the BVI. From the beginning of its 
adoption as the main strategy to supply the PNI the TA strategy has lasted for over 34 
years.
230
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
# of TA processes
# of products
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 7.1: Technology Acquisition Processes X Products Introduced 
 
Another aspect that strengthens the argument raised in this research is the intensity of 
the TA processes in the four decades described in Table 7.1. In absolute terms the 
number of TA processes has increased from two in the 1970s and 1980s to three in the 
1990s and five more recently, as represented in Figure 7.1. This figure also shows the 
total number of products introduced through the decades, some of them developed in-
house, which is an issue to be analyzed in the next section.  
 
                                                 
227
 Table 7.1 lists the products introduced after the creation of the PNI. Therefore, three products currently 
purchased by the PNI from the BVI were not included in the table. The first is the yellow fever vaccine, 
produced by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz since 1938 (see footnote 230). The other two are the intradermal 
BCG vaccines produced by Instituto Butantan since 1971 and by Fundação Ataulfo de Paiva since 1972, 
both similar and old technologies developed in-house. 
228
 The aspects of the vaccines developed in-house will be approached in Section 7.3. 
229
 As stated in footnote 6 of Table 7.1, some TA processes included more than one product. As this 
research is focusing on the products introduced, the same TA process was counted twice in these cases.  
230
 Technology acquisition is not new to the BVI, however. In 1938 the technology of the, then, recently 
developed yellow fever vaccine was transferred to Fiocruz by the Rockefeller Foundation/USA. 
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The figures increase and are more revealing in percentage terms, as shown in Figure 7.2. 
In this figure, apart from the first decade when the two products introduced to the 
market were the results of TA, there was an increase in the number of TA processes 
related to the number of products introduced to the public market from 33% in the 
1980s, to 60% in the 1990s, and 71% in the 2000s.
231
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Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 7.2: Technology Acquisition Processes as % of Products Introduced 
 
7.2.2 The Characteristics of the Process of Technology Acquisition in BVI 
The processes of technology acquisition by the BVI firms can be approached from other 
perspectives. At the beginning the mechanisms were mostly of cooperation with no 
economic interest involved, and the technologies transferred were mature and of general 
use in the market.
232,233 Some of the agreements benefited from broader cooperation 
agreements between the nations involved (interviews 2, 11 and 19).
234
 Strong quality 
control capabilities were developed within the successful agreements but Good 
                                                 
231
 In both Figures 7.1 and 7.2 the TA process of the measles vaccine carried out by Instituto Butantan in 
1979 was omitted since the process was interrupted before the vaccine was introduced to the market, as 
revealed in interview 6. 
232
 The first technology acquisition approached in Table 7.1 is an exception to this rule and is described in 
detail by Barbosa (2009:106-115): following an epidemic of meningitis in the country, the Brazilian 
government decided to immunize the entire population and 80 million doses of the vaccine were bought 
from the Mérieux Institute in France. As the technology had been recently developed the manufacturer 
did not have installed capacity to produce all the doses required and decided to build a pilot plant in 
Brazil. At the end of the business the pilot plant was donated to Oswaldo Cruz Foundation along with the 
technology, personnel training and technical assistance.  
233
 See Figure 6.5 in the previous chapter for a typology of the vaccine life cycle in the markets.  
234
 The agreements for the technology transfer of the measles and polio vaccines to Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz took place under a broader cooperation agreement between Brazil and Japan. This 
was coordinated by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and involved the donation of 
equipment and personnel training (Barbosa, 2009 and interview 11). 
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Manufacturing Practices (GMP) were not required by the transferors and were not 
implemented by the BVI at that time (interviews 6 and 11).
235
 
 
The second phase of the technology acquisition was inaugurated in 1998 with the 
agreement for the technology transfer of the Hib vaccine, and it remains up to the 
present time.
236
 From that time on, a new mechanism was used for the agreements –
licensing – since the vaccines were mostly proprietary products (interview 15).237 The 
technologies transferred became increasingly more complex, and the elapsed time 
between the launch of the vaccine on to the international market by the transferor, and 
the starting of the technology transfer to the firms of the BVI became surprisingly 
short.
238
 As shown in the first column of Table 7.1, from 1999 most of the technologies 
transferred were in their early product phase and, more recently, the elapsed time of the 
last two technology transfer agreements was around 1 year; this is the exact opposite of 
the pattern described in literature about technology transfer to catch-up countries and 
industries.
239
 According to several interviewees the huge Brazilian public market 
created by the PNI, along with government purchasing power and preference for 
vaccines produced by the local manufacturers, have been determinant in persuading 
some “Big Pharma” firms to adopt this different strategy (interviews 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15 
and 19). 
 
The technologies transferred during this second phase resulted in another important 
impact on the two main BVI firms. As new technologies were introduced, the price 
profile of the vaccines marketed has risen from cents to dollars and therefore the income 
of the firms has grown dramatically, bringing the firms to a new economic reality.
240
 
 
                                                 
235
 Later on Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz became the representative of the JICA and hosted annual training 
programmes on quality control techniques for measles and poliomyelitis vaccines for third world 
countries (Barbosa, 2009). 
236
 The agreement was signed in 1998 and production started in 1999 (interview 11). 
237
 As there were patents involved, the agreement had to be approved by the Brazilian intellectual 
property authority – the National Institute of Industrial Property – INPI (interview 15). 
238
 It is worth clarifying that the adoption of the launch date of the vaccines to the market by the transferor 
in Table 7.1 instead of the date of the first introduction of the vaccine to the world market in some cases 
(as presented in Table 5.4 of Chapter 5 on pg. 104), is because the former constitutes newly and improved 
technologies partially or totally protected by patents. 
239
 The issues about technology transfer of mature products to catch-up countries and about the 
specificities of the vaccine life cycle are approached in Sub-section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3 (pg. 54 and 
footnote 82) and Figure 6.5 of Chapter 6 (pg. 146) respectively.  
240
 Figures about the BVI are presented in Sub-section 6.2.4 (pg. 135-143) and Section 6.3 (pg. 147-151) 
of the previous chapter. 
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The high complexity of the manufacturing process of vaccine, already described and 
illustrated in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 (pg. 115-118), was a critical issue in the processes 
of technology transfer listed in Table 7.1. This was central to the specific and “reverse” 
way the technologies have been transferred (interview 11). In the first stage the firm 
acquires the “bulk” of the vaccine from the transferor and carries out the final 
processing steps, including quality controls. In addition to being less technologically 
complex, the capabilities for final processing are normally already developed and used 
for other vaccines manufactured by the firms.
241
 The same is often true for the facilities 
that can normally be used for the final processing of different types of vaccines. This 
stage can last several years whilst the firm learns the upstream stage – the production of 
the concentrate(s) – and adapts or builds the proper facilities for this second stage of the 
manufacturing process.
242
 The implementation of the second stage can also last several 
years, depending on the level of complexity of the technology and on the technical 
conditions of the transferee to receive and even to adapt the technology to the local 
conditions.
243,244
 
 
Amongst the interviewees approached about the subject of operating capabilities, it was 
unanimous that previous knowledge was key for the accomplishment of the processes 
(interviews 2, 6, 8 and 11). Furthermore, several capabilities developed during the first 
TA processes have made the more recent processes easier and quicker (interviews 2 and 
                                                 
241
 It does not mean that knowledge acquisition is not intense in this stage. On the contrary, there are 
many things to learn about the new technology, especially about the steps of formulation, freeze-drying 
and about the quality control tests required. Furthermore, the second stage is planned and the facilities 
begin to be adapted and/or built during this stage (interview 11).  
242
 In some cases this reverse process can start more downstream, that is, the first stage starts with the 
acquisition of the vaccine already in the vials and the transferee carries out only the labelling and 
packaging steps of the final processing. Amongst the possible reasons are the very special characteristics 
of the technology transferred, the need to speed up the introduction of the vaccine in the market and the 
need to adapt or expand the final processing facilities (interview 11). Delays in adapting or building the 
new facilities have often postponed the conclusion of the processes (Barbosa, 2009 and interview 6).  
243
 This reverse way of transferring the technologies is convenient for all the actors involved. For the 
transferee it allows enough time to absorb the technology, develop the capabilities needed and implement 
the production process safely at the same time it starts selling the product to the government. For the 
government it allows a quicker introduction of the product to the immunization programme and enables 
the supply of the product on a regular basis. For the transferor the quick introduction of the vaccine to the 
market and bulk selling for several years normally provides high financial returns and a guaranteed 
market (interview 7). 
244
 The most recent technology transfer agreement is a revealing example. Although the production start-
up of the 10-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine is planned for 2010, less than one year after the 
contract signature, the entire process of technology transfer is predicted to last at least eight years 
(interview 10). The reasons presented by the interviewee are the high complexity of the technology, 
which consists in ten vaccines in one, and the need for new and dedicated facilities for the concentrate 
production. 
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11). Indeed, the benefits to the development of technological capabilities within the two 
main firms have been countless. Not only the specific capabilities directly involved in 
the manufacture of the vaccines but also others that could be exploited in the business in 
general.  
 
One good example is the quality assurance capability – including metrology and 
validation – that was highly improved by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz during the 
technology transfer of the Hib vaccine. The process was extended not only to all 
vaccine manufacturing lines but also to the management of the production processes. It 
allowed the firm to apply and obtain pre-qualification from WHO to supply the 
international market with some of its vaccines (Benedetti, 2008 and interviews 2 and 
11). Instituto Butantan also had its quality assurance capabilities strengthened along 
with the technology transfer of the influenza vaccine even though these capabilities are 
to be further improved by the Institute (interview 6).  
 
Other important capabilities developed by both firms were in the area of engineering. 
As mentioned before, to receive the transferred technologies the firms often need to 
adapt or even build new facilities that require a type of capability seldom found in the 
country due to the specificities of the vaccine sector. Therefore the transfer agreements 
always involved some technical assistance to support the local engineers with the design 
of the facilities, and with equipment and materials specifications (interviews 6 and 
21).
245
 In summary, what is evident is that the technology transfer agreements have 
helped the two main firms of the BVI to develop world class operating capabilities and 
to grow in the international scenario (interviews 7, 10, 11 and 20).
246
 
 
Notwithstanding, one point of great interest for the BVI and for this research remains 
highly controversial, as has been raised during the interviews. It relates to the 
supposedly intended benefits of the technology transfer processes to the development of 
                                                 
245
 According to one interviewee the agreement for the technology transfer of the influenza vaccine also 
included equipment specifications that were passed to the local equipment industry making possible the 
acquisition of several equipments locally (interview 6). 
246
 The processes of technology acquisition have benefited other firms of the BVI directly or indirectly. 
One example is the outsourcing of part of the production process of the Hib vaccine to Tecpar. Within 
this strategic alliance, Tecpar is producing the monomeric tetanic protein for Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz to 
be used in the conjugation of the Hib vaccine. Besides the specifications for the production of this 
component, Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz also helped Tecpar with the development of its quality assurance 
system to ensure that the production complies with GMP requirements (Barbosa, 2009). 
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innovative capabilities. For most of the interviewees approached about the subjects of 
policies, corporate strategies and operating capabilities, the TA processes have been 
important and directly or indirectly helped the development of internal innovative 
capabilities or somewhat accelerated it (interviews 2, 3, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 19). As 
technologies transferred invariably need to be adapted to local needs, the R&D areas are 
constantly developing to support the ideal establishment of the processes (interview 11).  
 
For most of those interviewees who work with technological development, however, the 
knowledge spillover from these agreements to R&D areas is limited, sometimes 
localized but not that useful in terms of development of the capabilities needed to 
innovate (interviews 1, 4, 6, 12 and 14). In this sense the TA processes are seen as a 
means of postponing the pressures and needs for quick answers from the R&D areas 
rather than to help to develop them. Moreover, within these agreements the transferors 
are keen to control the capabilities they do not wish to transfer (interview 1). For some 
interviewees the TA processes can eventually hinder the development of innovative 
capabilities since projects are cancelled due to the lack of practical necessity of their 
results (interviews 1 and 12).  
 
However, other interviewees point out the importance of the proximity between 
production and R&D areas, stating that these interactions have been increasingly 
important to the development of some innovative capabilities (interviews 5 and 18). As 
an example, several improvements to the old yellow fever vaccine and to its production 
process were made possible from the knowledge acquired in the TA process of the 
measles vaccine (interview 18). The same interviewee points out that some capabilities 
developed within the TA process of the MMR vaccine might help the in-house 
development of a Hepatitis A vaccine. The domain of new technological platforms has 
also been possible with some of the agreements and is of interest to the firms for the 
development of innovative capabilities (interviews 5 and 18). The issue is, therefore, far 
from an agreement. 
 
One last point about the TA agreements relates to the contracts themselves and their 
implications to the firms. There are some restrictions imposed by the transferors and the 
most important relates to the markets where the firms can sell the technologies 
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transferred.
247
 Normally, by contract, they are allowed to supply the Brazilian public 
market only, which restricts important international markets such as UNICEF and 
PAHO (interview 7).
248
 
 
7.2.3 Trends to the Technology Acquisition Strategy 
One of the concerns of this research was to try to capture future trends in the adoption 
of TA strategy. In an article about the Brazilian and Indian vaccine industries Milstien 
et al (2007) pointed out that, despite the increasing development of their innovative 
capabilities, these emerging manufacturers are expected to resort more often to 
technology transfer agreements. This is due to the implications of the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement in these countries. One of the interviewees, the former general 
director and founder of one of the firms and responsible for the firm’s TA strategy since 
the 1980s, believes that TA will still remain important for 10 or more years whilst the 
firm develops and strengthens its innovative capabilities. After that period, the TA 
strategy might continue but it would decrease in importance (interview 19). In a similar 
direction other interviewees see the BVI links to the TA strategy tightened in the short 
term, but point out that the industry and government should be aware of the risks of 
relying excessively on this strategy (interviews 7, 13, 15 and 16). 
 
From a more critical view and based in some indicators, another interviewee recognizes 
that the TA strategy was very important for the first phase of the BVI’s development. 
The strategy helped the two main firms to become larger, with significant income and 
best practice in the production area.
249
 However, the role of this strategy has now been 
fulfilled and the firms should concentrate their efforts on developing their innovative 
capabilities, taking advantage of several of the innovation policies and funds made 
available more recently by the Brazilian government and governmental institutions 
(interview 20).  
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 Another restriction is the limit of freedom to modify the technology transferred. Any improvement or 
change to the technical specifications of the product should be previously submitted to and approved by 
the transferor (interview 11). However, this restriction has not hindered the improvement of the products 
especially in adapting them to local circumstances. This issue is approached in Section 7.3.  
248
 Some aspects of the UNICEF and PAHO markets are presented in Sub-section 6.4.1 of Chapter 6 (pg. 
153-154). 
249
 The interviewee pointed out that, before the second phase of the TA agreements, the incomes of the 
firms were tiny and did not justify high investment in R&D. With the incomes now in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars there is room for more significant investment in R&D.  
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In his view, to speed up the process, the firms should use the government purchasing 
power to force the “Big Pharma” to transfer innovative capabilities. In fact, less than 
one year after this interview the first TA agreement signed by one of the firms – to 
transfer the technology of the 10-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine – 
encompassed cooperation for the development of new vaccines and investments of 
about US$ 30 million from the transferor to this cooperation (interview 10).
250
 
According to the same interviewee, this unprecedented type of TA agreement is 
certainly a distinguishing initiative of the firm, and it may constitute the beginning of a 
new phase in the BVI’s development. 
 
Notwithstanding, there are other signals that the level of importance of TA will remain 
high in the BVI. One example is its suitability to the Ministry of Health’s short-term 
policies. As new and improved vaccines have been introduced in the international 
market, there is pressure from the society for their quick introduction to the Brazilian 
market; this would not be possible through in-house development (interview 16). In a 
book celebrating 30 years since the creation of the PNI, TA agreements are 
acknowledged today as a shortcut, a more rational and more suitable strategy to enable 
the access to new technologies (Brasil, 2003:32). Moreover, even though the firms, 
together with the Ministry of Health, have produced a list of priority vaccines within the 
scope of the INOVACINA Programme, looking for strengthening R&D and innovation 
inside the BVI (Carvalheiro et al., 2005), of the first three vaccines already introduced 
two were a result of TA agreements (rotavirus and pneumococcal), and the third (human 
rabies in vero cell) was first introduced through a TA agreement and later substituted by 
the same technology developed in-house.
251,252
 
 
7.3 Development of Innovative Capabilities 
In this section this research turns to those sources of knowledge that are increasingly 
important in a common pattern of technological capabilities development in catching-up 
industries, as argued in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3. In the model developed, 
the transition from advanced to competitive levels of technological capabilities is based 
                                                 
250
 The collaboration for the development of the dengue, inactivated polio and malaria vaccines are 
included in the agreement (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009a and interview 10). 
251
 The INOVACINA Programme was briefly approached in Sub-section 6.4.2 of the previous chapter (pg. 
161).  
252
 There are 31 vaccines listed as being of priority interest for Brazilian health policies, 16 of which were 
still not available worldwide by the time the list had been prepared (Carvalheiro et al., 2005:276-279). 
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on increasing levels of innovative capabilities. This includes other channels of 
exploiting sources of technological knowledge, such as internal and external linkages 
and training, rather than on TA. 
 
The extent of the adoption of the TA strategy, especially in recent years as stressed in 
the previous section, may lead to a perception that the BVI firms have been either 
passive or are still in the early stages in terms of innovative capability development. 
However, data gathered from the two main firms during the fieldwork show that this 
perception may be misleading. 
 
This research has tracked the development of internal innovative capabilities, and of 
internal and external linkages, by these main BVI firms seeking to disclose its real 
extension, its current level and possible constraints to the completion of the transition 
phase. This was done in order to enable the examination of the real pattern of 
technological development and the characteristics of the transition phase of this industry. 
With the same objective the existence of initiatives of training by the firms was 
investigated. In this sense, Sub-section 7.3.1 presents the trajectory and main 
achievements in the process of internal innovative capability development, including in-
house R&D and clinical trials. The strengthening of internal and external linkages is 
examined in Sub-section 7.3.2, and finally the importance of learning by training within 
the BVI as a source of knowledge is briefly approached in Sub-section 7.3.3. 
 
7.3.1 Internal Innovative Capabilities: Own R&D, Clinical Trials, Design and 
Engineering 
Own R&D – Even though the period studied in this research starts in the 1970s it is 
worth remembering that the two main firms of the BVI have their origins in the early 
20
th
 century when they had the task of developing and producing serum for bubonic 
plague. After doing that successfully, several other vaccines were developed and 
produced by both institutions before the period focused on in this thesis.
253
 Therefore, 
although there had been great transformations in the scientific and technological vaccine 
knowledge base in the international scenario, especially after WWII, one can suppose 
                                                 
253
 See Sub-section 5.2.3 on pg. 98-100). 
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that in the early 1970s those BVI firms had inherited some technological capabilities 
from the past. 
 
Notwithstanding, during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s what can be observed in 
the BVI is basic and intermediate levels of innovative capabilities. These were mostly 
informal and directed towards adapting foreign technologies and/or improving the 
production process of old ones. This notion was captured from two interviews and some 
additional data. In one of the firms, minor adaptations to old technologies, such as the 
introduction of fermentation processes to the production of the pertussis vaccine, other 
adaptations to the production of diphtheria and tetanus vaccines and the improvement of 
the water used in the production process, were carried out basically by the production 
team in order to improve product quality (Instituto Butantan, 2000 and interview 6). 
According to the interviewee, at that time production was very small and addressed São 
Paulo state’s needs only. In the other firm a series of improvements to the yellow fever 
vaccine and its production process were carried out mainly in the 1980s by a sole 
technician in conjunction with the production and quality control teams (Leal, 2004 and 
interview 11).  
 
Although both firms were part of research institutions, they did not count on formal 
R&D areas to support technological innovation at that time. Eventually, however, there 
were significant achievements. The most important was the adaptation of the 
poliomyelitis vaccine during the process of technology transfer and the implementation 
of its production. In collaboration with a research institute of Fiocruz, Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz developed a new formulation to the vaccine to adapt it to the 
characteristics of the country. The WHO then recommended that the new formulation 
be adopted in all tropical countries (interview 11).
254
 Prior knowledge in vaccine 
production was a very important asset at this phase, as emphasized by the interviewees. 
 
From the mid-1980s this situation started changing. The firms realized that building 
new production facilities would not be enough either to cope with the tighter quality 
requirements imposed by the government or to keep up with the technological advances 
                                                 
254
 The original formulation of the vaccine did not give protection against one of the prevalent virus of the 
disease in the country. With the change in the formulation the vaccine became fully protective and the last 
case of poliomyelitis in Brazil was registered a few years later, in 1989 (Brasil, 2003).   
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in the vaccine area in the international scenario. The precursory fact of this new phase 
took place in 1985 with the inauguration of the Biotechnology Centre by the Instituto 
Butantan (Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003). A short time later Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
implemented the first two laboratories dedicated to technological development of viral 
and bacterial vaccines (Leal, 2004). The importance of both initiatives, and the new 
approach to technology, can be recognized as a landmark in the development of 
innovative capabilities within this industry. The events that unfolded since then are 
described below. 
 
The results of the initiatives of both firms described above came shortly after. In 1987 
the Instituto Butantan concluded the development of DTP and DT vaccines, as shown in 
Table 7.1.
255
 The most important and visible result of the creation of the Biotechnology 
Centre, however, was the development of a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, concluded 
in 1998 (interviews 5 and 6).
256 , 257
 As noted by Gadelha and Azevedo (2003), in 
addition to consolidating the importance of the Biotechnology Centre within the 
institution, this achievement also represented to the BVI an advance in terms of 
technological management. This was because its pioneering managed to integrate 
biomedical research, technological development and industrial scale-up, a phenomenon 
hardly seen in most Brazilian industries.
258
 Other achievements of the Biotechnology 
Centre in terms of product development that evidence the development of innovative 
capabilities within the firm were the development of a dT vaccine and, more recently, of 
a rabies vaccine in vero cell (see Table 7.1 on pg. 165).
259
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 Since the 1970s, the Instituto Butantan had already produced the components of the DTP vaccine as 
single vaccines. In addition to the studies for combining the components into a triple vaccine, they also 
established a new process for producing each of the components in “closed systems”. This avoided 
contaminations and guaranteed the quality of the product (interview 6). The interviewee also emphasized 
that there were manuals in the public domain on how to produce the old vaccine but, in practice, 
establishing the parameters and developing tacit knowledge was a painstaking process. 
256
 It is worth noting that the hepatitis B vaccine was the first vaccine developed using genetic 
engineering techniques and that it had been launched in the international market by Merck only 12 years 
before (see Sub-section 5.3.1 on pg. 105 and Table 5.4 on pg. 104). 
257
 According to one interviewee the development of the vaccine started in 1993 after the hiring of two 
Russian researchers who owned the strain of the virus. They were then provided with a team, facilities in 
the Biotechnology Centre, and material resources to develop the vaccine (interview 6). Although the 
product had been launched in 1998, the clinical trials had to be carried out again as they did not meet with 
the regulatory authority’s requirements and the use of the vaccine by the PNI was postponed till 2001 
(Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003). 
258
 The gap between basic research and technological development is one of the bottlenecks that the BVI 
is still struggling to overcome (interview 19) 
259
 With the development of the rabies vaccine in vero cell, the firm could interrupt the process of 
technology transfer started four years earlier (interview 6). The interviewee stated that the vaccine was 
developed entirely in-house, not benefiting from the technology partially transferred from Aventis Pasteur. 
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In Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz the two R&D laboratories implemented were responsible 
for several incremental innovations to the vaccines produced by the firm and to their 
production processes during the 1990s, up to the point that the original technology of 
some of these products was completely transformed (Leal, 2004 and interview 11). The 
R&D area was then expanded with the creation of the Department of Technological 
Development in the early 1990s, with the introduction of studies on DNA recombinant 
technology in 1994, and with the implementation of the Recombinant Technology 
Laboratory in 1998 to start the development of new DNA recombinant vaccines (Leal, 
2004). More recently the R&D structure was reformed with the creation of the Directory 
of Technological Development (Barbosa, 2009).
260
 In terms of new products the most 
important achievement of the firm so far was the introduction of the DTP+Hib vaccine 
in 2002 (see Table 7.1 on pg. 165).
261,262
 
 
Notwithstanding, if we look at the R&D pipeline of both firms greater achievements 
seem to be on the way, strengthening the notion that they have already developed 
advanced innovative capabilities. According to the data gathered from the firms there 
are currently 29 new vaccines under development. Figure 7.3 shows some selected 
projects being developed by each firm, their current stage, the availability of the product 
worldwide and the partnerships established during their development.  
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 Two other more recent initiatives, currently in the final stages of construction, have been pointed out 
as being of key importance to the strengthening of vaccine innovation: the first is the construction by 
Fiocruz of the Centre of Technological Development in Health (CDTS), a new institute aiming to fill the 
gap between basic research, carried out by its research institutes, and technological development, carried 
out by its production institutes, and to comply with the legal requirements (Good Laboratories Practices – 
GLP) to develop a vaccine. The second is the construction of a pilot plant by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, 
aiming to provide modern and dedicated facilities to the scale-up and production of vaccines for the 
clinical trial (phases I and II) phase of the vaccines technological development (Leal, 2004; Moreira, 
2005). 
261
 The development of this tetravalent vaccine was extremely important to both Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
and Instituto Butantan, as the PNI intended to introduce it to the immunization routine; the importation of 
the vaccine would dramatically affect both firms (interview 11). The quick response of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz in combining its Hib vaccine with the DTP vaccine produced by Butantan, carrying 
out the clinical trials required, registering the product, organizing the production process and launching 
the new vaccine, is the main aspect to be highlighted about this achievement. According to the 
interviewee, the firm counted on the collaboration of GSK and Instituto Butantan in this project,.  
262
 Incremental innovations during the absorption of foreign technologies have remained important and 
effective in recent years. One example relates to the MMR vaccine. During the absorption of the 
technology the firm needed to develop a new freeze-drying process to obtain better results than the 
original technology. This new process is now under final tests in order to be implemented and has 
awakened the interest of the transferor of the technology (interview 11). 
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As can be seen in Figure 7.3, there is a big diversity amongst the projects in the firms’ 
pipeline. Some are in the earlier stages of development, others are in later stages or even 
in the process of being registered. Some address existing products but several projects 
address products that are new to the world market. All the projects, however, address 
Brazilian needs, some of them addressing diseases only found in developing countries 
and, therefore, not of interest of the “Big Pharma” – e.g. leishmaniasis and leptospirosis 
(interview 19). 
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        Source: Own elaboration from data gathered during the fieldwork. 
 
Figure 7.3: Selected Projects of the R&D Pipeline of the BVI Firms 
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Although some projects address existing products they have an innovative approach, as 
in the case of the DTPL vaccine – Diphtheria, Tetanus and “low” Pertussis – (interview 
6).
263
 Even therapeutic vaccines, considered the future of vaccines by vaccine experts 
(e.g. Plotkin, 2005b), are in the later stages of development by one of the BVI firms.
264
  
 
Another point emphasized by one of the interviewees is the good results that one of the 
firms is achieving with the development of new adjuvants (interview 6). Adjuvants are 
important components of vaccines, as already stressed in Sub-section 5.3.1 of Chapter 5 
(pg. 106). 
 
Table 7.2: R&D Personnel x Employee Total in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz  
Year / 
Growth 
Employee 
Total 
(A) 
R&D 
Personnel
1
 
(B) 
B/A 
PhD 
(R&D) 
(C) 
C/A C/B 
1999 411 58 14.1% 8 1.9% 13.8% 
2008 1102 162 14.7% 31 2.8% 19.1% 
Growth 168.1% 179.3% - 287.5% - - 
Annual 
Average 
Growth 
11.7% 14.2% - 17.8% - - 
1 Include personnel engaged in R&D of diagnostic reagents and biopharmaceuticals and in clinical trials. 
Source: Own elaboration from data gathered during the field work. 
 
Other data and figures were gathered to help the examination of the strengthening of 
innovative capabilities in the BVI. The evolution of the personnel engaged in R&D is 
one of them. In Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz detailed data of the last 10 years (i.e., when 
the firm experienced rapid growth due to the new vaccines introduced by technology 
transfer) show that the R&D area was not neglected in terms of R&D personnel and 
their qualifications. As shown in Table 7.2 above the rise in the numbers of R&D 
personnel from 1999 to 2008 has indeed overcome the rise in the total number of 
employees. Whilst the former has grown at an annual average rate of 14.2%, the latter 
has grown at 11.7%. The ratio of R&D personnel to total employee, therefore, rose from 
14.1% to 14.7%. As a matter of comparison the same ratio in the “Big Pharma” Sanofi-
                                                 
263
 The interviewee explained that the (whole) pertussis component of the traditional DTP vaccine is very 
reactogenic, and the substitute vaccine available worldwide using acellular pertussis is very expensive as 
its production yield is very low. Instituto Butantan managed to develop a new process to obtain a less 
reactogenic pertussis component at a much lower cost and with similar or better immunogenicity. 
264
 The firm is developing two therapeutic vaccines according to institutional material released (Instituto 
Butantan, 2007). 
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Aventis has remained stable at around 19.2% during the period 2006-2008 (Sanofi-
Aventis, 2009). 
 
Another important figure shown in the table relates to qualifications of R&D personnel; 
this was because the rise in the numbers of PhDs engaged in R&D was still more 
impressive in the period studied. With an annual average growth rate of 17.8% the ratio 
of PhDs to other personnel within the R&D area has decreased from 1:6 to 1:4 
approximately.  
 
The achievements of the Biotechnology Centre are undoubtedly linked to the 
strengthening of its personnel. The hiring of some retired scientific leaders just before 
the inauguration of the centre was a strategy used to attract skilled researchers and 
students from universities and research institutes (interview 5).
265
 Figures gathered 
during the fieldwork show a fair increase of skilled people in recent years. In 1998 the 
Biotechnology Centre employed 15 PhDs (Mello, 2000). By 2009 the number of PhDs 
allocated to the centre had reached 21 (Chaimovich, 2010), a growth of 40% in the 
period. However, according to the manager of the centre, more skilled people should be 
hired to speed up the results, but it has been a very difficult process. Moreover, the 
facilities must be expanded before it is possible to offer more adequate conditions 
(interview 5). 
 
It is also useful to look at the R&D expenditures of the firms. As noted by Milstien et al. 
(2007) both firms have significantly increased their R&D expenditure in recent years, 
however this was not quantified. Table 7.3 presents these figures from one of the firms 
to exemplify the growth mentioned by the authors and provide a quantitative picture of 
the situation.
266
 As can be seen from the table the growth figures are really impressive, 
especially the R&D intensity that has more than tripled in six years, denoting an 
awareness of the importance of this area to the development of the firm as well as a 
conscious effort toward its strengthening. However, in a broader context the situation is 
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 More information about this issue can be found in Sub-section 7.3.2 of this chapter.  
266
 The values of R&D investments and total revenues were converted into dollars because this is the 
currency used in this research; it also allowed a comparison with figures of the international scenario. 
However it is worth noting that the Brazilian currency – the Real – has sharply appreciated to the US 
dollar in the last decade, and the same figures present a different growth and annual average growth when 
expressed in the Brazilian currency, even adjusted by the Brazilian inflation. In this case the R&D 
investments and the total revenues have grown by 660.3% and 107.9% in the period studied at a 44.3% 
and 18.3% annual average rate respectively. 
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still far from being significant. Not only were R&D investments in 2008 tiny when 
compared to those of the four “Big Pharma” – over US$ 500 million on average – but 
the same is also true of the R&D intensity indicator. This varied from 14.9% to 20.5% 
on average during the period 2006-2008 for the same companies (see Table 6.1 in the 
previous chapter on pg. 125). 
 
Table 7.3: R&D Intensity and Investment Growth in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
Year/Growth 
R&D Investments 
(US$)
1
 
(A) 
Total Revenues 
(US$)
1
 
(B) 
R&D Intensity 
(A/B) 
2002 1,252,103 80,764,699 1.6% 
2008 17,964,653 316,808,419 5.7% 
Growth 1,334.8% 292.3% - 
Average Annual 
Growth 
62.5% 31.7% - 
1
 Values encompass all the businesses of the firm. They were converted into US$ by the average rate of 
exchange provided by the Brazilian Central Bank. The values of 2002 were then adjusted to 2008 by the 
US inflation rate (CPI) provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Own elaboration. Source: Bio-Manguinhos (2008, 2009b) 
 
However, the responses of the interviewees who work in the R&D area show that the 
amount of resources currently invested in R&D is only part of the problem relating to 
the development of technological capabilities within the firms (interviews 1, 4, 5, 12, 14 
and 18). Although they unanimously recognize that more resources should be invested 
in more adequate facilities, in the domains of new technological platforms, 
strengthening of specific technological capabilities, increasing the number of skilled 
people and training activities to speed up the results of the projects, there is a common 
sense amongst them that the lack of efficient R&D management and the bureaucracy of 
the public sector are important hindrances that, if not solved, will postpone or even 
invalidate any increase of resources invested. 
 
Clinical trials – due to several reasons already discussed in Sub-sections 3.5.1 (Chapter 
3 on pg. 69-70) and 5.3.3 (Chapter 5 on pg. 109-114), special attention is given in this 
research to the process of vaccine development in order to help the examination of the 
strengthening of innovative capabilities within the BVI. From one perspective, in spite 
of the fact that most projects fail during the clinical trials phase, the existence of several 
vaccine projects in the clinical trials phase of development, as shown in Figure 7.3, 
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itself suggests that the BVI firms have reached a significant level of innovative 
capabilities, as several complex steps have to be accomplished before this important 
stage. On the other hand, as the regulatory authorities have tightened the requirements 
for clinical trials, aiming at the safety and efficacy of the vaccines, the domain of 
clinical trials capabilities have become essential and limited to only a few firms, as 
noted by the WHO (2002b).
267
 The vaccine manufacturers have increasingly outsourced 
the clinical trials to specialized institutions (the Contract Research Organizations 
(CROs)); this is also done by some “Big Pharma” firms.268 
 
In Brazil there are only a few CROs, all of them dedicated to carrying out clinical trials 
for multinational firms (interview 22). An initiative of developing a network of clinical 
research in the country was launched some years ago by the MOH but no concrete 
results have been achieved so far (interview 17). In the BVI both firms have followed a 
different strategy. The Instituto Butantan, the first to develop vaccines in recent times, 
has relied on partnerships with universities and public hospitals to carry out clinical 
trials. However, not to own any clinical trials capabilities is risky, and sometimes the 
result may be frustrating as happened with the development of the hepatitis B vaccine, 
where clinical trials were considered not to have complied with the requirements (see 
footnote 257). New clinical trials for the vaccine were then financed and coordinated by 
the PNI (interview 22). More recently the firm recognized the need to develop its own 
clinical trials capabilities (interview 6). An epidemiologist was then hired with the 
objective of structuring this activity within the firm (interview 3). 
 
The other firm, however, has been more successful in this purpose. By hiring the expert 
who had coordinated the clinical trials of the hepatitis B vaccine for the PNI, the firm 
started structuring this new area in 2002 and have achieved important results since then 
(interview 16). Amongst these results are the successful conclusions of the clinical trials 
of the tetravalent vaccine (DTP+Hib), and, more recently, of the pentavalent vaccine 
(DTP+Hib+HB). In addition, important vaccines are currently in the clinical trials phase, 
as shown in Figure 7.3 (interview 22).
269
 With a rapid expansion the firm employed 32 
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 See Sub-section 6.2.1 (pg. 122-123) on the importance of clinical trials capabilities for the “Big Pharma”.  
268
 See Sub-section 5.3.3 (pg. 109-114) and Table 5.6 (pg. 110) in Chapter 5 for these and other general 
aspects of clinical trials. 
269
 According to the interviewee, some existing vaccines were also successfully tested through clinical 
trials in order to obtain new registration due to incremental innovations.  
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personnel in this area in 2008, but according to the same interviewee there is still a long 
way ahead to reach international standards, especially with regards to the infrastructure 
needed. The development of the protocols for the studies was mentioned as one 
important capability developed. Moreover, the studies are monitored by an external 
committee, which confers credibility to the results achieved.
270
 The interviewee also 
pointed out two important advantages of carrying out clinical trials in-house for the 
development of innovative capabilities: there is a flow of important technical 
information from the clinical trials to the laboratories that carry out the previous phases 
of the vaccine development, especially to the immunology laboratory. At the same time, 
the close interaction with these laboratories during the development of the vaccine helps 
the design of the protocols and the conduction of the clinical trials later on. 
 
Design and Engineering – Vaccine design is inherent to the process of developing 
vaccine, beginning with the discovery up to the definition of the production process of a 
vaccine for clinical trials (interview 18).
271
 The background of the professionals for 
these steps is broad and varied, depending on the step and the type of vaccine being 
developed. The main source of technological knowledge in this industry, however, is 
commonly concentrated in the biomedical, biological and chemical sciences. Some 
specific engineering knowledge may be required only during the development of the 
downstream process, according to the same interviewee. 
 
The type of design and engineering capabilities more visible and important in this 
industry, therefore, are those directed towards the design and building of facilities to 
comply with biosafety, GMP and GLP requirements, as already discussed in Sub-
section 7.2.2 of this chapter. Although important for the vaccine industry, this type of 
capability does not warrant a deeper discussion within the scope of this research. 
   
7.3.2 Other Sources of Knowledge – Internal and External Linkages 
The importance of interactivity and networking in the process of innovation was 
stressed in Sub-section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 (pg. 15-16). In the present sub-section the 
existence, evolution and results of specific interactions developed by the BVI in order to 
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 That is, external to the firm. 
271
 The development of a vaccine was already discussed in Sub-section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5 (pg. 109-114) 
and therefore not much attention will be given to this issue here.   
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acquire technological knowledge, as defined in Sub-section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3 (pg. 70), 
will be examined. This type of interaction has been decisive to the manufacture of 
vaccine, especially to the “Big Pharma”, as discussed throughout Section 6.2 of Chapter 
6 (pg. 121-143). 
 
In the BVI, links with universities and research institutes were common until the mid-
1980s due to the location of the firms inside research centres, but the results in terms of 
innovation in vaccines were limited, with few exceptions.
272
 In the mid-1980s, just 
before the inauguration of its Biotechnology Centre, Instituto Butantan took an 
important initiative that strengthens the notion that this was the beginning of new times 
in the BVI. By hiring 10 scientific leaders from the universities and research institutes 
of São Paulo state, most of them recently retired, the Institute Butantan not only 
established closer connections with the academic and research communities but also 
benefited from a rich interchange of students from those institutions (interviews 3, 4 and 
5). 
 
In the 1990s the links and collaborations were intensified by both firms and provided 
several concrete results. Amongst the most important are a collaboration with the FDA, 
which provided a consultant to participate in the development of a meningococcal B 
vaccine (Leal, 2004), the hiring of the two Russian researchers who developed the 
hepatitis B vaccine for Instituto Butantan (see footnote 257 on pg. 176), and the hiring 
of a British vaccine expert who was the responsible for several incremental innovations 
of the measles and yellow fever vaccines of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz.
273,274
 
 
In fact, the network of collaborations has been increasingly broadened and strengthened 
in the last decade, both in the national and international contexts, as the firms realized 
that this is an essential strategy to achieve quicker and better results. Some interviewees 
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 See paragraph complemented by footnote 254 in Sub-section 7.3.1 of this chapter (pg. 175). 
273
 According to Leal (2004:94), the development of the meningococcal B vaccine, which is currently in 
clinical trials (see Figure 7.3), also involved collaboration between Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz and Instituto 
Butantan and with Instituto Adolfo Lutz, another São Paulo state research institute . 
274
 In the late 1990s, Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz inaugurated a new instrument – the “Letters of 
Commitment” – in order to strengthen the links with the research institutes of the Fiocruz and induce 
research within its areas of interest. By this instrument Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz committed to fund 
projects intended to improve or develop new immunobiologicals. A total of 38 letters were signed with 
Fiocruz institutes. Later on the initiative was extended to external research institutions and universities 
(Moreira, 2005). According to Leal (2004), the first results have been achieved in the area of diagnostic 
reagents. 
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who work directly within R&D emphasized this point (interviews 1, 4, 14 and 18).
275
 
Figure 7.3 shows that most of the products in the firms’ R&D pipeline are being 
developed with some kind of collaboration. One interviewee from Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz, however, pointed out that, although collaboration with the public 
sector has been running increasingly well, there is a need to strengthen collaboration 
with the private sector; this has been more difficult due to the bureaucracy faced by the 
BVI firms (interview 1).
276
 Despite being hampered by the same problem of 
bureaucracy, Instituto Butantan has already started an interesting type of partnership 
with a private company with the inauguration in 2006 of a joint research centre with the 
firm Ouro Fino Animal Health.
277
 The objective of this research centre is the research 
and development of veterinary immunobiologicals to be commercialized by the private 
company, and with the eventual profits to be invested in human immunobiologicals 
(Instituto Butantan, 2006). 
 
Linkages with suppliers – both national and international – have also been established 
by the BVI, although they need to be further strengthened (interviews 6, 10 and 11). 
These linkages, however, have mainly addressed specific production requirements such 
as the adequate specification of materials and the certification of the quality of suppliers 
to ensure the product quality, and to comply with the GMP requirements.  
 
7.3.3 Other Sources of Knowledge – Learning by Training 
The focus now turns to a specific way of acquiring technological knowledge – learning 
by training. Learning by training seems to be especially important in the vaccine 
industry as several of its specificities are not even found in other segments of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as already discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, and emphasized by 
several interviewees (interviews 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 18 and 22). This means that much of the 
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 The Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), outlined in Sub-section 6.4.1 
of Chapter 6 (pg. 155), is one recent and original initiative in which the main firms of the BVI are 
participating, in an attempt to strengthen international collaborations. 
276
 The interviewee cited one recent case as an example of the problem of rigidity in establishing 
agreements with the private sector: after identifying a technology of interest to Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
for the development of a new yellow fever vaccine being developed by an international biotech firm, the 
firm saw the technology being licensed to Acambis during the negotiations. Acambis was one of the most 
prominent biotech firms in the field of vaccines, which was later acquired by Sanofi-Pasteur, the main 
competitor of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz in the international market of yellow fever vaccine. The problem 
rigidity/administrative inflexibility within the BVI is discussed in Section 7.4 (see Figure 6.1 and Table 
6.2 in the previous chapter on pg. 123 and 128, respectively, for some information about Acambis). 
277
 The research centre was built inside the Instituto Butantan campus from the resources of both firms 
and from other funds from two governmental financing agencies. 
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specific capabilities of this industry must be developed in-house as they are difficult to 
find ready-made in the market (interviews 6 and 11). In addition, the firms have to deal 
with the deficiencies of the formal education provided by the still developing Brazilian 
educational system.
278
 According to the same interviewees, this, in turn, gives firms a 
further problem: after extensively training biotechnologists, engineers and technicians 
to carry out their activities, the firms see some highly skilled people absorbed by private 
companies that can afford higher salaries than the public sector. 
 
Some evidence of the firms’ efforts and strategies, as well as the hindrances they are 
faced with in terms of providing training as an important source of knowledge, was 
gathered from interviews, annual reports and theses, and shows both some interesting 
initiatives and imbalances within the BVI. Despite the high awareness of the need to 
continuously improve the qualifications of its researchers, biotechnologists and 
technicians, the Instituto Butantan did not rely on any formal training policy in the 
1990s (Mello, 2000). According to Mello, the responsibility of defining the needs and 
raising funds for training were delegated to each research team at the time of applying 
to financing agencies for project funds, whilst the firm provided the facilities for the 
training events. The main reason was the lack of freedom to establish its own training 
policy due to restrictions of state government bureaucracy (ibid. p.219). 
 
Today the situation does not seem to be very different. According to one interviewee, 
government restrictions still hinder the possibility of training the firm’s researchers 
abroad for periods over three months, and this has been a serious drawback to the 
qualifications of R&D personnel (interview 5). Providing training for operating 
capabilities, however, has been easier as there is a need to comply with GMP 
requirements. Moreover, the technology transfer agreements already encompass 
personnel training, which are carried out both in Brazil and in the transferors’ facilities 
(interview 6). 
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 As indicated by one interviewee, the existence of several outstanding universities and technical 
schools in the country is recognized (interview 5). 
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In the other firm a much more formal commitment to training was found, although 
being part of the federal government structure also implies certain restrictions.
279
 The 
firm explicitly invested in a Training Programme and the growth of this type of 
investment has overtaken the growth of the total revenues of the firm. In 2008 the firm 
invested over US$ 660k in training.
280
 The figures, however, seem insignificant when 
compared with the average annual expenditure per employee in a sample of large 
organizations in the US; this was in a survey undertaken by The American Society of 
Training & Development (ASTD). These figures are shown in Table 7.4.
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Table 7.4: Training Investment in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
Year / 
Growth 
Training 
Investments
1
 
US$ (A) 
Total 
Revenues
1
 
US$ (B) 
(A/B) 
Employee 
Total 
Expenditure 
per 
Employee 
ASTD 
Benchmarking 
US$ 
2002 134,714 80,764,699 0.17% 560 201 826 
2008 669,284 316,808,419 0.21% 1102 607 1,435
2
 
Growth 396.8% 292.3% - - - - 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
68.2% 31.7% - - - - 
1
 Values encompassing all the firm’s businesses. They were converted into US$ by the average rate of 
exchange provided by the Brazilian Central Bank. The values of 2002 were then adjusted to 2008 by the 
US inflation rate (CPI) provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
2
 In 2006. 
Own elaboration. Source: Bio-Manguinhos (2008, 2009b), ASTD (ASTD, web page, accessed in 
01/2009). 
 
The firm has had three creative initiatives in recent years that have enhanced the results 
of those investments. The first was the creation of a “professional” masters degree in 
technology on immunobiologicals, within the structure of the firm and in partnership 
with a research institute of Fiocruz (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b). As noted by Moreira 
(2005), an interesting characteristic of this degree is that the students are encouraged to 
present a dissertation representing a concrete contribution to their technical activities. 
The students have, therefore, generated innovations to the firm’s production processes 
(interview 19).
282
 The second was the creation in 2004 of a technical course on 
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 Recently the firm had to stop financing external training to outsourced personnel for legal reasons. As 
the firm relied heavily on personnel outsourcing as an alternative to the limitations in hiring public 
workers, this legal restriction caused an important impact to the firm’s training programme (Barbosa, 
2009). 
280
 These investments include training abroad provided by the transferors of technologies (Barbosa, 2009). 
281
 The firm does not calculate the return on investment (ROI) for their activities on training. 
282
 Three cohorts have finished the two year degree since then, and the last two cohorts have relied on 
workers from other institutions of the field of immunobiologicals (interview 10). 
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biotechnology in health. This course is a partnership with an education institute of 
Fiocruz and is directed at technicians with no graduate background (Barbosa, 2009). 
The third was the creation in 2005 of a specialization course in industrial management 
on immunobiologicals, in partnership with an Institute of Engineering of the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro – COPPE/UFRJ (Bio-Manguinhos, 2009b). 
 
7.4 Organizational Capabilities 
As this research considers, by definition, that technological capabilities encompass both 
the firm’s technical and organizational efforts in dealing with technology, this section 
briefly approaches some of those types of competencies concerning the governance of 
the organizations as a whole, in the sense distinguished by Dosi et al. (2008).
283
 In this 
regard, and more specifically, two key issues of a managerial and strategic nature were 
identified as of interest to this research:  
 
a) the public nature of the BVI firms in the context of a country where public 
companies are popularly regarded as less efficient than private ones. This is 
because of the limited freedom to the management of their structure, people, 
finances and procurement and, therefore, of their decision process (Castanhar et 
al., 2005); and,
284
  
b) the high dependence of a sole purchaser – the PNI – as a strategic weakness the 
BVI firms have been faced with, as indicated by these same authors (ibid. p.246).  
 
How the firms have been dealing with these issues is the point approached here.   
 
The limitations mentioned above have posed a huge challenge to BVI firms. The same 
government arrangements that have made their growth possible, and enabled the 
development of important technological capabilities so far in a sector dominated by few 
oligopolistic multinationals, have apparently imprisoned the firms within a managerial 
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 Technological capabilities were defined, for the purpose of this research, in Sub-section 3.4.1 on pg. 
52. The approach of this research to organizational capabilities is discussed in Sub-section 3.5.2 on pg. 
71-72.  
284
 One example given by one interviewee was the case of Petrobrás, the biggest Brazilian company that 
runs businesses in the energy sector. The company is public: it is, however, a different and more flexible 
type of public company than the BVI firms. To become more efficient and competitive in the 
international market, however, the company needed more organizational flexibility that was gained a 
decade ago by the approval by the Brazilian Congress of a specific law, known as the Petroleum Law 
(interview 10). 
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system that seems to hamper the further developments needed to make them 
competitive in an international context and even in the local market.  
 
Amongst the firms’ managers interviewed there is a great awareness and consensus 
about the need of the firms to become efficient and competitive. This is in order to keep 
on developing and strengthening their main vocation – to fulfil public demands 
(interviews 3, 9, 10 and 19). Worrying, however, is the consensus amongst the same 
managers, and among other managers outside the BVI who were interviewed about the 
subject of Policies, that BVI firms would not be able to survive without the current 
government protection (previous interviews plus interviews 7, 13, 15 and 16). In 
addition, according to one interviewee, as the public market grows and the PNI 
introduces more sophisticated vaccines in the routine, there is a high probability that 
this market will again draw the attention of private companies, especially of the “Big 
Pharma” firms that have not been benefiting from this market through the licensing of 
their technologies (interview 9).
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Despite the growth of the Brazilian public market, what the main firms of the BVI seem 
to be relatively aware of today is that they have reached a size whereby providing 
vaccines only to this protected market is not enough to ensure their growth, 
technological development and survival in the long term. One of the interviewees, with 
great international experience in vaccines, stated emphatically that technological 
development of vaccines does not take place if not backed by a solid productive base 
(interview 19). This implies the need to keep on expanding the horizons of the firms. 
 
Yet, most of the firms’ initiatives to strengthen their managerial capacity and reach new 
markets have so far been limited. There seems to be the same lack of strategic mindset 
in the way described by Hobday et al. (2004:1454). The main alternative explored by 
the firms to gain administrative flexibility has been to resort to non-profit private 
organizations created specifically to support them.
286
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 In fact Novartis is currently building facilities for vaccine production in Brazil, as already mentioned 
in footnote 190 in Chapter 6 (pg. 136). 
286
 Already mentioned in Sub-section 6.2.4 of the previous chapter (pg. 138 and 140). 
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Although this initiative has indeed provided some more flexibility and efficiency to the 
firms (interview10), and is being considered by some as a complete solution to their 
constraints (interview 3), it is actually far from being the appropriate model to deal with 
the legal restrictions imposed by public sector legislation in the long term. As noted by 
Castanhar et al. (2005), the use of this mechanism to bypass the law is constantly 
objected to  by public auditors and solicitors.  
 
Another fragility of the managerial system relates to the hiring of personnel. In order to 
grow amid the restrictions of hiring public workers, firms use the alternative of 
outsourcing human resources, including to the production and R&D areas. In other 
words, the kind of personnel who own valuable technical information and tacit 
knowledge. While the Instituto Butantan relied on around 20% of outsourced personnel 
in 2004, the percentage of these workers performing technical and administrative 
activities in Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz was over 79%, according to figures presented by 
the same authors.
287
 
 
On the other hand some more consistent initiatives that were intended to strengthen the 
efficiency of the firms were found amongst the data gathered. The start-up to the 
implementation of a quality assurance system in the Instituto Butantan is one of them 
(interview 6).
288
 In Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, in addition to the creation of a project 
management team in 2003, aimed at the organization and assessment of R&D projects 
(Moreira, 2005), a partnership with COPPE/UFRJ, an Institute of Engineering of the 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, provided the development of capabilities and 
routines to production management, and the design and implementation of an ERP 
system (Bio-Manguinhos, 2008). 
 
With regard to the firms’ strategies to the market, there has been a mix of successful and 
unsuccessful achievements so far. Both firms have succeeded in diversifying their 
businesses, with Bio-Manguinhos implementing the production and R&D of 
biopharmaceuticals in 2004 (Bio-Manguinhos, 2008), and the Instituto Butantan 
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 Data gathered during the fieldwork show that the situation has not changed in Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz as the firm relied on 77% of outsourced personnel in 2008. 
288
 Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, which already has a full quality system implemented, has helped the 
Instituto Butantan in this initiative (interviews 6 and 19). It has also collaborated with Tecpar in the same 
initiative (interview 9).  
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expanding its business toward the production and R&D of biopharmaceuticals and, 
more recently, of blood products (interview 3). The new businesses have been directed, 
however, exclusively towards the Brazilian public market. Relating to vaccines, Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz, which obtained WHO pre-qualification in 2001 (Benedetti, 2008), 
has been exporting surplus production of two products to the UN. However, expanding 
the export to other products has been prevented due to restrictions in the technology 
transfer agreements.
289,290
  
 
Instituto Butantan, which has been exporting its serums to several countries (Instituto 
Butantan, 2007), has applied for pre-qualification but it has not so far been inspected by 
the WHO and, therefore, its human vaccines have been directed only to the local public 
market (interviews 3 and 6). According to these interviewees, after obtaining the WHO 
pre-qualification the Institute will quickly be able to export several of its products 
through the UN agencies. 
 
With regard to the formulation of the technological strategies, the evidence shows 
different approaches amongst the firms. In this regard, one of the firms has implemented 
a broad process of discussing and defining its objectives across all managers and by 
using a specific tool – the Balanced Scorecard (Bio-Manguinhos, 2008, 2009b). In the 
other firm the responsibility of formulating its technology strategies is restricted to its 
higher boards or to its main scientific leader (Instituto Butantan, 2007 and interview 5).  
 
7.5 Technological Capabilities and the Unfinished Transition in the BVI 
This section draws on the conceptual and analytical aspects of the transition phase as 
defined in Sub-sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.2 of Chapter 3 (pg. 58-63 and 74-75, respectively). 
It also draws on all data presented previously in the empirical chapters – Chapters 5 and 
6 and Sections 7.2 to 7.4 of this present chapter. This section will describe the 
boundaries (Sub-section 7.5.1) and characteristics (Sub-section 7.5.2) of the transition 
phase of the BVI firms., It will also try to identify the main constraints to the 
development of innovative capabilities of this industry and to the completion of this 
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 According to Benedetti (2008), in 2001 the firm obtained the first WHO pre-qualification for the 
Yellow Fever vaccine. He noted that the process started in 1992 with training in GMP provided to 66 
workers by a WHO expert. 
290
 The vaccines being exported are Yellow Fever and Meningococcal C. 
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transition phase (Sub-section 7.5.3). Table 7.5 summarizes these boundaries, 
characteristics and constraints at the end the sub-section.  
 
7.5.1 The Boundaries of the Transition Phase  
Although establishing the boundaries of the transition phase may appear a somewhat 
subjective task, it seems there is enough evidence gathered to make a clear distinction 
between the pre-transition and transition phases of technological capabilities 
development within the BVI, and to set up when and how it started. At the other 
extreme, the empirical evidence shows that the upper limit of this transition phase needs 
to be better qualified due to the different long term objectives of the BVI firms from 
those approached in the works of Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and Hobday et al. (2004).  
 
To discuss the first point, this research draws on the concepts of the “accumulation of 
minimum essential knowledge base” and “development of embryonic strategic 
capabilities” developed by Dutrénit (2000) to distinguish the characteristics of the pre-
transition phase and to set up the mid-1980s as the beginning of the transitions phase. 
As can be noted from the empirical evidence, the minimum essential knowledge base 
accumulated within the BVI stands for the accumulation of a set of basic and 
intermediate capabilities. The more visible ones are the production of old vaccines by 
processes and internal facilities that were not of assured quality, the identification of 
mature technologies abroad of interest to the public market, and the absorption and 
implementation of the production of foreign mature technologies. Moreover, some basic 
to intermediate innovative capabilities can be identified, such as the adaptation of 
acquired foreign technologies to the context of the country, and the improvement of 
existing products with a series of incremental innovations.  
 
However, these innovative capabilities were essentially informal as there were no 
physical structures dedicated specifically to the R&D activities in both firms. During 
this period the firms started strengthening their capabilities and managed to survive 
even though most of the vaccines bought by the PNI had been imported. All this 
evidence is highly indicative of the completion of a pre-transition phase in an analogy 
with the minimum essential knowledge base described by Dutrénit. 
 
194 
It is also possible to match the overall characteristics of this pre-transition phase with 
some characteristics of the “Reactive” type of firm as defined by Bessant et al. 
(2001).
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 In the period up to the mid-1980s, despite a fair awareness of the need to 
continuously improve technology, the firms clearly had limited internal resources and a 
lack of key skills in more advanced technologies. Furthermore the approach to 
technology was still reactive rather than strategic and poor external links had been 
developed. 
 
On the other hand from the mid-1980s onwards, the firms presented a different 
approach to technology. This was more strategic, starting with the implementation of 
R&D facilities, use of international consultants to support R&D activities, growing links 
with external research institutions, consistent achievements in terms of development of 
new products (new to the firms), the design of new facilities to comply with the tighter 
quality requirements, and so on. The transition phase had started, and its characteristics 
are approached in more detail in the next sub-section. 
 
Relating to the second point – the upper boundaries of this transition phase – there is a 
need to clarify the BVI firms’ strategies a priori. According to some interviewees who 
are in charge of the formulation strategies of those firms (interviews 3, 10 and 19), there 
are significant differences between the strategies of the oligopolistic firms – the 
technological and market leaders – and of the BVI firms. They see neither possibility 
nor need to try to compete with the “Big Pharma” firms in terms of innovation and 
market strategies, even though it may eventually occur in certain specific 
circumstances.
292
 Indeed, the strategy of the BVI firms can be seen as complimentary to 
those of the “Big Pharma” firms’ ones.  
 
The focus is on the needs of the Brazilian public market and includes vaccines already 
in the international market (follower strategy), and vaccines new to the world (but for 
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 At this level of technological capability, the firms still do not have the capability of interest for 
analyzing transition, in the sense employed by Hobday et al. (2004). See also Sub-section 3.4.3 and Table 
3.2 on pg. 73-74 and 60, respectively, for more details about the boundaries of these levels as adopted by 
these authors. 
292
 The case of the yellow fever vaccine is one example. As the biggest world manufacturer of this 
vaccine Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz is exhorted by the UN agencies to produce enough to fulfil the needs of 
the poor countries. In this field the firm competes with Aventis-Pasteur, which is also a large supplier of 
this vaccine in the international market. In the R&D area there is another example since Bio-Manguinhos 
is establishing a strategic partnership with GSK for the development of dengue and malaria vaccines. 
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neglected diseases of epidemiological interest to the country, where there is little or no 
interest by the “Big Pharma” firms to invest).293 In a broader perspective, the BVI, as it 
is currently constituted, seeks to develop technological capabilities in order to dominate 
the process of technological change and to achieve technological self-sustainability 
within the strategic field of vaccines.
294
 Furthermore, the firms do not intend to try and 
compete in the private market of both developed and developing countries, which is 
where the “Big Pharma” firms make most of their revenues. Conversely, their strategies 
for international markets so far encompass the supply of the production surplus to the 
UN agencies procurement only. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the BVI firms’ catch-up process does not seek international 
technological and market leadership at all, but rather seeks to become innovative and 
competitive in a niche market, eventually contributing to the technological frontier. 
Consequently, and slightly different from the cases approached by Dutrénit (2000, 2007) 
and Hobday et al. (2004), the upper limit for the transition phase applies specifically to 
the case of the BVI; this approach, therefore, seems to be more appropriate. 
 
The assessment of the current level of technological capabilities in the BVI, therefore, 
takes into account the characteristics of the transition phase as defined in the works of 
Dutrénit (2000, 2007), Bessant et al. (2001), Hobday et al. (2004) and Rush et al. (2007), 
with the upper limits defined above.  
 
7.5.2 The Characteristics of the Transition Phase – Unfinished Transition?   
In the previous sub-section it was stated that the transition phase of technological 
capabilities development in the BVI had begun in the mid-1980s, when the firms had 
already built the minimum essential knowledge base and had started to adopt a strategic 
approach to technology. This sub-section seeks to identify the overall characteristics of 
this transition phase amongst all empirical data gathered, and in the light of the 
characteristics described in previous works already mentioned and summarized in Table 
3.3 of Chapter 3 (pg. 62 and 63). 
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 Some examples are presented in Figure 7.3. 
294
 Strategic or an issue of national security, as the Brazilian government defined the field of vaccines 
since the early 1980s. See Sub-sections 7.2.1 in this chapter (pg. 164) and 6.4.2 in the previous chapter 
(pg. 159) for other details. 
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The first important characteristic to be highlighted is the intensity of the technology 
acquisition processes, especially from the late 1990s up to the present time. Although 
this strategy was expected to be of decreasing importance during the transition phase it 
has indeed been increasingly adopted, as demonstrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 (pg. 166 
and 167). Notwithstanding, during this period this strategy enabled the main firms of the 
BVI to develop world class operating capabilities and strengthen their technological 
capabilities overall much faster. At the same time it has assured the supply of most 
needs of the Brazilian public market by these firms. On the other hand, the benefits of 
this strategy to the development of innovative capabilities are highly controversial, and 
the current intensity of its adoption seems an unequivocal signal that the transition is 
still unfinished. 
 
However, there is abundant evidence about the characteristics of the development of 
innovative capabilities within the BVI and of its growing importance during the 
transition phase. The first was selected by this research as the starting point of this 
transition phase and stands for a new and more strategic approach to technology. This 
characteristic was identified from the establishment of organizational structures and 
building of facilities especially dedicated to R&D activities, and with the hiring of 
senior scientists from universities and research institutes in the mid-1980s. The sharp 
increase in the number of technical personnel and PhDs allocated to R&D activities, and 
of investments in R&D activities to strengthen in-house capabilities, is another 
characteristic of this transition phase. These investments have also encompassed 
training activities, including an important initiative – the creation of a specific Masters 
degree in the technology of immunobiologicals inside one of the firms. The 
development of new capabilities, such as genetic engineering and clinical trials, and the 
domain of some new (to the firms) technological platforms, were other characteristics of 
strategic importance during this phase. 
 
Another characteristic of the BVI firms’ transition phase was the support from 
international consultants and researchers for improvements to existing products and 
development of new products. At the same time the firms strengthened their internal 
and external links through strategic alliances between themselves, and developed links 
and collaborations with universities and research institutes in both national and 
international contexts. A partnership with a private company was also started by one of 
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the firms. Linkages with suppliers have been also developed, although not to address the 
development of innovative capabilities. 
 
At the organizational level it is explicit from the data gathered that the firms have 
developed a high awareness of the need to improve organizational capabilities. Some 
initiatives had already been taken or were in the process of being taken, such as the 
implementation of a quality system and of a project management system. The search for 
more administrative autonomy and flexibility through the support of non-profit 
organizations was an alternative adopted by the firms in an attempt to overcome the 
legal limitations imposed by their public nature; this alternative obtained limited success. 
To address the needs of the Ministry of Health, firms have undertaken the successful 
implementation of new businesses, and the strengthening of existing businesses, in areas 
other than human vaccine as a strategy of diversification and of decreasing dependence 
from a sole business, have been other characteristics of the firms during this transition 
phase. 
 
One very specific characteristic of the BVI’s transition phase is the important support of 
the government for the firms. To begin with, this support addressed the expansion and 
strengthening of the vaccine manufacturing of the public firms. At the same time it kept 
these firms protected from the international manufacturers through the use of 
purchasing power. More recently, besides continuing to use its purchasing power to 
benefit the BVI firms, the government has launched other initiatives to try and support 
the strengthening of innovation by the firms. 
 
All in all the overall assessment of the current technological capabilities of the main 
firms of the BVI can be translated by the results achieved so far in an extremely 
technologically complex and competitive field such as the human vaccines. In addition 
to the imitation of mature technologies, the in-house imitation of newer generation 
technologies, together with the diversity of products in the firms’ R&D pipeline (some 
of which are in the later stages of development), are unequivocal signals that the BVI 
has achieved high levels of innovative capabilities. Conversely, these results have not 
been significant enough so far to enable the firms to become competitive, even in the 
local public market, and to survive without government protection. Hence, and drawing 
on the upper limits of this transition phase as posed in the previous sub-section, one can 
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be assured that the transition is still unfinished. The constraints to the completion of this 
transition phase are approached in the next sub-section. 
 
7.5.3 The Constraints to the Completion of the Transition Phase in the BVI 
It was argued in the previous sub-section that the BVI has achieved high levels of 
technological capabilities but has not yet completed the transition phase, to the extent as 
defined in this research. The fact that the firms of this industry in Brazil are eminently 
different due to their public nature and specific long-term objectives, sets up a specific 
upper limit to this transition phase and poses somewhat different challenges to its 
completion. This sub-section speculates on some of the main evidence that seems to 
have been determinant in the BVI not accomplishing this transition phase so far. 
 
An initial point relates to the specificities of the innovation process on vaccines, and the 
rate of development of technological capabilities in this sector. Due to its high 
technological complexity and high cost, the process of developing a new vaccine is 
usually very long, from 10 to 15 years on average, sometimes longer.
295
 For the same 
reasons, failure rates of the projects are also very high.
296
 After only 25 years from the 
start of a more strategic approach to technology – i.e. the beginning of the transition 
phase and of the development of more advanced technological capabilities, as argued 
previously – it is no surprise that only a few products have been developed by the firms 
of the BVI to date. 
 
On the other hand, this slow build up of technological capabilities in the BVI seems to 
be linked to other reasons, as the evidence shows. Despite great efforts, R&D intensity 
remains low and incompatible with the levels found in the pharmaceutical sector. In 
addition, low investment in training and a reduced number of skilled people allocated to 
R&D activities, seem to be amongst the reasons for the delay in the completion of the 
transition phase. Some of the reasons cited by the interviewees that have affected the 
achievements and rate of development of the BVI include: 
 the unavailability of some important technological platforms to express antigens;  
 the inadequacy of some R&D facilities to BPL and biosafety requirements;  
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 See Sub-section 5.3.3 (pg 109-114) and Figure 5.1 (pg. 114) in Chapter 5 for a discussion of the 
process of developing vaccines. 
296
 See Table 5.6 (pg. 110) in the same sub-section of the previous footnote for more details about market 
entrance probability in each of the project development phases. 
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 the lack of a significant induction of applied research on vaccines; and,  
 the still existent gap between basic research and technological development in 
the country. 
 
In the organizational context the lack of firms’ administrative flexibility due to the tight 
legislation of the public sector has been claimed as one of the main weaknesses. It is 
also an important constraint not only on an adequate management of the business but 
also in maintaining a steady growth in the future. However, it seems there is still a gap 
between what the firms can do in the current context and what they have actually done. 
In this sense there is a need to strengthen some managerial and market capabilities, to 
expand the WHO pre-qualification to other products and to exploit strategic 
partnerships more efficiently. 
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Table 7.5: Technological Capabilities Transition in the Brazilian Vaccine Industry – Boundaries, Characteristics and Constraints  
Zuma Medeiros 
Boundaries  Characteristics (cont.) 
. From the beginning of a more strategic approach to technology to full 
domination of the technical change process, becoming competitive in a 
niche market, eventually contributing to the technological frontier. 
 . Strategic alliances amongst BVI firms; 
. Increasing internal and external links, and collaborations with universities 
and research institutes in the national and international contexts; 
. Still limited partnerships with private companies and suppliers; 
. High awareness of the need to improve organizational capabilities; 
. Strong governmental protection and support to the firms; 
. Successful diversification of the business (addressing the Brazilian public 
market only); 
Characteristics  
. Minimum essential knowledge base already accumulated – 1) basic and 
intermediate capabilities such as the production of old technologies with 
no GMP and identification, absorption and implementation of foreign 
mature technologies; 2) basic and intermediate informal innovative 
capabilities such as the adaptation of foreign acquired technologies and 
incremental innovations to existing products; 
. Strategic approach to technology; 
. Increasing use of technology acquisition strategy for dominating the local 
public market, developing world class operating capabilities and 
strengthening overall technological capabilities; 
. Strengthening of in-house innovative capabilities through rapid growth of 
personnel and PhDs allocated to R&D activities, and of investments in 
R&D activities; 
. Development of new strategic capabilities such as genetic engineering 
and clinical trials; 
. Development of some new (to the firms/country) products and several 
products under development (some new to the world); 
. Hiring of international consultants and researchers to support the 
development of new products and incremental innovations to existing 
products; 
. Domain of some technological platforms; 
 
 
Constraints to complete transition  
 . Slow rate of development of technological capabilities due to: 
   . High technological complexity, high cost and length of the process of 
developing vaccines; 
   . Low R&D intensity, low investment in training and need for more 
skilled people allocated to R&D activities; 
   . Unavailability of important technological platforms (e.g. antigen 
expression); 
   . Inadequacy of some R&D facilities to BPL and biosafety requirements; 
   . Lack of significant induction of applied research in vaccines, and gap 
between basic/applied research and technological development in the 
country; 
. Lack of administrative flexibility and strategic mindset; 
. Need for strengthening managerial and market capabilities and for 
expanding WHO pre-qualification to other vaccines; 
. Need for exploiting strategic partnerships more efficiently. 
Source: Own elaboration, based on empirical findings and following the format of Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 (pg. 62 and 63). 
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7.6 Assessing the Technological Capabilities – a Survey 
Complimentarily to the above approach, this research made use of a survey regarding 
the assessment of the current level of technological capabilities of the BVI. The survey 
was based on the tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001), which is also intended to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in the development of technological capabilities 
within the firms. It was carried out in the biggest firm of the BVI in August/September 
2009. 
 
A few adaptations were made with the inclusion of some information about the 
respondents in order to make an overview of the results across different areas of work 
and categories of employees possible. The survey was addressed to employees in posts 
where graduation was the minimum required background. There were 123 valid 
responses; this represented 22.9% of the total possible responses and 10.6% of the total 
employees of the firm.
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Figure 7.4: Capability Level in the BVI – the Overall Results 
 
The results of the survey far exceeded expectations and corroborate the evidence 
gathered during the fieldwork. As can be seen from Figure 7.4, the current level of 
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 Of the 140 total responses 17 questionnaires were excluded due to poor answers (more than 7 blank 
answers from 24 questions).  
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technological capability of the BVI is positioned in the lower band of the highest 
category of technological capability of the audit tool – the beginning of the creative type 
of firm level – very close to the limit with the strategic level. In the light of the 
framework developed by Bessant et al. (2001) it is clear that these results strengthen the 
overall assessment in Sub-section 7.5.2, that the BVI has achieved high levels of 
technological capability within the transition phase. They also strengthen the evidence 
that there is a very high degree of awareness of the need to change in order to 
accomplish the objectives of this industry. Moreover, they also show that there is a high 
degree of awareness of what and how to change in order to achieve the results in 
practice, albeit with the need to develop and/or strengthen some capabilities to become 
competitive. 
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       Source: Own elaboration from data gathered in the survey. 
 
Figure 7.5: Profile of the Technological Capability of the BVI 
 
The areas where the BVI is strong and where it needs to improve to accomplish its 
objectives were also identified by the survey. Figure 7.5 shows a graphic representation 
of the overall results of the survey by each of the technological dimensions compared to 
the maximum level, the hypothetical best practices. Table 7.6 presents the detailed data 
arranged across the variables and dimensions of technological capabilities. These 
figures are examined as follows. 
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Table 7.6: Survey on Technological Capabilities Level – the Detailed Results 
Variables 
Dimensions of Technological Capabilities / Average Scores1 
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All Data 
92% 77% 75% 77% 83% 90% 71% 72% 77% 
75.3 123 
3.7 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 
Area: 91% 77% 73% 79% 83% 87% 68% 69% 74% 
73.9 30 
R&D 3.7 3.1 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.5 2.7 2.7 3.0 
Area: 94% 83% 78% 84% 85% 94% 78% 79% 75% 
78.6 29 
Production 3.8 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.1 3.2 3.0 
Area: 89% 69% 73% 67% 77% 91% 63% 64% 82% 
72.2                                         8 
Engineering 3.6 2.8 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.6 2.5 2.6 3.3 
Area: 89% 82% 80% 75% 81% 90% 73% 77% 82% 
77.4 19 
Quality 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 
Area: 91% 72% 72% 74% 82% 87% 70% 69% 76% 
73.5 37 
Management 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.8 2.8 3.0 
Post: 91% 77% 75% 77% 83% 90% 72% 70% 75% 
74.9 65 
Manager 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.0 
Post: 92% 77% 74% 77% 83% 89% 71% 74% 78% 
75.8 55 
Non Manager 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Years in the Company: 91% 74% 71% 74% 80% 88% 70% 71% 76% 
73.5 61 
Less than 10 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 2.8 2.8 3.0 
Years in the Company: 91% 78% 77% 82% 86% 92% 72% 77% 79% 
77.7 28 
Between 10 and 20 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 
Years in the Company: 92% 79% 77% 77% 84% 89% 72% 71% 76% 
75.5 24 
Over 20 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.1 
Qualification: 92% 73% 75% 75% 88% 91% 70% 81% 77% 
76.1 8 
Graduation 3.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.6 2.8 3.2 3.1 
Qualification: 93% 81% 79% 82% 85% 94% 78% 76% 80% 
79.0 31 
Specialization 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.2 
Qualification: 91% 75% 73% 76% 79% 87% 67% 70% 76% 
73.5 56 
Masters Degree 3.6 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 
Qualification: 89% 76% 67% 76% 80% 88% 71% 65% 73% 
72.1 17 
PhD 3.6 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 2.9 2.6 2.9 
Survey carried out in Aug-Sep 2009 – Firm: Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz. No. of employees (Aug 2009) = 1,157, of which with graduate background = 536. % of responses = 
10.6 and 22.9 respectively. 
1
 See Annex B for details on how the scores were calculated. 
2
 The total number of respondents across some variables is less than 123 since some 
of them did not provide all the information about their profile and therefore those questionnaires were not considered for that specific variable but only for the whole result.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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The empirical data collected and presented in previous chapters and previous sections of 
this chapter, as well as the interviews carried out for this research, were used to deepen 
the interpretation of the results of the survey. 
 
According to the audit tool the degree of “awareness” reflects the ability of the firm to 
recognize the role of technology to its development and competitiveness: it measures 
the awareness of the need to change. The very high score achieved in this dimension of 
technological capability (3.7), highly uniform across all variables, is consistent with 
several evidences gathered. These include the efforts of the BVI to develop in-house 
innovative capabilities, its results and prospects, and even with its strategy of keeping 
updated with the most recent technologies through technology acquisition. 
 
The assessment of the other eight technological capabilities dimensions measures the 
degree of awareness of the firms in areas that enable them to change what is identified 
as needed. The average score obtained in the survey for this set of capabilities was high 
(3.1), but brings to light areas where the firms are strong and where they should 
improve to complete the transition phase and become competitive. Amongst these 
dimensions was one distinguished by a very high score (3.6). According to the survey 
“technology acquisition” (which measures the effectiveness of the firm at acquiring 
technology from external sources and the existence of good links with important 
external suppliers of technology), is a very strong capability of this industry. This 
strengthens the emphasis of this research on the strategy of technology acquisition as 
one of its main sources of knowledge. Although the results have been fairly uniform 
across the variables, they were notably higher among production area workers, which is 
the entrance door of the technologies acquired externally, and amongst the workers with 
specialization as their highest qualification. In this latter case no apparent reason was 
identified. 
 
The “Assessing and Selecting” technological capability dimension was another area that 
received a very high score (3.3). The survey measures the firms’ ability to identify the 
right technology and its best sources for their business. Therefore, this ability is a 
requirement for the next step in the technological cycle of the firm – technology 
acquisition. Hence, the result is consistent with the result and comments above about the 
“Technology Acquisition” dimension. 
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At the other extreme, two dimensions received the lowest score (2.9) of the survey. 
“Implementing and absorbing technology” refers to how effective technology activities 
are organized as well as to the existence of clear processes for carrying out technology 
projects. “Learning” refers to how effective the firm is in learning from the assessment 
of technology projects, from post-project reviews, and from one technology project to 
another. The results suggest the need to improve skills and coordination in areas such as 
R&D, Engineering, Project Management, Knowledge Management, Marketing and so 
on. The results for the first dimension were particularly influenced by the responses 
from workers from the Engineering, R&D and management areas, and from those with 
a Masters degree as their main background, as shown in Table 7.6. The respondents of 
the same areas and amongst the PhDs mainly determined the results of the “Learning” 
dimension. 
 
The result of the “Building Core Competence” dimension (3.0) also fell below the 
average of these eight dimensions, and it was mainly determined by the workers of the 
same three areas stated above. This capability refers to the firms’ ability to audit their 
competencies, and identify and adequately exploit their strengths in order to build up 
competitive advantages. As empirical data show that the firms of the BVI are well 
aware of the role of technology to their business, the main needs of this industry in this 
area seem to be the identification of their advantages, the development of ways of 
protecting them, and the identification of competencies to be outsourced instead of 
being developed in-house.  
 
The results of the other three dimensions fell right over the average score for this set of 
capabilities (3.1), just at the beginning of the creative stage of technological capabilities. 
“Search”, the ability of firms to assess technological opportunities and threats, was 
noticeably perceived less favourably by the workers of the Engineering and 
Management areas, and by those with less than 10 years in the firm or with graduation 
as main qualification. Conversely, the workers of the production and quality areas 
assigned the highest degree for this capability. The evidence from interviews and other 
empirical data suggest, however, that this ability is restricted to some few mature 
scientific leaders. The development of stronger marketing capabilities and of a broader 
scientific and technological network through systematic participation in conferences, 
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seminars and exhibitions abroad are some initiatives to be implemented by the BVI in 
this area.  
 
The “Technology Strategy” dimension measures how skilled the management is at 
formulating a technology strategy and defining its priorities to meet business goals. 
According to the audit tool, to be successful and able to think about technology in a 
strategic way, firms need a clear understanding of their core competencies and a process 
for discussing and communicating their technology strategy. Also, choosing whether to 
conduct technological activities in-house or outsource them to technological partners is 
a strategic challenge of these firms. Although some formal initiatives about strategy 
formulation have been detected amid the empirical data, difficulties with the 
identification and development of core capabilities, and legal restrictions regarding the 
public nature of the firms, may restrain the formulation of more daring strategies by the 
firms.  
 
“Exploiting External Linkages and Incentives” refers to how aware the firms are of the 
existence of government incentives and of external resources to help them to develop 
technologies and how well they exploit them. The result of the survey in this area also 
seems very consistent since empirical evidence gathered showed that BVI firms have 
largely benefited from governmental policies to develop. Moreover, external linkages 
with universities and research institutes in the national and international contexts, as 
well as international consultants and researchers, have been increasingly exploited. 
However, some interviewees pointed out the need to broaden external linkages, 
especially with private firms and suppliers. Once more, legal impediments can hinder or 
delay the establishment of some kinds of technological alliances such as joint ventures 
and public-private partnerships (PPP). 
  
The questionnaire developed by Bessant et al. (2001) and used in the survey is 
presented in Annex B. 
 
7.7 Summary 
This last empirical chapter has approached the development of technological 
capabilities within the Brazilian Vaccine Industry (BVI) since the early 1970s. The data 
gathered confirmed that technology acquisition, the acquisition of foreign packaged 
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technology in the sense defined in Chapter 3, has been an intensive strategy of this 
industry and an important source of knowledge to develop, even within the transition 
phase, and has resulted in the development of world class operating capabilities. 
Evidence has shown that the adoption of this strategy has been mainly pushed by the 
rapid growth of the Brazilian public market combined with the high complexity of the 
process of developing vaccines. 
 
On the other hand, data gathered has shown that high levels of innovative capabilities 
have also been developed by the main firms of the BVI due to a more strategic approach 
to technology since the mid-1980s. In this sense the strengthening of their own R&D 
through the hiring of skilled personnel, growing investments in R&D activities and 
training, and growing linkages with external sources of knowledge, both in the national 
and international contexts was noticed. In addition, the development of important R&D 
capabilities especially in the area of clinical trials was also noted. Moreover, some 
products have been developed by the firms, and several new (to the firms and to the 
world) products are currently in their R&D pipeline. 
 
The assessment of technological capabilities of the BVI through the use of the transition 
approach, as defined in Chapter 3, has confirmed that this industry has reached high 
levels of technological capability but that the transition phase is still unfinished. 
Furthermore the boundaries and characteristics of this transition phase were identified 
as well as some of the constraints to its completion. 
 
Finally, the results of a survey carried out in one of the firms were presented. The 
survey, based on the audit tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001), was used as a 
complimentary tool to the assessment of the level, strengths and weaknesses of the 
development of technological capabilities within the BVI. Its results strengthened the 
assessment made previously from all data presented in the empirical chapters. 
 
The next chapter is dedicated to the analysis and discussion of the whole context of 
development of technological capabilities in the BVI in the light of the research 
questions and propositions defined in Chapter 3, and of the interactions represented in 
the analytical framework developed in the same chapter. 
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Chapter 8 – Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the research problem and aims were defined, drawing on the literature 
reviewed (Chapter 2) and on some assumptions raised about the Brazilian vaccine 
industry (BVI). The research questions and propositions were then posed and the 
conceptual and analytical frameworks developed, setting up the elements for 
investigation. Chapters 5 to 7 provided empirical data gathered in the light of the 
strategies developed and presented in the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4). The present 
chapter is dedicated to linking the empirical findings of this research to the objectives of 
the study, and to interpreting these findings in order to address the research questions 
and propositions posed. 
 
For convenience, the research questions and propositions are reproduced below: 
 
RQ1 How have technological capabilities in the Brazilian vaccine industry evolved over 
time? 
P1 Technological capabilities have been developed in the BVI in a distinct 
pattern of that represented by the traditional catch-up model identified in the 
literature on technological accumulation in latecomer firm/industries, influenced 
by specific circumstances of the context of this industry; 
P2 The strategy of continuous foreign technology acquisition adopted by the 
BVI has not contributed effectively to the development of local capabilities that 
could help to narrow the gap to the technological frontier. 
RQ2 How far has the Brazilian vaccine industry gone to date in the transition phase, how 
and why? 
P3 The BVI has been unable to develop significant innovative capabilities so far 
within the transition phase; 
P4 The speed of change in the scientific/technological frontier is the most 
important factor hindering the transition to competitive innovative capabilities; 
P5 The unfinished transition is a by-product of the strategy of continuous foreign 
technology acquisition adopted by the BVI. 
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The chapter is thus organized in two sections. Section 8.2 approaches the overall way 
technological capabilities have been developed within the BVI, with an emphasis on its 
specific pattern and on the strategy of foreign technology acquisition, in order to 
address Research Question 1 and its Propositions. The issues on the development of 
innovative capabilities during the transition phase are approached in Section 8.3 
illuminated by Research Question 2 and its Propositions 3 and 4. In order to address the 
last proposition (Proposition 5) of Research Question 2, the possible existence of a 
relationship between the strategies adopted by the BVI and the hindrances to the 
completion of its transition phase is an issue also analyzed in the same section. 
 
8.2 Literature and Development of Technological Capabilities in the BVI  
This section is about interpreting the overall way technological capabilities have been 
developed in the Brazilian vaccine industry over time, as set forth by the Research 
Question 1. More specifically, it focuses on possible differences and similarities 
between the specific characteristics of the development of technological capabilities in 
the BVI, and the common pattern identified in the literature on technological 
accumulation of catching-up firms/industries of latecomer countries, as proposed in 
Proposition 1 (Sub-section 8.2.1). Furthermore, this section also discusses the claim that 
the strategy of technology acquisition has not speeded up the development of the BVI, 
as asserted in Proposition 2 (Sub-section 8.2.2). Sub-section 8.2.3 presents a summary 
of the issues discussed in the two previous sub-sections in order to frame the answer of 
Research Question 1. 
 
8.2.1 The Pattern of Technological Capabilities Development in the BVI – 
Differences and Similarities 
The first concern of this research relates to the possibility of the existence of a distinct 
pattern of technological accumulation within the BVI due to persistent processes of 
foreign technology acquisition as the main source of technological knowledge, and as 
the main strategy to develop and to other specificities in the context of this industry.
298
 
 
The review of the literature on technological accumulation in latecomer countries 
revealed several approaches to this subject. From the most widespread view (e.g. 
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 Technology acquisition means, for the purpose of this research, the acquisition of foreign packaged 
technologies (see Chapter 3 on pg. 52). 
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Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Dahlman et al., 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995; 
Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997) one can infer, as emphasized in Chapter 2, that the catching-
up process of firms/industries in these countries has a common and logical pattern. It 
starts from a high dependence of the firms on mature technology imported from 
advanced countries due to the lack of existence of significant innovative capabilities and 
of local technological infrastructure. To catch-up and become competitive, however, 
these firms need to develop their internal innovative capabilities and strengthen the 
capabilities for exploiting other external sources of technological knowledge. 
Government, institutions and markets play an important role in this process. 
 
In some of these works (Mytelka, 1978; Kim, 1997) the relationships between foreign 
technology acquisition and the development of innovative capabilities are approached, 
and present certain situations where the use of the former inhibits the development of 
the latter. These situations are very close to the case of the BVI and are related to the 
nature of the firm (state-owned firms, in the case presented by Mytelka), and to the 
channel of knowledge acquisition (licensing of imported technologies from single 
sources, in the case observed by Kim). 
 
More recent literature focusing on innovation transition in Korea and Mexico, however, 
has unveiled in more detail the key issues faced by some firms by the time they attempt 
to approach the technological frontier and gain competitiveness. One of these key issues 
refers to the adoption of multiple strategies by the firms towards technology instead of a 
single corporate strategy (Hobday et al., 2004). The mix of strategies can 
simultaneously involve leadership, followership and latecomer technology strategies, 
and depends on the stage of development of each product or product families, according 
to these authors. 
 
Other works approach the catching-up process in a singular way. They emphasize new 
directions/paths as an alternative strategy of latecomer firms/industries to overcome 
their disadvantages and barriers, develop innovative capabilities, take advantage of 
opportunities and catch-up with the leaders, in line with Gerschenkron’s ideas. Among 
works putting forth this approach are Perez and Soete (1988), Forbes and Wield (2002, 
2008), Hobday (2003), Mathews (2006), and Figueiredo (2009).   
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On the other hand, empirical data gathered within this research has revealed in detail the 
way and context the main firms of the BVI have developed their technological 
capabilities in the last 35 years or so. The integration of the approach on innovation 
transition in the framework proposed in this research has provided the means to focus 
on the period when those firms have been developing the capabilities to innovate more 
intensively. 
 
One of the findings of the empirical data on technology acquisition (Chapter 7, Section 
7.2, pg. 164-173) was that the introduction of most of the products to the public market 
by the BVI since the creation of the National Immunization Programme (PNI) in 1973 
was originated from technology acquisition processes. Actually, this strategy has been 
increasingly adopted during the last three decades, as shown in Sub-section 7.2.1 of the 
same chapter (pg. 164-167). Moreover, technology acquisition is set to continue as an 
important strategy in the near future, as also shown by empirical data (Sub-section 7.2.3 
pg. 172-173). 
 
The persistent strategy of technology acquisition within this industry is the most visible 
internal element contributing to a supposedly distinct pattern of technological 
capabilities development. However, as revealed by subsequent parts of the same chapter, 
the main firms of the BVI have developed important innovative and other technological 
capabilities. They are now at a point where they are not too far from the threshold of the 
transition to a competitive level of technological capabilities.
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 In addition, the other 
empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) have disclosed important particularities of the 
vaccine industry across the world, as well as of the whole context of this industry in 
Brazil. These particularities have suggested an active participation of the Brazilian 
government in support of the development of the industry, and that this industry is very 
specific, with remarkable differences from other industries, even those of the science-
based sector, but also with some differences from other branches of its parent 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
At first glance, the data above may suggest some differences between the patterns 
observed. Nevertheless, looking at the intensity of the strategy of technology acquisition 
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 This issue is addressed in the next section of this chapter. 
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seems an oversimplification of the analysis, and does not represent the importance of 
this source of technological knowledge over time. Some other evidence of the context of 
the main firms of the BVI revealed by empirical data appears to be useful in the attempt 
to understand the pattern of technological accumulation in the BVI and to identify 
possible new directions. They are related to the distinct phases of the processes of 
technology acquisition as described below. The case of multiple corporate strategies 
toward technology revealed by Hobday et al. (2004) seems to be enlightening to this 
analysis, although in a different perspective. 
 
In the first phase of the period analyzed in this research, although complying with the 
demands of the PNI was imperative, the importance of the technology transfers in the 
development of technical capabilities was undeniable. This situation persisted until the 
late 1990s and early 2000s with the processes of technology acquisition of the Hib 
vaccine by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz and the Influenza vaccine by Instituto Butantan 
respectively. Along with these technology transfer processes the firms were still 
internalizing important technological capabilities, and this was the time they developed 
world class operating capabilities. From this time on the objective clearly changed, as 
quickly fulfilling the public market needs in order to avoid importing became the main 
explicit objective behind the strategy.  
 
Two facts can be selected from the empirical data to illustrate this situation. The first 
refers to the introduction of the Human Rabies (vero cell) vaccine. Through a 
technology transfer agreement with Aventis Pasteur, Instituto Butantan quickly 
managed to supply the PNI from 2002 whilst its own vaccine was still under 
development. The agreement was interrupted in 2006, however, when the Brazilian 
manufacturer managed to conclude the development and license its own vaccine with a 
similar technology (see Table 6.8 on pg. 148 and Table 7.1 on pg. 165).  
 
The second fact regards the Rotavirus vaccine. When the incidence of this disease rose 
sharply in 2006 the PNI spent a large amount of money on an imported vaccine it was 
willing to introduce to its programme’s routine (see Figure 6.6 on pg. 149 and its 
preceding paragraph). Even though a vaccine against this disease was being developed 
by one of the firms by that time (see Figure 7.3 on pg. 179), it was quickly supplied to 
PNI from 2007 by the other firm thanks to a technology transfer agreement with GSK 
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(see Table 6.8 on pg. 148 and Table 7.1 on pg. 165). The development of the Rotavirus 
vaccine by the Brazilian firm has not yet been concluded, but both examples show that 
the importance of technology acquisition as a source of technological knowledge has 
definitely decreased. 
 
Two other examples are also illustrative of the decline of technology acquisition as the 
main source of technological knowledge in the BVI, along with the strengthening of the 
innovative capabilities within its main firms. When the PNI announced the intention of 
adopting the tetravalent vaccine (DTP+Hib) in the early 2000s due to technical and 
economic reasons, which meant a threat to both BVI’s main firms, Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz was able to form an alliance with Instituto Butantan, quickly 
developing a way to combine the antigens, carry out the clinical trials, and supply the 
PNI from 2002 (see Table 7.1 on pg. 165 and footnote 261 on pg. 177).  
 
A similar situation is happening now with the pentavalent vaccine (DTP+Hib+HB). In 
this case the vaccine developed by Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz in partnership with 
Instituto Butantan has been already approved in clinical trials and is currently under 
registration (see Figure 7.3 on pg. 179). 
 
These examples suggest a singular conclusion. On the one hand, taking the linear 
approach of catching-up they show that the trajectory of the sources of knowledge, in 
terms of their importance to the process of technological accumulation, appears to have 
similarities to the common pattern identified in the literature (represented in Figure 3.2 
on pg. 53). In this regard they show that the importance of technology acquisition as a 
source of technological knowledge has decreased at the same time that the importance 
of innovative capabilities has increased. In addition, they show that technology 
acquisition did not inhibit the development of innovative capabilities in the case of the 
BVI. 
 
On the other hand, the analysis of the importance of technology acquisition as a source 
of technological knowledge shows that it is not related to the intensity of adoption of 
this strategy since two main distinct objectives behind the strategy were revealed. This 
may indicate another conclusion. If we think about these distinct objectives, this may 
suggest new directions. Although the benefits in terms of technological knowledge had 
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apparently ended in the early 2000s, the strategy was kept in the new phase in order to 
avoid the re-emergence of imports and the consequent weakening of the policy of 
protection granted by the government to local manufacturers, while the firms develop 
more advanced innovative capabilities. What strengthens the notion of a distinguishing 
path is that this new strategy (or new objective of the strategy) was articulated by the 
firms together with the government, which used its huge and attractive public market, 
and its purchasing power, to persuade the “Big Pharma” firms to transfer recently 
developed technologies to the firms of the BVI.
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 The role of the government and the 
influence of its local public market are, therefore, clear drivers of this new 
path/direction. 
 
One further example suggests the existence of new directions in the development path 
of the BVI. It relates to several projects in the R&D pipeline of the two main firms 
addressing local/regional neglected diseases (see Figure 7.3 on pg. 179). Many of them 
were not of interest to the “Big Pharma” firms for economic reasons, as already 
indicated before. In addition to tackling the special needs of the Brazilian government, 
developing vaccines for these diseases may open opportunities to exploit export markets 
in more advantageous conditions. 
 
8.2.2 Technology Acquisition, Local Capabilities and the Gap to the Technological 
Frontier 
A second issue is addressed in Research Question 1 in order to disclose the 
particularities of the development of technological capabilities in the BVI. It relates to 
whether or not the continuous strategy of technology acquisition has helped this 
industry to develop local capabilities in order to narrow the gap to the technological 
frontier, as raised in Proposition 2. 
 
Before advancing into the discussion proposed above, it seems useful to clarify two 
issues on behalf of the analysis of this proposition. The first refers to what 
“technological frontier” means to this research. When asked about where the frontier is 
in the field of vaccines, the R&D professionals interviewed during the fieldwork 
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 The Brazilian public market is being considered here as attractive, not only due to the volume of 
vaccines purchased by the government but also due to the new technologies/proprietary products 
introduced in the immunization routine. 
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pointed out a vast range of new concepts, products and processes. Chapter 5 (Section 
5.5, in particular, on pg. 118-119) provides the same broad view when approaching the 
aspects of innovation on vaccines. 
 
This seems evident for multi-disciplinary sectors such as vaccines, pharmaceuticals and 
others, and means that a firm/industry in those sectors can reach the technological 
frontier in some areas whilst not in others, as in the case of electronics in East Asia 
revealed by Hobday (1995). However, this is not useful for the purpose of evaluating 
the referred proposition. On the other hand, managers in charge of the strategies 
formulation of the main firms of the BVI, also interviewed during the fieldwork, stated 
that the firms are not seeking technological and market leadership but rather to become 
both innovative in order to develop the vaccines of interest to the PNI (be they existing 
technologies or new to the world technologies), and competitive in a niche market (see 
third and fourth paragraphs of pg. 194 in Sub-section 7.5.1).  
 
Literature focusing on transition (Dutrénit, 2000, 2007; Hobday et al., 2004) refers to 
firms approaching the innovation frontier as those that are looking for leadership 
through new products developed by in-house R&D, a broader meaning. This research 
draws on the objectives of the main firms of the BVI and sets up that reaching 
technological frontier means to acquire the ability to develop new to the world vaccines, 
even though not aiming at challenging the leaders in the international scenario. 
 
The second issue refers to the notion that narrowing the gap to the technological frontier 
is a matter of being quicker than the leaders, as if in a race, or being directly linked to 
R&D spending. As literature shows this may be misleading. It is true, as noted by 
Hobday (1995), that the technological frontier is continuously advancing and that this 
can lead to a continuous cycle of catching-up behind the frontier, as shown by Hobday 
et al. (2004:1450). It is also true, however, that successful catching-up has been mainly 
based on “running in a new direction”, rather than a simple matter of speed, to quote the 
words of Perez and Soete (1988:460), and in line with other works of Gerschenkronian 
inspiration cited in the previous sub-section. 
 
In addition, although the vaccine sector is regarded as requiring high R&D investment, 
successful innovation is frequently a result of the content of R&D rather than of R&D 
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spending itself. This is demonstrated by Forbes and Wield (2002) through the examples 
of Honda and Toyota compared with Ford and GM in the 1970s and 1980s. Mastering 
the capabilities for generating innovation is, in this sense, what really matters, as stated 
by many authors (e.g. Dahlman et al., 1987; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Radosevic, 1999; 
Tidd et al., 2001; Rush et al., 2007).  
 
In order to analyze the proposition, therefore, this sub-section looks for new and 
different evidence/new directions, and once more the innovation transition approach is 
used to support the assessment. In this case the analysis and discussion are put forward 
by taking advantage of the results of the survey carried out to assess the technological 
capability level of the main firm of the BVI (see Section 7.6 on pg. 201-206). This 
survey, based on the audit tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001), showed that the firm 
is very close to the highest level considered in the tool, not too far to conclude the 
transition to the competitive/creative level. Here the specificities of some of the 
dimensions of technological capabilities approached in this audit tool are borrowed in 
an attempt to raise evidence of the contribution of the technology transfer processes to 
the current level of the firm. 
 
The first dimension to be approached relates to the level of awareness. It seems 
undoubted that the technological transfer processes have raised this ability inside the 
firm. As shown throughout Chapter 7, the firm has made use of increasingly advanced 
technologies, even though they are acquired ones, to fulfil the demands of the PNI and 
to consolidate its position in the public market. Moreover, the last agreements show the 
acquisition of some of the most recent technologies available in the international 
scenario (see Table 7.1 on pg 165), making the firm able to accurately frame where the 
frontier is and its position in relation to this frontier. Straightforwardly, it seems 
reasonable to think that dealing with up-to-date technologies strengthens the ability to 
recognize what makes sense and what is feasible in terms of new technologies, 
infrastructure and market needs, which is in direct connection with other dimensions 
such as “search” and “assessing and selecting”. 
 
The successful negotiation of the agreements for licensing and transferring the 
technologies clearly indicates other skills that have been enhanced in recent times. Two 
aspects evidence this assertion. One regards the complexity of the agreements, which 
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involves proprietary products of market leaders and the approval of the national 
authority on intellectual property. As revealed in informal conversations with some 
interviewees, the first complex agreement in 1999 was the most difficult as there was 
little experience in either the formal aspects of this type of agreement or the negotiations 
with leading international corporations’ businessmen. In subsequent agreements the 
firm’s negotiators felt themselves more confident to bargain better contractual 
conditions.  
 
The second aspect is directly linked to this increasingly improved skill and is related to 
the attempt to capture knowledge and learn from the agreements. The most visible 
example is the inclusion of R&D cooperation for the development of new to the world 
vaccines in the most recent agreement (see first paragraph of pg. 173 in Sub-section 
7.2.3 and footnote 250 in the same page). This inaugurated a new era in technology 
transfer agreements for this industry as it introduced a shift in the partnership between 
both firms and establishes a longer term and more strategic alliance between them, as in 
the case of the firms approaching the innovation frontier shown by Hobday (1995:204). 
Within the audit tool proposed to discuss the referred proposition, the above examples 
are very suggestive of the strengthening of some skills in the “technology acquisition” 
and “learning” dimensions of technological capabilities. 
 
The “implementing and absorbing technology” dimension is the subsequent step after 
the acquisition of a technology in the model developed in the audit tool and, therefore, it 
is inherent to the discussion proposed. As is well known, technology transfer is not an 
automatic process. The complexity of the process of manufacturing a vaccine, as 
demonstrated in Section 5.4 (pg. 115-118), make it extremely hard in the field of 
vaccines. It involves the need for further development in several areas of the firm in 
order to succeed in the absorption of the technology. In this case many examples of 
benefits that can be used in the discussion were already referred to previously in 
Chapter 7. These include  the improvement of the quality system, the creation of project 
management activities, the development of new capabilities in the engineering area, and 
the development of capabilities to adapt, sometimes even improve, foreign advanced 
technologies (see footnote 262 on pg 177). Moreover, new and different facilities and 
adaptations are currently in the process of being built to make feasible the 
implementation of the most recent technology transfer agreements, with technical 
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support of the technology transferor (see third paragraph of pg. 170 in Sub-section 
7.2.2). 
 
“Exploiting external linkages and incentives” is the last dimension to be approached. 
According to the audit tool, successful firms are well aware of a wide range of external 
sources of knowledge and resources and make use of them to develop (Bessant et al., 
2001:28-29). In this case the contribution of the technology acquisition strategy to the 
strengthening of some of the skills required in this dimension is also visible in the 
empirical findings. The link with the international leaders itself is an example.  
 
Notwithstanding, the technology transfer processes of advanced technologies have 
frequently required new links with international suppliers of materials and capital goods, 
some of them the same suppliers of the technology transferor, in order to meet with the 
quality levels of these technology transferors. In one specific case the technology 
transferor provided equipment specifications through the agreement, and the Brazilian 
firm established links with the local capital goods industry to have this equipment 
developed and produced (see footnote 245 on pg. 170). The interactions mentioned 
above are certainly a valuable source of knowledge for the recipients of the technologies 
and corroborate the idea developed here. 
 
To conclude, using the way proposed above to interpret the contribution of the 
technology acquisition strategy, it seems evident that, overall, these processes of foreign 
technology acquisition have helped the main firms of the BVI to strengthen their 
technological capabilities and absorptive capacity. Consequently, they increasingly 
mastered a variety of new capabilities required to make them able to narrow the gap to 
the technological frontier. Moreover, a shift in the type of capabilities that have been 
enhanced can be noticed as the later agreements have resulted in a more systematic 
strengthening of the managerial ones. 
 
These findings do not contradict the idea that the acquisition of foreign technology is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for development, as put forward by Radosevic 
(1999:4) and others. Similarly, it does not intend to deny that narrowing the gap to the 
technological frontier depends much more on a combined set of factors, internal and 
external to the firms, than on technology acquisition in isolation, as shown by Hobday 
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(1995). Rather, they emphasize the fact that the contribution of the acquisition of 
foreign technologies during the latecomer industries transition may be higher than 
revealed so far and not only important during their initial phase of development.  
 
Therefore, linking the above findings with the current level of technological capabilities 
of the firms as revealed in Chapter 7, it seems not an overstatement to say that the 
strategy adopted has effectively helped the industry to develop new local capabilities 
and get closer to the technological frontier. Furthermore, it seems likely that there may 
be other under-investigated dimensions of technological capabilities, the development 
of which the acquisition of foreign technology has effectively contributed. 
 
8.2.3 Overall Findings of Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 is about unveiling the overall way technological capabilities have 
been evolving in the Brazilian vaccine industry. It focuses on the aspects involved in the 
strategy of technology acquisition adopted to address the assumption that this industry 
has overstressed the importance of this mechanism in its process of development. In this 
regard two specific propositions were posed. The first one relates to whether or not the 
BVI has developed through a distinct pattern of technological capability building, and to 
the importance of technology acquisition and other specificities of the context of this 
industry to this process. The second proposition goes deeper into the importance of the 
technology acquisition strategy to technological accumulation by considering whether 
or not it contributes to the development of local capabilities in order to narrowing the 
gap to the technology frontier. 
 
With regard to the first proposition, the analyses were primarily made from a linear 
perspective of the catching-up process, represented in this research by the model in 
Figure 3.2 (pg. 53), that is, by assessing the trajectory of the importance of the sources 
of technological knowledge. Although the analysis under this perspective was not 
conclusive in terms of significant differences that could characterize a distinct pattern, it 
revealed some characteristics of the process that provided the elements for the analysis 
under the perspective of Gerschenkron. New directions are then clearly suggested. 
Three facts support this evidence. The first relates to the distinct objectives of the 
strategy of technology acquisition. When the focus is on the first phase of its 
development, it is clear that the acquisition of foreign technologies was used with the 
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specific objective of developing the technological capabilities of the firms. When the 
focus is on the transition phase, still in progress, the evidence indicates a shift in the 
objective of the strategy. In this period, especially in the most recent times, the strategy 
of foreign technology acquisition has been adopted to quickly fulfil the needs of the 
Brazilian public market, thus avoiding the government’s requirement to import vaccines 
while the innovative capabilities inside the firms are not fully developed. Furthermore, 
this strategy has been perceived by some of the managers interviewed as of lesser 
importance to the development of internal innovative capabilities more recently. Indeed, 
the firms have increasingly relied on incremental innovation and in-house development 
of technologies, and their technological capabilities have reached a high level, as shown 
in Chapter 7. 
 
The second fact relates to the strong influence of the government to the success of this 
second objective. By using its huge and attractive public market and its purchase power 
to protect local firms, the government managed to persuade the “Big Pharma” firms to 
license proprietary technologies, some of them recently developed and launched in the 
international market. A strong role of the government and the influence of its market are, 
therefore, the main drivers to this distinct pattern. 
 
The third evidence is found in the R&D pipeline of the two main firms. In this case the 
development of vaccines for local/regional neglected diseases is a promising new 
direction for addressing particular needs of the Brazilian government, as well as for 
exploiting opportunities in export markets.   
 
On the other hand, the assessment of Proposition 2 reveals a surprising outcome and 
strengthens the outcomes of the analysis of the previous proposition. By using some 
dimensions of technological capabilities, and their underlying themes borrowed from 
the audit tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001), it was possible to show that the 
technology acquisition strategy adopted by the BVI has made, more recently, an 
additional contribution to the development of important capabilities to the process of 
innovation of its main firms. This result is surprising in two senses: firstly, it discloses 
the real way the above mentioned strategy has contributed to the development of the 
capabilities of the BVI, apparently still not approached in the literature. Looking at the 
process in its entirety, it is evident that the technical capabilities were addressed more 
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intensively in the first phase, including the beginning of the transition phase. The more 
recent part of this transition phase, however, has been characterized by a more intensive 
strengthening of the kind of managerial capabilities. These capabilities are equally vital 
to the innovation process and the lack of them is amongst the constraints to the 
completion of the transition phase, as revealed in the works on innovation transition 
(see Table 3.3 on pg. 62-63). 
 
The second surprising finding is related to how the importance of the foreign 
technology acquisition strategy (the acquisition of packaged technology, as defined in 
Sub-section 3.4.1 on pg. 52) has recently been perceived by the actors of the context. 
Despite the fact that embedding R&D collaboration, as in the last agreement signed by 
one of the firms, denotes a higher awareness of the importance of the strategy as a tool 
for its development, it seems that the most recent strengthening of some important 
capabilities to the process of innovation as a whole – the managerial capabilities – has 
not been perceived as a result of these technology acquisition processes, either by most 
of the managers interviewed or by the government. As a consequence, the potential for 
the use of this strategy may be higher than has been comprehended so far. And the 
awareness of that has important implications for management and policy. 
 
Finally, and briefly, the findings of the analysis of the two propositions suggest that, 
more recently, the Brazilian vaccine industry has developed its technological 
capabilities through a distinct pattern. This pattern is in line with the argument of “new 
directions/paths” first stressed by Gerschenkron and further developed by some 
contemporaneous authors. In addition, they suggest that this particular pattern is driven 
by a strong role of the government and by its local public market, and shaped by distinct 
roles of the foreign technology acquisition strategy. 
 
8.3 Development of Innovative Capabilities within the Transition Phase 
This section focuses on the transition phase, the period when the main firms of the BVI 
started a more strategic approach to technology. It addresses the issues raised by 
Research Question 2 and its propositions. In the Sub-section 8.3.1 the current level of 
technological capabilities of the firms, the landmarks and drivers of this transition phase 
are discussed to address Proposition 3. The hindrances to the completion of the 
transition phase are analyzed in the subsequent sub-section (8.3.2) in order to interpret 
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the claim in Proposition 4. In Sub-section 8.3.3 whether the evidence gathered can 
support the existence of a relationship between the hindrances of the unfinished 
transition and the strategy of continuous foreign technology acquisition adopted by the 
industry is analyzed, in order to examine the claim in Proposition 5. As in the previous 
section, the last sub-section (8.3.4) summarizes the issues discussed in the previous sub-
sections in an attempt to frame the overall answer of the research question. 
 
8.3.1 Technological Capabilities in Transition 
This Sub-section addresses Proposition 3 by approaching the specificities of the 
development of technological capabilities by the main firms of the BVI during the 
transition phase. Initially the emphasis is on the current level of innovative capabilities, 
but it also embeds the “how” and “why” issues about the process. The term “innovative 
capabilities” is being employed in this research with a broader meaning and 
encompasses not only the ability to produce new technological knowledge inside the 
innovating units of the firm, but also the ability to exploit outside sources of 
knowledge.
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The elaboration of Proposition 3 departed from the assumption that the excessive 
reliance on foreign technology acquisition by the main firms of the BVI could mean a 
lack of existence of significant innovative capabilities inside these firms. One of the 
works inspiring this assumption was carried out in 90 firms located in three countries of 
South America, and found a strong correlation between the licensing of foreign 
technologies and low engagement in own R&D, especially in state-owned firms 
(Mytelka, 1978).
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Notwithstanding, data gathered during the fieldwork proved this assumption is wrong in 
the case of the BVI. Section 7.3 on pg. 173-189 provides an incontestable picture of the 
development of significant innovative capabilities by the main firms of this industry, 
especially during the transition phase. This is illustrated by several incremental 
innovations, the development of some new to the firms’/country’s vaccines, and the 
existence of other new to the firms/country and of some new to the world vaccines in 
the firms’ R&D pipeline, some of them in a very advanced stage (see Figure 7.3 on pg. 
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179). The specificities and high complexity of the vaccine sector and of the process of 
developing vaccines, as stressed across Chapters 5 and 6, further enhance the 
importance of these achievements. Moreover, the development of clinical trials 
capabilities inside the BVI is also emphasized in Section 7.3 on pg. 182-184.  
 
This type of capability is considered as essential but very specialized in the 
pharmaceutical industry being, for this reason, dominated by few firms in the world 
scenario (WHO, 2002b). The empirical data also show that product innovation in the 
BVI has been increasingly supported by links with outside sources of knowledge, be 
they internal or external to the firms, in the national or international contexts, which, 
according to some authors (Galambos and Sewell, 1995; Galambos and Sturchio, 1996; 
Galambos, 1999; Wilson et al., 2007), is critical to vaccine R&D. Finally, all these 
empirical data, clearly showing the development of the main firms of the BVI, were 
endorsed by the results of a survey carried out in the biggest firm. In this survey an 
audit tool specially developed by Bessant et al. (2001) to assess the level of 
technological capabilities of firms was applied, and the results revealed that the firm 
assessed had reached a high level of technological capabilities development within the 
transition phase (Section 7.6 on pg. 201-206). 
 
Achieving a high level of technological capabilities as above discussed, was neither 
easy nor quick. Analyzing the process of technological accumulation in the BVI with 
the use of the innovation transition approach, represented here mainly by the works of 
Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and Hobday et al. (2004), has helped to understand the details of 
how it has unfolded. Some landmarks and main drivers of this process that emerged 
from the empirical data may be instructive for the learning process of other firms and 
are then discussed here. 
 
One benefit of the use of the approach was the clear identification of how and when the 
transition phase started. In a broad sense it started in the BVI in the same way as in the 
firms analyzed in the works above mentioned, that is, from a more strategic approach to 
technology. In a more specific view this happened, in the case of the BVI, by the time 
the firms decided to build dedicated facilities and establish organizational structures to 
their R&D activities from the mid-1980s. The firms explored two slightly different 
routes in the first phase of the learning process (the pre-transition phase, as it was 
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named in this research) to pave the road that allowed this more strategic approach to 
technology. One more intensively based on the acquisition of foreign mature 
technologies, its absorption and adaptation, and the other on imitation of old 
technologies.  
 
A second point, that naturally follows the first, relates to the time this transition has 
lasted. So far around 25 years have passed but the transition has not been completed and 
it is not possible to predict accurately when it will. Although empirical data show that 
the main firms are not too far from achieving the end of the technological transition, the 
process seems to be lengthy especially due to the specificities and complexity of the 
field of vaccine, but other reasons are also contributing to delay the process, as is shown 
in the next sub-section. 
 
Other landmarks of this more strategic approach to technology which characterizes the 
transition phase, are the sharp growth of personnel allocated to R&D activities, 
especially highly skilled people, growing investment in R&D and training, and the 
development of some specialized capabilities closer to the knowledge frontier (e.g. in 
genetic engineering). Table 7.5 on pg 200 presents a broader range of the characteristics 
of this phase. 
 
Another relevant aspect that arises from the transition analysis concerns the role of 
government and institutions in promoting the development of the BVI. Government 
investments and the huge and protected public market created by the PNI, have reduced 
the risks and uncertainties for the manufacturers, provided a good manufacturing 
infrastructure, influenced the “Big Pharma” firms to transfer proprietary technologies to 
them and, as a consequence, resulted in the sharp growth, the development of world 
class operating capabilities and new directions in the path of development. On the other 
hand, little attention was paid to the development of innovative capabilities itself. Only 
more recently have the firms started benefiting from new national policies directed at 
fostering innovation, and from more substantial resources of government financing 
agencies to fund R&D. The results, however, are still to come.
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8.3.2 The Hindrances of the Unfinished Transition 
This sub-section analyzes and discusses the claim that the speed of change in the 
scientific/technological frontier is possibly the main hindrance to the completion of the 
transition phase, as posed in Proposition 4. Two main issues in the vaccine context 
inspired the above proposition: the first relates to the extent of the technological 
breakthroughs in the knowledge frontier, and the high complexity of the vaccine 
innovation process, as stressed throughout Chapter 5. The second relates to the 
dynamics and economics of the vaccine business and, more specifically, the power of 
the “Big Pharma” firms, which constitute the oligopolistic core of this industry, as 
detailed throughout Chapter 6 (see Sub-section 6.2.1 on pg. 121-125, and Section 6.3 on 
pg. 144-145). 
 
In an article about the Brazilian and Indian vaccine industries, Milstien et al. (2007) 
assessed the impacts of the TRIPS agreement on technology access in both countries.
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Although emphasizing that it is too soon for a definitive conclusion since there are some 
problems in the implementation of the agreement in these countries, the authors expect 
that intellectual property rights will force emerging manufacturers to resort increasingly 
to technology transfers and licensing agreements rather than to develop new vaccines. 
In other words, this paper means that the extent of new scientific and technological 
knowledge protected by patents, especially within the “Big Pharma” firms’ domains, is 
an important constraint to emerging manufacturers in reaching the technological frontier. 
This is a matter of concern for other experts in the vaccine field, as stated in other 
literature (e.g. Plotkin, 2005c). 
 
One certainly cannot deny or underestimate the achievements of the “Big Pharma” firms 
in the last 50 years as well as the impact of patents to knowledge creation, but there are 
some aspects to be considered here that are of interest to the specific discussion about 
transition. Firstly, even though molecular biology and genetic engineering has been 
considered by several vaccine experts as one of the main revolutions in vaccine 
development in the knowledge frontier in this period, few “genetic vaccines” were 
actually introduced to the market so far (see Item G of Sub-section 5.3.1 on pg. 105 and 
Table 5.4 on pg. 104). Although promising results have been announced for the near 
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future, this model of development seems to follow the same “well-established, historical 
pattern of slow and incremental technology diffusion” found by Nightingale and Martin 
(2004:564) in the drug business of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Secondly, as shown by Wilson et al. (2007), for most of the vaccines developed and 
launched by the “Big Pharma” firms in the same period the basic research was mainly 
carried out by universities and public or non-profit research institutions, often financed 
by public funds (see Sub-section 5.3.2 on pg. 107 and Table 5.5 on pg. 108). This 
confirms both the findings of Galambos and Sewell (1995), that the ability of building 
networks is critical to vaccine innovation, and the importance of what Nightingale and 
Martin (2004:564) call a “translation of science into technology” as another strong 
capability of these firms. Therefore, drawing on these two previous points, and on the 
concept that managing the innovation process is imperative to the success of firms, as 
pointed out by Tidd et al. (2001), it seems plausible to conclude that, although issues of 
a scientific and technological nature are certainly important hindrances to the firms of 
the BVI, no less important are the problems of a managerial nature they currently face 
in accomplishing the innovation transition. 
 
This is in line with the findings of the works on innovation transition in Mexico and 
Korea, as summarized in the section “constraints to complete transition” in Table 3.3 on 
pg. 63. This statement is also supported by the empirical findings of this research. As 
shown in Table 7.5 on pg. 200 most of the reasons for the slowing of the rate of 
technological capabilities development in the BVI refer to managerial issues (e.g. low 
investments in R&D and in training, inadequacy of facilities, unavailability of 
technological platforms).
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 Other issues of same nature are also presented in that table. 
These include the lack of administrative flexibility (which is a characteristic of the 
public sector in Brazil) and of a strategic mindset by the main actors; it also includes the 
need for exploiting strategic partnerships more efficiently. In addition, the results of the 
survey indicate other weaknesses linked to the managerial process such as the 
organization of technology activities, the learning process, and the ability in building 
core competencies (see Section 7.6 on pg. 201-206).  
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One further issue revealed during the analysis and discussion of Proposition 2 (Sub-
sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 above) seems symptomatic of the importance of the managerial 
dimension to the completion of the transition phase. It regards the shift in the role of the 
technology acquisition strategy as a source of knowledge during the transition phase. As 
firms have approached the innovation frontier the strengthening of managerial 
capabilities have been much more intense than technical capabilities, even though the 
firms do not seem completely aware of that. 
 
Notwithstanding, the evidence raised has shown that the hindrances to the development 
of the BVI are not limited to scientific/technological and managerial issues. The last 
component of this triad is of a broader nature and concerns the national system and the 
role of government and institutions. Although the country has well recognized strong 
science capabilities, the absence of articulation amongst ST&I policies has been pointed 
out by some authors (Gadelha and Azevedo, 2003; Gadelha, 2005; Temporão and 
Gadelha, 2007) as one of the factors setting back the development of the BVI (see Sub-
section 6.4.2 on pg. 156-157). Dutrénit (2007:143) points out that countries like Mexico 
and Brazil (and other transition economies) present an imbalance between science and 
innovation capabilities, with the former being more developed than the latter. This 
poses a challenge to the catching-up process and to “the development of a more 
problem-oriented science”. This is a problem also raised by one of the interviewees 
(interview 5 – see last paragraph of Sub-section 6.4.2 on pg. 161). Several authors have 
stressed the importance of the policy environment to the effective development of 
industries (e.g. Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Kim, 1997; Ernst et al., 1998a; Forbes 
and Wield, 2002, among others). More recent initiatives of the Brazilian government in 
terms of policies and programmes in an attempt to overcome the above fragilities were 
identified in some paragraphs of Sub-section 6.4.2 (pg. 156, 160 and 161), but it seems 
too soon for concrete results in a long-term innovation process as is the case of vaccines. 
 
One further issue that arises from the specific context where the BVI is inserted refers to 
markets and the complex relationship between the BVI firms and the government. What 
the evidence shows is that government has apparently seen the firms as exclusively 
dedicated to fulfil the Brazilian public needs. This is due to the strategic nature of the 
vaccine sector set up by the government in the past, the huge investments it has made in 
the infrastructure of the firms, the big and stable protected market it has provided, and 
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the public (and non-profit) nature of these firms (see Section 7.4 on pg. 189-192). What 
the empirical evidence does not show is whether this big and highly protected market, 
along with the high dependence of the firms within it, has so far hampered the 
innovation transition of the firms. Notwithstanding, markets are commonly regarded in 
the literature as one of the most important sources of knowledge and a necessary 
condition to stimulate investments in innovation. The transition issues of the firms of 
the BVI cannot be disconnected to them. As shown by Forbes and Wield (2002:50) 
imbalanced infant-industries policies led, in many cases in industrializing countries such 
as India, Brazil, Mexico and others, to the fostering of permanent infants. 
 
8.3.3 Unfinished Transition and Foreign Technology Acquisition Strategy 
This sub-section analyzes and discusses the possible existence of a causal relationship 
between the persistent strategy of foreign technology acquisition adopted by the BVI, 
and the constraints of its unfinished technological transition in order to address 
Proposition 5. As in Propositions 2 and 3, this proposition assumes, once more, the 
possible existence of negative effects of that strategy on the development of the industry, 
reflecting concerns of some actors of the context of the BVI. This has obvious 
implications for policy and management. In those cases (Propositions 2 and 3), however, 
this assumption was demystified. 
 
As noted by Hobday (1995:202) in the case of East Asian countries the then current 
weaknesses (as well as advantages and opportunities) of latecomer firms were directly 
linked to their origins, paths and strategies. Kim (1997:225) analyzed the technological 
learning in Korean firms and found that the acquisition of foreign packaged 
technologies through licensing from single sources (as in the case of the main firms of 
the BVI) leads to a “passive attitude toward the learning process”. The findings of 
Mytelka (1978) in several firms of some South American countries are not dissimilar, as 
already emphasized in Sub-section 8.3.1 above. The findings of the above literature are 
suggestive of what the proposition implies. 
 
In general, the evidence of the BVI case points to the opposite way. In some ways the 
analysis and discussion in the previous sub-sections have already addressed this issue. It 
would certainly be a mistake to deny the influence of origins, culture and path amongst 
the drivers of the current weaknesses of the firms of the BVI and, by extension, of the 
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constraints to finish their technological transition, but the technology acquisition 
strategy itself is certainly not amongst them.  
 
As shown before, this strategy was and still is important to the development of the BVI. 
Besides being an important source of knowledge to strengthen technical capabilities in 
the past, it is currently contributing to increase the size of the firms, to fulfil the short-
term demands of the public market, to a more strategic alliance with the technology 
transferors, and to strengthen some managerial capabilities. Moreover, it has not 
hindered the development of innovative capabilities, as empirical data and the analysis 
in the previous sub-sections have proved. On the contrary, the high awareness of the 
importance of technology led to the deployment of several initiatives toward the 
learning process and the development of R&D and of other innovative capabilities and, 
as a consequence, to the development of some new products. Additionally, several 
important hindrances to the unfinished transition concern local, national and legal issues, 
as emphasized in Sub-section 8.3.2 above, and the technology acquisition processes will 
not fill this gap. 
 
Therefore, the constraints to the completion of the technological transition in this 
industry seem not a matter of what has been done, as the case of the strategy of 
continuous foreign technology acquisition adopted so far, but rather of what has not 
been done, which stands for not addressing adequately the main hindrances of the 
process. The attempt to link the strategy of technology acquisition with the unfinished 
transition helps neither the understanding of the real problem nor the design of 
strategies and policies to overcome the existing constraints. 
  
8.3.4 Overall Findings of Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was formulated to address the assumption that, although the BVI 
might have already achieved the technological transition stage, it might not have yet 
caught-up and reached the technological frontier. This was due to an excessive reliance 
on foreign technology acquisition processes, and to the dynamics in the knowledge 
frontier dominated by a few oligopolistic firms – the “Big Pharma”. The use of the 
innovation transition approach made the gathering of very rich empirical data possible. 
This in turn provided a clear and detailed view of the characteristics of the process of 
developing more advanced technological capabilities by the main firms of the industry 
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in comparison to the context of firms in other developing countries. Moreover, a survey 
based on an audit tool developed to assess the technological capabilities of firms was 
carried out in the biggest firm, thus enhancing the main empirical data gathered and the 
results of the analysis, as well as working as a triangulation of the data. 
 
Overall the results of the analysis and discussion of Propositions 3 to 5 were revealing 
and fairly surprising. They were revealing because several aspects of the micro 
dynamics of the transition phase of the industry were disclosed. Amongst them were the 
facts that characterized the start-up of the transition phase. The events that later 
unfolded, such as special capabilities developed, R&D investments, initiatives in 
training, strengthening of external links and the consequent achievements in terms of 
incremental and product innovation, are other important aspects unveiled. Also, the 
main hindrances to the completion of the transition phase were stated amongst the 
results of this research question. One further and important aspect revealed relates to the 
role of the foreign technology acquisition to the development of the firms during the 
transition phase. 
 
On the other hand some of the results were, to a certain extent, surprising. First is the 
current high level of technological capabilities achieved by the BVI firms as revealed by 
empirical data and confirmed by the survey. According to these findings, although it is 
not possible to predict a time in the future, the firms are very close to complete the 
transition phase. It is worth remembering that the firms of the BVI are not seeking to 
leader but to acquire the ability for technical change and to be competitive in a niche 
market.  
 
A second interesting point relates to the just above-mentioned role of foreign 
technology acquisition, especially during the most recent part of the transition phase. 
Although it has been adopted with the main objective of quickly fulfilling the short-term 
demands of the public market whilst more advanced technological capabilities are being 
developed inside the firms, the analysis points out a more important role not perceived 
by most of the actors of the industry. In this regard the analysis revealed that several 
managerial capabilities and skills have been strengthened lately through technology 
transfer agreements, and that this is an issue that should be further exploited by the 
firms.  
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The last surprising fact revealed is linked to this latter one. Innovative capabilities 
should be further developed within the transition phase, but managerial issues and some 
factors in the national context arise as other important hindrances to be overcome by the 
firms. This seems to be the big challenge for them and an interesting aspect of the 
transition phase of latecomer firms. 
 
To sum up, Research Question 2 has helped to understand how far the BVI has come 
within the technological transition phase and how the process has unfolded. The context 
of development, the achievements and hindrances to the completion of this phase 
indicate the conclusions and some implications for the future of this industry. These are 
issues to be approached in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Implications 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This research has investigated the development of the Brazilian vaccine industry (BVI). 
It was motivated by preliminary data suggesting that its sharp growth in the last decades 
could be related to scientific, technological, political, social, organizational and 
economic specificities of its context, a persistent strategy of foreign technology 
acquisition, and an unclear level of innovative capabilities developed by public firms 
dealing with advanced technologies and seeking to reach the technological frontier. The 
main argument of this thesis was built drawing on studies on the dynamics of 
technological capability building in catching-up firms/industries of latecomer contexts, 
especially during the transition period when they are approaching the innovation 
frontier. It also draws on those studies focusing on new directions/paths as an 
alternative strategy that some catching-up firms/industries adopt to overcome barriers 
and disadvantages to development. It is argued that the specificities of the Brazilian 
context and of the vaccine sector might be determining a particular pattern of 
technological accumulation within the BVI, and that interpreting its pattern of 
development may be useful to understand how and if this industry has overcome its 
disadvantages to develop. 
 
The simple conceptual framework, as developed and stressed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.2 
on pg. 53), integrates the linear catching-up and the innovation transition approaches 
and claims that the development of technological capabilities in catching-up 
firms/industries of latecomer countries performs a common/linear pattern during the 
period; this may be represented by the level of importance of two complementary sets of 
sources of knowledge – foreign technology acquisition and local innovative capabilities 
– and by the influence of other internal and external elements present in their contexts. 
In addition, it is claimed that, during the transition phase, firms develop the kind of 
more advanced capabilities needed to approach the innovation frontier. This research 
uses this simple framework as a benchmark tool to look for similarities and differences 
in the pattern of development of the BVI and to unveil its main characteristics. 
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By interpreting the empirical evidence gathered in the light of the linear catching-up 
approach, this study has provided a broad picture of the development of technological 
capabilities within this industry. It did not reveal differences in the trajectory of the two 
sources of technological knowledge investigated in terms of their level of importance, 
but it provided the elements for the analysis in the light of the Gerschenkronian 
perspective. Under this latter perspective new directions in the path of development of 
the BVI were clearly shown, suggesting that the development of this industry may be 
performing in a distinct pattern. On the other hand, the integration of the innovation 
transition approach in the conceptual and analytical frameworks made it possible to 
unveil the special characteristics of the most recent period of development of this 
industry. This indicates a very high level of technological capabilities development 
within the transition phase, and suggests possible alternative explanations for the 
constraints in completing the transition. 
 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the research (Section 9.2) and, in addition 
to indicate some implications for policy, management and for the future of this industry 
(Section 9.3), it points out contributions and limitations of the work (Section 9.4). It 
also suggests issues and questions for further research (Section 9.5) and briefly presents 
some final remarks (Section 9.6). 
 
9.2 Main Findings 
The research questions and their propositions were approached in the previous chapter. 
They were posed with the objective of addressing the research problem, and the analysis 
carried out to answer them provided both a broad view of the development of the 
Brazilian vaccine industry in the last four decades, and a detailed view of its most recent 
period of development and of its determinants. The findings were meaningful and 
revealing. The main findings of this research are summarized in the following three sub-
sections. 
 
9.2.1 Technological Accumulation in the BVI – Similarities, Differences, New 
Directions and Specificities of the Context 
The assumption of the existence of a particular pattern of technological accumulation in 
the development of the BVI was investigated in the light of a benchmark model that was 
built based on linear approaches of the catching-up process of firms/industries in 
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latecomer contexts (Figure 3.2 on pg. 53). The analysis under the linear perspective of 
catching-up did not reveal significant differences; on the contrary it evidenced 
similarities with the pattern represented in the model. In this regard it was shown, for 
example, that the importance of foreign technology acquisition as a source of 
technological knowledge has decreased, despite the increasing intensity of adoption of 
this strategy, while the importance of local innovative capabilities has significantly 
increased. 
 
Revealing this distinction between importance and intensity of the acquisition of foreign 
technologies, however, made it possible to identify new directions in the path of 
technological accumulation of this industry. In fact, the strategy of foreign technology 
acquisition was adopted with distinct objectives. In the first phase, it was clearly used to 
help the development of strong technical/operating capabilities; that was achieved by 
the early 2000s.
306
 In the second phase, while firms were developing the innovative 
capabilities needed to reach the technological frontier, the strategy was clearly adopted 
to avoid the re-emergence of vaccine imports and the weakening of the incentives and 
protection assured by the Brazilian government to these firms. This more recent 
objective of the strategy was an articulation of the firms with the government (Ministry 
of Health), who used its purchase power related to its huge and attractive public market 
in order to persuade the “Big Pharma” firms to license and transfer recently developed 
proprietary products to the firms of the BVI. This strengthens the notion of new 
directions/distinguishing paths in the BVI, and evidences the strong role of the 
government and of its public market as some of its main drivers. 
 
Other evidence also suggests the existence of new directions in the path of development 
of the BVI. By looking at the R&D pipeline of the two main firms (Figure 7.3 on pg. 
179) we can find several projects addressing local/regional diseases that are important to 
the Brazilian and other developing/poorer countries needs, but that are not of interest of 
the “Big Pharma” firms for economic reasons. Although it is not possible to predict if 
and when these projects will be concluded, developing these vaccines not only 
constitutes competitive advantage to fulfil special needs of the local market, but also 
opens up opportunities to exploit export markets in more advantageous conditions. 
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 This is approached in more detail in the next sub-section. 
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Table 9.1: Context of Development of the BVI: Dimensions, Determinants and 
Specificities 
Dimension Determinants Characteristics/Specificities 
Scientific/ 
Technological 
dimension 
. Technological specificities and 
complexities of manufacturing 
and developing vaccines; 
. tacit knowledge and prior experience as 
key to the learning process; 
. requires multidisciplinary knowledge; 
. requires a good national basic science 
infrastructure; 
. long period of development – over 10 
years typically; 
. high investment in adequate 
manufacturing facilities and in R&D 
needed; 
. tight governmental regulation; 
. capabilities to overcome the gap 
between basic/applied research and 
technological development required; 
Policy-making 
dimension 
. Strong support and protection 
of the Brazilian government to 
the BVI with sole aim on import 
substitution to fulfil the local 
public market; 
. set up vaccine industry as an strategic 
sector; 
. creation of an outstanding and huge 
public market via PNI, which has grown 
fast and required quick responses of the 
BVI; 
. little concern about the international 
public market and the private market – 
local and export; 
. lack of applied research induction; 
. short term approach of the innovation 
policies until recently; 
. recently a more strategic approach of the 
innovation policies still not mature; 
Organizational 
and Market 
dimensions 
. The ability of developing new 
to the world vaccines in few 
hands – the oligopolistic “Big 
Pharma” firms; 
. existence of very good organizational 
capabilities; 
. able to afford high R&D investments; 
. high capability for exploiting external 
sources of knowledge – networking; 
. heavy and dynamic business game – 
mergers, acquisitions, alliances; 
. Organizational rigidities within 
the BVI due to the public nature 
of the firms; 
 
. Marketing rigidities; 
. lack of managerial flexibility in several 
areas; 
. high dependence on government 
protection and investments; 
. need of WHO pre-qualifications to 
supply UN agencies; 
. focus on the Brazilian public market 
almost exclusively; 
Social dimension . Government and Institutions; 
. High engagement of governments, UN 
agencies; public and private institutions in 
fostering vaccine production and 
development, especially to supply low-
income countries; 
Economic dimension 
. PNI feasibility; 
 
. Firm’s size; 
. vaccine shortages in the international 
market; 
. high price of imported vaccines; 
. need of the firms to grow to afford the 
high R&D investments required; 
Source: Own elaboration based on the empirical data gathered. 
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The specificities of the context of the BVI are summarized in Table 9.1 above. They are 
presented to qualify the quite distinct context in which the development of technological 
capabilities of the BVI has happened. This quite distinct context has, in many respects, 
no parallel in the literature approaching technological capabilities, although some of its 
characteristics may be found in the context of other industries in developing countries. 
They constitute, therefore, the specific elements of the sectoral, national and 
international system of innovation of this industry and represent many of the barriers 
and opportunities faced by the BVI. 
 
To sum up, the evidence above suggests that the pattern of technological capability 
building of the BVI is marked by distinct phases. The first presents similarities with the 
common/linear approach of catching-up. The second reveals new directions in an 
attempt to overcome some barriers and explore some opportunities present in its quite 
specific context. A third phase, not mentioned above, is still in its infancy, but 
strengthens further the notion of a distinct pattern. It is approached in the next sub-
section, which summarizes the importance of the process of foreign technology 
acquisition to the development of this industry. However, the evidence indicates that, 
although important technological capabilities have been developed within this industry, 
the new directions revealed above have not allowed the firms to overcome all the 
barriers within the transition phase to date. This is an issue approached in Sub-section 
9.2.3. 
 
9.2.2 The Roles of Foreign Technology Acquisition 
Using the integration of the innovation transition approach to interpret the technological 
capabilities development of the BVI helped to understand the details of the most recent 
period of its development. It also showed that the role of the process of foreign 
technology acquisition to the development of the BVI should not be underestimated. On 
the contrary, the use of this channel as a source of knowledge has provided clear and 
planned results as well as unexpected and less perceived ones. In addition the most 
recent evidence shows a potential new role for this strategy as a new direction of the 
main firms to catch-up and reach the technological frontier. 
 
Consequently, the concerns of some actors about the context of the BVI with regard to 
possible hazards to the development of this industry due to the extent of the use of this 
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strategy seem unjustified.
307
 In addition, the findings of this research found no 
resemblance to the empirical findings of two works that approached the relationships 
between foreign technology acquisition and development of innovative capabilities in 
latecomer contexts. In one case Mytelka (1978) discovered a strong correlation between 
the licensing of foreign technologies (the same channel used by the BVI firms during 
the last decade) and low engagement in own R&D, especially in state-owned firms. Yet 
Kim (1997) found that licensing from a single source (as has also been the case with 
each of the main firms of the BVI during the last decade) leads to a “passive attitude 
toward the learning process” (p.225).  
 
The findings of the current research about the development of the BVI were exactly the 
opposite of the findings of both these works. In the specific case raised by Kim, the 
more intensive relationship with a single source of technology developed by the firms of 
the BVI seems to have increased the confidence of the transferor in the capabilities of 
the transferee, thus helping the negotiation of the subsequent agreements. Moreover, the 
two smaller firms of the BVI, not approached in depth in this research for 
methodological reasons, were exposed to the same context of the larger ones, but have 
not made use of foreign technology acquisition. Coincidently or not they have lagged 
far behind the two main firms.  
 
One important aspect of the process of foreign technology acquisition by the main firms 
of the BVI concerns the distinct roles of this source of knowledge along the process of 
developing technological capabilities. During the first phase of the development of this 
industry the main role of this strategy was linked to the technical aspects of 
manufacturing vaccines and, by extension, to the innovation process of vaccines. 
Among the main capabilities acquired and developed during this first phase, are those to 
design adequate facilities, to oversee the building of these facilities, to deal with new 
production processes and techniques, and with more advanced technologies during the 
manufacturing process, and to produce vaccines fully complying with international 
quality requirements. In addition, the firms’ efforts to adapt the acquired technologies 
and improve old ones were reported as having partially benefited from the same 
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 From the literature review chapter (Chapter 2) one can infer that opposition to the use of foreign 
technology acquisition is not uncommon in Brazil, as shown by the work of Dahlman and Fonseca (1987) 
about the development of a Brazilian steel company (see pg. 27, quotation).  
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processes of technology acquisition. A secondary, but also important, role during this 
phase was the increasing fulfilment of the needs of the National Immunization 
Programme (PNI) with consequent contributions to the import substitution policy of the 
government. Furthermore the main firms of the BVI had clearly built world class 
manufacturing capabilities at the end of this phase. 
 
As the main firms developed more advanced innovative capabilities, and became able to 
fulfil some of the needs of the PNI for more advanced technologies by their own 
technological efforts, the benefits from foreign technology acquisition to the 
development of technical capabilities became limited. The second phase of development 
identified by this research, still in process today, showed a shift and a dual role of the 
strategy. Intentionally, the strategy has been mainly used with market motivations, that 
is, to quickly fulfil those new demands of the PNI for proprietary products and to 
increase the size of the firms.
308
 In addition, as emphasized in the previous sub-section, 
by quickly fulfilling the new needs of the PNI, the firms clearly tried to avoid the 
weakening of the protection policy granted by the government. The second role of this 
source of knowledge during this phase appears to be a “by-product” of the more recent 
decision of keeping (or even increasing) the intensity of adopting the strategy of foreign 
technology acquisition (especially by the biggest firm of the BVI).  
 
In this case some managerial capabilities that are important to the process of managing 
innovation have been developed instead. To cite only a few: 
 The capability to better assess the technological frontier and the position of the 
firm in relation to it in terms of available resources and needs; 
 The ability to negotiate increasingly better technological conditions in complex 
contracts; 
 The opportunity to establish linkages with the own suppliers of materials and 
capital goods of the “Big Pharma” firms.  
 
A curious finding of this research was that this new role is not clearly perceived by most 
of the actors of the context of this industry and, therefore, possibly not fully exploited 
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 As tacit knowledge is key in the learning process of the vaccine industry, technical capabilities will 
always be important during the processes of foreign technological acquisition. However, they tend to be 
related more to the secrecies of the process of manufacturing the specific technology being transferred 
than to the acquisition of new technological techniques/platforms.  
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by the firms. Since it appears to be unintentional it was not approached before, but it 
seems to constitute an important new direction to be exploited by the firms. 
 
The third role of the foreign technology acquisition is very recent and overlaps with the 
second: it was established in the last technology transfer agreement but is still to be 
implemented. It is being considered here as a distinct role because it makes the bridge to 
a new and very important kind of relationship between the Brazilian firm and the “Big 
Pharma” firm who is transferring the technology. In this case the agreement goes 
beyond the simple technology transfer process to form a long-term strategic R&D 
alliance to develop new vaccines.
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 Although it is too soon to assess the impact of this 
initiative to the Brazilian firms and to the BVI, it clearly indicates a decisive step in the 
way to approach the technological frontier, in the same sense identified by Hobday 
(1995:204) about the most progressive firms of East Asia. This finding also shows that 
the role of foreign technology acquisition may be much more important than has been 
rationalized so far, and that the building of new paths is actively in progress. 
 
9.2.3 The Unfinished Technological Transition – Key Issues 
The aspects of the transition phase during the development of the BVI were raised and 
interpreted drawing mainly on the pioneering works of Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and 
Hobday et al. (2004). An audit tool developed by Bessant et al. (2001) to assess the 
level of technological capabilities of firms, as well as determining weaknesses and 
strengths in their process of technological accumulation, was also applied. The findings 
proved that the main firms have currently reached a high level of technological 
capability, and that the threshold to catch-up and reach the technological frontier is not 
too far. They also provided a very rich picture of the characteristics of development of 
these firms during this transition phase. Finally these findings shed light on the crucial 
part of the development of this industry, that is, on the aspects of the unfinished 
transition. The two key issues of the transition phase during the development of the BVI 
to be highlighted, therefore, concern how it started and why it has not yet finished. 
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 Although the expression “simple technology transfer” is being used, it actually encompasses the 
transfer of the most recent proprietary technology developed by the “Big Pharma” firms, recently licensed 
in the international market and one of the most important in the international market today. 
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On the first matter there is clear-cut evidence of the time when the transition phase 
started for the two main firms of the BVI and of the conditions that make the shift 
possible. The pre-transition phase was characterized by the development of what 
Dutrénit (2007:132) has termed as “minimal essential knowledge”. In the case of the 
BVI this type of knowledge was built through the acquisition of mature foreign 
technologies and imitation of very old technologies. However, until the mid-1980s, 
innovative capabilities were rather informal. From this time, the empirical evidence 
clearly shows that these main firms contemporarily presented a more strategic approach 
to technology, considered by Hobday et al. (2004:1438) as a typical sense developed by 
firms in transition. The organization of R&D activities, the building of dedicated R&D 
facilities, and the allocation of more skilled people to these activities, are representative 
of this strategic approach to technology by the two main firms of the BVI. 
 
Notwithstanding, as well as the importance of identifying the starting time of the 
transition phase or how the firms developed the preceding capabilities, it is also 
important to approach the context where this phenomenon happened. In this sense three 
factors found in the context of the BVI seem to exemplify some distinguishing 
characteristics of its transition phase. The first is that this transition phase started at a 
time of the Latin-American context regarded by several authors as not stimulative to 
innovative behaviour, this due to several decades of economic protection and marked by 
macro-economic instability, as pointed out by Dutrénit (2007:140). The second regards 
the market more specifically. The beginning of the transition phase and the successful 
development of the main firms of this industry so far have been sustained by a huge and 
protected local public market that has increasingly demanded new technologies. 
According to Radosevic (1999) this is not usually available in latecomer contexts that 
suggests export as an essential element for growth. The third factor relates to the 
internal decision of the firms that originated the beginning of the transition phase. 
Although it coincides with the launch of an important governmental programme to 
stimulate national self-sufficiency in immunobiologicals production – Programme of 
National Self-sufficiency on Immunobiologicals (PASNI) – and one of the main firms 
of the BVI has benefited from resources of this programme to build a biotechnology 
centre, the PASNI indeed paid little attention to the development of innovative 
capabilities. Therefore, the “strategic approach to technology” presented by the firms 
was probably linked to the historical culture of the firms and the high awareness of the 
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importance of technology inside the firms, rather than to direct governmental stimulus.
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On the matter of why the transition phase has not finished so far the findings were 
enlightening. The assumptions that major breakthroughs in the knowledge frontier and 
the speed of innovations determined by the few oligopolistic “Big Pharma” firms could 
be the main factors hindering the completion of the transition phase were knocked down 
by the evidence gathered. Although technical and scientific issues have been crucial for 
the development of the vaccine sector and constituted important barriers to the BVI, the 
evidence pointed to managerial issues as the most significant elements of the unfinished 
transition of the BVI. In this regard, organizational structures and capabilities gain an 
increasing dimension to the understanding of the determinants that influence the 
transition process. Furthermore, the findings of the research indicate a fair awareness of 
the managers of the firms of the managerial problems but a low awareness of what to do 
to overcome these problems.  
 
The works of Dutrénit (2000, 2007) and Hobday et al. (2004) also identified the 
managerial dimension as being amongst the constraints faced by firms approaching the 
innovation frontier in latecomer contexts. The findings about the BVI led to two 
conclusions: firstly, drawing on the conclusions of the works cited above, it indicates 
that the BVI has reached a high stage in the development of technological capabilities; 
secondly, the managerial issues seem to be the last stage of the transition process of 
latecomer firms/industries, as it starts overlapping with issues found in the 
organizational context of large firms of developed countries. As argued by Pavitt (1998): 
 
… in the late twentieth century, lack of technological knowledge is rarely the 
cause of innovation failure in large firms based in OECD countries. The main 
problems arise in organization and, more specifically, in coordination and 
control (p. 434-435). 
 
Moreover, the evidence also indicates one or two policy issues that have also influenced 
and delayed the transition of the firms. More recently, the government has tackled the 
lack of articulation among ST&I policies of the 1990s, but it could not produce concrete 
results to date due to the long-term nature of the vaccine innovation process. A second 
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 See details about the PASNI in sub-section 6.4.2 of Chapter 6 on pg. 159-160. 
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issue relates to the policy model adopted by the vaccine sector in Brazil. An import-
substitution/infant industry model has been used by this sector since the 1980s and 
across discontinuous policy regimes in the country in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This 
model has helped the firms to develop important technological capabilities and 
implement new directions in their path of development, but has not stimulated them to 
compete both in the national (public) and international contexts.  
 
Finally, Figure 9.1 attempts to illustrate the main characteristics of the development of 
the Brazilian vaccine industry summarized in the three sub-sections above, mirroring 
the benchmark model developed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.2 on pg. 53). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Characteristics of Technological Accumulation in the BVI 
 
9.3 Implications 
The findings of this research indicate some implications for policy and management. 
Although the literature has many examples showing that the specific context of each 
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industry, such as its own history and culture as well as the local and national advantages 
in terms of science and technology infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, level of 
education of the people, etc., poses important challenges to those industries that seek to 
learn from the experience of successful firms/industries (e.g. Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997), 
the case of the Brazilian vaccine industry may be of interest in some specific contexts.  
 
Firstly, for the government of most Latin American countries where the local vaccine 
industry was wiped out or became inexpressive in the past decade, making them 
completely dependent on imported vaccines, even the basic ones. Secondly, for the 
smaller firms of the BVI, who operate in a similar context to the larger ones and benefit 
from the same local public market advantages and policies, but have lagged far behind 
in terms of technology, production capacity and development of technological 
capabilities. 
 
However, there may be lessons for the two main firms of this industry, and for the 
Brazilian government too. Despite the success they have achieved so far, the model of 
excessive dependence of the local public market and of the government protection that 
has been one of the drivers of their development may be reaching its limit. Although 
there are no elements in this research to suggest a twist in the role of the government in 
the near future, or to predict whether the public market will keep on growing at a similar 
rate and whether its growth will be able to sustain the development of the firms, relying 
solely on the stability of this model sounds risky. Hobday et al. (2004:1452) show that 
the changing circumstances of the macroeconomic environment, government policies 
and competitor strategies, are also critical to the successful transition of firms.  
 
Kim (1997:239) calls attention to the new order of international trade and the pressures 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) against protected markets. Forbes and Wield 
(2002:56) revealed that the success of East Asian Industrialization was a result of a 
potent combination of infant-industry protection with export-orientation, which is a 
missing issue in the policies for the vaccine sector in Brazil. These authors also point 
out that protectionism has, in many cases, “led to the fostering of permanent infants” 
(ibid. p.50). The firms of the BVI must be prepared for changes in their environment, to 
compete in the local market, and to explore international markets efficiently. A different 
context will certainly require these firms to develop a different kind of managerial skill, 
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a more flexible and dynamic management process, and the capability to explore and 
compete in new markets. This seems to be the new agenda to complement the “new 
directions/path” strategy of the development of this industry. It also seems to be a new 
agenda for driving the government policies for this sector. 
 
9.4 Contributions and Limitations 
This research was originally designed and has succeeded in contributing to literature in 
two areas: a) to provide a broad understanding of the development of technological 
capabilities in an industry context full of specific and uncommon characteristics and not 
approached before; and, b) to provide a deeper understanding of the micro dynamics of 
the innovation transition process in a latecomer context. Within these contributions this 
study brings to light three new themes that have been apparently neglected so far. The 
first shows some firms of the vaccine industry in a latecomer context looking for new 
directions to overcome the barriers to their development. The second concerns the role 
and importance of government and institutions in providing a local niche market (public) 
and policies able to sustain a good portion of the cycle of development of local firms of 
an industry. In the case of the BVI this cycle has not yet finished, and the evidence 
shows that there are missing issues in the policy agenda of the government to this sector. 
However the evidence raised also suggests that the main firms of this industry are not 
too far from catching-up and reaching the technological frontier. The third concerns the 
distinct roles of the foreign technology acquisition strategy to the development of 
technological capabilities of firms. In this case the findings suggest that each distinct 
role is linked to the stage of development of technological capabilities of the firms and 
that there are potential new roles/new directions to be exploited. 
 
On the other hand this research presents some limitations due to the choices made 
during the research design and methodology processes. By choosing to focus on the 
industry context, the research paid little attention to the differences amongst the firms 
and therefore to the possible influence of these differences to the development of their 
technological capabilities. By choosing to focus on the micro dynamics of the 
innovation transition process this research paid limited attention to the macro 
determinants of the context of the industry, and to the impact of the national system of 
innovation to the development of innovative capabilities within the firms. 
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9.5 Further Research 
The conclusions of the case of the Brazilian vaccine industry has revealed key issues 
about technological capabilities development, especially during the transition phase of 
its main firms, but was unable to go further in some of these issues, indicating that more 
research is needed. First, it was shown that managerial issues are currently one of the 
main constraints to the completion of the transition process in this industry, and that this 
seems to be the last stage in its transition process. In this specific context, further 
research could approach the managerial and organizational capabilities required to 
finish transition in more depth, as well as the determinants and constraints to develop 
them. In a broader perspective, new research could compare the aspects of technological 
accumulation and innovation transition between the context of this public industry in 
Brazil, and private firms of the same industry in other latecomer countries. India could 
be an interesting site as there are some private and public firms emerging in the 
international vaccine scenario. China is an alternative, although they face problems 
relating to regulation issues. 
 
Second, the research revealed a huge public market and government policies sustaining 
the transition process/new directions of the firms of the BVI to date. The extent to 
which this model will guarantee the completion of the process or can be emulated in the 
context of other industries, as well as the imbalances of the infant-industry policy for 
this sector, are also issues to be approached by further research. 
 
9.6 Final Remarks 
The integration of the catching-up and innovation transition approaches as a benchmark 
model has shown to be useful in interpreting the characteristics of the development of 
the Brazilian vaccine industry and in revealing some similarities and differences of its 
more recent distinguishing path. 
  
Although with a distinct purpose, Freeman (1988) stated that: 
 
A satisfactory theory should certainly be one which conforms more closely to 
the available empirical evidences … (p. 4). 
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ANNEX A 
 
List of interviewees, background and subjects approached 
Interview – Interviewee – Position1 
Date of the 
Interview 
Subjects of 
the Interview 
Interview 1 – Dr. Ricardo Galler – Director of Technological 
Development of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz. 
14 August 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 2 – Dr. Antonio Risolia de Padua Barbosa – Director of 
Production of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz. 
19 August 
2008 
Operating 
Capabilities 
Interview 3 – Otavio Augusto Mercadante – General Director of 
Instituto Butantan and former Head of Cabinet of the Ministry of 
Health. 
21 August 
2008 
Corporate 
Strategies 
Interview 4 – Dr. Ivo Lebrun – Scientific Director of Instituto 
Butantan. 
21 August 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 5 – Dr. Paulo Lee Ho – Director of the Biotechnology 
Centre of Instituto Butantan. 
21 August 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 6 – Dr. Hisako Gondo Higashi – Director of Production 
and Technological Development of Instituto Butantan and former 
General Director of the same Institute. 
22 August 
2008 
Corporate 
Strategies, 
Operating 
Capabilities 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 7 – Mario dos Santos Moreira – Director of 
Management of the IBMP and former Director of Management of 
Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz.  
26 August 
2008 
Policies, 
Markets 
Interview 8 – Renato Rau – Director of Production of the Instituto 
de Tecnologia do Paraná (Tecpar). 
26 August 
2008 
Operating 
Capabilities, 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 9 – Dr. Mariano de Matos Macedo – President of the 
Instituto de Tecnologia do Paraná (Tecpar). 
26 August 
2008 
Corporate 
Strategies 
Interview 10 – Artur Roberto Couto – Director of Management 
(1
st
 interview) and General Director of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz 
(currently and during the 2
nd
 interview by September 2009). 
28 August 
2008 
1 September 
2009 
Corporate 
Strategies, 
Markets 
Interview 11 – Maria da Luz Fernandes Leal – Director of Quality 
of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, former Director of Production and 
General Director of the same Institute. 
1 September 
2008 
Operating 
Capabilities, 
Corporate 
Strategies 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 12 – Dr. Ellen Jessouroum – Manager of the 
Programme of Development of Bacterial Vaccines of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz.  
2 September 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 13 – Dr. José da Rocha Carvalheiro – Vice President of 
Research and Technological Development of Fiocruz and former 
Manager of the INOVACINA Project. 
2 September 
2008 
Policies 
Interview 14 – Dr. Geraldo Armoa – Senior Researcher of the 
Instituto Oswaldo Cruz/Fiocruz and former Manager of the 
Laboratory of Recombinant Technology of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz.  
2 September 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
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Interview 15 – Marcos Henrique de Castro Oliveira – Vice 
President of Abifina and former General Director of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz. 
4 September 
2008 
Policies, 
Corporate 
Strategies 
Interview 16 – Maria de Lourdes de Souza Maia – Senior Advisor 
of the Clinical Trials Advisory and former General Manager of the 
National Immunization Programme (PNI).  
4 September 
2008 
Policies, 
Clinical Trials 
Interview 17 – Dr. Cristiane Quental – Coordinator of the Master 
Degree on Innovation in Health of the Sergio Arouca National 
School of Public Health/Fiocruz and Fiocruz Representative of the 
Brazilian Clinical Trials Network. 
4 September 
2008 
Clinical Trials 
Interview 18 – Dr. Marcos da Silva Freire – Manager of the 
Program of Development of Viral Vaccines of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz. 
5 September 
2008 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Interview 19 – Dr. Akira Homma – General Director of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz, founder of the Institute, former President of 
Fiocruz, former advisor of the PAHO and current President of 
DCVMN. 
8 September 
2008 
Corporate 
Strategies, 
Policies 
Interview 20 – Dr. Carlos Augusto Grabois Gadelha – Vice-
President of Production and Innovation in Health of Fiocruz. 
9 September 
2008 
Policies 
Interview 21 – Josmar Almeida Soares da Silva – Head of the 
Department of Engineering of Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz.  
26 August 
2009 
Engineering 
Interview 22 – Reinaldo Menezes Martins – Senior Advisor and 
former Head of the Clinical Trials Advisory of Bio-
Manguinhos/Fiocruz, Coordinator of the clinical trials of the 
Hepatitis B vaccine for the PNI and former President of the 
Brazilian Pediatrics Society. 
1 September 
2009 
Clinical Trials 
1 Position at the time of the interview. Interviews sorted by the date of the interview.  
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ANNEX B 
 
1) Survey for the Assessment of Technological Capabilities – the Questionnaire1 
Firm:                                                                     Date: 
1) Select the options below that best fit your professional profile: 
a. Activity area: R&D / Production / Engineering / Quality / Management 
b. Post: Manager / Non Manager                     c. Years in the firm: less than 10 / 10-20 / over 20 
d. Highest qualification: Graduation / Specialization / Masters Degree / PhD 
2) Dimensions of Technological Capabilities
2
 and Key Questions 
Assessment 
(scores) 
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Awareness:  
 1 – Technology plays an important part in my company’s business strategy; 
 2 – My company is well aware of the technologies most important to its 
business;  
     
Search: 
 3 – My firm is well equipped to assess technological opportunities; 
 4 – My company can assess technology threats without difficulty; 
     
Building Core Competence: 
 5 – My company has special technological strengths which it is able to exploit; 
 6 – My company knows which technology to outsource and which to develop 
internally; 
     
Technology Strategy: 
 7 – Our management is skilled at formulating a technology strategy to meet 
business goals; 
 8 – Our firm knows its main technology priority; 
 9 – Our firm has a well developed technology vision; 
     
Assessing and Selecting Technology: 
10 – Our firm knows how to select the technology needed for its business; 
11 – Our company knows which are the best sources of technology; 
     
Technology Acquisition: 
12 – Our company is effective at acquiring technology from external sources; 
13 – Our company has good links with important external suppliers of 
technology; 
     
Implementing and Absorbing Technology: 
14 – Our technology activities (e.g. engineering and R&D) are organised 
effectively within our company; 
15 – We have clear processes for carrying out technology projects; 
     
Learning: 
16 – Our company has a good system for assessing technology projects; 
17 – Our firm carries out post-project reviews; 
18 – We are able to learn from one technology project to another; 
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Exploiting External Linkages and Incentives: 
19 – Government policies encourage us to invest in technology; 
20 – We use external organisations (e.g. consultancy firms) to assist us with 
technology assessment; 
21 – We use outside bodies to help us develop technology; 
22 – External organisations help us assess our technology performance; 
23 – We work with universities in key technology projects; 
24 – We work with government research institutes in important technology 
projects; 
     
1
 The questionnaire was translated into Portuguese by the author of this research;  
2
 The dimensions of technological capabilities were included here just to show which ones are related to 
each group of questions and they were not included in the questionnaire used in the survey. 
Source: Bessant et al. (2001). 
 
2) Operationalizing the Results 
The overall audit result of the survey (see Table 7.6 in Chapter 7 – pg. 203) was 
calculated in the light of the levels and scores defined by Bessant et al. (2001). Table 
B.1 shows these figures. The final result of each dimension was determined by 
calculating the average of the scores of all questions related to that dimension. For 
example, the dimension “Awareness” got a score of 3.7, which is the average of the 
scores of question 1 (3.9) and question 2 (3.5). The total score refers to the sum of the 
scores of all 24 questions. 
 
Table B.1: Levels of Technological capabilities and Scores Range 
Capability Level Score Range 
1 Unaware/Passive 24 
2 Reactive 25 – 48 
3 Strategic 49 – 72 
4 Creative 73 – 96 
Source: Bessant et al. (2001). 
 
 
